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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-7449. March 23, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICANOR ACOSTA Y PALA alias MATA, ET AL., defendants NICANOR ACOSTA Y PALA alias MATA, Defendant-Appellant.

Eduardo M. Aquino for appellant.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.

SYLLABUS


CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEA OF GUILTY; ESSENCE OF. — The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information; that when formally entered, such a plea is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof; and that while it may be prudent and advisable in some cases, especially where grave crimes are charged, to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime, nevertheless it lies in the sound discretion of the court whether to take evidence or not in any case where it is satisfied that the plea of guilty has been entered by the accused with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of this act.


D E C I S I O N


PER CURIAM, p:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary

This case has been elevated to this Court as prescribed by the Rules so that we may review the sentence of death passed upon the accused Nicanor Acosta y Pala by the Court of First Instance of Manila.

It appears that the said accused was, together with four others, charged in the court below with the crime of robbery With homicide, committed, according to the information, as follows:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary

"That on or about the 21st day of October, 1953, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with abuse of superior strength, the use of motor vehicle, and by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, to wit: by treacherously shooting one Olimpia Francisco de Guzman Santos six times with a firearm, take steal and carry away, with intent of gain and against the consent of the owner thereof, a handbag containing the sum of P10,000 in cash belonging to the said Olimpia Francisco de Guzman to her damage and prejudice in the said sum of P10,000, Philippine currency and thereby indicting upon her multiple (6) gunshot wounds lacerating the heart, inferior vena cava, lung and kidney, which injuries were the direct and natural cause of her death of a few moments thereafter;"chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

the information further alleging — "That the accused Nicanor Acosta y Pala alias Mata is a habitual delinquent, having been previously convicted by final judgment of competent courts as follows:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary

B-58172 Theft 1 mo. & 1 day 2-14-52 4-16-52

B-77275 Estafa 1 mo. & 1 day 6-30-50 7-31-50

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. But when the case came up for trial about a month later, he withdrew his plea of not guilty and, upon the information being read to him, entered that of guilty. After satisfying itself that the accused, who was then represented by counsel, was aware of the consequences of his plea, the court pronounced its judgment, declaring him guilty as charged and, in view of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information with only the plea of guilty to mitigate the offense, sentencing him to death.

The attorney de oficio recommends that the sentence be set aside and the case remanded to the court below for a new trial, contending that it was error to mete out so grave a penalty, on a mere plea of guilty, without first fully explaining to the accused the consequences of such plea in view of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information.

This Court has already declared that the essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information; that when formally entered, such a plea is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof; and that while it may be prudent and advisable in some cases, especially where grave crimes are charged, to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime nevertheless it lies in the sound discretion of the court whether to take evidence or not in any case where it is satisfied that the plea of guilty has been entered by the accused with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act. U. S. v. Jamad, 37 Phil., 305; U. S. v. Burlado, 42 Phil., 72; People v. Sta. Rosa, 88 Phil., 487; People v. Sabilul, 89 Phil., 283.)

In the present case, the decision below states:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary

"Asked by the Court whether he is fully aware of the consequences of his voluntary plea of guilty in view of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information namely, abuse of superior strength, use of motor vehicle, treachery, and habitual delinquency, the accused maintained his plea of guilty.

It thus appears that, before passing sentence, the court first satisfied itself that the accused was well aware of the consequences of his plea of guilty, the full import of which, in view of the aggravating circumstances alleged, must have been brought home to him by his lawyer, who was then with him and must be supposed to have duly performed his duty as such. Undoubtedly aware that there were no mitigating circumstances — for he made no offer to prove any — counsel must have figured that defendant’s only chance to obtain leniency was for him to atenuate his liability with a frank admission of guilt and throw himself upon the mercy of the court. In the circumstances, the trial court was not bound to take evidence since the plea of guilty, which was advisedly entered, already supplied the necessary proof.

In the case of People v. Palupe, 69 Phil., 703, this Court, in affirming a conviction for murder on a plea of guilty, said:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary

"Cuando el Juzgado no requirio la presentacion de pruebas adicionales, fue indudablemente porque no hubo el menor asomo de duda de que el acusado, o sea el apelante, conocia los verdaderos hechos y la naturaleza de su delito, siendo por dicha razon innecesario dicho tramite; y nadie mejor que el Juzgado podia determinar si habia tal necesidad o no porque tenia ante si al apelante que por cierto no estaba solo, sino acompañado y asistido debidamente de su abogado defensor a quien se supone naturalmente que le asesoro con absoluta fidelidad y aprobo el paso que iba a dar confesandose culpable porque era lo mejor que podia hacer para merecer la menor pena posible. Ademas, el apelante no pidio en ningun momento antes de perfeccionar si apelacion, que se le permitiese presentar pruebas para establecer alguna defensa, no obstante haber hecho su confesion sin reservas de ningun genero."chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The above pronouncement fits in to the case now before us. And it clearly appearing that the trial court accepted the plea of guilty only after satisfying itself that the accused was aware of its consequences in view of the aggravating circumstances alleged, we find no need for ordering a new trial, especially because no offer has been made to prove any defense or any circumstances that might mitigate criminal liability.

The sentence imposed below being in accordance with law, the game is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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