EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-29058. February 28, 1969.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMAS LACANDAZO, Et Al., Accused, FELIZARDA SANDOVAL, Mother of the offended party and appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES; RETIREMENT GRATUITY; RECEIPT OF RETIREMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS UNDER GSIS LAW, PRECLUDES RIGHT TO GRATUITY UNDER ACT NO. 2589. — At all events, it is not denied that the appellant was retired as deputy provincial treasurer and postmaster of the Municipality and granted the corresponding retirement insurance benefits under the provisions of the GSIS ACT. Having thus availed himself of the retirement benefits under the GSIS law, he cannot now legally be granted further gratuity under Act 2589 because Section 28(b) of the GSIS Act, as amended, provides that." .. no gratuity or benefit shall be paid by an employer to an employee entitled to the retirement benefits of this Act." Indeed, We ruled in Gabriel v. Government Service Insurance System (L-11580, May 9, 1958 - and emphasized in Lacson v. Auditor General (L-12538, April 29, 1960) that under the second paragraph of Section 28 of the GSIS Act, as amended, any gratuity is excluded by the enjoyment of retirement insurance benefits. Consequently, the appellant - by receiving retirement insurance benefits under the GSIS law - has, by his own voluntary act, divested himself of his right to gratuity under Act 2589.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE AGAINST RECEIVING DOUBLE PENSION. — The appellant of course argues that he was granted under the GSIS Act only the retirement benefits corresponding to his positions as deputy provincial treasurer and postmaster, respectively; ergo, he should be awarded retirement gratuity as municipal treasurer. The foregoing argument completely ignores the overriding consideration that although he was simultaneously discharging the duties of postmaster, municipal treasurer and deputy provincial treasurer, he was rendering service to only one Government. The gratuity received by him under the GSIS Act, as amended, was obviously in consideration of his entire services rendered to the Government as of his retirement in 1958. It is equally clear that the retirement benefits he claims under Section 1 of Act 2589 are in consideration of the same services. Evidently, if he were allowed to receive full benefits under the Osmeña Retirement Law, in addition to the retirement insurance benefits he had already received under the GSIS Act, he would receive double pension for exactly the same services. This eventuality would run roughshod over the well- settled rule that in the absence of an express legal exception, pension and gratuity laws should be construed to preclude any person from receiving double pension. In fine, although the appellant had established his right to gratuity under Act 2589, when he opted to receive gratuity benefits under the GSIS Act, he thereby waived the benefits available under the former law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPALITY IN INSTANT CASE IS NOT DUTY BOUND TO PAY APPELLANT GRATUITY. — We agree with the lower court that there is no statute which makes it obligatory for the Municipality to pay out of its funds the gratuity which the appellant demands under Act 2589. The appellant, however, cites sections 2184 and 2242(a) of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1 of R.A. 2264. Sec. 2184 of the Revised Administrative Code does indeed command that two-thirds of the salary of the Municipal Treasurer be paid from the municipal funds and one-third thereof from provincial funds. But from this insufficient premise one cannot derive the conclusion that the Municipality is duty bound to pay the appellant the gratuity receivable under Act 2589, for Section 4 of the said Act designates in no uncertain terms the source of the sums necessary to implement its provisions — i.e., the Insular (now the National) Treasury. Assuming therefore that the appellant is additionally entitled to gratuity under Act 2589, that would be a financial liability not of the Municipality but of the National Government.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF GRATUITY IN INSTANT CASE IS AN OBLIGATION OF THE NATIONAL TREASURY. — Section 2242(a) of the Revised Administrative Code specifies the duties of a municipal council, conformably with law, to fix the salaries of all municipal officers and employees (except the treasurer and the teachers in the public schools) and to provide for such expenditures as are necessary in the proper conduct of the lawful activities of the various branches of the municipal government. Verily, this provision of law cannot avail the appellant any, since the payment of the gratuity which he claims, would by law be an obligation of the National Treasury.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO STATUTORY OR DECISIONAL LAW TO SUPPORT PAYMENT OF GRATUITY BY MUNICIPALITY. — Section 1 of R.A. 2264 has no relevance in this case of a retired deputy provincial treasurer and postmaster of a municipality, because it merely requires a province, city, municipality and a regularly organized municipal district to include in their respective budgets provisions for their statutory and/or current contractual obligations. No statutory or decisional law supports the position that the gratuity which the appellant claims is a statutory or current contractual obligation of the municipality.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISALLOWANCE OF MANDAMUS IN INSTANT CASE IS PROPER. — The appellant has failed to establish his cause of action. We have searched in vain for any statutory provision on the basis of which the Municipality may be compelled to pay the gratuity to which he claims he is entitled under Act 2589. The lower court did not therefore err in disallowing the writ of mandamus and the damages prayed for by him, and in consequently dismissing his petition below.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE AGAINST RECEIVING DOUBLE PENSION. — The appellant of course argues that he was granted under the GSIS Act only the retirement benefits corresponding to his positions as deputy provincial treasurer and postmaster, respectively; ergo, he should be awarded retirement gratuity as municipal treasurer. The foregoing argument completely ignores the overriding consideration that although he was simultaneously discharging the duties of postmaster, municipal treasurer and deputy provincial treasurer, he was rendering service to only one Government. The gratuity received by him under the GSIS Act, as amended, was obviously in consideration of his entire services rendered to the Government as of his retirement in 1958. It is equally clear that the retirement benefits he claims under Section 1 of Act 2589 are in consideration of the same services. Evidently, if he were allowed to receive full benefits under the Osmeña Retirement Law, in addition to the retirement insurance benefits he had already received under the GSIS Act, he would receive double pension for exactly the same services. This eventuality would run roughshod over the well- settled rule that in the absence of an express legal exception, pension and gratuity laws should be construed to preclude any person from receiving double pension. In fine, although the appellant had established his right to gratuity under Act 2589, when he opted to receive gratuity benefits under the GSIS Act, he thereby waived the benefits available under the former law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPALITY IN INSTANT CASE IS NOT DUTY BOUND TO PAY APPELLANT GRATUITY. — We agree with the lower court that there is no statute which makes it obligatory for the Municipality to pay out of its funds the gratuity which the appellant demands under Act 2589. The appellant, however, cites sections 2184 and 2242(a) of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1 of R.A. 2264. Sec. 2184 of the Revised Administrative Code does indeed command that two-thirds of the salary of the Municipal Treasurer be paid from the municipal funds and one-third thereof from provincial funds. But from this insufficient premise one cannot derive the conclusion that the Municipality is duty bound to pay the appellant the gratuity receivable under Act 2589, for Section 4 of the said Act designates in no uncertain terms the source of the sums necessary to implement its provisions — i.e., the Insular (now the National) Treasury. Assuming therefore that the appellant is additionally entitled to gratuity under Act 2589, that would be a financial liability not of the Municipality but of the National Government.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF GRATUITY IN INSTANT CASE IS AN OBLIGATION OF THE NATIONAL TREASURY. — Section 2242(a) of the Revised Administrative Code specifies the duties of a municipal council, conformably with law, to fix the salaries of all municipal officers and employees (except the treasurer and the teachers in the public schools) and to provide for such expenditures as are necessary in the proper conduct of the lawful activities of the various branches of the municipal government. Verily, this provision of law cannot avail the appellant any, since the payment of the gratuity which he claims, would by law be an obligation of the National Treasury.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO STATUTORY OR DECISIONAL LAW TO SUPPORT PAYMENT OF GRATUITY BY MUNICIPALITY. — Section 1 of R.A. 2264 has no relevance in this case of a retired deputy provincial treasurer and postmaster of a municipality, because it merely requires a province, city, municipality and a regularly organized municipal district to include in their respective budgets provisions for their statutory and/or current contractual obligations. No statutory or decisional law supports the position that the gratuity which the appellant claims is a statutory or current contractual obligation of the municipality.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISALLOWANCE OF MANDAMUS IN INSTANT CASE IS PROPER. — The appellant has failed to establish his cause of action. We have searched in vain for any statutory provision on the basis of which the Municipality may be compelled to pay the gratuity to which he claims he is entitled under Act 2589. The lower court did not therefore err in disallowing the writ of mandamus and the damages prayed for by him, and in consequently dismissing his petition below.
R E S O L U T I O N
DIZON, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 3115 of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, Tomas Lacandazo was found guilty of homicide through simple negligence and sentenced accordingly "to an imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased (Matilde Sandoval) in the amount of P6,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs." After the promulgation of the sentence the record of the case was elevated to us because of an appeal "made . . . by the mother of the offended party and approved by the court" (Record, p. 1).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 10, 1968, a notice to file brief and to submit proof of service thereof on the adverse party was sent by us to Mrs. Felizarda Sandoval, mother of the deceased Matilde Sandoval, which, according to the record, was received by her on the 20th of the same month and year. In answer thereto, on November 8, 1968, the Clerk of this Court received from Mrs. Sandoval a letter of the following tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I have the honor to inform your High Office that I have already received your kind letter dated September, 1968, in connection with my APPEAL to that Honorable Court.
"With respect to your request to furnish you all pertinent papers regarding this Case, same have already been forwarded to the Solicitor General by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Province of Palawan, Philippines.
"Thanking you in advance for the kind and prompt attention being extended to my humble-self in the premises."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 19, 1968 Tomas Lacandazo filed a motion to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that appellant has no personality to prosecute the same; that the appeal was taken contrary to the provisions of Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court; that at the time of the filing of the notice of appeal Lacandazo had long been serving sentence and that, having already served the penalty imposed upon him, he has been actually released from custody.
Criminal Case No. 3115 mentioned above involved also the civil action for indemnity. As the decision rendered against Lacandazo finding him guilty of homicide through simple negligence can not be the subject of appeal because he would thereby be placed in jeopardy, Mrs. Sandoval’s appeal could be only from that portion of said decision sentencing Lacandazo to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P6,000. It appears in this connection that while the decision aforesaid was dated February 10, 1967, Mrs. Sandoval received notice thereof only on March 9 of the same year and she filed the required notice of appeal on March 17, well within the period of appeal. To this must be added the circumstance that in his order of April 19, 1967, His Honor, the judge of the lower court, gave due course to Mrs. Sandoval’s appeal. It is reasonable to presume, therefore, that appellant had complied with all the legal requirements in connection therewith. Consequently, her appeal can not be dismissed upon any of the grounds relied upon in the motion under consideration.
On the other hand, the record shows that appellant Felizarda Sandoval has not filed any brief up to this time, probably relying upon the Solicitor General to do it for her. In the interest of justice it is resolved to require her to file her brief as appellant, as far as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, within thirty (30) days from notice.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., took no part.
On September 10, 1968, a notice to file brief and to submit proof of service thereof on the adverse party was sent by us to Mrs. Felizarda Sandoval, mother of the deceased Matilde Sandoval, which, according to the record, was received by her on the 20th of the same month and year. In answer thereto, on November 8, 1968, the Clerk of this Court received from Mrs. Sandoval a letter of the following tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I have the honor to inform your High Office that I have already received your kind letter dated September, 1968, in connection with my APPEAL to that Honorable Court.
"With respect to your request to furnish you all pertinent papers regarding this Case, same have already been forwarded to the Solicitor General by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Province of Palawan, Philippines.
"Thanking you in advance for the kind and prompt attention being extended to my humble-self in the premises."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 19, 1968 Tomas Lacandazo filed a motion to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that appellant has no personality to prosecute the same; that the appeal was taken contrary to the provisions of Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court; that at the time of the filing of the notice of appeal Lacandazo had long been serving sentence and that, having already served the penalty imposed upon him, he has been actually released from custody.
Criminal Case No. 3115 mentioned above involved also the civil action for indemnity. As the decision rendered against Lacandazo finding him guilty of homicide through simple negligence can not be the subject of appeal because he would thereby be placed in jeopardy, Mrs. Sandoval’s appeal could be only from that portion of said decision sentencing Lacandazo to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P6,000. It appears in this connection that while the decision aforesaid was dated February 10, 1967, Mrs. Sandoval received notice thereof only on March 9 of the same year and she filed the required notice of appeal on March 17, well within the period of appeal. To this must be added the circumstance that in his order of April 19, 1967, His Honor, the judge of the lower court, gave due course to Mrs. Sandoval’s appeal. It is reasonable to presume, therefore, that appellant had complied with all the legal requirements in connection therewith. Consequently, her appeal can not be dismissed upon any of the grounds relied upon in the motion under consideration.
On the other hand, the record shows that appellant Felizarda Sandoval has not filed any brief up to this time, probably relying upon the Solicitor General to do it for her. In the interest of justice it is resolved to require her to file her brief as appellant, as far as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, within thirty (30) days from notice.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., took no part.
