EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21473. October 31, 1967.]
PERFECTO D. KORDOVEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SOFRONIO C. CARMONA, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Respondent-Appellee.
E. M. Diola for Petitioner-Appellant.
R. N. de la Victoria and Solicitor General for Respondent-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT OF POLICE OFFICERS; SECTION 3 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 557 NOT REPEALED. — Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557 was not repealed by Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260. Republic No. 557 is a special law applicable, only to provincial guards, city and municipal policemen, with civil service eligibility, while Republic Act No. 2260 is a general law applicable to public officials and employees, civil service eligibles or not. In case of conflict between the two kinds of legislative enactment, the rule is that the one general in character shall not be deemed to have repealed the special law unless that is expressly and clearly provided in the former. Besides, Section 16 of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, reproduces the last part of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557.
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN REINSTATEMENT CANNOT BE LEGALLY DEMANDED. — Although under Republic Act No. 557 a suspended policeman is entitled to reinstatement if the administrative case against him has not been finally decided within sixty (60) days after his preventive suspension, such reinstatement can not be demanded if the delay in the disposition of his case is due to his own fault or petition as when the cause of the delay was his appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service (Alacar v. City, etc., G.R. No. L-10020, December 29, 1958; Martinez v. Municipal Mayor, etc., G.R. No. L-11868, April 30, 1958). It would be contrary to the spirit of mandamus proceedings to compel reinstatement of a suspended officer after he has been found guilty and dropped from the service by the competent official body (Martinez v. Municipal Mayor, etc., supra).
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN REINSTATEMENT CANNOT BE LEGALLY DEMANDED. — Although under Republic Act No. 557 a suspended policeman is entitled to reinstatement if the administrative case against him has not been finally decided within sixty (60) days after his preventive suspension, such reinstatement can not be demanded if the delay in the disposition of his case is due to his own fault or petition as when the cause of the delay was his appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service (Alacar v. City, etc., G.R. No. L-10020, December 29, 1958; Martinez v. Municipal Mayor, etc., G.R. No. L-11868, April 30, 1958). It would be contrary to the spirit of mandamus proceedings to compel reinstatement of a suspended officer after he has been found guilty and dropped from the service by the competent official body (Martinez v. Municipal Mayor, etc., supra).
D E C I S I O N
DIZON, J.:
Petitioner Perfecto D. Kordovez was a desk sergeant of the police force of the City of San Carlos, Province of Negros Occidental, with the required civil service eligibility. Having been charged administratively by the respondent mayor for violation of law or duty, he was suspended from office on September 19, 1962.
After due investigation of the charges, the Municipal Board, on October 24, 1962, rendered a decision dismissing him from the service. Thereupon and within the period provided for in Republic Act No. 557, he appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service.
Sixty days after the date of his suspension (September 19, 1962) petitioner asked the respondent mayor to order his reinstatement pending appeal, invoking the provisions of Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557, and our ruling in the case of Paulino Garcia v. the Hon. Executive Secretary, Et. Al. Respondent having refused to do so, the petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for Mandamus to secure an order for his reinstatement, to recover back salaries from November 19, 1962, the date which he claimed to be the end of his 60-day preventive suspension, and damages (Civil Case No. 6862).
After due trial, however, the lower court rendered its decision dismissing the petition. Hence, this appeal.
To secure a reversal of the appealed decision, the petitioner relies solely upon the proposition that under the provisions of Section 35 of Republic Act 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he is entitled to reinstatement because the Commissioner of Civil Service has not decided his appeal within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of his preventive suspension. We find no merit in this contention.
The law applicable to the present case is Republic Act No. 557, Section 3, and not the one relied upon by the petitioner. Contrary to his view, We are of the opinion that no provision of the latter had repealed the former. Republic Act No. 2260 is a general law which covers public officials and employees, civil service eligibles or not, while Republic Act No. 557 is a special law which applies only to provincial guards, city and municipal policemen with civil service eligibility. In case of conflict between the two kinds of legislative enactment, the rule is that the one general in character shall not be deemed to have repealed the special law unless that is expressly and clearly provided in the former. The reason for this is that the special law evinces the particular legislative intent more clearly.
That Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557 was not repealed by Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260 may also be inferred from the fact that Section 16 of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966 - which took effect on September 8, 1966 - reproduces the last part of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Provided, however, That if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence, or petition of the respondent, the period of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. The respondent shall be entitled to his salary for the period of suspension upon exoneration."cralaw virtua1aw library
In connection with such provision, We have held heretofore that although under Republic Act No. 557 as suspended policeman is entitled to reinstatement if the administrative case against him has not been finally decided within sixty (60) days after his preventive suspension, such reinstatement can not be demanded if the delay in the disposition of his case is due to his own fault or petition as when the cause of the delay was the appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service taken by him (Alacar v. City etc., G.R. No. L-10020, December 29, 1958; Martinez v. Municipal Mayor, etc., G.R. No. L-11868, April 30, 1958)
In the Martinez case (supra), We said the following which applies squarely to the one before Us:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It will be noticed however, that on the sixtieth day the council voted by resolution to remove the petitioner from his position, Such resolution would have decided the matter finally if petitioner has not filed a notice of appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service. Therefore, his case was not finally disposed of because of his own voluntary act of appealing which amounted to a petition for review. Such petition excused any delay in the definite disposition of the charges.
"Indeed, it would be contrary to the spirit of mandamus proceedings to compel reinstatement of a suspended officer after the latter had been found guilty and dropped from the service by the competent official body. Such suspended official, it may be said, did not have a clear legal right (to return) enforceable by mandamus. And the court’s discretion should not be exercised in a way injurious to public interest; nor should mandamus issue where it would not promote substantial justice."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
After due investigation of the charges, the Municipal Board, on October 24, 1962, rendered a decision dismissing him from the service. Thereupon and within the period provided for in Republic Act No. 557, he appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service.
Sixty days after the date of his suspension (September 19, 1962) petitioner asked the respondent mayor to order his reinstatement pending appeal, invoking the provisions of Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557, and our ruling in the case of Paulino Garcia v. the Hon. Executive Secretary, Et. Al. Respondent having refused to do so, the petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for Mandamus to secure an order for his reinstatement, to recover back salaries from November 19, 1962, the date which he claimed to be the end of his 60-day preventive suspension, and damages (Civil Case No. 6862).
After due trial, however, the lower court rendered its decision dismissing the petition. Hence, this appeal.
To secure a reversal of the appealed decision, the petitioner relies solely upon the proposition that under the provisions of Section 35 of Republic Act 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he is entitled to reinstatement because the Commissioner of Civil Service has not decided his appeal within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of his preventive suspension. We find no merit in this contention.
The law applicable to the present case is Republic Act No. 557, Section 3, and not the one relied upon by the petitioner. Contrary to his view, We are of the opinion that no provision of the latter had repealed the former. Republic Act No. 2260 is a general law which covers public officials and employees, civil service eligibles or not, while Republic Act No. 557 is a special law which applies only to provincial guards, city and municipal policemen with civil service eligibility. In case of conflict between the two kinds of legislative enactment, the rule is that the one general in character shall not be deemed to have repealed the special law unless that is expressly and clearly provided in the former. The reason for this is that the special law evinces the particular legislative intent more clearly.
That Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557 was not repealed by Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260 may also be inferred from the fact that Section 16 of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966 - which took effect on September 8, 1966 - reproduces the last part of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 557 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Provided, however, That if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence, or petition of the respondent, the period of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. The respondent shall be entitled to his salary for the period of suspension upon exoneration."cralaw virtua1aw library
In connection with such provision, We have held heretofore that although under Republic Act No. 557 as suspended policeman is entitled to reinstatement if the administrative case against him has not been finally decided within sixty (60) days after his preventive suspension, such reinstatement can not be demanded if the delay in the disposition of his case is due to his own fault or petition as when the cause of the delay was the appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service taken by him (Alacar v. City etc., G.R. No. L-10020, December 29, 1958; Martinez v. Municipal Mayor, etc., G.R. No. L-11868, April 30, 1958)
In the Martinez case (supra), We said the following which applies squarely to the one before Us:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It will be noticed however, that on the sixtieth day the council voted by resolution to remove the petitioner from his position, Such resolution would have decided the matter finally if petitioner has not filed a notice of appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service. Therefore, his case was not finally disposed of because of his own voluntary act of appealing which amounted to a petition for review. Such petition excused any delay in the definite disposition of the charges.
"Indeed, it would be contrary to the spirit of mandamus proceedings to compel reinstatement of a suspended officer after the latter had been found guilty and dropped from the service by the competent official body. Such suspended official, it may be said, did not have a clear legal right (to return) enforceable by mandamus. And the court’s discretion should not be exercised in a way injurious to public interest; nor should mandamus issue where it would not promote substantial justice."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
