SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2525. April 26, 1949. ]
MARY BURKE DESBARATS and ANTONIO T. CARRASCOSO, JR., the latter in his capacity as executor of the estate of W. J. Burke, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOMAS DE VERA, Defendant-Appellant.
Claro M. Recto and Ross, Selph, Carrascoso & Janda, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Narciso Peña, for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; APPEAL; EXECUTION OF THE PART OF APPEALED JUDGMENT, EFFECT OF. — The party who voluntarily executes, either partially or in toto the execution of appealed judgment, is not permitted to appeal from it.
2. ID.; JUDGMENT; NATURE OF JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION. — The judgment for possession is certainly indivisible and it cannot be correct or wrong as to a part and correct or wrong as to the other part.
3. ID.; APPEAL; DEFENDANT’S DELIVERY OF GREATER PORTION OF LEASED PREMISES AS ESTOPPEL TO ASSAIL APPEALED JUDGMENT. — The delivery by the defendant of the greater portion of the "Burke Building" has estopped him from assailing the propriety of the appealed judgment as regards the matter of possession.
4. ID.; ID.; ORDER ISSUED BY TRIAL COURT AFTER APPROVAL OF RECORD ON APPEAL IS VOID. — A modifying order allowing defendant to occupy the portion of the building he is actually holding which was not for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties is conspicuously null and void; having been entered after the records on appeal had been approved and, accordingly, after the Court of First Instance had lost jurisdiction over the case.
2. ID.; JUDGMENT; NATURE OF JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION. — The judgment for possession is certainly indivisible and it cannot be correct or wrong as to a part and correct or wrong as to the other part.
3. ID.; APPEAL; DEFENDANT’S DELIVERY OF GREATER PORTION OF LEASED PREMISES AS ESTOPPEL TO ASSAIL APPEALED JUDGMENT. — The delivery by the defendant of the greater portion of the "Burke Building" has estopped him from assailing the propriety of the appealed judgment as regards the matter of possession.
4. ID.; ID.; ORDER ISSUED BY TRIAL COURT AFTER APPROVAL OF RECORD ON APPEAL IS VOID. — A modifying order allowing defendant to occupy the portion of the building he is actually holding which was not for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties is conspicuously null and void; having been entered after the records on appeal had been approved and, accordingly, after the Court of First Instance had lost jurisdiction over the case.
D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
In an ejectment case instituted in the municipal court of Manila, judgment was rendered on December 18, 1947, ordering the defendant to vacate the premises involved in the complaint, namely, the 4-story building known as the "Burke Building," situated at No. 133 Escolta, City of Manila; to restore the possession thereof to the plaintiffs; to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P110,000, representing the balance of rentals from June 1 to November 30, 1947, plus legal interest thereon from December 10, 1947, until delivery of the premises in question to the plaintiffs, at the rate of P19,000 a month; and to pay the costs of the suit.
Upon appeal by the defendant, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered on July 12, 1948, a decision ordering the defendant to surrender the possession of the building to the plaintiffs, and to pay to the latter the rentals from June 1, 1947, until delivery of the premises, at the rate of P10,400 a month, less the amounts collected or to be collected by the plaintiffs from the sublessees, without special pronouncement as to costs.
On July 30, 1948, the defendant addressed a letter to plaintiff Carrascoso worded as follows: "In accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 12, 1948, I am hereby making a formal delivery to you of the Burke Building as of July 31, 1948, retaining meanwhile, pending final disposition of your appeal to the Supreme Court, a small portion thereof occupied by my real estate office and the ’Counterkool’, the latter at the instance of its owner." In response, plaintiff Carrascoso stated that the plaintiffs would take over the building and that "As regards the portion of the building occupied by you, I regret to tell you that the owners of the building will need the space occupied by you, and for this reason I request that you immediately vacate the same." (Letter of Atty. Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., dated July 31, 1948.)
The plaintiffs appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance in so far as it reduces the rental to be paid by the defendant from P19,000 to P10,400 monthly. The defendant also appealed, "particularly with respect to certain incidental matters involved in the case." The records on appeal of both the plaintiffs and the defendant were approved by the lower court on September 23, 1948. Even so, said court, on September 24, 1948, issued an order allowing the defendant to retain the aforesaid portion of the "Burke Building" at a monthly rental of P2,000.
The case is now before us pending appeal. We are, however, called upon for the present to resolve the motion filed by the plaintiffs, praying for the immediate execution of the part of the appealed judgment ordering the defendant to vacate the building in question in its entirety. Our conclusion is that said motion is well founded.
The decisive principle is not new and has already been embodied in the case of Verches v. Rios, 48 Phil. 16, in which this Court, quoting from De Egana’s Succession, 18 La. Ann., 59, pointed out "that the party who voluntarily executes, either partially or in toto, the execution of that judgment, is not permitted to appeal from it," with the observation, furthermore, that "owing to the similarity of the jurisprudence of that State with the law in the Philippine Islands, the Louisiana decisions are important and should have great weight in this Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
It should be noted that the defendant had delivered the greater portion of the property expressly "in accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 12, 1948," thereby plainly acquiescing in said decision at least in so far as it orders him to surrender the possession of the building to the plaintiffs. The judgment for possession is certainly indivisible and it cannot be correct or wrong as to a part and correct or wrong as to the other part. It stands to reason that the delivery by the defendant of the greater portion of the "Burke Building" has estopped him from assailing the propriety of the appealed judgment as regards the matter of possession.
The defendant, however, invokes the order of the Court of First Instance issued on September 24, 1948, allowing him to occupy the portion he is actually holding, at a rental of P2,000. Said order is conspicuously null and void, having been entered after the records on appeal had been approved and, accordingly, after the Court of First Instance had lost jurisdiction over the case. (Section 9, Rule of Court No. 41.) It cannot of course be pretended that said order was merely for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal. The Court is unanimous on this point. But it is contended by the dissenting Justices that the order in question cannot be set aside because the lower court is not a party herein, and that the proper remedy should have been a special civil action for certiorari. This contention would be meritorious if the main case is not before us on appeal, and if said order is not void ab initio. Certiorari may be availed of when there is no "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" (section 1, Rule of Court No. 67); and the procedure adopted by the plaintiffs certainly falls within the category of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, not to mention the fact that it has thereby avoided multiplicity of suits. Moreover, a void order may be attacked collaterally. (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717; Caluag v. Pecson, 82 Phil., 8.) In the latter case, Mr. Justice Feria, speaking for the Court, held that "a wrong, or for that matter a correct decision is void, and may be set aside either directly or collaterally, where the court exceeds its jurisdiction and power in rendering it."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs cannot now rely on the partial delivery of the premises in question, because they had voluntarily accepted the same. To this it is sufficient to answer that the acceptance was made with the protest and demand of Attorney Carrascoso "that you immediately vacate the same" (referring to the portion retained by the defendant).
The equitable aspect of the situation also inclines on the side of the plaintiffs. It appears that the contract of lease in favor of the defendant admittedly expired on December 31, 1948; and there seems to be absolutely no reason for conceding to the defendant any extension, especially in view of the circumstance that he had delivered the greater portion of the building "in accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance," something obviously inconsistent with any pretense that the defendant would seek in this appeal an extension of his lease, which covers the entire "Burke Building." In his notice of appeal, the defendant furthermore particularized "certain incidental matters involved in the case." It is needless to state that his ejectment from the building, to which he had already voluntarily conformed, is of course not a mere incidental matter.
Without deciding other issues that may properly be raised in the present appeal as well by the plaintiffs as by the defendant, we hereby grant the plaintiffs’ motion for immediate execution of the appealed judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 12, 1948, in so far only as it orders the defendant to surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of the "Burke Building" in its entirety. So ordered.
Pablo, Perfecto, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., concurs in the result.
FERIA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I dissent from the resolution. It is contrary to law and equity, and the pertinent decisions of this Court. The undisputed facts material to this incident are briefly the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In an action of illegal detainer instituted by the plaintiffs and appellees against defendant and appellant, the municipal court of Manila rendered a judgment on December 18, 1947, ordering the defendant to vacate and restore the possession of the leased premises to the plaintiffs, and to pay the latter the sum of P110,000 for rentals due on the leased building from June 1, to November 30, 1947, and to pay likewise the rental accruing at the rate of P19,000 a month from December 1, 1947, until the premises have been actually vacated and surrendered to the plaintiff, plus the costs.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment, on July 12, 1948, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No se discute por las partes el hecho de que el demandado ha gastado, por lo menos, el termino medio del calculo de ambas (P85,000), por las mejoras que ha puesto en el edificio, para ponerlo, del mal estado en que se hallaba, en condiciones de ser habilitado para oficinas y establecimientos comerciales, para el beneficio mutuo de ambas partes. El demandado ya no podria recobrar su capital invertido en dichas mejoras, porque, segun el contrato, las mismas pasaran a ser de la propiedad de los demandantes. Desde luego es de presumir que el demandado, cuando entro en esta transaccion, esperaba ganar la diferencia entre los alquileres de los subarrendatarios y los alquileres que se obligo a paegar a los demandantes. Cuando el demandado asumio esta obligacion, tendria en la mente la idea de que con el servicio de ascensor en el edificio, cuya instalacion el demandante Sr. Carrascoso le aseguro conseguir de sus representados, el podria cumplir dicha obligacion y obtener un margen de ganancia para el. Esto era lo mas natural. Cuanto debia ser este margen? Desde luego no seria menos de lo que los demandantes ganarian con el edificio en mal estado y el solar correspondiente y con el capital invertido por el demandado. Pero si, por la falta de ascensor, con cuya instalacion los demandantes no se conformaron, no obstante su necesidad y conveniencia, el demandado no ha conseguido subarrendar todos los cuartos del edificio, el Juzgado entiende que no seria justo ni equitativo el que, mientras los demandantes ganem los P85,000 en mejoras, mas el alquiler de P19,000 mensuales (P228,000 al año), con el estado malisimo del edificio, el demandado, despues de perder los P85,000 en mejoras, todavia tenga que perder o no ganar nada, en alquileres.
"El Juzgado cree que los intereses de la justicia estarian mejor servidos, equiparando a las partes, sin permitir qua mientras una de ellas gane, la otra pierda en una transaccion que, como se ha dicho arriba, se ha celebrado con la mejor buena fe del mundo, con miras de ganar para su mutuo beneficio, sin el menor animo de tomar la ventaja sobre la otra.
"De las pruebas obrantes en autos se desprende que los alquileres que pagan los subarrendatarios por los respectivos locales que ocupan ascienden alrededor de P10,400 mensuales, poco mas o menos. El demandado ocupa una porcion en el piso bajo del edificio, dos veces mas grande que la porcion ocupada por cada uno de los indios que le pagan a P2,000 cada uno de alquiler mensual, para su oficina y un establecimiento de negocio. Teniendo en cuenta todas las circunstancias del caso y el hecho de que el demandado ha puesto en el edificio mejoras que ascienden poco mas o menos a P85,000, sin las cuales no hubiera sido posible el alquiler que se percibe actualmente, el Juzgado cree que el demandado debe pagar a los demandantes, como alquiler del edificio en cuestion, la cantidad de P10,400 mensuales, a partir desde el 1.
Upon appeal by the defendant, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered on July 12, 1948, a decision ordering the defendant to surrender the possession of the building to the plaintiffs, and to pay to the latter the rentals from June 1, 1947, until delivery of the premises, at the rate of P10,400 a month, less the amounts collected or to be collected by the plaintiffs from the sublessees, without special pronouncement as to costs.
On July 30, 1948, the defendant addressed a letter to plaintiff Carrascoso worded as follows: "In accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 12, 1948, I am hereby making a formal delivery to you of the Burke Building as of July 31, 1948, retaining meanwhile, pending final disposition of your appeal to the Supreme Court, a small portion thereof occupied by my real estate office and the ’Counterkool’, the latter at the instance of its owner." In response, plaintiff Carrascoso stated that the plaintiffs would take over the building and that "As regards the portion of the building occupied by you, I regret to tell you that the owners of the building will need the space occupied by you, and for this reason I request that you immediately vacate the same." (Letter of Atty. Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., dated July 31, 1948.)
The plaintiffs appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance in so far as it reduces the rental to be paid by the defendant from P19,000 to P10,400 monthly. The defendant also appealed, "particularly with respect to certain incidental matters involved in the case." The records on appeal of both the plaintiffs and the defendant were approved by the lower court on September 23, 1948. Even so, said court, on September 24, 1948, issued an order allowing the defendant to retain the aforesaid portion of the "Burke Building" at a monthly rental of P2,000.
The case is now before us pending appeal. We are, however, called upon for the present to resolve the motion filed by the plaintiffs, praying for the immediate execution of the part of the appealed judgment ordering the defendant to vacate the building in question in its entirety. Our conclusion is that said motion is well founded.
The decisive principle is not new and has already been embodied in the case of Verches v. Rios, 48 Phil. 16, in which this Court, quoting from De Egana’s Succession, 18 La. Ann., 59, pointed out "that the party who voluntarily executes, either partially or in toto, the execution of that judgment, is not permitted to appeal from it," with the observation, furthermore, that "owing to the similarity of the jurisprudence of that State with the law in the Philippine Islands, the Louisiana decisions are important and should have great weight in this Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
It should be noted that the defendant had delivered the greater portion of the property expressly "in accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 12, 1948," thereby plainly acquiescing in said decision at least in so far as it orders him to surrender the possession of the building to the plaintiffs. The judgment for possession is certainly indivisible and it cannot be correct or wrong as to a part and correct or wrong as to the other part. It stands to reason that the delivery by the defendant of the greater portion of the "Burke Building" has estopped him from assailing the propriety of the appealed judgment as regards the matter of possession.
The defendant, however, invokes the order of the Court of First Instance issued on September 24, 1948, allowing him to occupy the portion he is actually holding, at a rental of P2,000. Said order is conspicuously null and void, having been entered after the records on appeal had been approved and, accordingly, after the Court of First Instance had lost jurisdiction over the case. (Section 9, Rule of Court No. 41.) It cannot of course be pretended that said order was merely for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal. The Court is unanimous on this point. But it is contended by the dissenting Justices that the order in question cannot be set aside because the lower court is not a party herein, and that the proper remedy should have been a special civil action for certiorari. This contention would be meritorious if the main case is not before us on appeal, and if said order is not void ab initio. Certiorari may be availed of when there is no "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" (section 1, Rule of Court No. 67); and the procedure adopted by the plaintiffs certainly falls within the category of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, not to mention the fact that it has thereby avoided multiplicity of suits. Moreover, a void order may be attacked collaterally. (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717; Caluag v. Pecson, 82 Phil., 8.) In the latter case, Mr. Justice Feria, speaking for the Court, held that "a wrong, or for that matter a correct decision is void, and may be set aside either directly or collaterally, where the court exceeds its jurisdiction and power in rendering it."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs cannot now rely on the partial delivery of the premises in question, because they had voluntarily accepted the same. To this it is sufficient to answer that the acceptance was made with the protest and demand of Attorney Carrascoso "that you immediately vacate the same" (referring to the portion retained by the defendant).
The equitable aspect of the situation also inclines on the side of the plaintiffs. It appears that the contract of lease in favor of the defendant admittedly expired on December 31, 1948; and there seems to be absolutely no reason for conceding to the defendant any extension, especially in view of the circumstance that he had delivered the greater portion of the building "in accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance," something obviously inconsistent with any pretense that the defendant would seek in this appeal an extension of his lease, which covers the entire "Burke Building." In his notice of appeal, the defendant furthermore particularized "certain incidental matters involved in the case." It is needless to state that his ejectment from the building, to which he had already voluntarily conformed, is of course not a mere incidental matter.
Without deciding other issues that may properly be raised in the present appeal as well by the plaintiffs as by the defendant, we hereby grant the plaintiffs’ motion for immediate execution of the appealed judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 12, 1948, in so far only as it orders the defendant to surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of the "Burke Building" in its entirety. So ordered.
Pablo, Perfecto, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I dissent from the resolution. It is contrary to law and equity, and the pertinent decisions of this Court. The undisputed facts material to this incident are briefly the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In an action of illegal detainer instituted by the plaintiffs and appellees against defendant and appellant, the municipal court of Manila rendered a judgment on December 18, 1947, ordering the defendant to vacate and restore the possession of the leased premises to the plaintiffs, and to pay the latter the sum of P110,000 for rentals due on the leased building from June 1, to November 30, 1947, and to pay likewise the rental accruing at the rate of P19,000 a month from December 1, 1947, until the premises have been actually vacated and surrendered to the plaintiff, plus the costs.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment, on July 12, 1948, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No se discute por las partes el hecho de que el demandado ha gastado, por lo menos, el termino medio del calculo de ambas (P85,000), por las mejoras que ha puesto en el edificio, para ponerlo, del mal estado en que se hallaba, en condiciones de ser habilitado para oficinas y establecimientos comerciales, para el beneficio mutuo de ambas partes. El demandado ya no podria recobrar su capital invertido en dichas mejoras, porque, segun el contrato, las mismas pasaran a ser de la propiedad de los demandantes. Desde luego es de presumir que el demandado, cuando entro en esta transaccion, esperaba ganar la diferencia entre los alquileres de los subarrendatarios y los alquileres que se obligo a paegar a los demandantes. Cuando el demandado asumio esta obligacion, tendria en la mente la idea de que con el servicio de ascensor en el edificio, cuya instalacion el demandante Sr. Carrascoso le aseguro conseguir de sus representados, el podria cumplir dicha obligacion y obtener un margen de ganancia para el. Esto era lo mas natural. Cuanto debia ser este margen? Desde luego no seria menos de lo que los demandantes ganarian con el edificio en mal estado y el solar correspondiente y con el capital invertido por el demandado. Pero si, por la falta de ascensor, con cuya instalacion los demandantes no se conformaron, no obstante su necesidad y conveniencia, el demandado no ha conseguido subarrendar todos los cuartos del edificio, el Juzgado entiende que no seria justo ni equitativo el que, mientras los demandantes ganem los P85,000 en mejoras, mas el alquiler de P19,000 mensuales (P228,000 al año), con el estado malisimo del edificio, el demandado, despues de perder los P85,000 en mejoras, todavia tenga que perder o no ganar nada, en alquileres.
"El Juzgado cree que los intereses de la justicia estarian mejor servidos, equiparando a las partes, sin permitir qua mientras una de ellas gane, la otra pierda en una transaccion que, como se ha dicho arriba, se ha celebrado con la mejor buena fe del mundo, con miras de ganar para su mutuo beneficio, sin el menor animo de tomar la ventaja sobre la otra.
"De las pruebas obrantes en autos se desprende que los alquileres que pagan los subarrendatarios por los respectivos locales que ocupan ascienden alrededor de P10,400 mensuales, poco mas o menos. El demandado ocupa una porcion en el piso bajo del edificio, dos veces mas grande que la porcion ocupada por cada uno de los indios que le pagan a P2,000 cada uno de alquiler mensual, para su oficina y un establecimiento de negocio. Teniendo en cuenta todas las circunstancias del caso y el hecho de que el demandado ha puesto en el edificio mejoras que ascienden poco mas o menos a P85,000, sin las cuales no hubiera sido posible el alquiler que se percibe actualmente, el Juzgado cree que el demandado debe pagar a los demandantes, como alquiler del edificio en cuestion, la cantidad de P10,400 mensuales, a partir desde el 1.
