1. REALTY EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS; LOCATION OF THE LAND. — The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate stated in said complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. After the filing of the complaint the plaintiff took possession of the lands described therein, building its line, stations and terminals, and put the same into operation. Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable amount of evidence, and finally made their report. After said report had been made and filed with the court the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to dismiss the action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, it having been recently, ascertained by the plaintiff that the lands sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. The motion was heard and after due deliberation the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground that, inasmuch as the land described in the complaint was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija instead of in the Province of Tarlac, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. Held: Error.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE OVER ACTIONS AFFECTING REALTY. — Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer upon the Courts of First Instance complete and perfect jurisdiction over all of the lands within the Philippine Islands. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no limitation. It is universal. So far as jurisdiction over the subject matter is concerned, the Court of First Instance of one province may, if there is no objection by any of the parties, take cognizance of an action in reference to real estate located in another province.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF THE LAW OF PROCEDURE. — Certain statutes confer jurisdiction. Others provide for the procedure by which that jurisdiction is made effective. The purpose of procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter but to give that jurisdiction effectiveness. The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority. It simply directs the manner in which it shall be exercised. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. On the other hand, questions of civil procedure, generally speaking, are subject to the volition of the parties.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAYING OF VENUE IS PROCEDURAL. — The laying of the venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions of law relating to the same were not intended to take anything from the power of the court but, rather, to grant something to one or both of the parties. They establish a relation, not between the court and the subject matter, but between the plaintiff and the defendant.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF SECTION 377, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. — Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that actions affecting real property shall be brought in the province where the land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located, does not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over the land itself but relates simply to the personal rights of the parties as to the place of trial.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FULL JURISDICTION CONFERRED UPON THE COURTS. — The Philippine Commission has in fullest phrase given the Courts of First Instance unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate in the Islands by Act No. 136, and that jurisdiction ought not to be held to be withdrawn except by virtue of an Act equally express or so clearly inconsistent therewith as to amount to the same thing.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VENUE NOT CONNECTED WITH JURISDICTION; WAIVER BY PARTIES. — Venue is not connected with jurisdiction over the subject matter; and the defendants’ rights in respect thereto, as they are conferred by section 377 above referred to, may be waived expressly or by implication. Act No. 136 before referred to having conferred the fullest and completest jurisdiction possible upon Courts of First Instance relative to the real estate of the Islands, section 377 referred to will not be held or construed to restrict or limit that jurisdiction, it not containing express provisions to that end.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTENT OF THE RIGHT OF WAIVER. — It is a general principle that a person may renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited or the right conferred is of such a nature that its renunciation would be against public policy. This right of renunciation is so thoroughly established, and was at the time of the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, that its exercise by a defendant in relation to the venue of an action will not be held to have been abridged by section 377 without very clear provision therein to that effect. There being no part of such section express enough to accomplish such result, such section does not abridge the right of the defendant to renounce the privilege conferred upon him thereby. If the parties consent thereto there is no legal reason why the Court of First Instance of Manila may not take cognizance of and determine a controversy affecting the title to or an interest in real estate situated in Ilocos Norte or any other province.

9. ID.; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS GOVERNED BY SPECIAL LAWS. — The condemnation of real estate by a railroad corporation is governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the venue of an action in condemnation proceedings generally are not applicable to the proceedings-by a railroad company to condemn lands. Section 377 was intended to cover simply actions relating to the condemnation of real estate where the land involved is, comparatively speaking, compactly together. It was not intended to meet a situation presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously from one end of the country to the other.

10. ID.; ID.; VENUE BY MUTUAL CONSENT; RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO INSIST UPON CHANGE OF VENUE. — In an action by a railroad company to condemn lands, while, with the consent o~ defendants, express or implied, the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff, it being one in which the lands sought to be condemned, or some part thereof, is located, nevertheless, the defendants who have lands lying in another province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun, but would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces.

11. ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL OF PARTIES CONSENTING TO VENUE. — The plaintiff having brought the action of necessity submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. It took advantage of the situation it itself created to take possession of the land described in the complaint, construct its line, switches, stations, yards, and terminals, and carry the case through two years of expensive, litigation. It can not now be permitted to make all this go for naught alleging its own negligence as a reason therefor. Under such circumstances the plaintiff is estopped from alleging that the court has no jurisdiction over it.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion of the plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the controversy.

The question for our consideration and decision is the power and authority of a Court of First Instance of one province to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.

In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in his complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is authorized by law to construct a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is for the purpose of condemning lands for the construction of such line that this action is brought. The land sought to be condemned is 69,910 square meters in area. The complaint states that before beginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough search in the office of the registry of property and of the tax offices of the municipalities for the purpose of determining where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that the lands in question were located in the Province of Tarlac. The defendants are numerous. Advantage was taken by plaintiff of Act No. 1258 to join as defendants in one action all of the different owners of or persons otherwise interested in the 69,910 square meters of land to be condemned. After filing and duly serving the complaint the plaintiff, pursuant to law and pending final determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the same in operation. During the progress of the action a commission to appraise the value of the lands was duly appointed, which, after taking oral testimony, amounting to 140 typewritten pages when transcribed, and after much labor and prolonged consideration, made a report consisting of about 55 typewritten pages, resolving the question submitted to it. On the coming in of this report the court, by order entered the 27th of September, 1909, set the 11th day of October following for the hearing thereon.

On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be made to the court to- dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said judgment of dismissal.

The decision of the learned trial court was based entirely upon the proposition, already referred to, that in condemnation proceedings, and in all other proceedings affecting title to land, the Court of First Instance of a given province has no jurisdiction, power or authority where the land is located in another province, and that no such power, authority, or jurisdiction can be conferred by the parties.

Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of First Instance of these Islands with respect to real estate in the following words:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. — The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance shall be of two kinds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Original; and

"2. Appellate.

"SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library



"2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon courts of justice of the peace."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is apparent from the wording of these sections that it was the intention of the Philippine Commission to give to the Courts of First Instance the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over the subject matters mentioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation The jurisdiction is universal. Nor do the provisions of sections 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52 at all militate against the universality of that jurisdiction. Those provisions simply arrange for the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts and do not relate to their power, authority, or jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. While it is provided in these sections that a particular court shall hold its sessions in the province to which it has been assigned and in which it habitually sits and, inferentially, that it can not hold sessions in any other province (except under certain specified conditions), the assertion is nevertheless true that the jurisdiction of a particular court is in no wise and in no sense limited; and it is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a Court of First Instance of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned.

Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Others provide for the procedure by which that power or authority is projected into judgment. The one class deals with the powers of the court in the real and substantive sense; the other with the procedure by which such powers are put into action. The one is the thing itself; the other is the vehicle by which the thing is transferred from the court to the parties. The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute them selves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure i8 not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure to day is that it so restricts the exercise of the court’s powers by technicalities that that part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the admin. istration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.,It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism.

The proper result of a system of procedure is to insure a fair and convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a result. While a fair hearing is as essential as the substantive power of the court to administer justice in the premises, and while the one is the natural result of the other, it is different in its nature and relates to a different thing. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction between person and subject matter with reference to jurisdiction. jurisdiction of the person and jurisdiction of the subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over it. None of the parties -to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the-other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to depend, indirectly at least, on the party’s volition. As we have said, jurisdiction of the subject matter does not depend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached.

In the light of these observations, we proceed to a consideration of those provisions of the law which the plaintiff claims are decisive of his contention that a Court of First Instance of one province has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action by a railroad company to condemn lands located in another province. The plaintiff relies for the success of its cause upon section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure and upon the special laws relating to the condemnation of lands by railroad corporations. We take up first section of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to.

The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely a matter of method, of convenience to the parties litigant. If their interests are best subserved by bringing in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila an action affecting lands in the. Province o