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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al., Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, 1 petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974.]

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974.] 2

ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, Petitioner, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, Petitioners, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974.] 3

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974.]

ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA, Respondents.



SEPARATE OPINION



ESGUERRA, J., concurring:



A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT



On September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the whole Philippines under martial law. This proclamation was publicly announced by the President over the television and radio on the evening of September 23, 1972. The grounds for the proclamation are recited in detail in its preamble, specifically mentioning various acts of insurrection and rebellion already perpetrated and about to be committed against the Government by the lawless elements of the country in order to gain political control of the state. After laying down the basis for the establishment of martial law, the President ordered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated in orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly designated representative."cralaw virtua1aw library

Issued shortly after the proclamation was General Order No. 2, followed by No. 2-A, dated September 26, 1972, to which was attached a list of the names of various persons who had taken part in the various acts of insurrection, rebellion and subversion mentioned in the proclamation, and given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and take over the government by force. They were ordered to be apprehended immediately and taken into custody by the Secretary of National Defense who was to act as representative of the President in carrying out martial law.

The petitioners herein were on September 22 and 23, 1972, arrested and taken into military custody by the Secretary of National Defense pursuant to General Order No. 2-A of the President for being included in said list as having participated, directly or indirectly, or given aid and comfort to those engaged in the conspiracy and plot to seize political and state power and to take over the Government by force. They ask this Court to set them at liberty, claiming that their arrest and detention is illegal and unconstitutional since the proclamation of martial law is arbitrary and without basis and the alleged grounds therefor do not exist and the courts are open and normally functioning.

For the respondents the Solicitor General in his answer maintains that Proclamation No. 1081 is Constitutional and valid, having been issued in accordance with the Constitution; that the orders and decrees issued thereunder are valid; that the arrest and detention of petitioners pursuant thereto is likewise valid, legal and constitutional, and that this Court should refrain from issuing the desired writs as these cases involve a political question.

After joinder of issues, these cases were heard on September 26 and 29, 1972, and on October 6, 1972, followed by the filing of Memoranda and Notes on the arguments of both parties.

After submission of these cases for decision, petitioner Ramon W. Diokno filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw his petition. To the motion is attached a handwritten letter of said petitioner to his counsel stating the reasons why he wished to withdraw his petition. The principal reasons advanced by him for his action are his doubts and misgivings on whether he can still obtain justice from this Court as at present constituted since three of the Justices among the four who held in the ratification cases that there was no valid ratification of the New Constitution signed on November 30, 1972 and proclaimed ratified by the President on January 17, 1973 (the then Chief Justice having retired), had taken an oath to support and defend the said Constitution; that in filing his petition he expected it to be decided by the Supreme Court under the 1935 Constitution, and that with the oath-taking of the three. remaining members, he can no longer expect to obtain justice.

After the motion to withdraw had been deliberated upon by the Court, seven justices voted to grant and five voted to deny the motion. There being no majority to grant the motion, it was denied. Those who voted to deny the motion are of the view that it is not simply a matter of right to withdraw because of the great public interest involved in his case which should be decided for the peace and tranquility of the nation, and because of the contemptuous statement of petitioner Diokno that this Court is no longer capable of administering justice to him. This question should no longer stand on the way to the disposition of these cases on the merits.

B. THE ISSUES


Prescinding from the question of jurisdiction which the Solicitor General raised by reason of the President's General Order No. 3, dated September 22, 1972, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, dated September 24, 1972, which allowed the judicial courts to regularly function but inhibited them from taking cognizance of cases involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of the Martial Law Proclamation, or any decree, order or acts issued, promulgated or performed by the President or his duly authorized representative pursuant thereto, from which position he relented and he has, accordingly, refrained from pressing that issue upon the Court, the main issues for resolution are the validity of Proclamation No. 1081 declaring and establishing martial law and whether this Court can inquire into the veracity and sufficiency of the facts constituting the grounds for its issuance.

I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional, valid and binding; that the veracity or sufficiency of its factual bases cannot be inquired into by the Courts and that the question presented by the petitions is political in nature and not Justiciable

Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of 1935, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."cralaw virtua1aw library

This provision may, for present purposes, be called the Commander-in-Chief clause.

The above provision has no counterpart in the Constitution of the United States or in that of any state thereof except that of Alaska to a limited extent. To comprehend the scope and extent of the President's power to declare martial law, let us trace the background and origin of this provision.

To suppress the great rebellion in the United States, known as the Civil War, which was aimed to wreck the Federal Union President Lincoln exercised powers not granted to him by the Constitution of the United States but pertaining to the Congress. He had suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; proclaimed martial law in certain areas and Military Commissions were organized where it was deemed necessary to do so in order to subdue the rebels or prevent their sympathizers from promoting the rebellion. Lincoln justified his acts by saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I did understand . . . that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means that government – that nation – of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it . . ." (2 Nicholay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln Complete Works, 508 (1902)

Sydney G. Fisher in his work entitled "Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the Rebellion," 3 Pol. Science Quarterly, expressed the same idea when he said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Every man thinks he has a right to live and every government thinks it has a right to live. Every man when driven to the wall by a murderous assailant will override all laws to protect himself, and this is called the great right of self-defense So every government, when driven to the wall by a rebellion, will trample down a constitution before it will allow itself to be destroyed. This may not be constitutional law, but it is fact." (Pp. 454, 484-485)

But the difficulty occasioned by the absence of a constitutional power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand to proclaim martial law, which greatly hamstrung Lincoln in coping effectively with the civil law, was obviated when our own Constitution expressly provided for the grant of that presidential power (Art. VII, Section 10, par. 2). Unlike the legislative power under the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Article III, Section l, paragraph 14, 1935 Constitution), the President can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand impose martial law in cases of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion when the public safety requires it. The Congress could not have been granted the power to suspend in case of imminent danger as it is not by the nature of its office in a position to determine promptly the existence of such situation. It can only see or witness the actual occurrence thereof and when they happen, Congress is also empowered to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusas an exercise of legislative power when the President fails to act; but under no circumstances can it declare martial law as this power is exclusively lodged in the President as Commander-in-Chief.

When the Philippine Constitution of 1935 was written, the framers decided to adopt the provisions of Section 3, paragraph 7, of the Jones Law, which became Article III, Section 1, paragraph 14, of the 1935 Constitution, and those of Section 21 of the Jones Law which became Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2, of the same. The Jones Law provisions read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 3, paragraph 7 of the Jones Law provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusshall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require it, in either of which events the same may be suspended by the President, or by the Governor-General, wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.

And Section 21 of the same law in part provided that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . (H)e (referring to the Governor-General) may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Islands, or any part thereof, under martial law: Provided That whenever the Governor-General shall exercise this authority, he shall at once notify the President of the United States thereof, together with the attending facts and circumstance, and the President shall have power to modify or vacate the action of the Governor-General.

Before the Jones Law, the Philippine Bill of 1902 provided as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusshall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require it, in either of which events the same may be suspended by the President, or by the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, whenever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. (Section 2, par. 7)

The Philippine Bill of 1902 had no provision pertaining to the declaration of martial law."cralaw virtua1aw library

The adoption of the Jones Law provisions was prompted by the prevailing sentiment among the delegates to the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention to establish a strong executive, as shown by its proceedings reported by two of its prominent delegates (Laurel and Aruego) who recounted in their published works how the delegates blocked the move to subject the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrections or rebellion, to the approval of the National Assembly, but did nothing to block, and allowed, the grant of the power, including that to declare martial law, to the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. What is evident from this incident is that when it comes to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand establishment of martial law in case of the occurrence or imminent danger of the contingencies mentioned therein, and the public safety requires it, the clear intent was to exclusively vest in the President that power, whereas Congress can only suspend under the Bill of Rights provision when there is actual occurrence of these events for reasons already adverted to above. And when martial law is proclaimed, the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpusnecessarily follows for, the greater power includes the less. Nobody will ever doubt that there are greater restrictions to individual liberty and freedom under martial law than under suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the former he can even close the courts if necessary and establish in their place military commissions. In the latter, the action proceeds from the premise that the courts are open but cannot grant the writ.

When the Constitution of 1935 was being framed, the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter was that laid down in Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, September 30, 1905. In that case the question presented and decided is identical to what is raised by the petitioners here. This (1905) Court ruled that the judiciary may not inquire into the facts and circumstances upon which the then Governor General suspended the privilege of the writ under Section 5 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, which granted him the same power now vested in the President, and that the findings of the Governor General were "final and conclusive" upon the courts. Aware of this rule, the framers of the 1935 Constitution granted to the President the powers now found in Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2, of the 1935 Constitution.

On October 22, 1950, Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswas issued by the late President Quirino. Assailed before this Court in Montenegro v. Castañeda and Balao, 91 Phil. 882, as unconstitutional and unfounded, this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"And we agree with the Solicitor General that in the light of the views of the United States Supreme Court thru Marshall, Taney and Story quoted with approval in Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87, pp. 98 and 100) the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension belongs to the President and ‘his decision is final and conclusive' upon the court and upon all other persons."cralaw virtua1aw library

But in Lansang v. Garcia, L-33964, decided December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA, 448, this Court asserted the power to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases supporting the President's action in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusunder Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971. In departing from the rule established in the Baker and Castañeda cases, this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors, namely: (a) it relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott involving the U.S. President's power to call out the militia, which he being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces may be exercised to suppress or prevent any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b) the privilege had been suspended by the American Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all government authority emanates. The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case was based mainly upon the Barcelon case, and, hence, cannot have more weight than the same . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

I maintain that we should return to the rule in the Baker and Castañeda cases and jettison the Lansang doctrine which denies the grant of full, plenary and unrestricted power to the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand declare martial law. This denial of unrestricted power is not in keeping with the intent and purpose behind the constitutional provision involved

The Act of Congress of 1795 involved in Martin & Mott (12 Wheat 19 (1827)) which is the main prop of the Baker case, held inapplicable in Lansang case, provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That whenever the United States shall be invaded or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth such number of the militia of the State or States most convenient to the place of danger or scene of action, as be may judge necessary to repel such invasion . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The distinction made by this Court between the power of the President to call out the militia and his power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand declare martial law does not warrant a different treatment. The important and decisive point to consider is that both powers are expressly conferred upon the President by the same Section, exercisable only upon the existence of certain facts and situations. Under the 1935 Constitution (Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2,) both powers are embraced in the President's power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

The Baker decision should not have been emasculated by comparing the position then of the Governor General "as the representative of the Sovereign" in relation to the Filipinos who were its "subjects." Under prevailing conditions and democratic principles, there would be greater justification for relying on the judgment of the President of the Philippines who is the chosen representative of the Filipino people and hence more authoritative in speaking for the nation than on that of an American Governor General then who personified the burden of an imposed sovereignty upon us. And as the Executive of this Government who is charged with the responsibility of executing the laws, he is as much a guardian of the rights and liberties of the people as any court of justice. To judicially undercut the force and efficacy of the Baker and Montenegro doctrine is to ride rough shod over the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution. Parenthetically it may be stated that the Commander-in-Chief clause was retained in the 1973 Constitution.

Although the Lansang case tried to cushion the blow administered to the constitutional provision involved by adopting the test of "reasonableness" in the exercise of the President's power, without meaning to substitute its judgment for that of the President, yet the effect of the ruling is so far reaching that it may lead to a serious confrontation between the Courts and the President. The power to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the habeas corpusproclamation (grounds for the issuance of which are the same as those for martial law) presupposes the power to know what are the facts to be tested by the constitutional provision. This is the essence of an inquiry; the determination of the constitutional sufficiency of those facts simply follows. Suppose this Court says they are not sufficient to justify martial law and the President says they are because the evidence on which he acted shows the existence of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or the imminent danger thereof, what will happen? The outcome is too unpleasant to contemplate. Let us not try to repeat in our country what transpired between President Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney when the latter issued a writ of habeas corpusto set free one held by the military and President Lincoln practically said: "Taney has issued his writ. Let him enforce it." Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861).

President Lincoln, in the face of the grave danger then to the nation, simply ignored it and nothing could be done about it.

The test of reasonableness, or absence of arbitrariness in the exercise of the presidential power, is all a play of words. The determination of the reasonableness of the act of the President calls for a consideration of the availability and choice of less drastic alternatives for the President to take, and when that is done the Court will in effect be substituting its judgment for that of the President. If the Court were to limit its powers to ascertaining whether there is evidence to support the exercise of the President's power, without determining whether or not such evidence is true, we would have the curious spectacle of this Court having no choice but to give its imprimatur to the validity of the presidential proclamation, as it did in the Lansang case where it merely accepted the reports of the military on the facts relied upon by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 889, without judicially determining whether or not the contents of those reports were true. In so doing, this Court simply displayed the miserable limits of its competence for having no means for checking whether or not those facts are true. It would have been more in keeping with the dignity, prestige and proper role of this Court to simply read and consider the bases for the suspension as stated in the various "whereases" of the Proclamation, and then determine whether they are in conformity with the constitution. This to me is the extent of its power. To transcend it is to usurp or interfere with the exercise of a presidential prerogative.

This Court should not spurn the reminder that it is not the source of the panacea for all ills affecting the body politic (Vera v. Avelino, 77, Phil. 192). When a particular cure can come only from the political department, it should refrain from injecting itself into the clash of political forces contending for the settlement of a public question. The determination of when and how a constitutionally granted presidential power should be exercised calls for the strict observance of the time-honored principle of the separation of powers and respect for a co-equal, coordinate and independent branch of the Government. This is the basic foundation of the rule governing the handling of a political question that is beyond judicial competence (Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 35; Cabili v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-4638, May 8, 1951; Baker v. Carr, 360 U.S. p. 186; 82 S. Ct. Rep. 69; 7 L. Ed. 2nd, 663). It is high time to reexamine and repudiate the Lansang doctrine and give the President the sole authority to decide when and how to exercise his own constitutional powers. A return to the sanity and wisdom of the Baker and Montenegro doctrine and a realization that judicial power is unwelcome when a question presents attributes that render it incapable of judicial determination, because the power to decide it devolves on another entity, is urgently needed. It is worthwhile recalling what this Court in its sobriety and wisdom, unperturbed by the formidable turmoils, the fierce passions and emotions and the stresses of our times, said in the Baker case: (The term "Governor General" should read "President").

"If the investigation and findings of the President, or the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, are not conclusive and final as against the judicial department of the Government, then every officer whose duty it is to maintain order and protect the lives and property of the people may refuse to act, and apply to the judicial department of the Government for another investigation and conclusion concerning the same conditions, to the end that they may be protected against civil actions resulting from illegal acts.

"Owing to conditions at times, a state of insurrection, rebellion or invasion may arise suddenly and may jeopardize the very existence of the State. Suppose, for example, that one of the thickly populated Governments situated near this Archipelago, anxious to extend its power and territory, should suddenly decide to invade these Islands, and should, without warning, appear in one of the remote harbors with a powerful fleet and at once begin to land troops. The governor or military commander of the particular district or province notifies the Governor-General by telegraph of this landing of troops and that the people of the district are in collusion with such invasion. Might not the Governor-General and the Commission accept this telegram as sufficient evidence and proof of the facts communicated and at once take steps, even to the extent of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as might appear to them to be necessary to repel such invasion? It seem that all men interested in the maintenance and stability of the Government would answer this question in the affirmative . . .

"But suppose some one, who has been arrested in the district upon the ground that his detention would assists in restoring order and in repelling the invasion, applies for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that no invasion actually exists; may the judicial department of the Government call the officers actually engaged in the field before it and away from their posts of duty for the purpose of explaining and furnishing proof to it concerning the existence or nonexistence of the facts proclaimed to exist by the legislative and executive branches of the State? If so, then the courts may effectually tie the hands of the executive, whose special duty it is to enforce the laws and maintain order, until the invaders have actually accomplished their purpose. The interpretation contended for here by the applicants, so pregnant with detrimental results, could not have been intended by the Congress of the United States when it enacted the law.

"It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to make such laws and regulations as will effectually conserve peace and good order and protect the lives and property of the citizens of the State. It is the duty of the Governor-General to take such steps as he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of enforcing such laws. Every delay and hindrance and obstacle which prevents a strict enforcement of laws under the conditions mentioned necessarily tends to jeopardize public interests and safety of the whole people. If the judicial department of the Government, or any officer in the Government, has a right to contest the orders of the President or of the Governor-General under the conditions above supposed, before complying with such orders, then the hands of the President or the Governor-General may be tied until the very object of the rebels or insurrectos or invaders has been accomplished. But it is urged that the President, or the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, might be mistaken as to the actual conditions; that the legislative department – the Philippine Commission – might, by resolution, declare after investigation, that a state of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion exists, and that the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when, as a matter of fact, no such conditions actually existed; that the President, or Governor-General acting upon the authority of the Philippine Commission, might by proclamation suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswithout there actually existing the conditions mentioned in the act of Congress. In other words, the applicants allege in their argument in support of their application for the writ of habeas corpus, that the legislative and executive branches of the Government might reach a wrong conclusion from their investigations of the actual conditions, or might, through a desire to oppress and harass the people, declare that a state of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion existed and that public safety required the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswhen actually and in fact no such conditions did exist. We can not assume that the legislative and executive branches will act or take any action based upon such motives.

"Moreover, it can not be assumed that the legislative and executive branches of the Government, with all the machinery which those branches have at their command for examining into the conditions in any part of the Archipelago, will fail to obtain all existing information concerning actual conditions. It is the duty of the executive branch of the Government to constantly inform the legislative branch of the Government of the condition of the Union as to the prevalence of peace or disorder. The executive branch of the Government, through its numerous branches of the civil and military, ramifies every portion of the Archipelago, and is enabled thereby to obtain information from every quarter and corner of the State. Can the judicial department of the Government, with its very limited machinery for the purpose of investigating general conditions, be any more sore of ascertaining the true conditions throughout the Archipelago, or in any particular district, than the other branches of the Government? We think not."cralaw virtua1aw library

C. THE CONCLUSION


The resolution of the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 and all acts done under it, by delving into the sufficiency of the grounds on which the declaration of martial law is premised, involves a political question. Whether or not there is constitutional basis for the President's action is for him to decide alone. I take it for a fact that he is not an irresponsible man and will act reasonably and wisely, and not arbitrarily. No President in his right mind will proclaim martial law without any basis at all but merely to fight the hobgoblins and monsters of his own imagination. In the exercise of that power this Court should not interfere or take part in any manner, shape or form, as it did in the Lansang case. When this Court required the Army officers, who furnished the President with the facts on which he acted, to present proofs to establish the basis of the habeas corpussuspension, this Court practically superimposed itself on the executive by inquiring into the existence of the facts to support his action. This is indeed unfortunate. To inquire is to know the facts as basis of action. To inquire is to decide, and to decide includes the power to topple down or destroy what has been done or erected. This is the ultimate effect of the Lansang doctrine.

When the security and existence of the state is jeopardized by sophisticated, clandestine and overseas means of destruction and subversion; when open avowals of attempts to dismember the Philippines are politically and financially encouraged and supported by foreign powers; when the advocates of a sinister political and social ideology are openly storming even the bastions of military power and strength with the use of smuggled arms furnished by those who wish this nation ill, let us leave to the Executive the unhampered determination of the occasion for the exercise of his power, as well as the choice of the weapons for safeguarding the nation. This Court should not, by a process of subtle reasoning and rhetorical display of legal erudition, stand on the way to effective action by virtually crippling him. Instead, it should be a rock of refuge and strength for those who are called upon to do battle against the forces of devastating iconoclasm and ruthless vandalism that ruled our streets, our public squares and our schools before the establishment of martial law. Instead of imposing cramping restrictions on the executive and thereby giving the enemy aid and comfort, this Court should allow the political department a full and wide latitude of action.

It follows that all orders, decrees or acts of the President under the Martial Law Proclamation, including those of the respondent Secretary of National Defense as his authorized representative, are valid and binding. The people have ratified those acts by the adoption and ratification of the New Constitution as proclaimed by the President on January 17, 1973, and by the Referendum held on July 27-28, 1973. For us to declare them valid in our decision now has become merely an anti-climax after we have decided in the Javellana case that the people have ratified and accepted the New Constitution and there remains no more judicial obstacle to its enforcement.

Consequently, the arrest and detention of the petitioners, including their further detention after the ratification and acceptance of the New Constitution, and even up to the present, are valid and constitutional. The duration of their detention, especially as regards petitioner Jose W. Diokno, is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the President. As to petitioner Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., his detention is no longer open to question as formal charges of subversion, murder and illegal possession of firearms have been filed against him with the proper Military Commission.

D. THE JUDGMENT


By this separate opinion I might incur the displeasure of my senior brethren who conceived and labored in bringing forth the Lansang decision which I am openly advocating to be discarded because this Court practically interfered with the exercise of a purely executive power under the guise of inquiring into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the habeas corpusproclamation. By requiring the representatives of the President to present evidence to show the reasonable exercise of his power, I repeat that this Court trenched upon a constitutionally granted power of the President. In expressing my honest thoughts on a matter that I believe is of supreme importance to the safety and security of the nation, I did so unmindful of the possible condemnation of my colleagues and fearless of the judgment of history.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to dismiss all petitions.
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