In the course of his employment with the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, private respondent got sick of "Rheumatic Arthritis" or "Gouty Arthritis" characterized by the swelling of joints and pains in the lower extremities causing his temporary incapacity from work during intermittent attacks. His ailment worsened, forcing him to retire from work. Following the day of his retirement, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of councilor. Thereafter he filed a claim for disability benefits which was controverted by petitioner more than three months after. The Acting Referee dismissed the claim stating that although the ailment supervened during employment it was not shown that it had incapacitated respondent as evidenced by the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and that the claim was filed when the employer-employee relationship had ceased to exist.

On motion of private respondent to lift the dismissal order, the Acting Chief Referee reassigned the case to another Acting Referee, who set aside the dismissal order, gave due course is the case, and granted the claim. Petitioner questions the authority of the second referee to set aside the first referee’s dismissal order.

The Workmen’s Compensation Commission sustained the award. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

1. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION; REFEREES; JURISDICTION; REFEREE TO WHOM A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION IS REASSIGNED IS COMPETENT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF CASE. — While the Supreme Court maintains that in order to insure judicial stability, the independence of the proceedings or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall not be interfered with by other courts of concurrent jurisdiction, this rule need not necessarily be determinative of the propriety of the proceedings in a compensation case. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission is but an administrative agency vested with quasi-judicial function whose duly designated referees perform their duties under the direction and supervision of the regional administrator or chief referee who may reassign the hearing of a claim to another referee. Hence, where a compensation case has been acted upon by a referee assigned to hear the case, and on motion for reconsideration the Chief Referee reassigned the case to another referee who reversed the decision of the first referee, the intervention of the second referee did not in reality constitute an undue interference, but on the contrary, it was a constructive step to satisfy the demands of due process.

2. ID.; ID.; FORMAL ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT NOT NECESSARY. — A formal order of reassignment is not mandatory it being sufficient that the Acting Chief Referee made known the reassignment of the case to another referee. Thus, the handwritten note of the Acting Chief Referee appearing on the left hand corner of a motion to lift the order of dismissal, reassigning the case to another referee is sufficient and valid to vest the latter officer the proper authority to hear and determine the claim for there is nothing in the Workmen’s Compensation Act requiring such authorization to be issued in a formal order, the authority of the superior officer not having been questioned and the act was done in the regular performance of his duty. Under Section 48 of the Act, the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy in workmen’s compensation cases shall be conducted without regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical rules on evidence and strict procedural rules should not be resorted to in order to defeat or suppress the substantial rights of the litigants.

3. ID.; ILLNESS; SUPERVENING ILLNESS; PRESUMED COMPENSABLE. — Once an illness, subject of a compensation claim is shown to have supervened in the course of employment, there arises in favor of the claimant the rebuttable presumption that the said illness either arose out of or at least was aggravated by the nature of claimant’s employment; and that consequently, the burden to show by substantial evidence the contrary lies with the employer. The ultimate result of this principle is that the presumption rebuttable at its inception becomes conclusive upon the failure of the employer to destroy the same. Rheumatic arthritis although not characteristically occupational, is considered a disabling and compensable ailment.

4. ID.; ID.; PHYSICAL DISABILITY; EVIDENCE; EFFECT OF FILING CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. — Mere filing of a certificate of candidacy is not the substantive kind of evidence acceptable to overthrow the state of physical disability. It only provided ground for the employer to surmise that a person entering the political arena, would have to engage in the usual hectic campaigning for votes, an activity certainly not fitted for a disabled man. The weakness of the conjecture lies on the singular emphasis on physical disability without regard to the equally important and concurring factor of loss or diminution of earning capacity. Aside from the filing of the certificate of candidacy, there is no other proof to ascertain that respondent thereafter actually engaged in political activities. In truth, respondent was not even elected.

5. ID.; ID.; LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE TOTAL DISABILITY AS BASIS OF COMPENSABILITY. — It is not impossible nor improbable for an afflicted man to engage in activities to keep with the normal and basic functions of life, including, perhaps, a modest or limited effort to earn a living. To deny him these would be a denial of life itself. The law does not require total state of incapacity alone as basis of compensability. It suffices that a person fit in some respect as the claimant herein but suffers a degree of disability resulting in the loss or diminution of an individual’s earning capacity he would still be within the benevolent coverage of he Workmen’s Compensation Act. Disability as a basis for compensation, is the combination of partial or total physical incapacity and of inability to work, or inability to work with the same case and competency as before the injury, or the loss, total or partial, of earning power from the injury.

6. ID.; CONTROVERSION; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO CONTROVERT. — By mandate of Section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act requiring the employer to controvert either on or before the fourteenth day of disability or within ten days after he has acquired knowledge of the alleged accident, petitioner’s failure to controvert the claim on time in effect constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defenses.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission affirming with modification the referee’s award for disability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.

Respondent claimant Edmundo Baculi was employed by petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System on September 17, 1953 with a starting position of Leave Clerk. Thereafter, claimant was successively promoted as Clerk Computer, Legal Researcher, Trial Attorney I, Trial Attorney II, Trial Attorney III and concurrently Private Secretary to the General Manager, and finally as Special Assistant. His last salary was P12,044.00 per annum. As Trial Attorney, he appeared as counsel for the petitioner in many cases litigated in court, and in many occasions, he had to wade across the streets during floods. As clearly as 1953, he had been afflicted with "Rheumatic Arthritis" or "Gouty Arthritis" characterized by the swelling of the joints resulting in pains to his lower extremeties which had caused temporary incapacity from work during intermittent attacks. Claimant was treated by Dr. Felix Monroy, Chief of the Medical Services of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, upon whose suggestion petitioner was hospitalized several times. His medical expenses were paid for by petitioner. The findings of Dr. Monroy were reflected in his Physician’s Report and medical certificate.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Since 1953, Baculi’s ailment had not improved until he began to limp, as a consequence of which he retired from the service on September 21, 1971, availing himself of the benefits provided for under R.A. 6234 reorganizing the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority. The Physician’s Report stated however that Baculi’s retirement was due to illness. Following the day of his retirement, or on September 22, 1971, Baculi filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of councilor of Quezon City.

On December 21, 1971, respondent filed a Notice of Injury or Sickness and Claim for Compensation for disability due to Gouty Arthritis contracted during employment (Records, p. 288). The claim was controverted thru petitioner’s Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness dated April 7, 1972 (Records, p. 296). On October 5, 1973, respondent filed a motion for ex-parte hearing of the claim on the ground of employer’s failure to file notice of controversion on time. Petitioner opposed the motion but Acting Referee Tomas G. Montesines issued an order on November 26, 1973 denying the motion for ex-parte hearing and proceeded to schedule the hearing of the claim (Records, p. 270).

On April 3, 1974, Acting Referee Montesines issued a decision dismissing the claim on the ground that the illness of claimant although proven to have supervened during the time of his employment, had not been shown to have incapacitated him from work as evidenced by his filing of his candidacy for councilor right after his retirement; and moreover, that at the time the claim was filed, there was no more employer-employee relationship.

It appears, however, that copy of the decision of Acting Referee Montesines was never served on claimant. The latter learned of the dismissal only through verbal inquiry. Hence, on May 15, 1975, claimant filed a motion to lift the order of dismissal believing that said order was merely interlocutory. The case was re-assigned to Acting Referee Estratronico Añano who gave due course to the aforesaid motion. The motion was heard at which petitioner-employer was represented by Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, who likewise manifested that he has not maintained that the decision of April 3, 1974 is not in order as there was no formal reception of evidence adduced by the parties. On August 15, 1975, Acting Referee Añano issued an order setting aside the decision dismissing the claim and set anew the hearing of the case in order that the basis issues in connection with claim can be properly ventilated (Annex "H", Records, p. 60).

The claim was heard anew, during which petitioner’s counsel lengthily cross-examined all the witnesses for the claimant. On September 16, 1975, while claimant was offering his evidence, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration contesting the authority of Acting Referee Añano in issuing the order of August 15, 1975, arguing to the effect that the decision of a referee can be set aside only by a superior officer, if not by the deciding referee himself, hence, it is only Acting Referee Montesines who can hear the motion to lift the order of dismissal (Annex "I", Records, p. 64). On October 24, 1975, Acting Referee Añano denied the motion for reconsideration after stressing that authority was vested in him when the case was re-assigned to him for further proceedings (Annex "L", Records, p. 100).chanrobles law library : red

After considering the evidence, Acting Referee Añano promulgated his decision on November 9, 1975 awarding to claimant disability compensation; stating as reasons that there was ample evidence to sustain the compensability of claimant’s illness which petitioner employer failed to overcome by substantial evidence. It was also ruled that claimant’s filing of his certificate of candidacy had nothing to do with his cessation from work and that petitioner failed to controvert the claim in due time in spite of its knowledge of claimant’s ailment for which claimant had taken leave of absence. The claimant was therefore awarded the following benefits:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Under Section 14 of the Act, claimant shall be entitled to disability compensation benefits equivalent to 60% of his average weekly wage which was P240.95 (P1,044.13 x 12 divided by 52 weeks). Sixty (60%) percent of P240.95 is P144.57 and for 208 weeks of temporary disability from September 22, 1971 to September 30, 1975 claimant shall be entitled to the sum of P31,070.56 but his amount is reduced to P6,000.00, the maximum fixed by the Act;

Under Section 13 of the Act, he shall be entitled to such medical, hospital services, supplies and appliances as the nature of his illness and extent of his disability shall so require.

Atty. Juan Baligad claimant’s counsel, shall be entitled to attorney’s fees of P300.00 pursuant to Section 31 of the Act.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgments is rendered in favor of the claimant and ordering the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System;

1. To pay claimant, Atty. Edmundo A. Baculi, the sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS, as disability compensation benefits under Section 14 of the Act;

2. To provide claimant with such medical, surgical, hospital services, supplies and appliances as the nature of his illness and extent of his disability shall so requires;

3. To pay Atty. Juan Baligad the sum P300.00 as attorney’s fees; and

4. To pay this Office the sum of P61.00 as decision fees pursuant to Section 55 of the Act."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above decision. Not disposed to change his decision, Referee Añano elevated the records of the case to the Commission for review. On March 30, 1976, the Commission rendered its decision confirming the compensability of the claim, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On the first instance, respondent advanced the theory that claimant did not suffer any disabling ailment during his employment with respondent and more so, at the time of his retirement on September 21, 1971. In this connection, it is pointed out that claimant had been performing his work continuously, thus earning one promotion to the other. Furthermore, it was argued that claimant cold not have possibly contracted his ailment within two months after his employment, meaning, he was already suffering from the said ailment when he entered the service of Respondent.

"We find no merit in respondent’s contentions, hence, we can not subscribed to its theory. Definitely, this is a case of aggravation. The coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, is not limited to illness directly caused or contracted by employment, but also extends to cases where the ailment is aggravated by or the result of such employment. The fact that claimant was already suffering from a pre-existing ailment at the time of employment would not relieve respondent from the liability to pay compensation mandated by such employment, such as in this case. It is noteworthy in this regard that when claimant entered the employ of respondent, he was not laboring under any disability otherwise, he would have been accepted for employment in the first pace. He might have been sick already, yes, but the same was not yet pronounced. It may be sated also in passing that when an employer hires an employee, he takes him with all the infirmities that the said employee is suffering and that these infirmities should not be aggravated in the course of employment, otherwise, liability to pay compensation under the law, attaches.

"The other point raised by respondent, however, well-taken. It appearing that claimant did not suffer from any temporary total disability, he is not entitled to compensation under Section 14 of the Act. His is (not) precluded, however, from receiving the benefits for permanent partial disability equivalent to a 30% non-scheduled disability rating as evaluated by the Assistant Chief Compensation Rating Medical Officer. In this respect, therefore, the decision appealed from, should be modified.

"Accordingly, claimant is entitled to compensation equivalent to fifty (50%) per cent of his average weekly wage of P239.31 (P12,444.00