Motion for reconsideration and/or new trial filed by petitioner-appellee praying that the decision in this case promulgated on April 30, 1970 disallowing the purported will, Exhibit D, of the deceased Gliceria A. del Rosario, be reconsidered and set aside and that the judgment of the trial court admitting the same to probate be affirmed, or, in the alternative, that before finally resolving the said issue of the probate of said purported will, this case be remanded to the court a quo in order that further evidence may be admitted relative to the factual question of whether or not the said deceased could have read the said document on December 29, 1960, the date of the alleged execution of the same, considering the condition of her eyes then.

The grounds alleged in support of the present motion are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Article 808 of the Civil Code applies solely to a blind testator and does not include one with a defective eyesight or one who is illiterate or cannot read;

2. he testimony of Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis, upon which the disallowance of the will was based, has no probative value, because: (a) it is premised upon a grave factual error; (b) such testimony is contradicted by his own clinical record; and (c) it is glaringly superficial and evasive;

3. he testatrix, Doña Gliceria A. del Rosario, was not blind; she could read and did actually read the will now in question, Exhibit "D" ; and

4. Should this Honorable Court still believe that it is necessary to reopen the case to admit additional evidence showing that Doña Gliceria A. del Rosario was not blind, could read and did actually read the aforesaid will, Exhibit "D", then we respectfully move for a new trial for the purpose of admitting such evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library

No doubt counsel’s scholarly dissertation of the above first ground both in their motion and in their reply to appellant’s opposition is impressive and, insofar as the writer of this opinion is concerned, quite logically persuasive and plausible in many respects; but considering the view the Court takes, as hereinunder discussed, of the main factual issue here, on the determination of which the point discussed by counsel has to be predicated, the more fitting occasion to resolve the question thus very ably and vigorously pressed upon would be if and when this case comes back to this Court later, in the event that anyone of the parties should find it necessary to submit an appeal after the court a quo has held the further proceedings herein ordered. At the moment, consideration and resolution of the above second ground should suffice to terminate the present proceeding in this Court.

Under the said second ground, counsel for movant contends that the testimony of Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis, the witness of the so-called intestate heirs, upon which the Court has relied in disallowing the supposed testament, Exhibit D, in its decision now under review, has no probative value. In other words, it is argued that said testimony should not have been believed.

In this connection, it should not, of course, be lost sight of that, as pointed out by appellants in their opposition to the present motion, there are other considerations stated in the decision additionally supporting the assailed conclusion of the Court that "with the condition of her eyesight in August, 1960, and there is no evidence that it had improved by 29 December, 1960, Gliceria del Rosario was incapable of reading and could not have read the will supposedly signed by her on 29 December, 1960." For instance, the numerous typographical errors in the document and its informal and untidy appearance, considering its importance, were taken into account as suggestive of the fact that the supposed testatrix might not have been capacitated to read the same, as otherwise, it is to be normally assumed that she would have refused or, at least, hesitated to proceed with its execution without the proper corrections being made first.

Accordingly, for the Court now to accede to movant’s prayer that it overturn its previous findings in this case, more than mere ratiocination regarding the testimony of Dr. Tamesis is needed. The pivotal issue here is one of fact, and bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence which the Court might have overlooked and which would convincingly show that said doctor’s observations and conclusions are or might be gravely erroneous cannot suffice to move the Court to reverse itself Stated differently, the question that confronts Us now is this: does appellee’s motion at hand allege and demonstrate that there are factual circumstances extant in the record, related to the doctor’s testimony or forming part thereof and probably not clearly brought out before, which if considered now would tend to show that the judgment of this Court may be materially erroneous on account precisely of Our having relied on said testimony?

On this score, movant points out that the testimony of Dr. Tamesis is belied by the very records referred to by said witness himself in the material portions of his declaration in court. Certainly, this point is serious, for if it turns out to be supported by the record, what appears to be one of the main props of the decision would naturally fall and this may eventually cause modification of the judgment, depending on how materially important such discordance is in the resolution of the very issue of whether or not the deceased could have read Exhibit D on December 29, 1960. Consequently, a second look at the relevant evidence discussed in the motion is more than justified.

Before going, however, to the points raised by movant, it bears stating that the first thing that would strike anyone who reviews the testimony of Dr. Tamesis is that the reason or purpose of the so-called appellant intestate heirs in presenting the same is not clear, considering that in none of the nine formal and detailed oppositions filed in the Court below, sometimes individually, at other times jointly by the two groups of appellants, is there any specific indication of the ground for disallowance now under discussion, namely, that there was failure to comply with the requirement of Article 808 of the Civil Code because Doña Gliceria, if she was not blind, had such a defective eyesight on December 29, 1960 that she could not have read the will in question, Exhibit D. In other words, judged from the grounds of disallowance alleged in their formal oppositions on record before the witness was presented, there was nothing to indicate that the good doctor was going to testify on the alleged totally defective reading vision of the right eye of the deceased, which paucity, as We see it now, might account for the rather ambiguous, or equivocal tenor of his declarations regarding the most material facts in dispute. It may be pointed out that the so-called testate heirs represented by Attys. Inton and Garcia closed their case on February 23, 1966 without presenting any evidence of their own on such alleged defective eyesight of Doña Gliceria; neither does the record show that they adopted the testimony of Dr. Tamesis, offered by the so-called intestate heirs, thru Atty Ordoñez when the latter closed his evidence at the hearing of March 2, 1966. Indeed, this particular ground of opposition seems not to have surfaced until after Dr. Tamesis had already testified, for it was only in his memorandum submitted to the court after the trial, that Atty. Ordoñez, the counsel for oppositors Severina, Rosa and Josefa Narciso and Vicente and Delfin Mauricio, some of the intestate heirs, discussed the same for the first time. Even the discussions among counsel during the course of the doctor’s testimony hardly suggest such point. No wonder, in making reference to the oppositions filed with the lower court, the learned trial Judge said in his decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The probate of the will has been opposed by several persons. For the purpose of simplifying the proceedings and in order to avoid confusion, the Court divided them into the so-called "testate" heirs and "intestate" heirs. The testate heirs are the oppositors who stand to inherit under a prior will allegedly executed by the testatrix in 1956; while the intestate heirs are those who stand to inherit in case of intestacy. The documentary exhibits submitted by them had been marked with the appendix "Garcia, et als." for the testate heirs, and "Narciso, et als." for the intestate heirs. After the close of the proceedings, memoranda were filed by the petitioner and by both the testate heirs and the intestate heirs, while a separate memorandum was filed in behalf of oppositors Natividad del Rosario Sarmiento and Pascuala Narciso-Manahan.

In behalf of the intestate heirs, the probate is opposed on the following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) he physical appearance of the will itself reveals irregularities in its execution;

(2) here had been incontrovertible evidence presented that the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity;

(3) he testimonies of the attesting witnesses and of the notary public show irreconcilable inconsistencies on material matters; and

(4) he proponent and her family had been guilty of suppressing material evidence and using perjured testimony in support of the probate of the will.

On the part of the testate heirs, it is averred that Exhibit D is not the true and authentic will of the decedent, the true will of the deceased being one executed on June 9, 1956 (Exhibit 9-Garcia, et als.) before Notary Public Jose Ayala; the 1960 will was not executed in accordance with law: and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the proponent are vital to its probate.

Oppositors Natividad del Rosario-Sarmiento and Pascuala Narciso-Manahan contend that (1) from August 30, 1960 up to December 29, 1960, the testatrix was a blind woman for reading purposes and could not have read the will; (2) there is no evidence presented as to who prepared or typewrote the will Exhibit D: (3) the alleged will Exhibit D was not signed by the testatrix in the presence of the witnesses and of the notary public nor in the presence of each other on December 29, 1960; (4) the signature of the deceased to the document marked as Exhibit D was secured through misrepresentation; (5) the testatrix was not possessed of a sound and disposing memory on December 29, 1960; and (6) the testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioner, including that of the petitioner herself, are highly incredible."cralaw virtua1aw library

"x       x       x.

"The oppositors do not question the authenticity of the will Exhibit D nor the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and of the attesting witnesses appearing thereon. In synthesis, the opposition to the probate of the said will Exhibit D is centered on the alleged lack of testamentary capacity on the part of the decedent, and the supposed irregularities in its execution.

On the testamentary capacity of the decedent the oppositors maintain that the decedent was no longer in a position to execute a will on December 29, 1960 because she was then more than 91 years old; that she could not manage her own properties so much so that her properties were under the management of Alfonso D. Precilla; that she was well on the way to blindness due to glaucoma; that she was so weak that she had to be assisted whenever she moved from place to place; and that as certified to by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 11, 1961 in Special Proceedings No. 43871 of this Court, the decedent could hardly understand the questions propounded to her, that she took much time to understand and answer the questions and that most of her answers were not responsive to the questions."cralaw virtua1aw library

"x       x       x.

"It is noteworthy that aside from claiming that the decedent was much advanced in age and that she suffered from a weakened eyesight, the oppositors have not imputed any infirmity which would affect the mental capacity or soundness of mind of the testatrix.’To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects-of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.’ (Articles 799, 800, Civil Code)."cralaw virtua1aw library

We are not saying that because of these observations, the alleged blindness or incapacity to read of the supposed testatrix and the testimony of Dr. Tamesis in regard thereto may not be considered at this stage. Mention of the above circumstances is here made only to stress the point that even the oppositors themselves are not unanimous as regards this specific ground of opposition. As a matter of fact, even at the appeal level in this Court, nowhere in the discussion of the ten errors assigned by so-called testate heirs in their brief is mention made of this specific issue. It may, therefore, be said that subjectively said testate heirs, who precisely would have the greater probability of benefiting from the disallowance of the will in controversy, because they appear to be testamentary heirs under the prior will of 1956, which stands a good chance of being the one probated if the 1960 will is ultimately rejected, might not have considered said point to be factually tenable, as may be inferred from the fact that they did not present any witness to prove this alleged deficiency of the eyesight of the deceased, nor did they even adopt the evidence on this point of the other oppositors. They limited themselves to the presentation of documentary evidence, none of which touched on the said point. Only the intestate heirs presented two witnesses in their attempt to substantiate this unannounced ground of their opposition, namely, Atty. Vidal Ranoa and Dr. Tamesis, and at that, only the latter’s testimony appears to have some relevance.

It is clear, however, that whatever fault there might be in the tactics or exact position of the testate heirs, We cannot now dodge this issue of the alleged blindness or incapacity to read of the deceased. Even the failure of appellee’s counsel to properly object to evidence on said issue, for not being directly relevant to the grounds of opposition alleged by appellants, or the apparent waiver of such possible objection as a consequence of his act of cross-examining the doctor are of no consequence. In Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, this Court postulated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extra-judicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither they may do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others."cralaw virtua1aw library

"x       x       x.

"Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing is allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that ’no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court’; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees." (Italics supplied)

So much is the concern of the law for the indispensability of probating a will that Section 4 of Rule 75 penalizes with a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos the failure of the custodian of a will to deliver the same to the court or to the executor named therein, as also the failure of the executor to present the will to the proper court for probate; and under Section 5 of the same rule, such custodian may be detained by order of the court until he makes the required delivery of the will. The court has to be convinced of the authenticity and due execution of the will even if its allowance is not opposed and the rule requires in such a situation that, at least, one attesting witness must testify. (Sec. 5. Rule 76). A testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before, it is not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law (Section 11, Rule 72; Unson v. Abella, 43 Phil. 494; Fernandez v. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 Phil. 742; Ramirez v. Butte, 100 Phil. 635) because the proponent is not concluded by the testimonies of the attesting witnesses. (Fernandez v. Tantoco, supra). Withal, the dismissal of a petition for probate for non-appearance of petitioner or counsel does not constitute res adjudicata (Arroyo v. Albay, L-15814, Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 555), and the presentation for authentication of a will does not prescribe. (Guevara v. Guevara, supra.) Irrespective, therefore, of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will here in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the Court and/or ought to be before it that is controlling.

In the case at bar, the evidence before Us with respect to the capacity of Doña Gliceria to read on December 29, 1960, which appears on its face to be the date of the controverted execution of the will in question boils down to this: on the part of the appellee, direct evidence consisting of the testimonies of the three attesting witnesses, Francisco Decena, Francisco Lopez and Vicente Rosales, who uniformly declared that the testatrix read the will silently in their presence before signing the same and, in addition, the records of court proceedings more or less attesting to her capacity to read and some sworn certifications as well as checks signed by her; on the part of the intestate heirs, only the testimonies of their two witnesses, Atty. Vidal Ranoa and Dr. Jesus Tamesis, but actually, it was only the latter who gave what might be considered as evidence related to the eyesight of Doña Gliceria. In other words, the evidence of appellee consisted of the direct evidence of three attesting witnesses as to their actual personal knowledge of the matter in dispute, corroborated by court records and other documents, whereas the intestate heirs-oppositors had only the testimony of Dr. Tamesis.

Referring now to said testimony of Dr. Tamesis, the record is rather vague as to whether he was presented to testify as a professional expert or he was called for the purpose of declaring from actual personal knowledge of the condition of the eyesight of the testatrix on the date in question, December 29, 1960. Having been her ophthalmologist and surgeon who operated on her left eye on August 8, 1960 and who had her "under medical supervision up to 1963" (meaning since March 11, 1960), 1 it would indeed have been more desirable, in Our view, if the doctor had testified more directly from personal knowledge rather than on mere opinion, as he seems to have done, on the basis of records, which in some vital instances were prepared, according to him, by other persons. And, perhaps, there would have been less difficulty in arriving at a safe conclusion as regards the vital fact now in controversy, if the doctor had only been more categorical and definite, rather than somehow ambiguous and equivocal in his testimony. Of course, We cannot wholly blame him alone; he might have waited for questions of counsel that were never asked.

It is quite interesting and very revealing to follow step by step the testimony of the doctor.

Testifying on notations made by him as to condition of the eyes of his patient (Doña Gliceria) on March 11, 1960, the first day of consultation, he declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q After the words eye grounds O.D. there appears certain writings in ink above the two circles, will you kindly inform the court the significance of these and their meaning?

A My assistant did not draw, but I saw. However, these are my writings appearing here and I made notations that the optic nerve manifested that senile degeneration and was pale.

Q That is with respect to which eye?

A With respect to the right eye marked by O.D. — the letters O.D.

Q And the notation on the other circle, Doctor, will you kindly inform the court the significance?

A On the other circle there was no drawing and my remarks here were under the substance that open the pupil for examination the optic nerve was also pale and there was even a cupping of the optic nerve. Other details hardly noticeable.

Q When did you make these notations which appear to have been made near the circles in Exhibit 3-A?

A They were made on the day of consultation to me, March 11, 1960.

Q Can you inform the court, Doctor, in lay language what is the significance of the notation that the optic nerve was pale appearing on the circle above which you have written, the word pale, Doctor?/

ATTY. AQUINO

I object to this line of questioning, Your Honor, these questions are absolutely immaterial in this case. The witness here, as he has said, is an ophthalmologist. He is not a psychiatrist or a neurology surgeon.

COURT

You just enter a general and continuing objection.

ATTY. AQUINO

I would like to register a general and continuing objection to these questions.

COURT

You may proceed.

Q What does that mean, that annotation? You are asked, Doctor, to explain . . .

A This "pale disc senile degenerates retina", it simply meant that the vital organs of the eye such as the retina and optic nerve had degenerated and, therefore, function is expected or might be below normal.

ATTY. ORDOÑEZ

Q On the right side of this document Exhibit 3-A under the word tension there appears written notation or figures after the symbol O.D. and O.S. Will you inform the court the significance of those figures?

A Tension O.D. with the eye refers to the pressure of the eye, that is, whether the eye is soft, normal or hard.

Q In lay language, Doctor, what is the significance of this figure appearing under tension?

A You want me to interpret?

Q Yes.

A The right eye to me at that moment was normal in pressure, and the left eye at that moment was above normal.

Q Does the term "pressure" have any effect on the ability of the patient to see?

A In fact if the pressure is above normal indicates another disease.

Q Now, in this particular document what other disease, if any, is indicated by your notation, Doctor?

A I have diagnosed this aside from the cataract as a possible case of glaucoma.

Q What is the effect of glaucoma on the patient?

A Glaucoma invariably possesses blindness.

Q And at that time you examined the patient will you please inform the court what was the stage of that disease on the patient examined by you?

A Taking into consideration the findings in the eye grounds as manifested in the notation of this big circle and O.S. there were corroborative evidences that she has been suffering from glaucoma that time.

Q Approximately how long a time?

A At least a year from the changes mentioned.

ATTY. AQUINO

Already answered.

COURT

Let him answer.

WITNESS.

A Blindness is the ultimate result.

COURT.

Q You refer only to the left eye affected in this case?

A Yes."cralaw virtua1aw library

(pp. 14-18, t.s.n., March 23, 1966)

So far, as may be seen, the doctor was referring principally to the left eye. As to her right eye, his categorical declaration was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Even if the left eye has glaucoma that will permit the sight of the other eye?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. ORDOÑEZ

Q From this record is there any indication of the condition of the right eye at the time you examined the patient?

A From the meager data set down by my assistant, however, after examining her, the right eye would be seen to be operated for cataract, that her optic nerve and retina showed regeneration, that she was wearing lens with the grade that was noted by my assistant." 2 (p. 19 id.)

This was followed by references set down by his assistant which he called "farfetched data" :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q From the entries appearing in this record, would you be able to form an opinion as to the condition of the right eye of the patient?

A As to vision, from the farfetched data here there is no evidence on the actual visual capacity of that right eye my assistant had not noted it down." (pp. 19-20, id.)

Moving afterwards to Exhibit 3-B, Because of the insistence of counsel to get more specific information as to the "condition of the vision of the patient as to the right eye", he declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q But is there anything herein the entry appearing in the other documents Exhibits 3-B, 3.C, and 3-D from which you could inform the court as to the condition of the vision of the patient as to the right eye?

A On the underside?

Q Referring to Exhibit 3-B?

A Exhibit 3-B, here . . .

ATTY. ORDOÑEZ

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A Under date of August 30, 1960, is the record of refraction, that is setting of glass by myself which showed that the right eye with my prescription of glasses had a vision of 20 over 60 (20/60) and for the left eye with her correction 20 over 300 (20/300).

ATTY. ORDOÑEZ

Q In layman’s language, Doctor, what is the significance or that notation that the right eye had a degree of 20 over 60 (20/60)?

A It meant that eye at least would be able to recognize objects or persons at a minimum distance of twenty feet.

Q But would that grade enable the patient to read print?

A Apparently that is only a record for distance vision, for distance sight, not for near. (pp. 20-21)

At this juncture, two points must be elucidated. In the first place, We have re-examined Exhibit 3-B very carefully, and We are fully convinced that movant’s contention that no such annotation of ’20/60" appears in the entry therein for August 30, 1960 is well taken, because what is clearly visible therein not 20/60 but 20/4 or 20/40 is written following the prescription of OD + 15.25 (L)-1.25 x 90 for the right eye and above the prescription for the left eye reading OS + 14.25 (Lic) -300 x 90 followed by the visual acuity of 20/300.

In the second place, when the witness was asked, "But would that grade enable the patient to read print?", which certainly was the pivotal and most important question, his answer was rather obscure and susceptible of misinterpretation. Instead of giving a direct, definite and categorical reply, he testified thus: "Apparently that is only a record for distance vision, for distant sight, not for near." While the reference to "distance vision, for distant sight" is apparently correct in the parlance of ophthalmologists, the last phrase "not for near" suffers from, at least, incompleteness, in the sense that, while again it appears to be the correct ophthalmological expression, he thought his words convey leaves the Court guessing as to whether or not it has the same connotation as when one says "the patient cannot read print", for, even casual acquaintance with ophthalmological symbols teaches that the notation 20/60 by itself alone, (assuming that such is the notation in Exhibit B although it is not, as already stated above) represents visual acuity for far or distance and is not exactly the symbol which indicates the capacity of the patient to read print.

In other words, when the good doctor said "not for near", technically, he did not refer to the incapacity of the patient to read print. By this statement, he simply meant that the notation "20 over 60 (20/60)", is not the usual manner of indicating whether or not the patient can read, for, indeed, as all ophthalmologists know, said notation refers to the visual acuity for far or distance vision measured on the Snellen chart. To be more specific, said notation is a clinical symbol referring to the size of the letters on the Snellen chart that a patient can recognize at a distance of 20 feet from the chart. The sizes of these letters on the chart vary and the measure of visual acuity for distance vision, not for reading, is determined according to the size of the letters on the chart that the patient can read from a distance of 20 feet. So, "20/60" means that the size of the letters on the Snellen chart that the patient can read from a distance of 20 feet is that which, according to the Snellen test, a person with normal vision can recognize even at a distance of 60 feet. When an ophthalmologist may venture offhand an opinion on the matter of the reading capacity of a patient on the basis of such notation of 20/60, it would be somewhat speculative for him to specify what type of print such patient can read. Indeed, according to the work or ocular diseases referred to in appellee’s brief:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"4. Near vision. — The principles of visual acuity for distance apply for near, remembering the added factor of accommodation. In young individuals or with the proper addition of plus lens in presbyopes, visual acuity for near can be determined by suitable charts usually at 14 in. The notations of the letter size unfortunately vary, but the equivalents are given in Table 1. Lebensohn’s chart (1) has several practical virtues, including the uses of letters, numbers and illiterate symbols, correlation of various designations of letter size with comparable Snellen distance acuities, a bar of music for testing intermediate distance, the two line and duochrome tests, an attached chain measuring 14 in. and a hard plastic surface which is easily cleaned. A normal individual can usually detect 3 or 4 point type on testing for near vision, but larger print is required for reading comfortably. For example, telephone directories 6 point) require 4 point acuity, newsprint (8 point) requires 5 point, magazines and books (9-10 point) require 6 point, children’s textbooks (12-18 point) requires 1-12 point and sight saving texts (24 point) require at least 16 point acuity. Although visual acuity for distance cannot be related exactly to visual acuity for near considering only the visual angle, an individual with corrected vision of less than 20/40 usually begins to have difficulty reading ordinary newsprint." W. F. Hughes, Office Management of Ocular Diseases, p. 17).

and the Table I mentioned gives the corresponding types of print for different acuities as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(The following page is the scanned copy of p. 18 of the above work where Table 1 is found.)

V I S I O N

LOSS OF CENTRAL VISUAL ACUITY. — The usual method of recording vision as a fraction does not indicate the true percentage of visual efficiency; e.g., 20/40 vision is not 50% efficient visual acuity. In 1925, a standard method of relating visual acuity of a single eye to visual efficiency (2) was approved by the Section on Ophthalmology of the American Medical Association, a condensation of which is given in Table 1. The percentage of vision in one eye can be calculated, utilizing both near and distance visual acuities, according to the following method, which weights the near vision twice.

TABLE 1. — ESTIMATION OF PERCENTAGE LOSS OF CENTRAL VISUAL ACUITY IN ONE EYE

Visual Acuity

for distance Visual Acuity for Near, Distance in & Visual % Visual

Unittent Snellen Meters 1 jacget Point Efficiency Loss

20/20 14/14 0.35 1 - 3 100 0

20/25 14/18 0.44 2 - 4 96 4

20/30 14/21 0.59 . . . 5 91 9

20/40 14/28 0.71 3 6 84 16

20/50 14/35 0.88 6 8 77 23

20/60 14/42 1.08 . . . 9 + 70 30

20/70 14/49 1.30 7 10 64 36

20/80 14/56 . . . 8 12 59 41

20/100 14/70 1.76 11 14 49 51

20/160 14/112 . . . 14 - 22 29 71

20/200 14/140 3.53 . . . . . . 20 80

20/400 14/230 7.06 . . . . . . 3 97

20/800 14/560 14.12 . . . . . . 0.1 99.9

calculated utilizing both near and distance visual acuities, according to the following method, which weights the near vision twice.

(% acuity distance) + (2 X % acuity for near)

——————————— = % visual acuity for 1 eye

3

For example:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Visual Acuity = 20/100 for distance and 14/140 for near

% Visual Acuity = 49% for distance and 20% for near

49 + 2 x 20

Combined % visual acuity for this eyes = ———— = 30%

3

LOSS OF VISUAL FIELD. — An estimation of the percentage efficiency of visual field is determined according to the following method. The peripheral visual field (isopter) is determined with a 1