1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; IMMIGRATION ACT; SECTION 9 (G) THEREOF, NOT APPLICABLE TO ALIEN WHO LEGITIMATELY BECOMES FILIPINO. — Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds.

2. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; EFFECTS. — The naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-avis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LANGUAGE OF STATUTE IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIONS, THAT WHICH CARRIES OUT OBJECT PREVAILS. — A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction. A construction will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a construction will not result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd consequences.

4. ID.; CONSTRUCTION AVOIDED IF INCONSISTENT WITH LEGISLATIVE INTENT. — So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the intention of the legislature an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an illusory right.

5. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; POLICY OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION, EXPLAINED. — The avowed policy of "selective admission" more particularly refers to a case where a citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to be come citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application is cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operations of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizens of the Philippines.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING FILIPINO IPSO FACTO BECOME CITIZEN PROVIDED NOT DISQUALIFIED BY LAW. — We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING, NOT REQUIRED. — Section 16 is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization a Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should not follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied that same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MODES OF. — The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1 [5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW; PURPOSE. — The leading idea or purpose of Section 15 was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provisions concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to who they are related, the effect is for said person to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WIFE DEEMED A CITIZEN IF SHE MIGHT HERSELF BE NATURALIZED. — The legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force.

11. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA NOT APPLICABLE TO RULINGS THEREON. — Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.

12. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; PROCEDURES FOR ALIEN WIFE TO ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. — Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of the said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited Section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WOMAN MARRIED TO FILIPINO MUST PROVE QUALIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 3. — Our naturalization law separates qualifications from disqualifications; the positive qualifications under Section 3 thereof express a policy of restriction as to candidates for naturalization as much as the disqualifications under Section 4. And it has been shown in our decision in the second Ly Giok Ha case (Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, L-21332 March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 416) that those not disqualified under Section 4 would not necessarily qualify under Section 3, even if the residence qualification were disregarded. In other words, by giving to Section 15 of our Naturalization Law the effect of excluding only those women suffering from disqualification under Section 3 could result in admitting to citizenship woman that Section 2 intends to exclude. In these circumstances, I do not see why American interpretation of the words who might herself be lawfully naturalized should be considered hinding in this jurisdiction.

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., Et. Al. v. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration, ’restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so.’

"The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.

"The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor’s visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits ’1,’ ’1-a,’ and ’2’). She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit ’4’). On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.’

"Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reasons set forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized’ incontestably implies that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao v. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).

‘Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

‘Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.

‘Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised." (Chung Tiao Bing, Et. Al. v. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun v. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).

The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed, not only by the decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act 503).’" (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).

‘And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So v. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.’

"It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write either language."cralaw virtua1aw library

The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the government’s brief, that "in the hearing . . ., it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library



THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE ’WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED’ (OF SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.



THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.



THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG’S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.



THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.



THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.



THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL).

We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised (Chung Tiao Bing, Et. Al. v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun v. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);

"That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao v. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)"

It is obvious from the nature of these objections that their proper resolution would necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants’ assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.



The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants’ second and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seems evident that the Solicitor General’s pose that an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9(g) of the law.

In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9(g) of the Immigration Act providing:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library

does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehement]y expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by aliens to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing v. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 Phil. 785, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of ’change’ or ’correction’, for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this hag been conferred upon him. Consider, for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that ’in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the be deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative.’" (At. pp. 462-463) In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed, therefore, appellants’ second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.



Precisely, the second objection of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung’s marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.

To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, Et. Al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., Et Al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706, 713,1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, G.R. No. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for naturalization, 2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3

Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that ’in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.

"The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.’

"Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she ’herself may be lawfully naturalized.’ As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (O.p. No. 52, series of 1950), * this limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

‘(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;

‘(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

‘(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

‘(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

‘(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;

‘(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the . . . Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;

‘(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.’

"In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the Respondents-Appellants.

"Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may ’be lawfully naturalized,’ and this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue." (At pp. 462-464.).

As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as regards the following propositions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized" ;

2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under Section 4 of the law quoted in the decision;

3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;

4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and

5. That in referring to the disqualifications enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications, 5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnoted several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that ’any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.’ A similar provision in the naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

"In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized’, should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)

"Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband." (Op. No. 176, v. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

"From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.’

"The phrase ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized’, as contained in the above provision, means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941: Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.

"It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)

The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purposes of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she ’might herself be lawfully naturalized’ as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.

"No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport." (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied]

For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law.

It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, 6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show that she ’might herself be lawfully naturalized’ in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.

"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha Et. Al. v. Galang Et. Al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that ’marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she ’herself may he lawfully naturalized,’ and that ’this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473.’ In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.



"Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups? The Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of deportation for ’overstaying’ is pending against the petitioner.

"We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius)" (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition." (Op. No. 38, B. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha Et. Al., v. Galang Et. Al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that ’marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she ’herself may be lawfully naturalized,’ and that ’this limitation of Section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473.’ In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship." (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

"The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph 1 of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, ’marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized" ’, and, quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28, s. 1950, ’this limitation of section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, B. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)

It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay’s authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated (Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the bondsman, (section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government." (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)

Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of; the undertaking in the bond — failure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice — were committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possesses the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization. ** There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization."cralaw virtua1aw library

Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that" (I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized’, should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be naturalized." (Op. Na. 79, s. 1940)

Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the construction of the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., Et. Al. v. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she ’might herself be lawfully naturalized,’ so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions.

It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court’s position. In La San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: 10 San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date at her permit, and when she was refused to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman ’should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen.’ (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: ’If, whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a snare. The proof of the facts may have existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.’)

"In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.

"Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that law provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.

‘Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.

‘Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of their petition.

‘The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to being not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of the following qualifications:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five years, except as provided in the next following section;

‘Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire Period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which they are living;

‘Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession; and

‘Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.

‘In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.’

"Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant, supra, to our law as it then stood, alien women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of that country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents and purposes.

"But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the Caun} and against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized’ must be understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.

"The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized’ must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.

"There is simply no support for the view that the phrase ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized’ must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats ’qualifications’ and ’disqualifications’ in separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that the phrase ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of persons qualified to become citizens by naturalization — the assumption being always that she is not otherwise disqualified.

"We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the same being self-serving."cralaw virtua1aw library

Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong V. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.

Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee’s husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year, Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child’s, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not on]y reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. 7

No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austria’s wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.

Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law." 9

Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the pendency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed above, 11 even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.

Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now under discussion is settled law.

In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? If nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because they wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curiae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who took no part in Ga Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration.

Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.

The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight."cralaw virtua1aw library

This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein."cralaw virtua1aw library

For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner."cralaw virtua1aw library

It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions were added to the above Section 13:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘SEC. 13 (a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.

‘SEC. 13 (b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.

‘SEC. 13 (c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.’"

When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13(a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.

As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.

As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Cauns and against Asiatics, "the only logical deduction . . . is that the phrase ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized’ must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the view that the phrase ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized’ must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14

A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be quoted:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may he deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-19977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in the United States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of the two countries, and hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens.

"This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provision — that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one ’who might herself be lawfully naturalized,’ the reference is no longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman ’might herself be lawfully naturalized’ would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.

"The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.

"Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13. t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.)

"While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being disqualified under any of the eight (’a’ to ’h’) subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.

"At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, Et. Al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.’

"Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the rule that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one who ’might herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).

"Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —

‘(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

‘(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,’

so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship ’must be of good moral character.’

"Similarly, the citizen’s wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain ’herrenvolk’, and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not ’opposed to organized government,’ nor affiliated to groups ’upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments’, nor ’defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas.’ Et sic de caeteris.

"The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess.

"As to the argument that the phrase ’might herself be lawfully naturalized’ was derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot but reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.

1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Cauns only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Who may become Philippines citizens. — Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein."cralaw virtua1aw library

and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable limitations flowing from our status as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority, without which it could not have been done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been quoted earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of the amendment.

2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization laws of the United States already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States."cralaw virtua1aw library

and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Cauns. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to Provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among those expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (c) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the nationalization in the quoted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17

3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason, why the construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as it stood before it repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction uniformly followed in all courts of the United States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United States and all administrative authorities charged with the implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [1935]; Helvering v. Windmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).

A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative authorities is contained in United Stats of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 285 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat.