EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-1802. September 30, 1949. ]
TORIBIO REYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Claro M. Recto and Damasceno Santos for Appellant.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso & Janda for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. LANDLORD AND TENANT; WHEN ACT OF TRESPASS ON LEASED PREMISES IS A TRESPASS IN FACT. — If the act of trespass is not accompanied or preceded by anything which reveals a really juridic intention on the part of the trespasser, in such wise that the lessee can only distinguish the material fact, stripped of all legal form or reasons we understand it to be trespass in fact only (de mero hecho). Doctrine in Goldstein v. Roces (34 Phil., 562), reiterated.
2. ID.; CONTRACTS; ABSENCE OF STIPULATION FOR NONPERFORMANCE IN CASE OF CONTINGENCIES. — Where a person by his contract charges himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must perform it, unless its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, by the law, or by the other party, it being the rule that in case the party desires to be excused from performance in the event of contingencies arising, it is his duty to provide therefor in his contract.
3. WAR; CONTRACTS; EXCUSE FOR NONPERFORMANCE; RULE. — In the absence of a statute to the contrary, conditions arising from a state of war in which the country is engaged, will not ordinarily constitute an excuse for nonperformance of contract; and impossibility of performance arising from the acts of the legislature and the executive branch of government in war time does not, without more, constitute an excuse for non-performance.
4. LANDLORD AND TENANT; LESSEE IS NOT RELIEVED FROM OBLIGATION TO PAY RENTS DUE TO MERE TRESPASS IN FACT. — The lessee would be relieved from the obligation to pay rent if the subject matter of the lease, were this possible, had disappeared, for the personal occupation of the premises is the foundation of the contract, the consideration that induced it (lessee) to enter into the agreement. But a mere trespass with which the landlord had nothing to do is a casual disturbance not going to the essence of the undertaking. It is a collateral incident which might have been provided for by a proper stipulation.
5. ID.; NONPAYMENT OF RENT IS NOT A CAUSE TO RESCIND CONTRACT; CASE AT BAR. — The failure of the defendant to pay rent during the war was due to impossibility inherent in the nature of the thing to be performed. In this aspect of the contract the payment was the very thing promised by the lessee, the very foundation, the sole consideration of the contract for the lessor, and the lessee’s failure to make good the promise was due to causes over which it had no control and for which it was in no manner at fault.
2. ID.; CONTRACTS; ABSENCE OF STIPULATION FOR NONPERFORMANCE IN CASE OF CONTINGENCIES. — Where a person by his contract charges himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must perform it, unless its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, by the law, or by the other party, it being the rule that in case the party desires to be excused from performance in the event of contingencies arising, it is his duty to provide therefor in his contract.
3. WAR; CONTRACTS; EXCUSE FOR NONPERFORMANCE; RULE. — In the absence of a statute to the contrary, conditions arising from a state of war in which the country is engaged, will not ordinarily constitute an excuse for nonperformance of contract; and impossibility of performance arising from the acts of the legislature and the executive branch of government in war time does not, without more, constitute an excuse for non-performance.
4. LANDLORD AND TENANT; LESSEE IS NOT RELIEVED FROM OBLIGATION TO PAY RENTS DUE TO MERE TRESPASS IN FACT. — The lessee would be relieved from the obligation to pay rent if the subject matter of the lease, were this possible, had disappeared, for the personal occupation of the premises is the foundation of the contract, the consideration that induced it (lessee) to enter into the agreement. But a mere trespass with which the landlord had nothing to do is a casual disturbance not going to the essence of the undertaking. It is a collateral incident which might have been provided for by a proper stipulation.
5. ID.; NONPAYMENT OF RENT IS NOT A CAUSE TO RESCIND CONTRACT; CASE AT BAR. — The failure of the defendant to pay rent during the war was due to impossibility inherent in the nature of the thing to be performed. In this aspect of the contract the payment was the very thing promised by the lessee, the very foundation, the sole consideration of the contract for the lessor, and the lessee’s failure to make good the promise was due to causes over which it had no control and for which it was in no manner at fault.
D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
This action was brought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to annul a contract of lease and to recover P6,900 as rent. Judgment was for defendant.
The contract in question was executed on the 23rd day of December, 1940, whereby Toribio Reyes, the plaintiff, leased to Caltex (Philippines) Inc., the now defendant, two parcels of land situated in the barrio of Baclaran, municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal, for a period of 10 years renewable for another 10 years at the option of the lessee, at the agreed monthly rental of P120 during the first 10 years and P150 a month for the subsequent period should the lease be extended, said monthly rental to be paid in advance within the first 10 days of each month. The contract further provides in paragraph 6 that, "Should the structures on said premises be destroyed by fire or storm, or should lessee, for any reason, be prevented from establishing or continuing the business of distributing petroleum products on said premises, or should said business, for any reason, in lessee’s judgment, become unduly burdensome, lessee may terminate this lease upon 30 days’ written notice, in which event the rental shall be prorated to the date of such termination."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the entry of Japanese troops, in December, 1941, these seized the premises and used them throughout the period of occupation as a sentry post. The officers of the lessee corporation, being American citizens, were interned by the invaders and the said company was closed throughout that period. After liberation the lessee again took over the premises but tendered payment for rent from February, 1945, only; it had not paid rent from January, 1942.
This nonpayment is the basis of the present suit.
The trial court applied article 1554 and article 1575 of the Civil Code which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1554. The lessor is obligated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. To deliver to the lessee the thing which is the object of the contract.
"2. To make thereon, during the lease, all the necessary repairs in order to preserve it in serviceable condition for the purpose for which it was intended.
"3. To maintain the lessee in the peaceful enjoyment of the lease during all the time of the contract.
"ART. 1575. The lessee shall have no right to a reduction of the rent on account of the sterility of the land leased or on account of the loss of the fruits through ordinary fortuitous events; but he shall have said right in case of loss of more than one-half of the fruits through extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous events, saving always a special agreement to the contrary.
"By extraordinary fortuitous events shall be understood fire, war, pestilence, extraordinary floods, locusts, earthquakes, or any other equally unusual events, which the contracting parties could not have reasonably foreseen."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 1575, it will be noted, deals with leases of agricultural land. The property in question is not devoted to agricultural uses, but was leased for the express purpose of being used, as it was and is now being used, as gasoline stations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the lessee suffered a loss of more than one-half of the fruits thereof. Other requisites of the article are lacking. It is plain article 1575 has no bearing.
The applicable provision is article 1560 in relation to article 1554. Article 1560 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1560. The lessor shall not be obliged to answer for the mere fact of a trespass made by a third person in the use of the thing leased, but the lessee shall have a direct action against the trespasser.
"The fact of trespass does not exist if the third person, whether he be an agent of the Government or a private individual, has acted by virtue of a right belonging to him."cralaw virtua1aw library
Manresa (10 Codigo Civil Español, 4.a Edicion) elucidates on the meaning of the term "mere fact of a trespass" (perturbacion de mero hecho) as distinguished from legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho) and treats of its legal effects, citing other noted writers. The comment so fits into the various phases of the present case and is so nearly wholly determinative thereof as to be worth quoting at length:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"El articulo preinserto (articulo 1560) guarda intima relacion con el numero 3.
The contract in question was executed on the 23rd day of December, 1940, whereby Toribio Reyes, the plaintiff, leased to Caltex (Philippines) Inc., the now defendant, two parcels of land situated in the barrio of Baclaran, municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal, for a period of 10 years renewable for another 10 years at the option of the lessee, at the agreed monthly rental of P120 during the first 10 years and P150 a month for the subsequent period should the lease be extended, said monthly rental to be paid in advance within the first 10 days of each month. The contract further provides in paragraph 6 that, "Should the structures on said premises be destroyed by fire or storm, or should lessee, for any reason, be prevented from establishing or continuing the business of distributing petroleum products on said premises, or should said business, for any reason, in lessee’s judgment, become unduly burdensome, lessee may terminate this lease upon 30 days’ written notice, in which event the rental shall be prorated to the date of such termination."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the entry of Japanese troops, in December, 1941, these seized the premises and used them throughout the period of occupation as a sentry post. The officers of the lessee corporation, being American citizens, were interned by the invaders and the said company was closed throughout that period. After liberation the lessee again took over the premises but tendered payment for rent from February, 1945, only; it had not paid rent from January, 1942.
This nonpayment is the basis of the present suit.
The trial court applied article 1554 and article 1575 of the Civil Code which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1554. The lessor is obligated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. To deliver to the lessee the thing which is the object of the contract.
"2. To make thereon, during the lease, all the necessary repairs in order to preserve it in serviceable condition for the purpose for which it was intended.
"3. To maintain the lessee in the peaceful enjoyment of the lease during all the time of the contract.
"ART. 1575. The lessee shall have no right to a reduction of the rent on account of the sterility of the land leased or on account of the loss of the fruits through ordinary fortuitous events; but he shall have said right in case of loss of more than one-half of the fruits through extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous events, saving always a special agreement to the contrary.
"By extraordinary fortuitous events shall be understood fire, war, pestilence, extraordinary floods, locusts, earthquakes, or any other equally unusual events, which the contracting parties could not have reasonably foreseen."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 1575, it will be noted, deals with leases of agricultural land. The property in question is not devoted to agricultural uses, but was leased for the express purpose of being used, as it was and is now being used, as gasoline stations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the lessee suffered a loss of more than one-half of the fruits thereof. Other requisites of the article are lacking. It is plain article 1575 has no bearing.
The applicable provision is article 1560 in relation to article 1554. Article 1560 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1560. The lessor shall not be obliged to answer for the mere fact of a trespass made by a third person in the use of the thing leased, but the lessee shall have a direct action against the trespasser.
"The fact of trespass does not exist if the third person, whether he be an agent of the Government or a private individual, has acted by virtue of a right belonging to him."cralaw virtua1aw library
Manresa (10 Codigo Civil Español, 4.a Edicion) elucidates on the meaning of the term "mere fact of a trespass" (perturbacion de mero hecho) as distinguished from legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho) and treats of its legal effects, citing other noted writers. The comment so fits into the various phases of the present case and is so nearly wholly determinative thereof as to be worth quoting at length:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"El articulo preinserto (articulo 1560) guarda intima relacion con el numero 3.
