EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16949. March 18, 1967.]
ROSALINA SANTOS ETC., ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, Defendant-Appellant.
Solicitor General, for Defendant-Appellant.
De los Santos, De los Santos & De los Santos, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS; EFFECTS WHEN NOT DISAPPROVED NO NECESSITY OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN ORDER TO BRING SUIT BEFORE THE COURT. — It is now settled that Department Secretaries are the alter ego of the President so that the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications is presumed to be that of the President, unless disapproved (See e.g., Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil., 451; Lovina v. Moreno, G. R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963). Hence, plaintiffs-appellees need not appeal the decision of the defendant-appellant to the President before bringing the case before the court.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF REP. ACT 2056. — Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that the silence of the Torrens Title with regard to the existence of a navigable stream within a property does not preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of its existence.
3. ID.; EX POST FACTO LAW; APPLICABILITY; CASE AT BAR. — A constitutional provision that no ex post facto law shall be enacted is applicable only to criminal cases. Plaintiffs-appellees are not being prosecuted for constructing dikes; they are merely being ordered by the Secretary of Public Works to demolish the illegal constructions on the channels of public navigable rivers and/or streams. As to constructions in the past, Republic Act No. 2056 merely authorizes their summary demolition as public nuisances by orders of the Secretary of Public Works after complying with due process. Here is no exercise by the State of the coercive power of its criminal law.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF REP. ACT 2056. — Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that the silence of the Torrens Title with regard to the existence of a navigable stream within a property does not preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of its existence.
3. ID.; EX POST FACTO LAW; APPLICABILITY; CASE AT BAR. — A constitutional provision that no ex post facto law shall be enacted is applicable only to criminal cases. Plaintiffs-appellees are not being prosecuted for constructing dikes; they are merely being ordered by the Secretary of Public Works to demolish the illegal constructions on the channels of public navigable rivers and/or streams. As to constructions in the past, Republic Act No. 2056 merely authorizes their summary demolition as public nuisances by orders of the Secretary of Public Works after complying with due process. Here is no exercise by the State of the coercive power of its criminal law.
D E C I S I O N
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal taken directly to Us by the Solicitor General in behalf of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, setting aside the defendant-appellant’s order in Administrative Cases Nos. RA-2056-90-91 as null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction theretofore issued.
On September 19, 1958, the then Senator Rogelio de la Rosa wrote a letter to the defendant Secretary of Public Works and Communications requesting action by the latter on the petition of some residents of Sexmoan, Pampanga, that certain creeks, rivers and/or streams which were allegedly converted into fishponds by certain parties, among them the plaintiff-appellees, be reopened pursuant to Republic Act No. 2056.
Acting on the said communication, Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications Marciano Bautista designated Atty. Jesus Lazaro to investigate the alleged encroachment of public navigable rivers, streams and waterways in Sexmoan, Pampanga. The cases, docketed as "Cases Nos. RA-2056-90-91," concerned two (2) fishponds, one called "Mandayag," registered in the name of the late Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, whose estate is now under administration of the plaintiff-appellee Rosalina Santos, a niece of the said decedent, and the other called "Paculayo," registered in the name of the spouses Jose S. Chivi, Jr. and Lydia R. Chivi, the other plaintiffs-appellees in this case.
The investigator conducted several hearings and thereafter submitted a report to the defendant-appellant on January 29, 1959. On the basis of this report, the defendant-appellant rendered a decision dated February 3, 1959, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Premises considered it is hereby ordered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That respondent Rosalina Santos de la Paz remove whatever fishpond constructions and/or works illegally placed on the bed of Sapang Mandayag and restore the channel of said stream to its original condition;
(2) That respondents Jose Chivi, Jr. and Lydia R. Chivi remove all fishpond construction and/or works placed across the Paculayo River and Paculayo Creek and restore the channels and/or beds of said streams to their original conditions; and
(3) That the above fishpond constructions and/or works be removed within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the decision by the respondents; otherwise, this Office or its duly authorized representative shall remove the same at the expense of said respondents within ten (10) days after the expiration of the thirty-day period given them, without prejudice to instituting judicial proceedings against them under the provisions of Section 3 of Republic Act No 2056."cralaw virtua1aw library
Not satisfied with the decision of the defendant-appellant, plaintiffs-appellees filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint with preliminary injunction "to declare null and void and without legal effect the decision, of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and/or to declare Republic Act No. 2056 unconstitutional." They alleged, among other things, that the fishponds which were the subject matter of the administrative investigation were their private properties registered under the Land Registration Act; that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional, being ex post facto and having delegated a purely judicial function to administrative officials; that the complainants in the administrative case were not real parties in interest and that the defendant-appellant had no authority whatsoever to inquire into the titles of plaintiffs-appellees or otherwise conduct the investigation in question.
In his answer, Defendant-Appellant Secretary of Public Works and Communications claimed that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because plaintiffs-appellees did not exhaust all administrative remedies; that Republic Act No. 2056 was valid and constitutional; that under the principle of separation of powers, the judiciary is not authorized to inquire into, or interfere with, the exercise of executive functions and defendant-appellant’s duties and authority under Republic Act No. 2056; that factual findings in administrative investigations are conclusive upon courts; that the construction and encroachments ordered demolished in defendant-appellant’s decision in question were made by plaintiffs on public navigable rivers, streams and creeks without proper authority and to the detriment of public interest; and that the Torrens titles of plaintiffs-appellees to the fishponds in question do not include public streams, rivers, creeks and waterways found therein and, that even supposing that their titles purport to cover such rivers, streams, creeks and waterways, the registration and adjudication thereof in plaintiffs’ name are illegal and null and void insofar as they include the said rivers, streams, creeks and waterways.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment declaring the decision of defendant-appellant null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction therefore issued. It, however, disallowed plaintiffs-appellees’ claim for damages on the ground that defendant-appellant had acted in his official capacity.
Defendant-appellant brought this appeal on the following assignment of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The lower court erred in holding that although plaintiffs have not appealed the defendant-appellant’s decision to the President of the Philippine they are not precluded from bringing the action to the court under the theory "that the Secretary of a Department is an alter ego of the President," and that "the action of the defendant bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. The lower court erred in holding that defendant-appellant committed "gross abuse of discretion" in investigating and rendering the decision in the administrative case on the ground that he cannot review and reverse the lawful actuations and final decisions of a court of justice which granted the registration of the properties in question to plaintiffs.
3. The lower court erred in holding that Republic Act No. 2056 which became effective on June 18, 1958 could not affect the plaintiffs’ fishponds constructed about a century ago; and that the prosecution of plaintiffs-appellees renders it ex post facto.
The first assignment of error is without merit. It is now settled that Department Secretaries are the alter ego of the President so that the decision of Secretary of Public Works and Communications is presumed to be that of the President, unless disapproved (See, e.g., Villena v. Sec. of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451; Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963).
But the second assignment is well taken. The trial court held that there was "gross abuse of discretion" on the part of the defendant-appellant when he ordered the removal of fishpond constructions on the beds of Sapang Mandayag, Paculayo River and Paculayo Creek because in so doing defendant-appellant reviewed and reversed the decision of a court of justice which ordered the registration of the properties under the Torrens system. In the case of Lovina v. Moreno, supra, this Court has held already that Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and that the silence of the Torrens title with regard to the existence of a navigable stream within a property does not preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of its existence.
Indeed, the investigator found evidence of the existence of a Paculayo River and Sapang Paculayo. His report states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
PACULAYO
"The documentary evidence gathered prove to the existence not only of the Paculayo Creeks but also of a certain Paculayung Maragul or River. The Blueprint Plan of a private land as surveyed for Lydia R. Chivi on July 18, 1956 and February 13, 1957 by Quintin A. Paredes which was approved by the Director of Lands on April 29, 1957, marked as Psu 158623 (See Annex S) and Blueprint Plan of private land as surveyed for Simeon Blas on December 9, 1928, by M. G. Espinosa and approved on August 20, 1930 by the Director of Lands for Psu 71475 (See Annex S-1), conclusively proved that Paculayo River was 100 meters wide and Sapang Paculayung Maragul was 30 meters wide and now enclosed in the fishpond now owned by the respondent Lydia R. Chivi.
"As to the navigability of the said Paculayu River and Sapang Paculayu, the same has been proven by the testimonies of Mr. Pedro Bengco and Pablo Lucas . . .
"However, at the Sexmoan Cadastre CM 14
On September 19, 1958, the then Senator Rogelio de la Rosa wrote a letter to the defendant Secretary of Public Works and Communications requesting action by the latter on the petition of some residents of Sexmoan, Pampanga, that certain creeks, rivers and/or streams which were allegedly converted into fishponds by certain parties, among them the plaintiff-appellees, be reopened pursuant to Republic Act No. 2056.
Acting on the said communication, Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications Marciano Bautista designated Atty. Jesus Lazaro to investigate the alleged encroachment of public navigable rivers, streams and waterways in Sexmoan, Pampanga. The cases, docketed as "Cases Nos. RA-2056-90-91," concerned two (2) fishponds, one called "Mandayag," registered in the name of the late Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, whose estate is now under administration of the plaintiff-appellee Rosalina Santos, a niece of the said decedent, and the other called "Paculayo," registered in the name of the spouses Jose S. Chivi, Jr. and Lydia R. Chivi, the other plaintiffs-appellees in this case.
The investigator conducted several hearings and thereafter submitted a report to the defendant-appellant on January 29, 1959. On the basis of this report, the defendant-appellant rendered a decision dated February 3, 1959, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Premises considered it is hereby ordered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That respondent Rosalina Santos de la Paz remove whatever fishpond constructions and/or works illegally placed on the bed of Sapang Mandayag and restore the channel of said stream to its original condition;
(2) That respondents Jose Chivi, Jr. and Lydia R. Chivi remove all fishpond construction and/or works placed across the Paculayo River and Paculayo Creek and restore the channels and/or beds of said streams to their original conditions; and
(3) That the above fishpond constructions and/or works be removed within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the decision by the respondents; otherwise, this Office or its duly authorized representative shall remove the same at the expense of said respondents within ten (10) days after the expiration of the thirty-day period given them, without prejudice to instituting judicial proceedings against them under the provisions of Section 3 of Republic Act No 2056."cralaw virtua1aw library
Not satisfied with the decision of the defendant-appellant, plaintiffs-appellees filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint with preliminary injunction "to declare null and void and without legal effect the decision, of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and/or to declare Republic Act No. 2056 unconstitutional." They alleged, among other things, that the fishponds which were the subject matter of the administrative investigation were their private properties registered under the Land Registration Act; that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional, being ex post facto and having delegated a purely judicial function to administrative officials; that the complainants in the administrative case were not real parties in interest and that the defendant-appellant had no authority whatsoever to inquire into the titles of plaintiffs-appellees or otherwise conduct the investigation in question.
In his answer, Defendant-Appellant Secretary of Public Works and Communications claimed that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because plaintiffs-appellees did not exhaust all administrative remedies; that Republic Act No. 2056 was valid and constitutional; that under the principle of separation of powers, the judiciary is not authorized to inquire into, or interfere with, the exercise of executive functions and defendant-appellant’s duties and authority under Republic Act No. 2056; that factual findings in administrative investigations are conclusive upon courts; that the construction and encroachments ordered demolished in defendant-appellant’s decision in question were made by plaintiffs on public navigable rivers, streams and creeks without proper authority and to the detriment of public interest; and that the Torrens titles of plaintiffs-appellees to the fishponds in question do not include public streams, rivers, creeks and waterways found therein and, that even supposing that their titles purport to cover such rivers, streams, creeks and waterways, the registration and adjudication thereof in plaintiffs’ name are illegal and null and void insofar as they include the said rivers, streams, creeks and waterways.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment declaring the decision of defendant-appellant null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction therefore issued. It, however, disallowed plaintiffs-appellees’ claim for damages on the ground that defendant-appellant had acted in his official capacity.
Defendant-appellant brought this appeal on the following assignment of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The lower court erred in holding that although plaintiffs have not appealed the defendant-appellant’s decision to the President of the Philippine they are not precluded from bringing the action to the court under the theory "that the Secretary of a Department is an alter ego of the President," and that "the action of the defendant bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. The lower court erred in holding that defendant-appellant committed "gross abuse of discretion" in investigating and rendering the decision in the administrative case on the ground that he cannot review and reverse the lawful actuations and final decisions of a court of justice which granted the registration of the properties in question to plaintiffs.
3. The lower court erred in holding that Republic Act No. 2056 which became effective on June 18, 1958 could not affect the plaintiffs’ fishponds constructed about a century ago; and that the prosecution of plaintiffs-appellees renders it ex post facto.
The first assignment of error is without merit. It is now settled that Department Secretaries are the alter ego of the President so that the decision of Secretary of Public Works and Communications is presumed to be that of the President, unless disapproved (See, e.g., Villena v. Sec. of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451; Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963).
But the second assignment is well taken. The trial court held that there was "gross abuse of discretion" on the part of the defendant-appellant when he ordered the removal of fishpond constructions on the beds of Sapang Mandayag, Paculayo River and Paculayo Creek because in so doing defendant-appellant reviewed and reversed the decision of a court of justice which ordered the registration of the properties under the Torrens system. In the case of Lovina v. Moreno, supra, this Court has held already that Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and that the silence of the Torrens title with regard to the existence of a navigable stream within a property does not preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of its existence.
Indeed, the investigator found evidence of the existence of a Paculayo River and Sapang Paculayo. His report states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
PACULAYO
"The documentary evidence gathered prove to the existence not only of the Paculayo Creeks but also of a certain Paculayung Maragul or River. The Blueprint Plan of a private land as surveyed for Lydia R. Chivi on July 18, 1956 and February 13, 1957 by Quintin A. Paredes which was approved by the Director of Lands on April 29, 1957, marked as Psu 158623 (See Annex S) and Blueprint Plan of private land as surveyed for Simeon Blas on December 9, 1928, by M. G. Espinosa and approved on August 20, 1930 by the Director of Lands for Psu 71475 (See Annex S-1), conclusively proved that Paculayo River was 100 meters wide and Sapang Paculayung Maragul was 30 meters wide and now enclosed in the fishpond now owned by the respondent Lydia R. Chivi.
"As to the navigability of the said Paculayu River and Sapang Paculayu, the same has been proven by the testimonies of Mr. Pedro Bengco and Pablo Lucas . . .
x x x
"However, at the Sexmoan Cadastre CM 14
