1. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; JURISDICTION OVER CASES APPEALED FROM INFERIOR COURTS. — Although the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction to decide the ejectment case in question on the merits, inasmuch as the municipal court had no original jurisdiction over said case, in view of the question of title to real property upon which the right of possession involved therein was dependent (Teodoro v. Balatbat, 94 Phil., 247) said court of firs instance had original jurisdiction to pass upon such issue, no objection to the exercise of such jurisdiction having been interposed by any of the parties.

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside and annul a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 13306 thereof, entitled "Serenidad V. Surio and Maximo Villacorta v. Dionisia Cañaveral and Rufino Bautista", as well as an order of said court denying a reconsideration of said decision, and to compel said court to remand the case to the Municipal Court of Manila "for further proceedings in accordance with section 10, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court."cralaw virtua1aw library

It appears that on April 19, 1949, Dionisia Cañaveral executed, with the consent of her husband, Rufino Bautista, an instrument, entitled "Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale," conveying, to Serenidad Surio, married to Maximo Villacorta, "two parcels of land with the building and improvements thereon, situated at 1403 Basilio, Sampaloc, Manila" and more particularly described in said document, subject to redemption within 12 months and to the right of the vendor to "continue occupying the premises in the capacity of a lessee at a monthly rent of P40 within a period of one year." On November 4, 1950, the Villacortas instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila Civil Case No. 13621, against the Bautistas, for illegal detainer. In the complaint therein filed, the Villacortas alleged that they are owners of the property above referred to, by virtue of said "Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale," and that the Bautistas refuse to vacate said property despite their failure to pay the agreed monthly rental and the repeated demands made by the Villacortas. Subsequently thereto, or on December 19, 1950, the Bautistas commenced Civil Case No. 12803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, against the Villacortas, for a declaration, among other things, that the deed already adverted to does not express the true intent of the parties thereto, which was alleged to be only to make a "contract of loan with security." This pretense was reiterated by the Bautistas in their answer in the ejectment case, in which pleading they, likewise, alleged the pendency of said Civil Case No. 12803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. In said answer, the Bautistas, also, contested the alleged right of the Villacortas to the possession of the property in dispute, upon the ground that the same belongs to the former and that the true intent of the parties to the aforementioned deed was merely to constitute a mortgage. After due trial, the municipal court issued an order, dated February 2, 1951, reading:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Considering that according to the evidence adduced by the parties in this case, the main issue that is raised before the Court is the question of ownership; and considering that the question of possession cannot be decided in this instant without first deciding the question of ownership, the Court finds it has no jurisdiction to proceed further.

Wherefore, this case is hereby dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs." (Record p. 29.)

The Villacortas appealed from this order to the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 13306 and the Bautistas reproduced the answer filed by them in the municipal court. In due course the court of first instance, then presided over by Hon. Demetrio Encarnacion, Judge, thereafter rendered a decision, dated February 20, 1952, the dispositive part of which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Por todo lo expuesto, encontrando el Juzgudo bien fundada la demanda, con gran preponderancia de pruebas a favor de los demandantes, se dicta sentencia condenando a los demandados a pagar a dichos demandantes los alquileres arriba reclamados, de P240 acumulados desde Abril 19, 1949 hasta Octubre 19, 1950, m