Phil Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction & Dev't Corp : 146478 : July 30, 2004 : J. Tinga : En Banc : Separate Opinion
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 146478. July 30, 2004]
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,Petitioner, v.SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORP., PICK& SHOVEL, INC., ATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC. (Joint Venture), Respondents.
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J.:
I agree with the ponencias ultimate ruling that the petition be granted and the records forwarded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. However, I disagree with the holding of the majority that the petitioner Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) had lost the right to perfect its appeal before the Court of Appeals.1 I maintain that the trial court grievously erred in failing to serve a copy of its assailed Decision on PPAs principal counsel, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), and that the ponenciahas regrettably overlooked the full ramifications of such failure.
There is no doubt that that the trial court Decision dated 8 June 1998 was not served on the OGCC. The majority admits just as much.2 The Notice of Decision was served only on the Legal Services Department of the PPA, without any indication that service was made to the OGCC.3 Still, the ponencia holds that the period within which the PPA could appeal the decision of the RTC should be reckoned from 22 June 1998, the date the Legal Services Department of the petitioner received the assailed decision, and not from when the OGCC received the decision. On this holding, I respectfully raise the succeeding points.
The PPA is a government owned or controlled corporation (GOCC).4 As pointed out by the ponencia, it is the OGCC which shall act as the principal law office of all GOCCs.5 In the case of Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel, 6 the court upheld the prerogatives of the OGCC when it comes to representation of GOCCs, ruling that a private counsel who had not secured the proper authorization from the OGCC could not represent the eponymous GOCC. It noted that under Administrative Order No. 130,7 all legal matters pertaining to government-owned or controlled corporations shall be exclusively referred to and handled by the OGCC.8 The Administrative Code of 1987 likewise mandates that the OGCC exercise control and supervision over all legal departments or divisions maintained separately by these GOCCs such as the PPA.9 ςrνll
Phividec acknowledges the strong policy bias of tasking the OGCC as the primary legal counsel of GOCCs, to the exclusion of others. Any legal moves in the course of litigation by a GOCC will require the prior consent, if not initiation, by the GOCC. This is the principle recognized by statutes and jurisprudence.
I think that the trial court seriously erred in failing to serve a copy of its Decision on the OGCC. The trial court very well knew that the OGCC was the PPAs principal counsel of record. In fact, it was necessary that the RTC Decision be served on the OGCC.By force of the Administrative Code, the OGCC is the lead counsel of all GOCCs and no agreement or arrangement entered into by, or any act or omission of, the OGCC can alter the set-up.In fact, unlike in the case of the Office of the Solicitor General which may take a position contrary to the government office it represents, the OGCC is expected to advocate the interests of the GOCC it represents. It also exercises control and supervision over the legal offices of the respective GOCCs. The implication is clear the participation of the OGCC in litigation involving GOCCs is indispensable; and its role in such litigation primary, to the exclusion of other collaborating counsels.
The reglementary period for appeal exists to afford counsel for a party sufficient time to prepare the appeal. The PPA Legal Services Department alone cannot initiate the appeal. It makes sense then that the period of appeal should commence upon receipt of the decision by the indispensable primary legal counsel, the OGCC, as it is the OGCC that would decide whether or not to interpose the appeal at all, what arguments to utilize if an appeal is taken, and generally exercise control or supervision over the preparation of the appeal.
The ponencia notes that the OGCC manifested in its appellants brief in the Court of Appeals that it had received the RTCs decision on 22 June 1998, although the said copy was served on it through the PPA Legal Services Department. The majority characterizes such admission as a judicial admission, citing Section 4, rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Still, the OGCC never asserted that it itself, as primary legal counsel, received the copy of the decision on 22 June 1998. In fact, it subsequently clarified that it was the PPA Legal Services Department which received the copy on such date, and that it had only relied on this copy in order to file the motion for reconsideration.10 ςrνll
It was clearly error for the OGCC to admit that 22 June 1998 was the reckoning date from which to commence the reglementary period to file the appeal, despite the fact that service of the decision was not properly perfected on that date. Still, such judicial admission should bear little relevance.It is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.11 ςrνll
Accordingly, the reglementary period for appeal by the PPA should be reckoned from the date the OGCC, and not the Legal Services Department of the PPA, received a copy of the assailed decision.Since in this case, the date when the OGCC actually received a copy of the trial court decision has not been duly established, I think it is premature to conclude that the PPA failed to interpose its appeal within the prescribed period. As such, I deem it unnecessary, as the ponencia has done, to invoke substantive justice as an excuse to relax the procedural rules and enable the grant of the petition.
For the reasons stated above, I vote to GRANT the petition.
Endnotes:
1 Decision, p. 14.
2 See Decision, p. 10. The records also show that the OGCC was not served a copy of the decision of the trial court.
3 RTC Records, p. 176.
4 Established as a body corporate by Pres. Decree No. 857 (1975).
5 Page 10, Decision, citing Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administration Code of 1987.
6 G.R. No. 155692, 23 October 2003.
7 Issued in 1994 by President Ramos.
8 See Section 1, A.O. No. 130 (1994).
9 Section 10, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 3, Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
10 CA Records, p. 80.
11 Luciano v. Estrella, 145 Phil. 454, 461 (1970); citing several cases. Such a principle dates back to Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of Lands, a 1919 decision. Republic v. Hon. Marcos, 152 Phil. 204, 212 (1973).
