1. ELECTION LAW; CONTESTED ELECTIONS. — The eligibility of candidates to be elected or to hold office cannot be drawn in question in these proceedings. (Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. Rep., 238.)

2. ID.; ID.; TIME LIMIT FOR FILING PROTESTS. — The provision in section 27, that a protest must be instituted "within two weeks after the election," means within two weeks after the last requirement essential to a choice of a representative by the people has been completed; or, in other words, after the conclusion of the election duties of the board of canvassers.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPUTATION OF TIME. — The day upon which the election terminates should be excluded from the computation of this period.

4. ID.; ID.; EXAMINATION AND RECOUNT OF BALLOTS. — The examination and recount of the ballots in an election protest is a matter of course under the provisions of section 27, and cannot be waived unless by stipulation of the parties to the contest.

5. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF PARTIES TO WITNESS RECOUNT. — It is reversible error for the court to deny the interested parties the right to witness the examination and recount of the ballots and to present evidence with reference to the legality of the questioned ballots.

6. ID.; ID.; DUTIES OF INSPECTION OFFICERS. — Section 27 confers no judicial discretion upon the officers appointed by the court to aid in the examination of the registry lists and the ballots. Their duties are merely clerical and subject to the direct supervision of the court, who alone may finally pass upon the validity of any questioned ballot.

7. ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE BEFORE THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS. — Section 25 requires that the provincial board of canvassers make (a) one statement of all votes cast for each candidate to the Assembly in each Assembly district, and (b) one statement of all votes cast for provincial officers, before the announcement of any of the returns. The board is not authorized to declare the election of any of the candidates prior to the completion of its canvass of all the votes.

At the general election held in the Province of Capiz on June 4, 1912, Jose Altavas, according to the proclamation of the provincial board of canvassers, received 3,542 votes, and Ramon Hontiveros received 3,371 votes, for the office of provincial governor. Hontiveros protested. The Court of First Instance, after trial, found that the protestant received 3,173 legal votes and the protestee 2,842. Judgment was entered directing the provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly. The protestee appealed.

The appellant now insists that the court erred: (1) In not declaring the appellee ineligible to be elected to the office of provincial governor because his certificate of candidacy was not in accordance with the law; (2) in not dismissing the protest upon the ground that the same was premature; (3) in not dismissing the protest because it was not presented within the time required by law; (4) in not finding that the provincial board of canvassers issued its proclamation on July 12, 1912; (5) in holding that the document filed by the appellee on July 27 was sufficient to constitute a protest; (6) in not requiring the appellee to make a prima facie showing of fraud or irregularity in the manner of casting or counting the ballots before the ballot boxes were opened on the hearing; (7) in denying his (appellant’s) request to intervene and select one of the commissioners appointed by the court to examine and recount the ballots; (8) in refusing to allow him or his counsel to be present at the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of the ballots by the commissioners; and (9) in not permitting him to examine in court the ballots rejected by the commissioners and present additional testimony with reference to the validity of such rejected ballots.

1. Questions relating to the eligibility of candidates to be elected to or to hold office cannot be drawn in question in these proceedings. (Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. Rep., 238.) But if we were now called upon to determine the validity of the appellee’s certificate, we would hold it sufficient for all purposes.

2. The second, third, and fourth alleged errors may be considered together. The facts are these: The ballots were deposited on June 4, and the counting of the same commenced on the night of the 4th and continued until terminated. The first protest was filed on June 18. In this protest it was alleged that up to that time the provincial board of canvassers had not determined who had been elected provincial governor. No proceedings pertinent to the questions here involved were taken in the Court of First Instance until August 10. The provincial board of canvassers met on July 12 and proceeded with a canvass of the returns from the various voting precincts. On that date they completed the canvass of the returns in so far as the offices of delegates to the Assembly and the provincial governor were concerned, and stated that owing to the lateness of the hour they would adjourn until the following day, the 13th, without having canvassed the returns for third member. On the 27th of that month the appellee presented what he called an "amended protest" and asked permission of the court to substitute this "amended protest" for the one filed on June 18. This permission was granted. The "amended protest" is complete in every particular, and it is not necessary to take into consideration for any purpose the protest filed on the 18th of June. In fact, this latter protest was never drawn in question thereafter, or referred to for any material purpose during the trial of the cause in the court below or in this court, except for the purpose of determining from what date the two weeks within which the protest might be filed, as provided in section 27 of Act No. 1582 as amended, should begin to run. Copies of the "amended protest" were served upon all the candidates voted for on June 4. The word "candidates" as here used is restricted to those persons who had filed certificates of candidacy with the authorities and who had not on June 4 withdrawn their candidacy.

Upon the foregoing facts, the question to be decided is (a) whether the time within which the motion which introduces an election contest for a provincial governorship expires two weeks after the day upon which the ballots are cast or two weeks after the day upon which the provincial board of canvassers determines who has been elected; and (b) in computing the time, should the first or the last day be excluded from the computation?

This is not the first time that this question has been under consideration by this court. It was directly involved and after a thorough investigation and extended discussions, it was answered in two cases. (Navarro v. Veloso, 23 Phil. Rep., 625; Manalo v. Sevilla, ante, 609.) In these cases we held that the two weeks begin to run from the date of the proclamation of the provincial board of canvassers and not from the day the ballots were cast. This question is no longer an open one in this jurisdiction, and if our attention had not been called to a number of adjudicated cases in the United States which it is claimed hold differently, we would say no more upon the question. But view of these citations, we deem it advisable to somewhat further discuss the matter. Our further remarks, how ever, will be confined to an attempt to distinguish between the cases relied upon and the law and the conditions in our own jurisdiction.

It is believed that no one will disagree with the statement that the Legislature is presumed to have used words in their natural and commonly accepted meaning unless that meaning would contravene the manifest intent of the enactment. In State v. McCoy (2 Marv., 576; 43 Atl., 270, 273) it is said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An election, under the Constitution, involves every element necessary to the complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will, embracing the entire range, from the deposit of the ballot by the elector up to the final ascertainment and certification of the result. An election by the people means and includes the perfect ascertainment of such result."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Norman v. Thompson (73 S. W., 62-64; 96 Tex., 250) and in Ex parte Conley (Tex.) (75 S. W., 301, 302) it was held that the word "election," as used in Revised Statutes section 3397, providing that, after the result of an election under the local option law has been declared, the election may be tested, and that if it appear that it was illegal or fraudulently conducted, or such a number of voters were denied the privilege of voting as might have changed the result, or the true result of the election cannot be ascertained, "another election shall be ordered," means the act of casting and receiving the ballots from the voters, counting the ballots, and making the returns thereon. (State v. Tucker 54 Ala., 205, 210.) That is the meaning of the word "election" in the ordinary usage, and it must be so construed, there being nothing in the law to suggest that the Legislature intended to use it in a different sense. (3 Words and Phrases, p. 2334.)

The treatise on the subject of "Elections" in 15 Cyc., 279 et seq., defines the word as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In common parlance an election is the act of casting and receiving the ballots, counting them, and making the return."cralaw virtua1aw library

If this be the only meaning of the word, there is little room for doubt as to the meaning of the term "after the election" as used in section 27. But it is insisted that the word is used in numerous places throughout the Act to designate only the day and the operation of casting the ballots by the duly qualified voters. From this source is derived the chief if not the sole reliance of the advocates of the contrary construction. In view of the speciousness of this argument and the tenacity with which it is maintained, we are not disposed to set it aside upon the mere strength of a lexicographer’s definition of the word "election." We shall endeavor to show that it is also inappropriate to the manifest intention of the Legislature.

Section 3 probably gives more color to the argument in question than any other. In it we find (quoting from the original act) such expressions as the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An election to elect such delegates shall be held upon the thirtieth day of July, 1907.

"Subsequent elections for such delegates shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of 1909, and of each odd-numbered year thereafter.

"An election for provincial governor and third member of the provincial board shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of 1907, and upon the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each odd-numbered year thereafter.

"An election shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November of 1907, to elect municipal presidents and vice-presidents."cralaw virtua1aw library

At first blush it would appear that the word "election’ as used in these excerpts is confined to the day upon which those enjoying the right of suffrage are called to the polls to express their choice of candidates; or, in other words that it is equivalent to the expression "election day" used in section 10. But although the statute requires that an election be held upon that day, it does not require that it be concluded upon that day. Subsequent sections of the act show this most clearly. Section 21 is the section which, as a matter of fact, provides for the actual operation of depositing the votes. It is there provided that the duly qualified electors shall have access to the polls "from seven o clock in the morning until five in the afternoon." It also provides the method by which the ballots shall be deposited. If this is the only meaning of the word "election" as used throughout the act, what relation to an election must be attributed to the operation described in a subsequent section (No. 25) entitled "counting the votes; announcement of the result?" We started with a definition which contained the statement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people."cralaw virtua1aw library

In 3 Words and Phrases (p. 2329 et seq.) , under the title Elect-Elected-Election, a large number of definitions, pivoting upon the words "a choosing or selection of one from among others" may also be found. It is difficult to conceive of any of the essential subdivisions of this act of choosing being excluded from the operation of the term which concretely expresses this act of the people, i. e., "election." We apprehend that no one would have the temerity to say that the counting of the votes is unnecessary to an election. Yet that it is not indispensable to a valid election to conclude this operation during the day upon which the election is "held" is evident by section 24 itself, wherein it states that "if, by reason of the length of time required for the count . . . it shall be impracticable to return the same before midnight . . ." Again, who will say that the formal announcement by the board of canvassers is-not essential to an expression of the popular will? If the count may be concluded upon a sub sequent day, a fortiori may the announcement of the result.

Section 25 provides that the provincial board shall sit as a board of canvassers to tabulate the statements prepared by the municipalities in accordance with section 24. Yet, that this canvass is indispensable to the election of a delegate to the Assembly of a provincial officer cannot be denied. The counting of the votes and the announcement of the results by the municipal officers, and the canvass by the provincial board are integral parts of the election, and the word cannot, therefore, be confined to the day upon which the ballots were cast. We think it too clear for argument that the Legislature in saying that an election should be held on a specified date intended only to convey the idea that the initial operation of selecting the candidate should start upon that day. The expression is thus used so frequently and with this certain meaning in all election statutes as to practically amount to an idiom of language, "the meaning of which as a whole cannot be derived from the conjoined meanings of its elements."cralaw virtua1aw library

Keeping in mind the meaning of the word "election" as above set forth, let us examine some of the authorities called to our attention. At the outset it is well to quote the following from Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil., Rep., 238):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The utmost care must be exercised in the citation of authorities in support of any particular contention in the interpretation of election laws. They are universally statutory and seldom similar in the matter of election controversies. A single statutory of constitutional provision may render worthless some other jurisdiction on the point under discussion."cralaw virtua1aw library

The period within which a statutory contest by a defeated candidate may be instituted differs in the various States, not only as to the length of time allowed, but also as to the designated date that it shall start to run. The latter is the only point with which we are herein concerned. It is submitted that a provision of law requiring that the period shall commence to run "after the official counting of votes" (Montgomery v. Dormer, 181 Mo., 5; 79 S. W., 913) "after return day" (Carbis v. Dale, 23 Utah, 463; 65 P., 204), and other similar expression which clearly designated a time included within the term "election" and precede the final steps necessary to the election of an candidate are not equivalent to the phrase "after the election" as used in our own statute; for, as we have seen, the scope of the term "election: includes every step necessary to the choice of a representative by the people, from the casting of the ballots to the certificate of election. However correctly these phrases were construed in the cases, and there are number of them in the books, it is submitted that the tribunals which prepared them were not considering the phares "after the election." These cases are, not therefore, in point.

It is claimed that the cases of Carion v. Burt (111 Cal., 129, 131) is in conflict with our holding. The law under discussion in that case read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When an elector contest the right of any person declared elected to such office, he must, within forty days after the return day of such election, file with the county clerk a written statement, etc."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the course of the decision it was expressly decided that "return day" was prior to the determination by the board of canvassers of who was elected. It is therefore not understood how the requirement that a protest be filed "after return day" can be equivalent to the requirement that it be filed "after the election." If it can, then any intermediate step necessary to a valid election, such as the casting of the ballots, the counting of the ballots, or the official declaration by the local authorities of the number of votes cast in a precinct may be deemed equivalent to the election of a person to office; in other words, a part is equal to the whole. We conclude that this case is not in point.

The case of Belen v. Sherburne (27 La. Ann., 305), also cited, is, however, exactly in point. The phrase used in the law which the court in that case was totidem verbis the one found in our own statute. The court in that case dismissed a protest filed more than ten days subsequent to the day the ballots were deposited, but within ten days of the result. But it must be remembered that this was a contest for a municipal office, and that the returns were doubtless known within a day or two at the most after the ballots were cast. The positive injustice of not allowing the candidate time to ascertain the result of the election before filing his contest was not, therefore the court. It is also a fact that this case is some forty years old, and further that the law in that State has now been changed to read "after the promulgation of the result of said election," thereby indicating that the legislature arrived at the conclusion that it was not advisable to date the period from the day the ballots were cast. (Revised Laws of La.,