Name Date of Position Salary
employment
Enrique Ramirez 12|16|46 Warehouseman P450 a mo.
Juan Ramirez -do- -do- 250 a mo.
NOTE. — The salary of Enrique Ramirez was later reduced to P360 per month. This was the amount he was receiving at the time of his dismissal.
EMPLOYED BY DEFENDANT HARRY LYONS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Daniel Sanchez 1/1/47 Carpenter- P250 a mo.
Foreman
Mariano Javier do Guard 5 a day
Venancio Diaz do do 5 a day
Esteban Bautista do do 5 a day
Faustino Aquillo do do 5 a day
Godofredo Diamant do do 5 a day
Marcial Lazaro do do 5 a day
Ambrosio de la Cruz do do 5 a day
Marcelino Maceda do do 5 a day
as per contracts of employment, copies of which are attached to defendants’ answer marked Exhibits 1 to 11 inclusive.
"2. That in said contracts of employment the plaintiff agreed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘I accept the foregoing appointment, and in consideration thereof I hereby agree that such employment may be terminated at any time, without previous notice, and I further agree that salary and wages, shall be computed and paid at the rate specified up to the date of such termination.
‘Also in consideration of such employment I hereby expressly waive the benefit of article 302 of the Code of Commerce and that of any other law, ruling, or custom which might require notice of discharge or payment of salary or wages after date of the termination of such employment.’
"3. That the plaintiffs were dismissed by the defendants on December 31, 1947 without one months’ previous notice.
"4. That each of the plaintiffs demanded payment of one month’s salary from the defendants and that the latter refused to pay the same.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment on the foregoing stipulation of facts be rendered by this Honorable Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The points in issue herein are: first, whether plaintiffs, both those paid on a monthly and daily basis, are entitled to the benefit granted in article 302 of the Code of Commerce; and secondly, if they are so entitled, was their waiver of such benefits legal and valid?
Article 302 of the Code of Commerce reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 302. In cases in which no special time is fixed in the contracts of service, any one of the parties thereto may cancel it, advising the other party thereof one month in advance.
"The factor or shop clerk shall be entitled, in such case, to the salary due for said month."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is a clear doctrine, as gleaned from the provision of the law and settled jurisprudence, 1 that in a mercantile contract of service in which no special time is fixed, any one of the parties may cancel said contract upon the giving of a one-month notice, called a mesada, to the other party. The law gives an added proviso that in the case of factors or shop clerks, these shall be entitled to salary during this one month of standing notice. In any case, the one-month notice must be given to any employee, whether factor, shop clerk or otherwise, so long as the two conditions concur, namely, that no special time is fixed in the contract of service, and that said employee is a commercial employee. And when such notice is not given under these conditions, not only the factor or shop clerk but any employee discharged without cause, is entitled to indemnity which may be one month’s salary. 2
In the instant case, there lies no doubt that plaintiffs are commercial employees of appellant corporations, rendering service as warehousemen, carpenter-foreman and guards. There is likewise no doubt as can be seen from the contracts of employment submitted as exhibits, that no special time has been fixed in the contracts of services between plaintiffs-appellees and defendants-appellants. The stated computation or manner of payment, whether monthly or daily, does not represent nor determine a special time of employment. Thus, a commercial employee may be employed for one year and yet receive his salary on the daily or weekly or monthly or other basis.
Appellants allege that the use of the word "temporary" in the contracts of services of some of the plaintiffs shows that their employment was with a term, and the term was "temporary, on a day to day basis." The record discloses that this conclusion is unwarranted. The contracts simply say — "You are hereby employed as temporary guard with a compensation at the rate of P5 a day . . . ." The word "temporary" as used herein does not mean the special time fixed in the contracts referred to in article 302 of the Code of Commerce. The daily basis therein stipulated is for the computation of pay, and is not necessarily the period of employment. Hence, this Court holds that plaintiffs-appellants come within the purview of article 302 of the Code of Commerce.
Now, as to the second question, namely, the validity of plaintiffs’ waiver of the benefits given them by said article 302. This court holds that such a waiver, made in advance, is void as being contrary to public policy. Granting that the "mesada" given in article 302 of the Code of Commerce, is for the bilateral benefit of both employer and employee, nevertheless, this does not preclude the finding that a waiver of such "mesada" in advance by the employee is contrary to public policy.
Public policy, with regard to labor, is clearly stated in article II, section 5, of the Philippine Constitution, which reads —
"The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State."cralaw virtua1aw library
and article XIV, section 6, which reads —
"The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with these provisions of our constitution. In the matter of employment bargaining, there is no doubt that the employer stands on higher footing than the employee. First of all, there is greater supply than demand for labor. Secondly, the need for employment by labor comes from vital and even desperate, necessity. Consequently, the law must protect labor, at least, to the extent of raising him to equal footing in bargaining relations with capital and to shield him from abuses brought about by the necessity for survival. It is safe to presume therefore, that an employee or laborer who waives in advance any benefit granted him by law does so, certainly not in his interest or through generosity but under the forceful intimidation of urgent need, and hence, he could not have so acted freely and voluntarily.
For all the foregoing, this court hereby affirms the decision of the lower court, with costs against appellants.
Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Bengzon and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Collete v. France & Collete, Inc., G. R. No. 23927, November 5, 1925; Lopez v. Roces, Et. Al. (S. C.) , G. R. No. 47950, July 1, 1942, 1 Off. Gaz., 672.
2. Lopez v. Roces Et. Al., see footnote 1.