Home of ChanRobles Virtual Law Library

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 49155. December 14, 1948. ]

JUAN CASTRO, demandante y apelado, contra ACRO TAXICAB CO., INC., demandada y apelante.

Los hechos aparecen relacionados en la decisi on del Tribunal.

Sres. Delgado y Dizon (Delgado y Flores) en representacion de la apelante.

D. Salvador E. Imperial y D. Amador Constantino en representaci on del apelado.

SYLLABUS


1. CONTRATOS; NEGLIGENCIA; CULPA CONTRACTUAL Y CULPA AQUILIANA, DISTINGUIDA. — La culpa aquiliana determina y engendra la responsabilidad, y por eso es sustantiva, independiente; mientras que la culpa contractual presupone la preexistencia de una obligacion, por tanto es s olo incidental — es decir, la infracciono incumplimiento de esa obligaci on es lo que genera la culpa contractual. Una implicacion o consecuencia caracteristica de la diferencia entre ambos conceptos juridicos es que, tratandose de la culpa extracontractual o aquiliana, el demandante que reclame indemnizacion de daños y perjuicios tiene que probar, como requisito indispensable para que prospere su accion, la culpa o negligencia del demandado, mientras que, trat andose de la culpa contractual, es bastante que se pruebe la existencia del contrato y que la obligacion resultante del mismo se ha infringido ono se ha cumplido, siguiendose daños da esta infraccione incumplimiento.

2. APELACION; APRECIACIONES Y CONCLUSIONES DE HECHO POR EL JUZGADO "A QUO." — Dentro del marco de nuestra jurisdiccion en alzada, tal como lo define la ley, no estamos autorizados para abrogar o alterar estas apreciaciones y conclusiones de hecho establecidas tanto por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia como por el Tribunal de Apelaci on: tenemos que darlas por buenas y resolver solamente cualquier cuestion de derecho suscitada sobre las mismas.

3. PRINCIPAL Y EMPLEADO; CULPA AQUILIANA; NEGLIGENCIA. — De la culpa imputable al dependiente de un establecimiento o empresa, al ocurrir el acto u omisi on negligente, nace simultaneamente la presuncion de negligencia de parte de los dueños o directores, si bien esa presunci on essolo juris tantum y puede ser enervada por la prueba de que estos ejercitaron el cuidado y diligencia de un buen padre de familia no solo en la seleccion del dependiente sino tambi en en la direccion, supervision y vigilencia de su conducta y de sus actos. Establecida suficientemente esta prueba, los dueños y directores de la empresa quedan exentos de responsabilidad por los daños causados.

4 ID.; CULPA CONTRACTUAL; NEGLIGENCIA. — Con respecto a la culpa o negligencia contractual (articulos 1.101 y 1.104 del Codigo Civil), la regla es completamente diferente. Ambas responsabilidades — la del dependiente y la del amo — son solidarias, se confunden en una sola. Asi que el patrono no puede exculparse alegando que ejercito el cuidado y diligencia de un buen padre de familia tanto en la selecci on del dependiente como en la direccion o inspeccion de sus actos.

5. DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS; INDEMNIZACION POR EL DOLOR Y LOS SUFRIMIENTOS. — Se reafirma la doctrina sentada en el asunto de Lilius (59 Jur. Fil., 800), en el sentido de que cabe indemnizar por daños morales y patrimoniales, incluy endose en estos el dolor y sufrimiento f isico. Con esto efectuamos en esta jurisdicci on una verdadera simbiosis del derecho hispano y derecho americano, y nos ponemos, adem as, justamente a tono con el espiritu y la marcha progresiva de los tiempos.

6. ID.; ID. — No introducimos ninguna reforma en el Codigo Civil; todo lo que hacemos es ampliar la interpretacion del concepto juridico del daño, incluyendo en el mismo al daño moral y el dolor o sufrimiento f isico; pero todo dentro del codigo. La famosa sentencia de 1912 del Tribunal Supremo de España de que habla el Sr. Castan no solo no extravasa los confines del c odigo civil, sino que va a las ra ices del mismo, "invocando precedentes del derecho patrio — ley 21, t it. IX, Partida VII," segun palabras mismas del insigne tratadista.

7. THE BAHIA DOCTRINE. — The diligence of the owner of a taxicab in the selection of his chauffeur cannot exempt him from responsibility for the damages caused by the latter, the doctrine in Bahia v. Litonjua (30 Phil., 624) being illegal, wrong and unjust.

8. ONE-SIDED LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. — The doctrine in the Bahia case is based on a philosophy intended to serve the unilateral interest of capitalists. It offers a shield of irresponsibility to the owner of public services and other enterprises dealing with the public in general, in utter discrimination against the defenseless public. There is no single word in the law on which the doctrine may stand.

9. THE WORD "DAMAGE" IN ARTICLES 1902 AND 1903 OF THE CIVIL CODE. — The word "damage" in these articles comprehends all that are embraced in its meaning. It includes any and all damages that a human being may suffer in any and all the manifestations of his life: physical or material, moral or psychological, mental or spiritual, financial, economic, social, political, religious.

10. PAINS ARE DAMAGES IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW. — The pains suffered by the victim of an accident constitute the largest and more important item of his damages. They entail the loss of positive economic values. The shock resulting from the fracture of five ribs will remain forever in his memory as a sad experience and will leave in his organism a permanent scar or internal deformity.

11. LOSS OF PERSONAL FREEDOM. — The loss of personal freedom resulting from hospitalization and compulsory confinement at home for the duration of medical treatment is loss of a thing of unquestionable economic value. Every individual would be willing to give a price to avoid losing that freedom.

12. LEGAL OPINION IN CIVILIZED COUNTRIES. — Physical pain and injured feelings are among the damages recognized in the most civilized countries of the world, United States of America, England, France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Switzerland.

13. THE MARCELO CASE. — The decision of the pre-Commonwealth Supreme Court in Marcelo v. Velasco (11 Phil., 287) is based on a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Spain on December 6, 1882, which the same Court has already abandoned. 14. WRONG DOXASTIC PROCESS. 0151 — The pre-Commonwealth Supreme Court in laying down the doctrine in the Marcelo case had followed, by wrong doxastic process, the traditional procedure of deciding litigations by looking for precedents first and reading the law as a last resort, when the logical procedure should be the reverse, law first and precedents after. Paying latreutic worship to precedents is a sure way to miscarriage of justice.

15. FLAWS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE MARCELO DOCTRINE. — The Marcelo doctrine even tested under the authority of the Spanish Supreme Court decision of December 6, 1882, and of Viada, appears full of flaws and weaknesses.

16. THE 19TH CENTURY SPANISH DOCTRINE UNREALISTIC. — The 1882 judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court is based on a premise which is unrealistic. It asserts an absolute, which is incompatible with the relativities of human nature. It is based on a failure to grasp the idea that a court of justice may make an appraisal of the minimum value of physical and moral pains. The doctrine has been abandoned by the same Spanish Supreme Court since December 6, 1912.

17. AN OBSOLETE DOCTRINE IN THE ATOMIC ERA. — Our Supreme Court has no reason to stick to the 19th century doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court which the same has relegated as outworn in the century of fuller enlightenment. It would be anachronistic for our Supreme Court to persist holding it in this Atomic era, when human mind has undergone a wonderful awakening and reason has conquered new ever widening fields of the spirit.

18. MR. JUSTICE MALCOLM. — In his concurring opinion in Manzanares v. Moreta (38 Phil., 821), Mr. Justice Malcolm has paved the way since 1918 for the revision of the doctrine in the Marcelo case.


D E C I S I O N


BRIONES, J.:


Esta es una apelacion, por via de certiorari, en que se pide que revisemos la sentencia del Tribunal de Apelaci on condenando a la demandada y apelante Acro Taxicab Co., Inc., a pagar al demandante y apelado Juan Castro la suma de P4,000 — P1,000, por gastos de tratamiento facultativo; y P3,000, como una "adecuada compensacion por los sufrimientos y por la incapacidad para trabajar durante el tiempo en que el (el demandante) habia estado actualmente incapacitado para realizar el trabajo previamente desempañado por el mismo." La sentencia del Tribunal de Apelaci on confirma sustancialmente la del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila, reduciendo solo la indemnizacion de P6,000 a P4,000.

Para una acabada comprension de los hechos esenciales del caso, reproducimos a continuacion toda la sentencia del Tribunal de Apelaci on, a saber:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Defendant, a domestic corporation, appeals from a judgment directing it to pay the sum of P6,000 as damages, with interest at 6 per cent from the filing of the complaint until paid, and costs.

"It appears that on July 14, 1939, about 4 a.m., after taking a cup of coffee at the Central Hotel, Juan Castro boarded taxicab No. 962, a car for hire owned by appellant corporation and driven by Sancho Ruedas, to go home. The cab proceeded northward on Rizal Avenue and before reaching Calle Lope de Vega, the passenger told the driver to turn to the right or east of Calle Zurbaran, the next cross street. Ruedas drove the cab so fast that when he had to turn it to the right or east of Calle Zurbaran, it collided with another taxicab No. 936 owned by the same corporation coming from the north. Both cars were heavily damaged, and the first hit the fire hydrant that was on the sidewalk, east of Rizal Avenue and southeast of Calle Zurbaran. Without losing time Castro boarded another car and directed the driver to take him to the Philippine General Hospital, and upon reaching Calle Carriedo in front of Tom’s Dixie, he ordered the driver to stop and requested patrolman Jose Lomboy to accompany him to the hospital. Upon arriving there, Dr. Eriberto Aguilar asked him to undress, looked over his body, applied ointment to aching parts, and told him to return home. The following day, as he was still suffering from acute pains on the left side of the chest, difficult breathing, fever, and coughs, he called Dr. Herrera who prescribed some palliative medicines, and on the 17th, Dr. Herrera advised him to go to a hospital because it was a case for a surgeon. On July 18, he entered St. Luke’s Hospital and was treated there by Dr. Fores who advised him to have an x-ray taken. Dr. Paulino J. Garcia took an x-ray picture (Exhibits A-1 and A-2) and this revealed that five left ribs were fractured. After three days stay in the hospital he was advised to go home because the hospital charges were rather heavy, and was told by Dr. Fores that he would continue treating him at the house (pp. 23-25, t.s.n., July 15, 1940). Twice a week for two consecutive weeks and once in the third week after his discharge from the hospital (p. 48, t.s.n., Sept. 3, 1940), or three or four times, he was visited in his house and treated by Dr. Fores (p. 19, t.s.n., July 15), and after one month he was told to report to the surgeon once every two weeks (p. 20, t.s.n., July 15), and reported twice (p. 48, t.s.n., Sept. 3). The honorarium of Dr. Herrera is P100; of Dr. Fores, P150; and the hospital bill was P40. Castro testifies that prior to the accident he was a sort of a utility man of Eleuterio Navoa, and for that work he was paid a salary of P250 a month (p. 6, t.s.n., Sept. 4), but he could no longer work after the accident, he lost his job.

"The first point to decide is whether the chauffeur of the taxicab, owned and operated for hire by appellant, had been imprudent in driving the car before and when he turned it to the right or east of Calle Zurbaran, for if he had been, the fact that the driver of the second car that collided with the first had also been reckless would be immaterial and would not affect appellant’s obligation arising from the imprudent or reckless act of its servant. If, on the other hand, only the driver of the second car had been imprudent, appellant would not be relieved just the same from its liability arising from the reckless act, as correctly held by the trial court. The determination of the accident’s cause is only necessary to ascertain and fix the source of appellant’s liability. If the cause of the accident was the imprudent act of the first car’s driver, then appellant’s obligation would be contractual. If it was the recklessness on the second car’s driver, then its liability would arise from tort or culpa aquiliana. A review of the evidence discloses that the driver of the first car ran his car at an immoderate speed, so much so that instead of passing the lamp post in the middle of the avenue and cross street to turn to the right or east of Calle Zurbaran, as required by law and ordinance, he did not pass it, an act which indicates clearly that because of the speed he was going he could not pass it but turned his car to the right passing on the south of the post, and after turning it in that way, the two cars collided at a point on the east of Rizal Avenue and on the south of Calle Zurbaran. The point where the collision took place must be the one indicated by appellee (Exhibit 1; p. 11, t.s.n., Sept. 4), because the fire hydrant located at the curve on the east of Rizal Avenue and southeast of Calle Zurbaran was hit by the first car and damaged as a result thereof. For this damage appellant and its driver undertook to pay, as they did pay, the Metropolitan Water District (Exhibits E, F, G, H; pp. 54-59, 77, t.s.n., Sept. 3). "The other point to determine is the amount of damages. The evidence shows that appellee has to pay for the X-ray picture (p. 15, t.s.n., Sept. 4); Dr. Herrera, P100 (p. 10, t.s.n., July 15); Dr. Fores, P150 (p. 21, t.s.n., July 15; p. 49, t.s.n., Sept. 3); and had paid the hospital P40 (p. 15, t.s.n., Sept. 4). It is not clear as to other expenses, such as the amount spent for medicines prescribed for and applied to appellee (p. 8, t.s.n., Sept. 4). Nevertheless, P1,000 for all fees and expenses would still be reasonable. On the other hand, the award of P5,000 for injuries suffered is speculative. There is no sufficient evidence to support it. If it is true that he only stayed 3 days in the hospital and was treated in his house by Dr. Fores 3 or 4 times (p. 19, t.s.n., July 15; p. 48, t.s.n., Sept. 3), then he was not disabled for the rest of his life, as claimed by him, to perform his previous work which required no physical exertion, for it was most likely that the fracture of the ribs had been cured by ossification, this kind of fracture being curable from 4 to 8 weeks (pp. 22, 33, 43, t.s.n., July 15; p. 37, t.s.n., Sept. 4), as shown by the fact that appellee was stout and healthy when seen at the trial of this case (p. 38, t.s.n., Sept. 4). If this fact be accepted, as it must, then P5,000 as compensation for damages suffered by appellee is certainly excessive. According to appellee, his work before the accident was that of a utility man of Eleuterio Navoa; according to appellant’s witnesses his work was that of a dealer in the game of cards conducted by his principal (pp. 30-31, 33, 34, t.s.n., Sept. 4). Whether it be the first or the second, certainly his work required no physical exertion and the ossification of the fractural ribs rendered him fit to perform again the work. On the whole, P3,000 would be an adequate compensation for pains and disability to work during the time he had been actually disabled to perform the work previously done by him.

"We modify the judgment appealed from and award appellee P4,000, together with lawful interests from the filing of the complaint until paid, and costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

La primera cuestion que tenemos que determinar y resolver, dentro del marco de nuestra jurisdiccion sobre asuntos que vienen en alzada del Tribunal de Apelaci on, es la que se refiere a la ley aplicable al caso. Resulta evidente, de los hechos expuestos, que las disposiciones legales aplicables son los art iculos 1.101, 1.103 y 1.104 del Codigo Civil, cuyo texto es como sigue:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 1.101. Quedan sujetos a la indemnizacion de los daños y perjuicios causados los que en el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones incurrieren en dolo, negligencia o morosidad, y los de cualquier modo contravinieren al tenor de aqu ellas."cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 1.103. La responsabilidad que proceda de negligencia es igualmente exigible en el cumplimiento de toda clase de obligaciones; pero podra moderarse por los Tribunales segun los casos."cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 1.104. La culpa o negligencia del deudor consiste en la omisi on de aquella diligencia que exija la naturaleza de la obligacion y corresponda a las circunstancias de las personas, del tiempo y del lugar. "Cuando la obligacion no exprese la diligencia que ha de prestarse en su cumplimiento, se exigira la que corresponder ia a un buen padre de familia."cralaw virtua1aw library

En los alegatos de ambas partes se debate hasta cierto punto el alcance de los art iculos 1.902 y 1.903 del mismo C odigo, pero es evidente que estos no son los pertinentes. En el caso que nos ocupa la culpa o negligencia de que se trata es la llamada t ecnicamente culpa contractual y es objeto de los art iculos primeramente citados, mientras que los ultimos se refieren a la denominada culpa extracontractual o culpa aquiliana del derecho romano. Ambos conceptos tienen, sin embargo, un com un denominador negativo y es la falta de intenci on dañada: si esta existiera, entonces ya no ser ia s olo culpa sino que ser ia delito o, por lo menos dolo, y las disposiciones aplicables serian entonces diferentes; trat andose de dolo, por ejemplo, el articulo aplicable ser ia el 1.102, y trat andose de delito el articulo 1.092.

Es importante y util recalcar la diferencia entre culpa contractual y culpa aquiliana porque ambos conceptos juridicos originan algunas implicaciones y consecuencias diferentes. La culpa aquiliana determina y engendra la responsabilidad, y por eso es sustantiva, independiente; mientras que la culpa contractual presupone la preexistencia de una obligaci on, por tanto es s olo incidental — es decir, la infraccion o incumplimiento de esa obligaci on es lo que genera la culpa contractual.

Una implicaci on o consecuencia caracter istica de la diferencia entre ambos conceptos jur idicos es que, trat andose de la culpa extracontractual o aquiliana, el demandante que reclame indemnizaci on de daños y perjuicios tiene que probar, como requisito indispensable para que prospere su acci on, la culpa o negligencia del demandado, mientras que, trat andose de la culpa contractual, es bastante que se pruebe la existencia del contrato y que la obligaci on resultante del mismo se ha infringido o no se ha cumplido, sigui endose daños de esta infracci on e incumplimiento. Esta Corte Suprema, bajo la ponencia del Magistrado Sr. Fisher en el asunto autoritativo de Cangco contra Manila Railroad Co. (1918), sent o la doctrina, con el siguiente pronunciamiento:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"La situacion de una persona natural o juridica que, por contrato, se ha obligado a alguna prestacion a favor de otra, es completamente distinta de la situaci on a que se contrae el articulo 1903. Cuando la fuente de la obligaci on en que se funda la acci on del demandante es un acto u omisi on negligente, al demandante incumbe acreditar la existencia de la negligencia — no prosperara su acci on sino lo hace. Pero, cuando los hechos alegados demuestren la existencia de un contrato en virtud del cual el demandado s e ha obligado a una prestaci on cualquiera a favor del demandante, y se alegue que este ha omitido o se ha negado a cumplir su contrato, no es necesario que el demandante especifique en su demanda que el incumplimiento del contrato se debi o a intenci on dolosa, o a mera negligencia por parte del demandado, o de sus empleados, dependientes o mandatarios. La prueba de la existencia del contrato y la de su incumplimiento son prima facie suficientes para que sea procedente que se dicte sentencia de acuerdo con lo pedido." (Cangco contra Manila Railroad Co. 38 Jur. Fil., p. 825.)

Apliquemos ahora la doctrina al caso que tenemos ante Nos. Cuando el demandante y apelado, Juan Castro, tom o el taximetro No. 962 de la compañia demandada y apelante para que le condujera a cierto punto de Manila, se perfeccion o entre ambas partes un contrato de transporte o pasaje en virtud del cual la demandada se obligaba a transportar al pasajero sano y salvo al lugar de su destino, y el pasajero a pagar la cantidad fijada en la Tarifa. Pero al llegar el referido taxi a la esquina de la avenida de Rizal y de la calle de Zurbar an choc o con otro tax imetro de la demandada — el taxi No. 936 — y de resultas del choque, el cual fu e violent isimo, los dos autom oviles se destrozaron casi por completo y el demandante sali o contuso y lesionado, fractur andosele cinco costillas. Ese choque engendr o jur idicamente una culpa contractual de parte de la demandada — consistiendo la culpa en el incumplimiento de la obligaci on de dicha demandada de transportar al demandante sano y salvo al punto de su destino. Y para que prosperase la acci on del demandante pidiendo indemnizaci on de dan os y perjuicios bastaba que probase la existencia del contrato de paseje, esto es, que tom o el taxi para ser conducido, y el hecho del choque que causo lesiones y daños en el pasajero. De acuerdo con la doctrina enunciada, para el exito de la acci on de daños no era necesario que se probase la culpa, descuido o negligencia del chofer que guiaba el taximetro No. 962. (Sin embargo, las pruebas obrantes en autos, tal como han sido apreciadas por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia y el Tribunal de Apelaci on, demuestran no s olo que fu e descuidado y negligente el chofer del tax imetro No. 962, sino que lo fu e tambi en el del tax imetro No. 936 que ven ia del norte y que choco contra aqu el, corriendo a una tremenda velocidad; de modo que, en realidad, las exigencias del derecho y de la jurisprudencia est an superadas en el presente caso).

Se preguntar a: qu e defensa pod ia interponer la demandada contra la acci on del demandante? Aquella pod ia defenderse alegando que se trata de un caso fortuito o fuerza mayor, pues, seg un el articulo 1.105 del C odigo Civil, "fuera de los casos expresamente mencionados en la ley, y de los en que as i lo declare la obligaci on, nadie responde de aquellos que no hubieren podido preverse, o que, previstos, fueran inevitables." Major casus est, cui humana infirmitas resistere non potest. (Gajus, lib. 1.
Top of Page