1. REMEDIAL LAW; EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT; JUDGMENT IS PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE OF A RIGHT BETWEEN PARTIES. — It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties," and rejection thereof may be justified, among others, by "evidence of a want of jurisdiction" of the issuing authority, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Hawaii hinged entirely on the existence of either of two facts in accordance with its State laws, i.e., either Borthwick owned real property in Hawaii, or the promissory notes sued upon resulted from his business transactions therein. Scallon’s complaint clearly alleged both facts. Borthwick was accorded opportunity to answer the complaint and impugn those facts, but he failed to appear and was in consequence declared in default. There thus exists no evidence in the record of the Hawaii case upon which to lay a conclusion of lack of jurisdiction. The opportunity to negate the foreign court’s competence by proving the non-existence of said jurisdictional facts established in the original action, was again afforded to Borthwick in the Court of First Instance of Makati, where enforcement of the Hawaii judgment was sought. This time it was the summons of the domestic court which Borthwick chose to ignore, but with the same result: he was declared in default. And in the default judgment subsequently promulgated, the Court a quo decreed enforcement of the judgment affirming among others the jurisdictional facts, that Borthwick owned real property in Hawaii and transacted business therein. It is plain that what Borthwick seeks in essence is one more opportunity, a third, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Hawaii Court and the merits of the cause of action which that Court had adjudged to have been established against him. This he may obtain only if he succeed in showing that the declaration of his default was incorrect. He has unfortunately not been able to do that; hence, the verdict must go against him.

2. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT UPHELD ON APPEAL. — It is not for this Court to disturb the express finding of the Court of First Instance that Daniel was Borthwick’s resident domestic houseboy, and of sufficient age and discretion to accept substituted service of summons for Borthwick. In any case, a review of the records shows that the Trial Court was correct in refusing to believe Borthwick’s representation that "Daniel gardens at the residence of Borthwick, then goes home to La Union after gardening itinerantly." As said Court observed, that situation is "ridiculous," it being "queer and hardly coincidental why on all papers served on the defendant, it was Fred Daniel who signed and acknowledged receipt." There was therefore no error committed by the Trial Court when it denied Borthwick’s motion to lift the order of default (which is what the motion for new trial actually is) because Borthwick had failed to establish any proper ground therefor.

3. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO THE SUPREME COURT; MAY RAISE ONLY QUESTION OF LAW. — Under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, a party appealing from the Courts of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court may "raise only questions of law, (and) no other question . . .," and is thus precluded from impugning the factual findings of the trial court, being deemed to have admitted the correctness of such findings and waived his right to open them to question.

By action commenced in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, U.S.A., 1 Joseph E. Scallon sought to compel payment by William B. Borthwick on four (4) promissory notes 2 in the amounts of $32,408.95, $29,584.94, $2,832.59 and $40,000.00, plus stipulated interest. Scallon’s complaint alleged, inter alia that Borthwick, an American citizen living in the Philippines, owned real property interests in Hawaii where he last resided and transacted business therein; that business dealings which transpired in Honolulu, Hawaii had given rise to the promissory notes sued upon, and Borthwick had failed to pay the sums thereunder owing upon maturity and despite demand. 3 Attached to the complaint were the promissory notes, which although uniformly specifying the city of Palos Verdes, Los Angeles, California as the place of payment, also provided that —

"in the event that payment . . . shall not have been made in full on or before the maturity date . . . at . . . (such) place . . ., payee may select, at his option, Manila, Philippines, or Honolulu, Hawaii as additional places for payment . . . and . . . any court in any of said places having jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be a proper Court for the trial of any action brought to enforce payment of this note and the law of the place in which said action is brought shall apply." 4

Borthwick being then in Monterey, California, summons 5 was served upon him personally in that place, pursuant to Hawaiian law allowing service of process on a person outside the territorial confines of the State, if he had otherwise submitted himself to the jurisdiction of its courts as to causes of action arising from, among others, the act of transacting any business within Hawaii 6 — alleged to consist as to Borthwick in the negotiation and dealings regarding the promissory notes. Borthwick ignored the summons. Default was entered against him, and in due course a default judgment was rendered as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"DEFAULT JUDGMENT

"That Defendant WILLIAM B. BORTHWICK having failed to plead or otherwise defend in the above-entitled action and his default having been duly entered herein;

"Now, upon the application of the Plaintiff JOSEPH E. SCALLON and upon the affidavit that the Defendant WILLIAM B. BORTHWICK is indebted to said Plaintiff in the sum of $104,817.48.

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and decreed that Plaintiff JOSEPH E. SCALLON recover from Defendant WILLIAM B. BORTHWICK the sum of $104,817.48 together with.

"(1) The transaction of any business within the State;



"(3) The ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this State;



(b) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisprudence of the courts of this State, as provided in this section, may be made as provided by sections 634-36, if he cannot be found in the State, with the same force and effect as though summons had been personally served within this State.

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