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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-3352. June 12, 1950. ]

ILEANA A. CELIS ET AL., Petitioners-Appellees, v. SOLEDAD CAFUIR ET AL., Respondents-Appellants.

Jose S. Sarte for Respondents-Appellants.

Valenton, Ildefonso, Jr. & Bautista for Petitioners-Appellees.

SYLLABUS


1. WORDS AND PHRASES; "ENTRUSTED," MEANING OF. — The word "entrusted" cannot convey the idea of definite and permanent renunciation of the mother’s custody of her child.

2. GUARDIAN AND WARD; GUARDIANSHIP IS ALWAYS TEMPORARY IN NATURE. — The designation of one as the guardian of another cannot and does not mean that said guardian will always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position. Guardianship is always or almost invariably understood to be temporary. While one is a minor or is incompetent, a guardian is appointed; but when minority has passed or incapacity has ceased, guardianship also terminates.

3. PARENT AND CHILD; NATURE OF PARENTAL FILIATION OF NATURAL PARENTS OVER THEIR CHILDREN. — This Court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise all that they have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a deed loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count.

4. ID.; AFFLUENCE OR POVERTY ARE NOT ALONE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE WELL BEING OF CHILDREN. — Whether a child should stay permanently with a kindly stranger or with his own mother, is not to be determined alone by considerations of affluence or poverty. Poor youths who had to work their way thru school and college, have, not infrequently, scaled the heights of success, as easily and swiftly as their more favored companions, and done so with more, inner satisfaction, and credit to themselves and their humble parents.


D E C I S I O N


MONTEMAYOR, J.:


This is an appeal taken by the respondents, Soledad Cafuir and Jose Simeon, supposedly her husband, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in a habeas corpus case granting the petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the Sheriff of Manila who then had custody of the boy, Joel Cafuir (John Cafuir) to deliver said child to its mother, petitioner Ileana A. Celis. The appeal involving as it does only questions of law, we accept the findings of fact made by the trial court. The facts are few and quite simple and may be stated briefly as follows:.

On July 10, 1946, Petitioner, Ileana A. Celis, single, gave birth at the North General Hospital to a boy subsequently named Joel (John) Cafuir. The father seems to be unknown, although from what may be gathered from the decision appealed from, he was an American soldier who formed part of the American Liberation Forces. Due to the anger and extreme displeasure of the father of Ileana because of the alleged disgrace that she brought on herself and the family for having maintained illicit relations with a man to whom she had not been married and because of her father’s objection to having her son in the paternal home where Ileana was then living, nine days after delivery, Joel was given to the custody of the respondent Soledad Cafuir, who thereafter took him direct from the hospital to her house, ministered to his needs and comfort, and even employed a nurse to take care of him. Ileana herself spent several days in Soledad’s house while recuperating, later, she returned to her own home leaving her child to the care of respondent Soledad. Thereafter, Ileana visited her child every Saturday, taking to him condensed milk, food, and a little money.

On September 17, 1948, Ileana married her co-petitioner Agustin C. Rivera. The couple thereafter decided to get back Joel Cafuir. Because of the refusal of respondent Soledad to give him up, petitioners sued out the corresponding writ of habeas corpus.

The theory of the respondents-appellants is that Ileana had definitely renounced her custody of and patria potestas over her child and that now she may not get him back. In support of this claim, Exhibits 4 and 1 were presented in evidence. The first exhibit is dated July 10, 1946, the same day that John Cafuir was born at the hospital, and reads as follows:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"July 10, 1946 .

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"I hereby entrusted to Mrs. Soledad Cafuir of 131 Limasana, Quiapo, Manila, my son named John Cafuir, for the reason that I don’t have the means to bring the child up. "Anybody who may claim my son for adoption in the future without the consent of the undersigned is hereby ignored. .

(Sgd.) NENITA CELIS "Mother."

The second, Exhibit 1, is dated November 2, 1946, and reads as follows:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"November 2, 1946 .

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"I, Nenita Celis, of 1196 Singalong, Malate, Manila, hereby designate Mrs. Soledad Cafuir, residing at 131 Limasana, R. Hidalgo, Quiapo, Manila to be the real guardian of my son, named Johnny Cafuir. .

"No one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir.

(Sgd.) "NENITA CELIS "Mother."

The trial court found and ruled that under these two exhibits signed by petitioner Ileana Celis, there is no basis for finding that she had renounced the custody of her child in favor of respondent Soledad. We agree with the said finding and ruling of the trial court.

In the case of Diaz v. Estrera (L-1155, June 30, 1947; 44 Off. Gaz., 4354), 1 this court in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus involving the custody of a child held that paternal authority or patria potestas may be waived, and it denied the petition of the mother to recover the custody of her child from the respondent Estrera. The facts in that case are, however, a little different from those in the present case. There, the mother in giving up the custody of her child signed a document reading as follows:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"A quien concierna:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"Hago constar que yo, Soria Bernardo Diaz, filipina, mayor de edad y vecina del pueblo de Badian, Ceb
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