198.75 sq. m. @ 12,500 per sq. m. = P2,484,375.00
Less: 35% downpayment paid 11-15-88 = 869.531.25
——————
Balance = 1,614,843.75
Monthly amortization payable in = 89,713.54
18 months starting December 1988
until May 1990 @ 3% penalty for
delayed amortization = 3%
——————
Penalty per month = P2,691.41
"Total Penalty x 3 months
——————
= P8,074.22
"RE-SALE:
198.75 sq. m. @ P14,500.00
per sq. m. = P2,881,875.00
Less: Balance = 1,614,843.75
——————
P1,267,031.25
Less: Interest for delayed
Amortization 8,074.22
——————
Net cash involved payable
in 6 months = P1,258,957.03"
Petitioners rejected the offer on the resale of the rights over the condominium unit proposed by private respondents because the offer was unreasonable, unfair and inequitable.
On March 19 and April 25, 1989, respondent Ramesh J. Sadhwani demanded a copy of the contract to sell, noting that his wife had no official document to show that she bought a condominium unit from GLPI and there were conditions and/or stipulations in the contract which she could not be expected to comply with, unless a copy of the same be given to her. By letter dated May 22, 1989 to GLPI, respondent Sadhwani’s counsel made a formal demand for the delivery to him of a copy of the contract to sell.
Spouses Sadhwanis failed to pay any of the monthly amortizations in the payment plan.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On August 7, 1989, petitioners sent a letter demanding payment of the balance amounting to P1,614,814.80, and informed the Sadhwanis that GLPI will rescind the Contract to Sell and automatically forfeit their down payment should they fail to pay within five (5) days from receipt of the letter in accordance with section 8 of the contract to sell. 5
On August 14, 1990, spouses Sadhwanis filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (hereinafter referred to as "HLURB"), a complaint for specific performance with an alternative prayer for refund against GLPI. Spouses Sadhwanis prayed that they be furnished with a copy of the contract to sell and allowed them to remit the balance of the consideration to GLPI and to deliver to them the title and possession of the condominium unit, or to be reimbursed of the amount they paid with interest and damages. 6
On October 8, 1990, petitioners filed with the HLURB an answer to the complaint and subsequently, the parties submitted their position papers.
On October 2, 1992, HLURB Arbiter Roberto F. Paras rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Ordering respondents Gold Loop Properties, Inc. and St. Martin to furnish complainants with a copy of the subject Contract to Sell and to accept complainant’s payment of the agreed purchase price balance of the Condominium unit described in the said Contract to Sell;
"2. Ordering said respondents to deliver possession of and to effect the transfer of title to the subject condominium unit in favor of the complainants after full payment of the purchase price;
"In the event compliance with the above dispositive portion is no longer possible, respondents instead are hereby ordered to jointly and severally reimburse complainants the amount of Eight Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Six Pesos and Thirty Five Centavos (P878,366.35) representing complainants’ reservation deposit and downpayment, with legal interest from the time of the filing of this complaint;
"3. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay complainants (a) moral damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and (b) attorney’s fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);cralaw : red
"4. Dismissing respondents’ counterclaim for lack of merit.
"IT IS SO ORDERED." 7
On November 16, 1992, petitioners appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, Quezon City while private respondents interposed a partial appeal thereto.
On October 11, 1993, the HLURB Board of Commissioners rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents’ appeal is hereby DENIED and complainants’ Partial Appeal is hereby given due course and the Decision subject of this Appeal is hereby MODIFIED by DELETING the second paragraph of order number two. Accordingly, complainants are directed to pay the balance of the purchase price, without interest, within 30 days from receipt hereof while respondents are ordered to accept said payment and turn over to complainants the unit subject of said contract to sell.
"All other aspects of the decision is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
"SO ORDERED." 9
On January 7, 1994, petitioners elevated the case to the Office of the President.
On August 24, 1994, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing 10 rendered a decision 11 dismissing petitioners’ appeal. He also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration 12 a Resolution 13 dated December 22, 1994.
On March 22, 1995, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari assailing the decision of the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President. In a resolution dated April 4, 1995, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. 13
On June 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition. 14 The court ruled that the failure of petitioners to give respondents a copy of the contract to sell sued upon, despite repeated demands therefor, and notwithstanding the payment of P878,366.35, was a valid ground for private respondents to suspend their payments. And given the fact that the contract to sell was in writing, the Sadhwanis, as buyers, were entitled to a copy. Their request for a copy sprung from their desire to comply with what was incumbent upon them to perform thereunder. While buyers do not need a copy of the contract to know the stipulated purchase price, the schedule of payments and the outstanding balance, the contract to sell, being an eight paged single-spaced document, broken down into twelve sections, spelling out the parties’ respective monetary and non-monetary rights and obligations, the buyers could not be expected to recall each and every detail of the stipulations of the contract without a copy of the contract to guide them.
On July 14, 1995, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration. 16 However, the court denied the motion. 17
Hence, this petition. 18
Petitioners contend that private respondents are not entitled to suspend payment of their monthly amortizations because of the alleged failure of petitioners to furnish them copy of the contract to sell and that private respondents used the alleged failure to give them copy of the contract as an excuse for defaulting in their contractual obligation to pay the installments. Petitioners insist that private respondents were given copy of the contract to sell. Petitioners pointed out that under the contract, they had the right to rescind the contract in case private respondents breached the contract.
In their Comment 19 and Memorandum, 20 private respondents alleged that they have not in fact received a copy of the contract to sell. Private respondents likewise averred that petitioners’ assertion is premised on its completely wrong proposition that private respondents had given petitioners a reason to rescind the contract to sell. What was really in issue was that it was petitioners that gave them sufficient and well-founded cause to suspend payment of their monthly amortizations on the condominium unit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
We agree with private respondents.
The core issue actually boils down to the question of whether or not respondents may suspend payment of their monthly amortizations due to failure of petitioners to furnish them copy of the contract to sell.
Time and again, the Court had occasion to reiterate the well-established rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and are not generally reviewable by this Court. 21 We find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, in the absence of showing that the present case falls within the exceptions to this rule. 22 When supported by sufficient evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court, are not to be disturbed on appeal. The rationale behind this doctrine is that review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is not a function that the Supreme Court normally undertakes. In the case at bar, we subscribe to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when it held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Private respondents were indeed justified in suspending payment of their monthly amortizations. The failure of petitioners to give them a copy of the Contract to Sell sued upon, despite repeated demands therefor, and notwithstanding the private respondents’ payment of P878,366.35 for the subject condominium unit was a valid ground for private respondents to suspend their payments. . . .
Endnotes:
1. In CA-G. R. SP No. 36977, promulgated on June 22, 1995, Purisima, J., ponente, Montoya and Jacinto, JJ., concurring, Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 34-41.
2. Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 45-51.
3. Petition, Statement of the Facts, Rollo, pp. 12-13.
4. Petition, Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 52-54.
5. Petition, Annex "E", Rollo, p. 55.
5. Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, p. 56.
6. Petition, Annex "G", Rollo, pp. 57-66.
7. Petition, Annex r, Rollo, pp. 85-93.
9. In HLRB Case No. REM-A-1307, Tungpalan, Comm., ponente, Mendiola and Altea, Comms., concurring, Original Record, pp. 330-338.
10. Now Associate Justice, Supreme Court.
11. In OP Case No. 5522, Petition, Annex ‘W’, Rollo, pp. 145-151.
12. Petition, Annex "O", Rollo, pp. 152-159.
13. Petition, Annex "P", Rollo, p. 160.
13. G. R. No. 119389, Petition, Annex "R", Rollo, p. 184.
14. Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 34-41.
16. CA Rollo, pp. 175-184.
17. By resolution, promulgated September 5, 1995, Rollo, pp. 43-44.
18. Petition filed on November 8, 1995, Rollo, pp. 10-33.
19. Rollo, pp. 188-202.
20. Rollo, pp. 228-253.
21. Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc., 306 SCRA 762, 775 [1999].
22. (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phils.), Inc., 305 SCRA 70 [1999], citing Misa v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 217 [1992]; Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771, 780-781 [1997]; Fule v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 698, 710 [1998]; Halili v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465, 470 [1998]; Remalante v. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Ayala Corporation v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, 294 SCRA 48 [1998].
23. CA Decision, Rollo, pp. 3940.