1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; NEW TRIAL; DETERMINATIONS OF SPECIFIC AWARD THAT EACH CLAIMANT SHOULD RECEIVE. — The trial court in the present case was correct in limiting the new trial court to the determination of the specific award that each of the claimants should receive, because it was for that very reason that the Supreme Court remanded the original case to that Court.

2. ID.; ID.; INDUSTRIAL COURT NOT BOUND BY TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. — Pursuant to Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, which provides that the Industrial Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of evidence, the affidavits of the claimants and the testimonies of 24 witnesses should be deemed sufficient to establish their claims.

3. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; SEPARATION OF EMPLOYEES; GRANT OF SEPARATION PAY IS NO BACK PAY. — Separation pay being that pay that an employee receives at the time of separation from the service, is distinct and different from the wages that he was entitled to; its granting presupposes a previous employment and is no bar to back pay.

4. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; ADMINISTRATIVE BODY; AFFIDAVIT ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE MAY BE REVIEWED. — The view of this Court that an affidavit is admissible in evidence before the Court of Industrial Relations for the reason that the same is an administrative body, does not prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing the affidavit itself for the purpose of determining whether the same justifies the claim for what it is presented.

5. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; JURISDICTION TO AWARD BACKPAY BASED ON PROMISE OF EMPLOYER; MUST BE BASED ON PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, NOT ON BENEFIT OF A DOUBT. — Where the claimants testified that the manager of the respondent company promised them two to three years back pay for services rendered to the U.S. Army in Bataan, but evidence was submitted to refute said testimony and the lower court declared that it was in a state of doubt as to whether or not such promise was actually made, it is held that the grant by the lower court of backpay to the claimants because "the Court has to give the claimants the benefit of the doubt", has no foundation in law. As the claimants were the ones who made affirmative allegation that such backpay was promised, it was them who had the duty of establishing the truth of such affirmative allegation by a preponderance of evidence.

6. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; PROMISE MADE DURING THE LAST WAR CONSTRUCTION LIMITED TO DURATION OF WAR IN BATAAN. — The most sensible interpretation of the alleged promise of backpay, in view of the belief then prevalent among Filipinos and American that the war would not last for a long time, was that the pay must be during the period of the hostilities only.

7. ID.; ID.; CLAIMANTS ENTITLED TO SIXTEEN HOURS OVERTIME PAY DURING THEIR STAY IN BATAAN. — Taking into account that claimants joined the U.S. Army in Bataan and were actually in service there and that hostilities were continuous from the time they went to Bataan up to the surrender in April 9, 1942, it is held that the claim for overtime pay of sixteen hours per day is justified.

8. ID.; ID.; BACKPAY CLAIM NOT REDUCED BY ACTUAL AMOUNTS RECEIVED FROM THE U.S. ARMY BY CLAIMANTS. — The claims of the for backpay should not be reduced by the actual amounts received by them from the U.S. Army, because during the claimants’ stay in Bataan they were there as employees of the respondent Luzon Brokerage Company.

9. ID.; ID.; AMOUNT OF PAY APPROVED. — Where the employer promised his employees back wages for services rendered to the U.S. Army in Bataan, it is held that the amount of pay approved should cover the wages from December 8, 1941 to June 8, 1942, with 16 hours overtime from December 8, 1941 to April 9, 1942.

10. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; RULE OF OMNIBUS MOTION APPLICABLE ONLY TO THOSE THAT TEND TO DELAY PERFECTION OF APPEAL. — The rule on omnibus motions is applicable only to motions for reconsideration that tend to delay the perfection of an appeal, but not to motions for reconsideration addressed to the merits of the case, as in the case at bar.

11. APPEALS; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF JUDGMENT OF SUPREME COURT; WHEN FINDINGS OF FACT MAY BE SUBJECT OF MOTION. — Findings of facts of the Court of Industrial Relations not reviewed in the original decision of the Supreme Court nor in the subsequent resolution of the later Court nor in the subsequent resolution of the later Court, may still be the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

12. LABOR RELATIONS; BACKPAY OF LABORERS DURING WAR OPERATIONS IN BATAAN; NOT TO INCLUDE INCIDENTAL EXPENSES — All incidental expenses spent by the claimant laborers while in war operations in Bataan cannot be granted to them, where there was no agreement that such expenses were to be charged against the company and said claimants had received both their backpay from the company and their wages from the United States Army.

13. ID.; ID.; CANNOT INCLUDE WAGES NOT SUBJECT TO SUIT. — Where the subject of the suit is back wages when the claimants went to Bataan during the last war, it cannot include supposed unpaid wages before the claimants went to Bataan.

The above-entitled case, G.R. No. L-17085, is a sequel to case G.R. No. L-6608 promulgated by this Court on December 29, 1954. In the latter some 425 employees of the Luzon Brokerage Company at the time of the outbreak of the last war brought an action in the Court of Industrial Relations for the recovery of their respective back pays for service rendered during the war. The Court of Industrial Relations found that claimants rendered services to the United States Army in Bataan, upon orders of their employer, the Luzon Brokerage Company, and under promise made by their president and general manager to grant them pay while in said service. Said Court found that a contract of employment existed and the claimants were entitled to their back pay. However, it dismissed the action on the ground that the cause of action for said back pay had prescribed. Upon appeal of the case to Us in G.R. No. L-6608, we reversed the decision, declaring that the action was not barred, so the case was remanded for new trial because the court below had not made specific awards for each of the 425 claimants. We ordered the court below, therefore, to give opportunity to the claimants to present evidence to determine the amount of pay each of the claimants was entitled to.

In the case at bar, which was the new trial ordered by this Court as above indicated, the Court of Industrial Relations received the evidence submitted by the claimants. After trial it found that only 239 of the claimants were entitled to back pay, setting forth in its decision the amounts that each of them was entitled to receive. This decision, dated December 29, 1959, is the subject of this present petition for certiorari.

In the Court below petitioner herein contended that in the new trial, further evidence on the question of the existence of a right on behalf of the claimants should be admitted from either side, but the court overruled the contention and held that the scope of the new trial should be limited to the reception of evidence on the specific amount that each of the claimants was entitled to receive, and that issues previously tried and determined could not be litigated anew. After hearing the evidence the court below found that only 239 of the original 425 claimants were entitled to recover back pay, overtime pay and incidental expenses, in the sums stated in the respective affidavits of claimants. The court summarized the said claims in a table of unpaid claims and this reached a total of around P1,500,000.

The first important question raised in this petition is the claim of petitioner herein that the new trial in the court below should not have been limited to the determination of the specific award that each of the claimants should receive. We find no merit in this contention. In the previous case, G.R. No. L-6608, the Court of Industrial Relations had found that there was a contract of employment between the members of the union and the Luzon Brokerage Company, when the manager of the latter asked the laborers to proceed to Bataan and there render services under the direction of the United States Army, and said manager made the promise to pay them wages that they were entitled to during their term of service. The court dismissed the petition, however, on the ground that their claims had already prescribed. To such effect was the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-6608. The reason why the case was remanded by Us to the court below was because there was no sufficient evidence upon which to determine the amount of the award that each of the claimants was entitled to. The contention of petitioner in the case at bar is, therefore, inconsistent with the decision in the said previous case, G.R. No. L-6608. The existence of a cause of action was the main issue in the original case. The trial court found that there was a cause of action but that the same had prescribed. On appeal the judgment of the Industrial Court was set aside, not on the ground that there was no cause of action, but on the ground that the said cause of action had not yet prescribed. This Court expressly ordered the remanding of the case to determine the specific amounts that each of the claimants was entitled to. This order would not have been issued had not the court found that the cause of action had already been proved.

Elaborating on its theory that the issue as to the right of the claimants to receive back pay should have been further examined and further evidence permitted, petitioner herein argues that some claimants who were given back pay did not state in their affidavits that they went to Bataan. We find however that there are witnesses to these claimants having been in Bataan. One of such witnesses is Agripino Monares. It is further argued that the ruling or finding that the claimants went to Bataan as employees of the petitioning company is erroneous because the records of the United States Army show that many of these claimants (24 mentioned in the brief for petitioner) had actually received pay from the United States Army, particularly the Philippine Motor Transport Depot, QMC, U.S. Army. On examining the transcript of the payrolls we find that the 24 employees received pay for actual work for different number of days, some 8, some 24 hours, some 132 hours, some 1-1/2 days, some 15 days, etc., so that the United States Army paid for services actually rendered in the motor pools, but these are only for the actual days employed. The basis of the claims is the promise of the Luzon Brokerage Company to pay for their services while in Bataan. The receipt of these salaries or wages does not mean that they are excluded or barred from claiming the back pay which the manager of the Luzon Brokerage Company had promised to them when they left Manila and proceeded to Bataan on orders of the United States Army. A third important objection to the decision sought to be reviewed is the claim that there is no evidence to support the awards given to the 239 claimants by the court below, except their respective affidavits. The gist of the contention is that the affidavits of the claimants upon which the awards are based had been objected to by petitioner herein and the court below never resolved said timely objections. The court below states the following in its judgments:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rest of the union witnesses, representing the group of garage employees, named and identified the 239 claimants who were sent to Bataan and indicated the designations and positions that each claimant was holding at the outbreak of the war. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

But the decision states that 30 witnesses testified at the time of the trial and these witnesses, with the exception of six, identified the claimants who were in Bataan. It is, therefore, not true that the award was based on the affidavits alone. Besides, Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 expressly provides that the Industrial Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of evidence. The bases of the awards were not only the respective affidavits of the claimants but the testimonies of 24 witnesses (because 6 were not given credence by the court below), who identified the said 239 claimants. The contention of petitioner on this point is therefore unfounded.

But it is further contended on the appeal that inasmuch as 6 witnesses for the claimants were not believed by the court below, the claimants whom they identified, around 80 in number, should not have been awarded their claims. These witnesses are Daniel Padilla, Anastacio Balano, Luis Malabanan, Eugenio Basco, Arturo Salazar and Emiliano Lazaro. The court below clearly declared that these witnesses could not be believed, but according to the court below their testimonies were not the only evidence upon which the claims of the 80 claimants mentioned by them were based. As the court below said, they were identified by the other witnesses, meaning that the 80 claimants questioned were identified by other witnesses (page 8, decision), as having been in Bataan. This identification together with their affidavits should be sufficient support for the finding of the court below that they were entitled to back pay.

A fifth question raised in the appeal is that as claimants have received their separation pay they should have been considered as having waived their back pay. There is also no merit in this contention. Separation pay is the pay that an employee receives at the time of separation from the service. Separation pay is distinct and different from the wages that he was entitled to. Precisely, the granting of separation pay presupposes a previous employment; how can an employee receive separation pay if he was not employed prior to the separation?

The sixth error assigned to the court, that the claim of petitioners has prescribed, was passed upon adversely by Us in the previous case, L-6608. The last contention of petitioner is that the Court of Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction to consider the claims for said money claims. This contention was already passed upon by Us adversely to the petitioner in G.R. No. L-9446, wherein we held that an employee-employer relationship existed between petitioner company and respondent claimants for back pay, and claims for back pay are potential sources of dispute between employer and employees. Consequently the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction (G.R. No. L-9446)

Finding no error in the decision of the court below, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied, and the decision sought to be reviewed affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.