EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17831. August 31, 1962. ]
JESUS J. ANDRES, Petitioner, v. MELECIO DOMINGO, as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, CIRILIO VILLANUEVA, as AUDITOR, DIOSCORO ORTIGA, as ACTING ACCOUNTING OFFICER and JOSE G. INFANTE, as CASHIER, Respondents.
Florentino Amansec for Petitioner.
Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. NEW TRIAL; RECANTATION BY PROSECUTION WITNESSES; DEFENDANT NOT NECESSARILY ENTITLED TO NEW TRIAL. — Recantation by prosecution witnesses does not necessarily entitle defendant to a new trial, such question being dependent upon all the circumstances of the case (People v. Follantes, Et Al., 64 Phil., 577).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT TESTIMONY GIVEN IN COURT IS TRUTHFUL AND FREELY GIVEN. — The testimony given at the trial with the solemnities prescribed by law and in the presence of the judge called upon to study the incidents and details thereof and who observed the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, carries with it the presumption that it was truthful, spontaneous and freely given (People v. Cu Unjieng, Et Al., 61 Phil. 906).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SWORN STATEMENTS WITHDRAWING TESTIMONY GIVEN IN COURT ENTITLED TO SCANT WEIGHT; REASON. — Scant weight can be given to sworn statements of witnesses withdrawing testimony previously given by them at the trial of a case and accepted as true by the trial judge (People v. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1). If new trial were to be granted every time an interested party succeeds in including some of the witnesses against him to vary their testimony after trial, there would be no end to every litigation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ASIDE FROM RECANTATION. — Even when the testimony of the recanting witness is the only evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction, a new trial may be ranted only upon a clear showing of the existence of special circumstances sufficient to raise a substantial doubt as to the truth of his testimony given at the trial and accepted as true by the trial judge (People v. Dacir, 26 Phil. 503).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT TESTIMONY GIVEN IN COURT IS TRUTHFUL AND FREELY GIVEN. — The testimony given at the trial with the solemnities prescribed by law and in the presence of the judge called upon to study the incidents and details thereof and who observed the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, carries with it the presumption that it was truthful, spontaneous and freely given (People v. Cu Unjieng, Et Al., 61 Phil. 906).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SWORN STATEMENTS WITHDRAWING TESTIMONY GIVEN IN COURT ENTITLED TO SCANT WEIGHT; REASON. — Scant weight can be given to sworn statements of witnesses withdrawing testimony previously given by them at the trial of a case and accepted as true by the trial judge (People v. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1). If new trial were to be granted every time an interested party succeeds in including some of the witnesses against him to vary their testimony after trial, there would be no end to every litigation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ASIDE FROM RECANTATION. — Even when the testimony of the recanting witness is the only evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction, a new trial may be ranted only upon a clear showing of the existence of special circumstances sufficient to raise a substantial doubt as to the truth of his testimony given at the trial and accepted as true by the trial judge (People v. Dacir, 26 Phil. 503).
R E S O L U T I O N
BARRERA, J.:
On August 22, 1960, petitioner-appellant Jesus J. Andres filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for mandamus (Civil Case No. 43971) against respondents Melencio Domingo (BIR Commissioner), Cirilo Villanueva (BIR Auditor), Dioscoro Ortiga (Acting BIR Accounting Officer), and Jose G. Infante (BIR Cashier) alleging, inter alia, that he is certified public accountant, and has been employed in the Bureau of Internal Revenue since before the war, until he became Supervising Revenue Examiner thereof, on August 1, 1958, with a compensation of P5,108.00 per annum, which position he still holds; that respondents have the legal duty to prepare and approve payrolls and to pay the salary of all employees in said bureau; that he was paid his salary up to February 14, 1960, but was not paid his salary from February 15 to February 21, 1960 and from February 22 to 28, 1960, which salaries were due and payable on February 22 and 29, respectively, as well as his weekly salaries thereafter, i.e., from February 29 to the date of the filing of his action, in the total sum of P2,775.75; that he is not in any way indebted to the government, or to any employee or official thereof, and he has no money or property accountability whatsoever; that respondent Commissioner suspended payment of his weekly salaries from February 15 without justifiable reason or cause; that in spite of repeated demands for payment of his said salaries, respondents willfully, unjustifiably, and deliberately neglected and refused to do; that in suspending or refusing said payment, respondent Commission acted in bad faith and with malice aforethought, and did so to harass, oppress, and prejudice petitioner; that as a result thereof, petitioner has undergone untold difficulties and sufferings, and suffered actual, moral, temperate, and exemplary damages, in the sums of P10,000.00, P20,000.00, P10,000.00, and P10,000.00, respectively, and incurred attorney’s fees in the sum of P2,000.00; that in suspending or refusing to pay petitioner’s salaries, respondents gravely abused their discretion and unlawfully deprived him thereof although he is lawfully entitled thereto, and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act specifically enjoined upon them as a duty, resulting from their office; and that he has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, except the petition for mandamus. Petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered ordering respondents to pay to him his salaries "from February 15 to date", amounting to P2,775.75, and P50,000.00 and P2,000.00 as damages and attorney’s fees, respectively, plus the costs of the suit.
To this petition, respondents-appellees (represented by the Solicitor General) filed their answer on September 8, 1960 alleging, as special defenses, that petitioner’s salary from February 16 to 28, 1960 was ordered paid by respondent Commissioner, but it remains unpaid due to petitioner’s failure to collect the same; that petitioner’s salary from February 29 to April 22, 1960, which is covered by his approved application for sick leave, was ordered paid by respondent Commissioner, but it remains unpaid also, because of petitioner’s failure to collect it; that petitioner is not entitled to compensation from April 23 to May 23, 1960 "because he has rendered no service, and because his application for sick leave covering said period has been validly disapproved" by respondent Commissioner; that from May 24, 1960 to the present, petitioner disliking his present assignment, for which he is being administratively investigated, "has not performed his duty, nor rendered service as Chief of the Collection Branch, BIR Branch District No. 9" ; that from May 24, 1960 to August 31, 1960, petitioner "had filed several applications for sick leave", which applications, "are presently pending investigation, verification, and approval" by respondent Commissioner; that despite demands, petitioner "has unjustifiably refused to submit to medical examination as legally required", thereby preventing respondent Commissioner from resolving his pending applications for sick leave; that petitioner is "not entitled" to sick leave with pay for the period of time subject of his claim, as he "has exhausted leave privileges" ; that "the granting of applications, or payment of such leave with pay applied for by petitioner is not a ministerial act" on the part of respondent Commissioner, as to be compellable by mandamus; that mandamus cannot issue in the instant case, because petitioner "has no clear legal right to the performance of the acts complained of" ; that petitioner’s action "is premature", as respondent Commissioner "has not yet resolved", his pending applications for sick leave; that petitioner "has not exhausted administrative remedies afforded him by law" before filing the petition; and that in ordering the suspension of payment of petitioner’s salaries from April 23 to August 31, 1960, respondents "did so within the scope of their authority and in the public interest", for which, they cannot be held civilly liable. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
On September 12, 1960, petitioner filed a motion to declare respondent Commissioner in default, but no action appears to have been taken by the court thereon.
But it appears that the case was thereafter tried, and, a after trial, the court, on November 28, 1960, dismissed the petition, in a decision which in part reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the question is, whether on this evidence, it is petitioner or it is respondents who should prevail in this petition for mandamus; petitioner contending that it is the clear legal duty on the part of respondents to immediately pay him his salaries for the period from February 15, 1960; and that they should also be required to pay him for damages; respondents’ contention, on the other hand, is that as to his salaries from February 16, to April 22, 1960, the same is already ready for delivery, but as to his salaries from April 22, 1960, petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to receive the same; the Court will rule as it examines the evidence.
"Going to the salary from 15 February to 22 April, 1960, there appears to be no debate; respondents concede that, and have prepared the warrant therefor; what has happened only is that it was prepared on 9 September 1960, but they have also shown that the salary was ready before 18 April, 1960 when it was temporarily suspended; and it will now appear that it was petitioner who has refused to get it; even if it was true that Jose J. Andres, his brother, had gone to the BIR and sought to collect the salary after 15 February, and was not able to do so, the Court finds it difficult to award damages in the absence of a clear showing of a demand and a clear showing of a refusal prior to 18 April, 1960 — which are the essential requirement after all — of mandamus; for these reasons and for those that will be said afterwards, the Court has not found sufficient merit in the action, so far as concerns that salary from 15 February to 22 April, 1960 which respondents are giving, but which petitioner has refused to receive. We go to the salary after that.
"If it was true that petitioner was sick and could not, and cannot perform the work in Zamboanga, he surely should be entitled to sick leave, because the right to sick leave is mandatory, if one is really sick, but if one is not really sick, it cannot be cannot be supposed that the Court will grant him mandamus to secure for him a sick leave; now, if petitioner was really sick, the Court does not understand why when the Bureau physician was ordered to examine him, he could not be found in his house, and, to all appearances, he has refused to be examined by that official doctor, whose competency and integrity, nothing in his evidence attacks; if this be the case, the Court can hardly be evidence attacks; if this be the case, the Court can hardly be expected to believe that he was really sick, nor does the Court in fact believe that he is sick to the extent that he should not proceed to Zamboanga; for the testimony of his own physician in open Court is, that he fist treated petitioner prior to the war for sinusitis, but, as the Court understands him, once again treated him for pharyngitis in January, 1960, and the Court notices that this coincides with the period when petitioner was already faced with no other alternative, but to follow the order for him to go to Zamboanga; nor is there anything in the testimony of Dr. Santamaria that would indicate that petitioner is disabled to work in Zamboanga; this being the case, and the Court noting that ever since the beginning, petitioner upon receipt of the order to proceed there, as early as September 9, 1959, he tried to avoid leaving Manila, by giving first the excuse that he had to finish certain work in this City, and asking deferment of the assignment to Mindanao for that reason and, later on, when he found it unavoidable, going to his new position, but hardly a few weeks later, returning to Manila, armed with applications for sick leave, which were repeated and repeated and repeated, when the Bureau, upon request of his chief of Mindanao, suspecting a falsity, and pursuant to circulars, Exhs. Def. 24 and 26, ordered his examination by the official doctor, he managed to avoid that by presenting this petition for mandamus; the Court, from these antecedents, cannot rely on the truth of his alleged sickness and disability to proceed to Mindanao; what it believes is that petitioner has refused to follow the order for him to work there, suspecting that the order was issued out of spite, in view of his past unpleasant relations with respondent Domingo. To follow an order is never easy; it becomes more difficult, if to do so would mean inconveniences to one’s person, and specially to one’s family; and doubly so, if one suspects that the order was given in bad faith. But as the order was legal and as petitioner is an inferior, and as Domingo is the superior; petitioner will have to obey; if it was true that the order was given in spite, the court cannot be the guardian of respondent’s conscience; nor will it follow that petitioner, in view of that supposed wrong, can be justified to commit another; this case is a simple one, where a superior has given a command, and an inferior has refused to obey, and the Court which must observe the equilibrium, in order to administer the correct justice, should decline to assist the disobedient.
"IN VIEW THEREOF, the Court is constrained to dismiss as it now dismisses this case, with costs.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Dissatisfied with the above decision, petitioner directly appealed to us, assigning the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The lower court erred in holding that petitioner-appellant had not demanded payment of his weekly salaries corresponding to the period from February 15 to April 22, 1960, and respondents-appellees had not refused payment thereof.
2. The lower court erred in holding that petitioner-appellant had refused to receive payment of his accumulated weekly salaries corresponding to said period, February 15 to April 22, 1960, and in not ordering respondents-appellees to pay petitioner-appellant said salaries, despite the fact that he was legally entitled thereto.
3. The lower court erred in holding that petitioner-appellant was not entitled to sick leave with pay, and in not ordering respondents- appellees to pay his accumulated weekly salaries corresponding to the period from April 23 to August 22, 1960, covered by his applications for sick leave.
4. The lower court erred in not holding that respondent-appellee Melencio R. Domingo had suspended payment of the weekly salaries of petitioner-appellant, corresponding to the period from February 15 to April 22, 1960, and from April 23 to August 22, 1960, and respondents- appellees had refused to pay said salaries without valid and lawful cause.
5. The lower court erred in not awarding damages to petitioner-appellant which he has suffered as a result of the suspension of the payment of his weekly salaries by respondent-appellee Melencio R. Domingo, and of the refusal of respondents-appellees to pay said salaries.
The above assignment of errors, it must be observed, all raise questions of fact which in view of the amounts involved, this court has no jurisdiction to review, questions which properly come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination in accordance with law. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
To this petition, respondents-appellees (represented by the Solicitor General) filed their answer on September 8, 1960 alleging, as special defenses, that petitioner’s salary from February 16 to 28, 1960 was ordered paid by respondent Commissioner, but it remains unpaid due to petitioner’s failure to collect the same; that petitioner’s salary from February 29 to April 22, 1960, which is covered by his approved application for sick leave, was ordered paid by respondent Commissioner, but it remains unpaid also, because of petitioner’s failure to collect it; that petitioner is not entitled to compensation from April 23 to May 23, 1960 "because he has rendered no service, and because his application for sick leave covering said period has been validly disapproved" by respondent Commissioner; that from May 24, 1960 to the present, petitioner disliking his present assignment, for which he is being administratively investigated, "has not performed his duty, nor rendered service as Chief of the Collection Branch, BIR Branch District No. 9" ; that from May 24, 1960 to August 31, 1960, petitioner "had filed several applications for sick leave", which applications, "are presently pending investigation, verification, and approval" by respondent Commissioner; that despite demands, petitioner "has unjustifiably refused to submit to medical examination as legally required", thereby preventing respondent Commissioner from resolving his pending applications for sick leave; that petitioner is "not entitled" to sick leave with pay for the period of time subject of his claim, as he "has exhausted leave privileges" ; that "the granting of applications, or payment of such leave with pay applied for by petitioner is not a ministerial act" on the part of respondent Commissioner, as to be compellable by mandamus; that mandamus cannot issue in the instant case, because petitioner "has no clear legal right to the performance of the acts complained of" ; that petitioner’s action "is premature", as respondent Commissioner "has not yet resolved", his pending applications for sick leave; that petitioner "has not exhausted administrative remedies afforded him by law" before filing the petition; and that in ordering the suspension of payment of petitioner’s salaries from April 23 to August 31, 1960, respondents "did so within the scope of their authority and in the public interest", for which, they cannot be held civilly liable. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
On September 12, 1960, petitioner filed a motion to declare respondent Commissioner in default, but no action appears to have been taken by the court thereon.
But it appears that the case was thereafter tried, and, a after trial, the court, on November 28, 1960, dismissed the petition, in a decision which in part reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the question is, whether on this evidence, it is petitioner or it is respondents who should prevail in this petition for mandamus; petitioner contending that it is the clear legal duty on the part of respondents to immediately pay him his salaries for the period from February 15, 1960; and that they should also be required to pay him for damages; respondents’ contention, on the other hand, is that as to his salaries from February 16, to April 22, 1960, the same is already ready for delivery, but as to his salaries from April 22, 1960, petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to receive the same; the Court will rule as it examines the evidence.
"Going to the salary from 15 February to 22 April, 1960, there appears to be no debate; respondents concede that, and have prepared the warrant therefor; what has happened only is that it was prepared on 9 September 1960, but they have also shown that the salary was ready before 18 April, 1960 when it was temporarily suspended; and it will now appear that it was petitioner who has refused to get it; even if it was true that Jose J. Andres, his brother, had gone to the BIR and sought to collect the salary after 15 February, and was not able to do so, the Court finds it difficult to award damages in the absence of a clear showing of a demand and a clear showing of a refusal prior to 18 April, 1960 — which are the essential requirement after all — of mandamus; for these reasons and for those that will be said afterwards, the Court has not found sufficient merit in the action, so far as concerns that salary from 15 February to 22 April, 1960 which respondents are giving, but which petitioner has refused to receive. We go to the salary after that.
"If it was true that petitioner was sick and could not, and cannot perform the work in Zamboanga, he surely should be entitled to sick leave, because the right to sick leave is mandatory, if one is really sick, but if one is not really sick, it cannot be cannot be supposed that the Court will grant him mandamus to secure for him a sick leave; now, if petitioner was really sick, the Court does not understand why when the Bureau physician was ordered to examine him, he could not be found in his house, and, to all appearances, he has refused to be examined by that official doctor, whose competency and integrity, nothing in his evidence attacks; if this be the case, the Court can hardly be evidence attacks; if this be the case, the Court can hardly be expected to believe that he was really sick, nor does the Court in fact believe that he is sick to the extent that he should not proceed to Zamboanga; for the testimony of his own physician in open Court is, that he fist treated petitioner prior to the war for sinusitis, but, as the Court understands him, once again treated him for pharyngitis in January, 1960, and the Court notices that this coincides with the period when petitioner was already faced with no other alternative, but to follow the order for him to go to Zamboanga; nor is there anything in the testimony of Dr. Santamaria that would indicate that petitioner is disabled to work in Zamboanga; this being the case, and the Court noting that ever since the beginning, petitioner upon receipt of the order to proceed there, as early as September 9, 1959, he tried to avoid leaving Manila, by giving first the excuse that he had to finish certain work in this City, and asking deferment of the assignment to Mindanao for that reason and, later on, when he found it unavoidable, going to his new position, but hardly a few weeks later, returning to Manila, armed with applications for sick leave, which were repeated and repeated and repeated, when the Bureau, upon request of his chief of Mindanao, suspecting a falsity, and pursuant to circulars, Exhs. Def. 24 and 26, ordered his examination by the official doctor, he managed to avoid that by presenting this petition for mandamus; the Court, from these antecedents, cannot rely on the truth of his alleged sickness and disability to proceed to Mindanao; what it believes is that petitioner has refused to follow the order for him to work there, suspecting that the order was issued out of spite, in view of his past unpleasant relations with respondent Domingo. To follow an order is never easy; it becomes more difficult, if to do so would mean inconveniences to one’s person, and specially to one’s family; and doubly so, if one suspects that the order was given in bad faith. But as the order was legal and as petitioner is an inferior, and as Domingo is the superior; petitioner will have to obey; if it was true that the order was given in spite, the court cannot be the guardian of respondent’s conscience; nor will it follow that petitioner, in view of that supposed wrong, can be justified to commit another; this case is a simple one, where a superior has given a command, and an inferior has refused to obey, and the Court which must observe the equilibrium, in order to administer the correct justice, should decline to assist the disobedient.
"IN VIEW THEREOF, the Court is constrained to dismiss as it now dismisses this case, with costs.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Dissatisfied with the above decision, petitioner directly appealed to us, assigning the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The lower court erred in holding that petitioner-appellant had not demanded payment of his weekly salaries corresponding to the period from February 15 to April 22, 1960, and respondents-appellees had not refused payment thereof.
2. The lower court erred in holding that petitioner-appellant had refused to receive payment of his accumulated weekly salaries corresponding to said period, February 15 to April 22, 1960, and in not ordering respondents-appellees to pay petitioner-appellant said salaries, despite the fact that he was legally entitled thereto.
3. The lower court erred in holding that petitioner-appellant was not entitled to sick leave with pay, and in not ordering respondents- appellees to pay his accumulated weekly salaries corresponding to the period from April 23 to August 22, 1960, covered by his applications for sick leave.
4. The lower court erred in not holding that respondent-appellee Melencio R. Domingo had suspended payment of the weekly salaries of petitioner-appellant, corresponding to the period from February 15 to April 22, 1960, and from April 23 to August 22, 1960, and respondents- appellees had refused to pay said salaries without valid and lawful cause.
5. The lower court erred in not awarding damages to petitioner-appellant which he has suffered as a result of the suspension of the payment of his weekly salaries by respondent-appellee Melencio R. Domingo, and of the refusal of respondents-appellees to pay said salaries.
The above assignment of errors, it must be observed, all raise questions of fact which in view of the amounts involved, this court has no jurisdiction to review, questions which properly come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination in accordance with law. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
