EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-10360 & L-10433. January 17, 1957. ]
JULIANO A. ALBA, in his capacity as Acting Vice Mayor of Roxas City, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JOSE D. EVANGELISTA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Capiz and VIVENCIO C. ALAJAR, Respondents.
VIVENCIO C. ALAJAR, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JULIANO A. ALBA, Respondent-Appellant.
Nicolas V. Villaruz, Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio Quiazon, Jr. for Juliano A. Alba.
Alvarez, Cacnio, Pamatian & Associates, Abeleda & Amores, Antonio J. Beldia, Pedro M. Bermejo, Jose M. F. Belo, Atila R. Balgos and Alfonso V. Legaspi for Vivencio C. Alajar.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; TENURE OF OFFICE MADE DEFENDANT UPON PLEASURE OF PRESIDENT; CESSATION IN OFFICE MAY BE WITH OR WITHOUT CLAUSE. — Where, as in the case at bar, the tenure of office of the vice-mayor has been made by law expressly defendant upon the pleasure of the President of the Philippines, the person thus appointed to such office by the Chief Executive has to leave it when the President in the exercise of his power legally appoints another person in his stead. Whereas the power of the President to remove at pleasure city officials under Section 2544 of the Revised Administrative Code should be preceded by legal cause (De los Santos v. Mallari, 48 Off. Gaz., 1791).
D E C I S I O N
FELIX, J.:
On January 1, 1954, the President of the Philippines appointed Vivencio Alajar as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas (Annex D). He took his oath and assumed office on January 6, 1954; on March 31 of that year, his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointment (Annex D-1) and he continued holding office until November, 1955, when he received a communication from Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema informing him that the President had designated Juliano Alba in his stead as Acting Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas and requesting him to turn over his said office to Mr. Alba effective immediately. This communication wherein the President directed the writer thereof to convey to Mr. Alajar his appreciation for the invaluable services he had rendered as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas (Annex C), was confirmed by a telegram that Alajar received from the President dated November 23, 1955 (Annex B).
On the other hand, Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro addressed Juliano A. Alba a communication through the Mayor of the City of Roxas wherein Alba was informed that the President has designated him as Acting Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas vice Vivencio Alajar, and instructed him to qualify and enter upon the performance of the office, furnishing the Commissioner of Civil Service with the copy of his oath (Annex A). On November 19, 1955, Juliano A. Alba took his oath and assumed office (Annex A-1).
Not satisfied with the action of the President, Vivencio C. Alajar instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Capiz against Juliano A. Alba (Civil Case No. V-2041), contending:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) That he was appointed Vice-Mayor of Roxas City on 1 January 1954 and his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on 31 March 1954 and that on 19 November 1955, Juliano A. Alba usurped the office of Vice-Mayor of Roxas City;
(b) That there existed no vacancy of said office at the time of the designation by the President of the Philippines of Juliano A. Alba as Acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City; and
(c) That there existed no legal cause or reason whatsoever for the removal or disqualification of said Vivencio C. Alajar by the appointment of Juliano Alba by the President of the Philippines as Acting Vice Mayor of Roxas City.
After proper proceedings and hearing, the parties submitted the case for decision on the only issue of whether the alleged removal of the petitioner and the designation in his place of respondent as Vice-Mayor of Roxas City was legal or illegal. On this point, the lower court held that the petitioner (Vivencio C. Alajar) was "entitled to remain in office as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto until he resigns, dies or is removed for cause. Without costs." (Decision, Annex C).
From this decision, Juliano A. Alba appealed to Us by filing a notice of appeal dated February 3, 1956. Four days later, the appeal notwithstanding, Vivencio Alajar filed a petition (Annex D) praying for immediate execution of the judgment, and despite the strong opposition of appellant, the motion was granted by the Court on February 18, 1956 (Annex E), based on the special reasons adduced by the petitioner and
"Moreover, to uphold the supremacy of the law and constitution, which is the supreme and fundamental authority, pertinent provisions of which are involved in this case, and considering that the immediate and positive effect of the motion, if the same is denied, is to prolong the status of illegality of the appointment of the second appointee and present incumbent to the position of Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas and the question of who is entitled to occupy the same and to exercise the public function of the office which affects public interest and public service, this Court, if it is to be consistent with its pronouncement, conclusion or judgment, as it should be, is constrained to grant said motion."cralaw virtua1aw library
The decision, however, was not executed because the herein petitioner, Juliano A. Alba, brought the matter up to this Superiority praying:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That pending the determination of the validity of the order of immediate execution, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, upon previous filing of the bond fixed by this Honorable Court by the herein petitioner, restraining the herein respondent Vivencio C. Alajar from discharging the duties and functions of the Vice-Mayor of Roxas City in order that the herein petitioner shall continue unmolested as acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City until the final determination of the question of the validity of the order for the immediate execution of the decision of the trial court;
(2) That after hearing, judgment be rendered declaring null and void the order of respondent, Hon. José D. Evangelista, dated 18 February 1956 for the immediate execution of his decision in the Quo Warranto Case (Alajar v. Alba) on the ground that the same was improperly issued as there existed no good reason for its issuance as contemplated and provided by Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
(3) For such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
In this instance, the Solicitor General requested permission to intervene in the certiorari case (G. R. No. L-10360), alleging that the order of immediate execution issued by the trial judge deprived him of the opportunity to be heard and defend the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 603 in the lower court and he desires to be heard by this Court before We proceed to determine the constitutionality of section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 by the affirmative vote of 8 Justices thereof (section 23, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court — I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1953 ed., p. 111). The stand of the Solicitor General is that said section 8 is constitutional (Article VI, section 1 and Article XII, section 1 of the Constitution of the Philippines; Jover v. Borra, 49 Off. Gaz., 2765 and enactments of Congress subsequent to the case of Santos v. Mallare, 48 Off. Gaz., 1793, etc., declaring certain position to be terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority — section 2545 Revised Administrative Code; Commonwealth Act Nos. 39, 51, 520, 547 and 592; Republic Acts Nos. 162, 170, as amended; 179, as amended; 183, 288, as amended; 305, 306, 327, 328, 521, 523, 525, as amended; 537, and 603). The motion for intervention of the Solicitor General was granted by this Court.
In the meanwhile, the appeal of Juliano A. Alba in said case V- 2041, was given due course and reached this Court. In this instance the parties have already filed their respective briefs and the case was submitted for decision at the hearing held on August 3, 1956.
Appellant’s counsel maintains that the trial Court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In predicating its decision on the mistaken assumption that the petitioner-appellee belongs to the unclassified civil service, an assumption which begs the very issue; whether the vice-mayor of Roxas City belongs to the unclassified service as claimed by the petitioner-appellee;
2. In not declaring without the necessity of making a pronouncement of its validity, that section 8 of Republic Act 603 was precisely intended by the Congress to exclude the office of vice-mayor of Roxas City from persons belonging to the unclassified service under section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended;
3. In not declaring that in the case of Jover v. Borra (49 Off. Gaz., 2767) the Supreme Court passed upon the validity of section 8 of Republic Act No. 603;
4. In holding that the office of vice-mayor of Roxas City is neither primarily confidential nor policy-determining, and
5. In not holding that section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 is a valid exercise of the broad legislative powers vested in the Congress of the Philippines by our Constitution.
As the petition for certiorari was admitted and given due course by this Court and the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued, We shall confine ourselves to the statement that appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance in quo warranto proceedings is perfected by the mere presentation of the notice of appeal (sections 16 and 17, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court), and from that moment "the trial court losses its jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, and to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal (which is not required in cases of quo warranto) to the appellate court" (section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). Hence, in the case at bar, the trial court had no jurisdiction to provide for the issuance of the writ for the advance execution of its judgment, as it did by order of February 18, 1956 (Annex E). Consequently, We have to declare that said order is null and void and of no force and effect and to make permanent the writ of preliminary injunction We have issued at the instance of the herein petitioner.
We will now consider the merits of respondent’s appeal in Case G. R. No. L-10433. The solution of the controversy hinges on the main question at issue, which may be propounded as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 creating the city of Roxas provides that the Vice-Mayor shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and shall hold office at the pleasure of the President. In view of this provision of the law, could the President of the Philippines legally replace respondent Vivencio C. Alajar, with or without cause, by petitioner Juliano A. Alba?"
Vivencio C. Alajar and judge Jos
On the other hand, Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro addressed Juliano A. Alba a communication through the Mayor of the City of Roxas wherein Alba was informed that the President has designated him as Acting Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas vice Vivencio Alajar, and instructed him to qualify and enter upon the performance of the office, furnishing the Commissioner of Civil Service with the copy of his oath (Annex A). On November 19, 1955, Juliano A. Alba took his oath and assumed office (Annex A-1).
Not satisfied with the action of the President, Vivencio C. Alajar instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Capiz against Juliano A. Alba (Civil Case No. V-2041), contending:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) That he was appointed Vice-Mayor of Roxas City on 1 January 1954 and his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on 31 March 1954 and that on 19 November 1955, Juliano A. Alba usurped the office of Vice-Mayor of Roxas City;
(b) That there existed no vacancy of said office at the time of the designation by the President of the Philippines of Juliano A. Alba as Acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City; and
(c) That there existed no legal cause or reason whatsoever for the removal or disqualification of said Vivencio C. Alajar by the appointment of Juliano Alba by the President of the Philippines as Acting Vice Mayor of Roxas City.
After proper proceedings and hearing, the parties submitted the case for decision on the only issue of whether the alleged removal of the petitioner and the designation in his place of respondent as Vice-Mayor of Roxas City was legal or illegal. On this point, the lower court held that the petitioner (Vivencio C. Alajar) was "entitled to remain in office as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto until he resigns, dies or is removed for cause. Without costs." (Decision, Annex C).
From this decision, Juliano A. Alba appealed to Us by filing a notice of appeal dated February 3, 1956. Four days later, the appeal notwithstanding, Vivencio Alajar filed a petition (Annex D) praying for immediate execution of the judgment, and despite the strong opposition of appellant, the motion was granted by the Court on February 18, 1956 (Annex E), based on the special reasons adduced by the petitioner and
"Moreover, to uphold the supremacy of the law and constitution, which is the supreme and fundamental authority, pertinent provisions of which are involved in this case, and considering that the immediate and positive effect of the motion, if the same is denied, is to prolong the status of illegality of the appointment of the second appointee and present incumbent to the position of Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas and the question of who is entitled to occupy the same and to exercise the public function of the office which affects public interest and public service, this Court, if it is to be consistent with its pronouncement, conclusion or judgment, as it should be, is constrained to grant said motion."cralaw virtua1aw library
The decision, however, was not executed because the herein petitioner, Juliano A. Alba, brought the matter up to this Superiority praying:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That pending the determination of the validity of the order of immediate execution, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, upon previous filing of the bond fixed by this Honorable Court by the herein petitioner, restraining the herein respondent Vivencio C. Alajar from discharging the duties and functions of the Vice-Mayor of Roxas City in order that the herein petitioner shall continue unmolested as acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City until the final determination of the question of the validity of the order for the immediate execution of the decision of the trial court;
(2) That after hearing, judgment be rendered declaring null and void the order of respondent, Hon. José D. Evangelista, dated 18 February 1956 for the immediate execution of his decision in the Quo Warranto Case (Alajar v. Alba) on the ground that the same was improperly issued as there existed no good reason for its issuance as contemplated and provided by Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
(3) For such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
In this instance, the Solicitor General requested permission to intervene in the certiorari case (G. R. No. L-10360), alleging that the order of immediate execution issued by the trial judge deprived him of the opportunity to be heard and defend the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 603 in the lower court and he desires to be heard by this Court before We proceed to determine the constitutionality of section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 by the affirmative vote of 8 Justices thereof (section 23, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court — I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1953 ed., p. 111). The stand of the Solicitor General is that said section 8 is constitutional (Article VI, section 1 and Article XII, section 1 of the Constitution of the Philippines; Jover v. Borra, 49 Off. Gaz., 2765 and enactments of Congress subsequent to the case of Santos v. Mallare, 48 Off. Gaz., 1793, etc., declaring certain position to be terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority — section 2545 Revised Administrative Code; Commonwealth Act Nos. 39, 51, 520, 547 and 592; Republic Acts Nos. 162, 170, as amended; 179, as amended; 183, 288, as amended; 305, 306, 327, 328, 521, 523, 525, as amended; 537, and 603). The motion for intervention of the Solicitor General was granted by this Court.
In the meanwhile, the appeal of Juliano A. Alba in said case V- 2041, was given due course and reached this Court. In this instance the parties have already filed their respective briefs and the case was submitted for decision at the hearing held on August 3, 1956.
Appellant’s counsel maintains that the trial Court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In predicating its decision on the mistaken assumption that the petitioner-appellee belongs to the unclassified civil service, an assumption which begs the very issue; whether the vice-mayor of Roxas City belongs to the unclassified service as claimed by the petitioner-appellee;
2. In not declaring without the necessity of making a pronouncement of its validity, that section 8 of Republic Act 603 was precisely intended by the Congress to exclude the office of vice-mayor of Roxas City from persons belonging to the unclassified service under section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended;
3. In not declaring that in the case of Jover v. Borra (49 Off. Gaz., 2767) the Supreme Court passed upon the validity of section 8 of Republic Act No. 603;
4. In holding that the office of vice-mayor of Roxas City is neither primarily confidential nor policy-determining, and
5. In not holding that section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 is a valid exercise of the broad legislative powers vested in the Congress of the Philippines by our Constitution.
As the petition for certiorari was admitted and given due course by this Court and the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued, We shall confine ourselves to the statement that appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance in quo warranto proceedings is perfected by the mere presentation of the notice of appeal (sections 16 and 17, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court), and from that moment "the trial court losses its jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, and to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal (which is not required in cases of quo warranto) to the appellate court" (section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). Hence, in the case at bar, the trial court had no jurisdiction to provide for the issuance of the writ for the advance execution of its judgment, as it did by order of February 18, 1956 (Annex E). Consequently, We have to declare that said order is null and void and of no force and effect and to make permanent the writ of preliminary injunction We have issued at the instance of the herein petitioner.
We will now consider the merits of respondent’s appeal in Case G. R. No. L-10433. The solution of the controversy hinges on the main question at issue, which may be propounded as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 creating the city of Roxas provides that the Vice-Mayor shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and shall hold office at the pleasure of the President. In view of this provision of the law, could the President of the Philippines legally replace respondent Vivencio C. Alajar, with or without cause, by petitioner Juliano A. Alba?"
Vivencio C. Alajar and judge Jos
