FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-5397. September 26, 1952. ]
LAURETO A. TALAROC, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ALEJANDRO D. UY, Respondent-Appellant.
Claro M. Recto for Appellant.
Justiniano R. Borja for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; Jus Soli, ABANDONED. — The Roa decision, promulgated on October 30, 1912 (23 Phil., 315) set a precedent that was uniformly followed in numerous cases. This long line of decisions applied the principle of jus soli up to September 16, 1947, when that principle was renounced in the cases of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor (79 Phil., 249) and Villahermosa v. Commissioner of Immigration (80 Phil., 541.)
2. ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT OF Jus Soli PRINCIPLE DOES NOT AFFECT THOSE WHO WERE CITIZENS AT TIME OF ADOPTION OF CONSTITUTION. — In abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case and making jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, the Constitution did not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption. If on the strength of the Roa decision a person was considered a full-pledged Philippine citizen (Art. IV, sec. 1, No. 1) on the date of the adoption of the Constitution when jus soli had been the prevailing doctrine, he cannot be divested of his Filipino citizenship.
2. ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT OF Jus Soli PRINCIPLE DOES NOT AFFECT THOSE WHO WERE CITIZENS AT TIME OF ADOPTION OF CONSTITUTION. — In abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case and making jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, the Constitution did not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption. If on the strength of the Roa decision a person was considered a full-pledged Philippine citizen (Art. IV, sec. 1, No. 1) on the date of the adoption of the Constitution when jus soli had been the prevailing doctrine, he cannot be divested of his Filipino citizenship.
D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
The election of Alejandro D. Uy to the office of municipal mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental, on November 13, 1951, brought the instant action of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of that province. The petitioner was Laureto A. Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates for the same office, and the grounds of the petition were that the respondent is a Chinese national and therefore ineligible. The court below found the petition well founded and declared the position in question vacant.
The personal circumstances of the respondent as found by the court are not in dispute. They are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Estan establecidas por las pruebas, y admitidas por las partes, que Alejandro D. Uy nacio en enero 28, 1912, en el municipio de Iligan, provincia de Lanao (Exhibito A), de padre chino, Uy Piangco, y de madre Filipina, Ursula Diabo, cuando convivian estos como marido y mujer, pero despues contrajeron matrimonio eclesiastico el marso 3, 1914, en dicho pueblo (Exhibito 9). Tuvieron siste hijos, siendo el recurrido Alejandro D. Uy el 5.
The personal circumstances of the respondent as found by the court are not in dispute. They are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Estan establecidas por las pruebas, y admitidas por las partes, que Alejandro D. Uy nacio en enero 28, 1912, en el municipio de Iligan, provincia de Lanao (Exhibito A), de padre chino, Uy Piangco, y de madre Filipina, Ursula Diabo, cuando convivian estos como marido y mujer, pero despues contrajeron matrimonio eclesiastico el marso 3, 1914, en dicho pueblo (Exhibito 9). Tuvieron siste hijos, siendo el recurrido Alejandro D. Uy el 5.
