SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-33089. July 31, 1978.]
STA. CLARA LUMBER CO., INC., Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE ARSENIO MARTINEZ, CHIEF COURT PROSECUTOR and ARNALDO DE MESA, JOSE CIPRIANO JR., ANGEL SANTIAGO, CARLOS SANTIAGO, VIRGILIO TOLENTINO, SANTIAGO TINIO, RUFINO ABRIGO, FEDERICO CASIANO, FELICIDAD R. DULAY, SOTERO BONAYON, ADRIANO LUMIBAO, ROGELIO MELENDRES, FLORENCIO REYES, TIMOTEO SANSANO, IRENEO ISIP, PEDRO DIAZ, and DOMINGO LEYTE, Respondents.
Ledesma & Associates for Petitioner.
N. R. Rivera for Private Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The respondent Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) denied the Court Prosecutor’s motion to dismiss an unfair labor practice charge. Petitioner moved to reconsider this order of denial. Respondent Judge resolved the motion for reconsideration, without submitting it to the CIR sitting en banc. Petitioner claims that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in resolving the motion for reconsideration without submitting the same to the CIR en banc. But the respondent judge states that the preliminary investigation of charges for unfair labor practice under Republic Act No. 875 is administrative in nature, hence, under his direct control and supervision as administrative head of the court.
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that preliminary investigation of charges of unfair labor practice is judicial in character and that a motion for reconsideration of the order denying a motion to dismiss the complaint must be resolved by the CIR sitting en banc, pursuant to Section 1, Com. Act No. 103, as amended.
Orders of respondent judge set aside, and case remanded to the National Labor Relations Commission for further proceedings.
Petition granted.
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that preliminary investigation of charges of unfair labor practice is judicial in character and that a motion for reconsideration of the order denying a motion to dismiss the complaint must be resolved by the CIR sitting en banc, pursuant to Section 1, Com. Act No. 103, as amended.
Orders of respondent judge set aside, and case remanded to the National Labor Relations Commission for further proceedings.
Petition granted.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR RELATIONS; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; RESOLUTION OF MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE IS JUDICIAL IN NATURE. — The preliminary investigation of charges for unfair labor practice under Republic Act 875 is not administrative but judicial in nature, and pursuant to Section 1, Commonwealth Act 103, a motion for the reconsideration of an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint for unfair labor practice must be resolved by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc and not by the presiding judge alone.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside the orders of the respondent judge dated May 12, 1970 and January 11, 1971, in CIR Charge No. 3212, and to order the respondent judge to submit the petitioner’s motions for reconsideration to the CIR en banc.
It appears that on October 14, 1969, herein private respondent Arnaldo de Mesa, Jose Cipriano, Jr., Angel Santiago, Carlos Santiago, Virgilio Tolentino, Santiago Tinio, Rufino Abrigo, Federico Casiano, Felicidad Dulay, Sotero Bonayon, Adriano Lumibao, Rogelio Melendres, Florencio Reyes, Timoteo Sansano, Ireneo Isip, Pedro Diaz and Domingo Leyte, as members and officers of the Sta. Clara Employees’ Union, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the herein petitioner, Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc., with the Court of Industrial Relations, for allegedly dismissing the complainants without any reason or cause whatsoever and in discriminating against them, in violation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. 1 The preliminary investigation of the complaint was conducted by the respondent Court Prosecutor after which, he submitted to the court a motion to dismiss the charge on the grounds that "the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause of action and/or if the court has jurisdiction, the complainants failed to establish a prima facie case to warrant the filing of the complaint." 2 The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss on April 18, 1970 and instructed the Prosecution Division of the CIR to file a formal complaint. 3 Consequently, the Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said order, 4 which the respondent judge denied on May 12, 1970. 5 The Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. then filed a motion for the reconsideration of this order claiming that the denial of the motion for reconsideration by the Presiding Judge alone and not by the CIR sitting en banc is contrary to the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, and settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the ruling, order and/or decision of the CIR sitting en banc on the motion for reconsideration is a pre-requisite and absolutely necessary before an aggrieved party can appeal to the Supreme Court and in accordance with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as for the determining the period within which an appeal by certiorari may be taken. 6 The respondent judge, however, denied said motion for reconsideration stating "that preliminary investigation of charges for unfair labor practice under Republic Act No. 875 are administrative in nature, hence, under the direct control and supervision of the Presiding Judge of this Court as the administrative head thereof. There is therefore no necessity of forwarding the charge to the Court en banc." 7 Hence, the present recourse.
The petitioner maintains that the respondent Judge, in resolving the motions for reconsideration without submitting the same to the CIR en banc acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction since the preliminary investigation of charges under Republic Act No. 875 are not administrative in nature, but judicial. Hence, the ruling of the court prosecutor is reviewable by the CIR sitting en banc.
There is merit in the petition. On February 11, 1971, this Court issued the following resolution: 8
"In G.R. No. L-33089 (Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. v. The Hon. Judge Arsemo Martinez, Et. Al.), the Court resolved to enjoin the respondents therein from further proceedings in Charge No. 3212 for Unfair Labor Practice filed against the petitioner, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P500.00, it appearing that this Court has already ruled in previous cases that the preliminary investigation of charges for Unfair Labor Practice under Republic Act 875 is not administrative in nature." (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant thereto, the motion for the reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss should have been resolved by the CIR sitting en banc pursuant to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, the pertinent provisions of which reads, as follows:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"Should any party aggrieved by a ruling or decision of any of the Judges, request reconsideration thereof, or at the request of any of them, the Judges shall sit together, and the concurrence of at least three of the five judges shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, order, or award."cralaw virtua1aw library
The orders of the respondent judge, dated May 12, 1970 and January 11, 1971, are, therefore, unjustified and hence, of no legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent judge dated May 12, 1970 and January 11, 1971 are hereby annulled and set aside. Let this case be remanded to the National Labor Relations Commission for further proceedings pursuant to Section 1, Rule XVIII of its Rules.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Santos, JJ., concur.
It appears that on October 14, 1969, herein private respondent Arnaldo de Mesa, Jose Cipriano, Jr., Angel Santiago, Carlos Santiago, Virgilio Tolentino, Santiago Tinio, Rufino Abrigo, Federico Casiano, Felicidad Dulay, Sotero Bonayon, Adriano Lumibao, Rogelio Melendres, Florencio Reyes, Timoteo Sansano, Ireneo Isip, Pedro Diaz and Domingo Leyte, as members and officers of the Sta. Clara Employees’ Union, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the herein petitioner, Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc., with the Court of Industrial Relations, for allegedly dismissing the complainants without any reason or cause whatsoever and in discriminating against them, in violation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. 1 The preliminary investigation of the complaint was conducted by the respondent Court Prosecutor after which, he submitted to the court a motion to dismiss the charge on the grounds that "the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause of action and/or if the court has jurisdiction, the complainants failed to establish a prima facie case to warrant the filing of the complaint." 2 The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss on April 18, 1970 and instructed the Prosecution Division of the CIR to file a formal complaint. 3 Consequently, the Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said order, 4 which the respondent judge denied on May 12, 1970. 5 The Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. then filed a motion for the reconsideration of this order claiming that the denial of the motion for reconsideration by the Presiding Judge alone and not by the CIR sitting en banc is contrary to the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, and settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the ruling, order and/or decision of the CIR sitting en banc on the motion for reconsideration is a pre-requisite and absolutely necessary before an aggrieved party can appeal to the Supreme Court and in accordance with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as for the determining the period within which an appeal by certiorari may be taken. 6 The respondent judge, however, denied said motion for reconsideration stating "that preliminary investigation of charges for unfair labor practice under Republic Act No. 875 are administrative in nature, hence, under the direct control and supervision of the Presiding Judge of this Court as the administrative head thereof. There is therefore no necessity of forwarding the charge to the Court en banc." 7 Hence, the present recourse.
The petitioner maintains that the respondent Judge, in resolving the motions for reconsideration without submitting the same to the CIR en banc acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction since the preliminary investigation of charges under Republic Act No. 875 are not administrative in nature, but judicial. Hence, the ruling of the court prosecutor is reviewable by the CIR sitting en banc.
There is merit in the petition. On February 11, 1971, this Court issued the following resolution: 8
"In G.R. No. L-33089 (Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. v. The Hon. Judge Arsemo Martinez, Et. Al.), the Court resolved to enjoin the respondents therein from further proceedings in Charge No. 3212 for Unfair Labor Practice filed against the petitioner, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P500.00, it appearing that this Court has already ruled in previous cases that the preliminary investigation of charges for Unfair Labor Practice under Republic Act 875 is not administrative in nature." (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant thereto, the motion for the reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss should have been resolved by the CIR sitting en banc pursuant to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, the pertinent provisions of which reads, as follows:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"Should any party aggrieved by a ruling or decision of any of the Judges, request reconsideration thereof, or at the request of any of them, the Judges shall sit together, and the concurrence of at least three of the five judges shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, order, or award."cralaw virtua1aw library
The orders of the respondent judge, dated May 12, 1970 and January 11, 1971, are, therefore, unjustified and hence, of no legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent judge dated May 12, 1970 and January 11, 1971 are hereby annulled and set aside. Let this case be remanded to the National Labor Relations Commission for further proceedings pursuant to Section 1, Rule XVIII of its Rules.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Santos, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, p. 13.
2. Id., p. 51.
3. Id., p. 83.
4. Id., p. 84.
5. Id., p. 110.
6. Id., p. 111.
7. Id., p. 137.
8. Id., p. 145.
