Heck v. Santos : AM RTJ-01-1657 : February 23, 2004 : J. Callejo Sr : En Banc : Decision
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring in the Result)
VITUG, J.:
Allow me to express, very briefly, my views on the various scenarios appurtenant to the subject of inquiry.
In A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, respondent Judge, now retired, has been charged on 21 March 2001, while still an incumbent judge, with having transgressed, prior to his appointment to the judiciary, the Notarial Law.
A. Exceptionally, a judge may be held administratively accountable for acts committed before his appointment to the Judiciary.
Generally, a judge is not made to account administratively for acts committed prior to his appointment. In Sevilla v. Salubre,1 respondent judge was charged with misappropriating for his own benefit money entrusted to him by his client while he was still a practicing lawyer.He, however, continued to ignore, even after his appointment in the judiciary, his previous clients demand for restitution.The Court explained: Being the visible representation of law, and more importantly, of justice, the people see in the respondent the intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests. If while still in active litigation practice lawyers do not know how to (so) uphold this kind of justice to their clients previous to their appointment as Judges, how then could people expect them to render judgments in the cases before them? In the earlier case of Alfonso v. Juanson2 where respondent judge was simply admonished for appearance of impropriety, the Court said that he could not be disciplined for immoral acts committed prior to his appointment in the judiciary absent showing that he continued to engage in these acts after his appointment.
B. The retirement or resignation of a judge could preclude the filing thereafter of an administrative charge against him for an infraction committed during his incumbency.
The filing of an administrative proceeding against a judge is predicated on the holding of his office or position in the judiciary; thus, his resignation or retirement from office could bar an administrative case3 from being initiated. An administrative charge already pendingupon resignation or retirement is not necessarily rendered moot since the penalty that can still be imposed, if the respondent is found guilty, goes beyond just dismissal from the service. Noteworthy is A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC which provides that if a complaint against a judge is filed within six months before his compulsory retirement for an alleged infraction occurring at least a year before such filing, and shown prima facieto be intended to harass the judge, the complaint must forthwith be recommended for dismissal.
C. A judge, already retired, may, but only under certain conditions, be subject to disciplinary action for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary.
A judge, already retired, may yet be subject to disciplinary sanction for an act committed prior to his appointment in the judiciary if (a) the judge has persisted, even after his appointment to the judiciary, in his assailed act, and (b) the administrative charge is filed while still an incumbent in the judiciary.
D. If, such as in the instant administrative case, the two conditions, above, are not shown, respondent judge may still be disciplinarily dealt with for his misconduct not as a judge but as a lawyer.
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis; neither purely civil nor purely criminal. It is not - and it does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit; it is rather an investigation into the conduct of an officer of the court. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor. Interest in the service of the profession is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney may still be a fit person to continue enjoying his privileges as such.4 It may thus be concluded that the administrative complaint can still be pursued.
While the cause of action does not prescribe, it is to be assumed, however, that the complaint must be filed within a reasonable time. What may or may not be a reasonable time is determined by circumstances peculiar and pertinent to the case.5 The administrative charge for alleged violation of the Notarial Law in this instance is said to have been committed more than twenty years ago by respondent judge prior to his appointment in the judiciary, filed several years after that appointment and just about a year prior to his retirement. No specific injury or damage has been shown for the alleged violation. The circumstances are enough, in my view, to warrant the dismissal of the complaint, and I so vote.
Endnotes:
1 Adm. Matter No. MTJ-00-1336, 19 December 2000, 348 SCRA 592.
2 Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-904, 7 December 1993, 228 SCRA 239.
3 See Diamalon v. Quintillan, Adm. Case No. 116, 29 August 1969, 29 SCRA 347; Absalud v. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 57, 30 October 1962, 6 SCRA 268; Reyes v. Arca, No. L-28234, 30 September 1970, 35 SCRA 247.
4 In re Almacen, No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
5 See Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions prepared by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
