EN BANC
(479 SCRA 1; 515 Phil. 1)
[G.R. NO. 149802 - January 20, 2006]
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO AND Y REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., ESTATE OF RAMON U. COJUANGCO, represented by IMELDA O. COJUANGCO, and IMELDA O. COJUANGCO, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 150320 - January 20, 2006]
ALFONSO T. YUCHENCGO AND Y REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., ESTATE OF RAMON U. COJUANGCO represented by IMELDA O. COJUANGCO, and IMELDA O. COJUANGCO, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 150367 - January 20, 2006]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS (represented by its Administrator, the Bureau of Internal Revenue), IMELDA R. MARCOS, PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., ESTATE OF RAMON U. COJUANGCO (represented by its Administratrix, IMELDA O. COJUANGCO), IMELDA O. COJUANGCO, ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, and Y REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 153207 - January 20, 2006]
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO AND Y REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., ESTATE OF RAMON U. COJUANGCO represented by IMELDA O COJUANGCO, and IMELDA O. COJUANGCO, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 153459 - January 20, 2006]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, GREGORIO MA. ARANETA, III, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IMELDA COJUANGCO, ESTATE OF RAMON COJUANGCO (represented by the Administratrix, IMELDA COJUANGCO), PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, AND Y. REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines on the PLDT shares subject of separate trial is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.The last two of the five petitions at bar, both for review on certiorari, were thereupon filed. The petition in G.R. No. 153207 filed by the complainants-in-intervention Yuchengcos,nd that in G.R. No. 153459 filed by the Republic, both challenge the Partial Decision.
The Motion for Summary Judgment [filed by Imelda Cojuangco, et al] is hereby GRANTED, and the Complaint-in-Intervention [filed by the Yuchengcos] DISMISSED.SO ORDERED. (Underscoring supplied)
There is no disagreement with respect to the disposition-dismissal by the minority of the first three petitions - the first having become moot, and the second and third for lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan.2 There is also no disagreement with respect to the disposition-denial by the minority of the fourth petition (G.R. No. 153207) in the absence of reversible error on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
- Whether petitioners in G.R. NOS. 149802, 150320 and 150367 were denied due process when the Sandiganbayan in effect directed them to terminate the presentation of their respective evidence; and
- Whether the Partial Decision being assailed via petition for review in G.R. NOS. 153207 and 153459, conforms to the evidence presented, the law and/or settled jurisprudence.
. . . the Republic has failed to provide such "proof of authenticity or reliability" of the documents offered by it in evidence. Thus almost all the documents offered by the Republic are photocopies, and no effort was undertaken . . . to submit the originals of said documents, or to have them properly identified, or to otherwise justify the admission of mere photocopies. Not surprisingly, defendants . . . objected to the admission of the Republic's documentary exhibits, citing violation of the Best Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure ["Rules"], the Rules of Presentation of Documentary Evidence (Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules). The Hearsay Evidence Rule, and the rule as to Purpose/s of Documentary Evidence (Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules)."4 (Underscoring supplied),a discussion of the evidence presented in the case is in order.
Meanwhile, 54,349 shares in another corporation, PTIC, were "contributed to and/or abandoned" by one of its stockholders, General Telephone and Electronics (GTE), an American corporation, in favor of PTIC.
Rolando C. Gapud - President Jose D. Campos, Jr. - Vice-President Gervasio T. Gaviola - Treasurer Francisco G. De Guzman - Secretary Rodolfo R. Dimaano - Assistant Secretary
x x x The unsupported allegation that President Marcos owned the disputed shares in PLDT, PTIC and PHImay perhaps explain the circumstances surrounding PHI's incorporation, why PTIC's stockholders were disinterested in purchasing PLDT's shares in 1977, why PTIC's stockholders waived their right of first refusal in 1978, why there are no proper entries in PHI's Stock and Transfer Book, or why the subject shareholdings were not included in Ramon U. Cojuangco's Estate inventory. However, the converse syllogism is not true - the details of PHI's incorporation, or the fact that PTIC's stockholders were disinterested in purchasing PLDT's shares in 1977, or that PTIC's stockholders waived their right of first refusal in 1978, or that there are no proper entries in PHI's Stock and Transfer Book, or that 400 PHI shares were not included in Ramon U. Cojuangco's Estate inventory do not necessarily establish that President Marcos owned the subject shares in PHI, PTIC and PLDT.Imelda Marcos, on the other hand, consistent with the theory of petitioner Republic, claims that she, her late husband President Marcos, and their family were the beneficial owners of PHI, alleging in her Cross-claim filed before the Sandiganbayan as follows:
These circumstances show that PHI had an undisclosed principal and beneficial owner. Subsequent events, i.e. the assignment of shares in 1981 and 1983, reveal and confirm that Mr. Ramon U. Cojuangco and his family were the principal and beneficial owners of PHI, and, corollarily, the subject PHI, PTIC and PLDT shares, not President Marcos.20 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
6.1 PHI was incorporated to serve as the holding company of all the PTIC shares owned by Mr. and Mrs. Marcos and family, in addition to those being held by trustees/nominees like defendants Ramon and Imelda Cojuangco. For this purpose, PHI was organized with the following as incorporators, all of whom were the trustees/nominees of the Marcoses:
Jose D. Campos - 400 shares Rolando C. Gapud - 400 " Renato E. Lirio - 400 " Gervaso T. Gaviola - 400 " Ernesto S. Abalos - 400 " Total _______
- 2,000
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
- Considering that the incorporators of PHI admittedly held the PHI shares registered in their respective name[s] for and in behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos and family, which trust relationship continued even with respect to the incorporators' nominees, no third party, including defendants Ramon and Imelda Cojuangco, could have lawfully and rightfully acquired any right over of (sic) said shares in their own right.21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)The Sandiganbayan, therefore, was not to look for proof beyond reasonable doubt, but to determine, based on the evidence presented, in light of common human experience, which of the theories proffered by the parties is more worthy of credence. The case of Joaquin v. Navarro24 instructs:
x x x "Juries must often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.The evidence presented by the parties shows that the preponderance clearly lies with the Republic, but the Sandiganbayan grossly misappreciated it and, therefore, committed a reversible error. In Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., 26 this Court ruled:
In conclusion, the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory - that the mother outlived her son - is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. x x x25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Once again, we apply the rule that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be overturned when supported by the evidence on record save in the known exceptions such as gross misappreciation of the evidence or misapprehension of facts.27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)THE TESTIMONIES OF CAMPOS, GAPUD, AND ATTY. FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN (De Guzman) ESTABLISH THE MARCOSES' OWNERSHIP OF PHI
Moreover, the case of Salazar v. Gutierrez28 teaches:
It bears repeating that the finding thus made, although apparently factual in character, is premised upon supposed absence of evidence, and therefore is reviewed by this Court if the premise is clearly contradicted by the record or unjustified upon other considerations which logically lead to a different conclusion, but which the decision under review did not take into account.29 (Underscoring supplied)
- I was able to maintain United Laboratories Inc. as the exclusive property of the original stockholders. x x x
- x x x Some of the listed shareholders of United Laboratories are personal holding companies of my family as well as the holding companies of the other shareholders. Again, in any of the personal holding companies listed as shareholders of United Laboratories Inc., Mr. Marcos or his family is not a stockholder. x x x
These statements speak for themselves. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan, after finding that "almost all the documents offered by the Republic are photocopies" (underscoring supplied) and ruling that the same were unreliable, omitted any discussion of the evidentiary weight of the Republic's testimonial evidence, including the deposition-statement of Campos quoted above. Notwithstanding Campos' testimony linking Marcos to PHI (and thus to the subject PTIC shares pertaining to PHI), the graft court concluded that "[t]here is no competent evidence to tie defendant Ferdinand Marcos with PTIC."
- In your Sworn Statement, page 2, you stated that with respect to the corporations you held in trust for President Marcos, it was your "policy" that whenever such a corporation was organized, you executed, and you required all your business associates to execute, a Deed of Trust or Deed of Assignment in favor of an "unnamed beneficiary", and delivered the originals thereof to President Marcos. x x x Was this "policy" followed in the case of [PHI]? xxx
ANSWER: All the corporations I organized - that was the standard policy – that we surrendered direct to President Marcos.
3.1 Was it also your policy to deliver to President Marcos the stock certificates that you and your business associates held in trust for him?
ANSWER: Yes, Ma'm.
3.2 If stock certificates that you and your business associates held in trust for President Marcos were delivered to him was it also your policy to have the stock certificates indorsed in blank? Were the stock certificates in [PHI] indorsed in blank?
ANSWER: If there are certificates issued in Prime Holdings, it is the same way it was delivered to him. If there is such certificate issued, it is indorsed in blank and follow the same pattern for all the corporations. Whatever we have decided, we deliver, sign in blank and deliver to him.
3.3 Did you and your business associates deliver to President Marcos the stock certificates issued by [PHI]? If not, what did you and your business associates do with the stock certificates?
ANSWER: If Prime Holdings certificates have been issued, as I said Ma'm, it is delivered to the President.- In your Sworn Statement, page 2, you also stated that "it is in fact my policy and procedure that we disclaim completely any interest" in the business organized for President Marcos and "make it clear to the former President that we held such interests in his behalf". . . . Was this "policy and procedure" followed in the case of [PHI]? xxx
ANSWER: The policy is followed by every corporation that we organized for the President.
4.1 Did you and your business associates also "disclaim completely any interest" in . . . (PTIC) and "make it clear to the former President that we hold such interests on his behalf"?
ANSWER: Ma'm, as I said, I don't know that Prime Holdings has such holdings of the PTIC shares that you referred to.33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, after Campos organized PHI, he entrusted most if not all of its business transactions to his close associate Gapud, the president of PHI who himself confessed to have acted as a Marcos nominee. Campos' lack of knowledge of PHI's holdings in PTIC, therefore, ceases to be a point against the reliability of his testimony.
Q [Atty. Manalaysay]: Now, Mr. de Guzman, you also mentioned that Mr. Campos asked you to or instructed you to organized (sic) Prime Holdings, Inc., is that correct? A: Yes, sir. x x x Atty. Manalaysay: My question to you is after (sic) you received other instructions from Mr. Campos regarding Prime Holdings, Inc. after incorporation? Witness: My recollection is that after, the only instruction I received after the organization was " Ang magbibigay sa iyo ng utos dito sa Prime Holdings, Inc. is Mr. Gapud", sir. Q: So, with that you will agree that Mr. Campos did not give any other instructions? A: I don't recall because from then on it was always Mr. Gapud who will call me or talk to me on what is to be done to Prime Holdings, Inc., if there is any at all, sir. 35(Underscoring supplied)
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Do you know the beneficial owner or owners of Prime Holdings, Inc.?As with the testimony of Campos, the Sandiganbayan did not explain its reasons for holding that, notwithstanding the existence of Gapud's testimony in the records, there is no competent evidence to support the Republic's thesis. The minority, however, passing upon the above-quoted testimony, expresses the view that Gapud contradicted himself with respect to the disposition of his 400 shares in PHI, since "it would have been implausible for him to make the assignment to Mr. Cojuangco if the covering certificates had previously been delivered to Pres. Marcos." (Underscoring supplied)
MR. GAPUD: What I know, Madam Consul, is the shares of stock and/or the assignments endorsed in blank were delivered to President Marcos by Mr. Campos.40
x x x x
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Did you really own the 400 shares of the Prime Holdings?
MR. GAPUD: No.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: For whom did you hold those 400 shares?
MR. GAPUD: Well, as I said earlier the shares and/or assignments indorsed in blank were delivered by Mr. Campos to President Marcos.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: The same heirs likewise alleged:"In separate Deeds of Assignment dated 18 February 1981, two (2) of the incorporators of Prime Holdings, namely: Rolando C. Gapud and Jose D. Campos, Jr., assigned and conveyed to Messrs. Ramon U. Cojuangco and Oscar Africa, respectively, all their shareholdings in Prime, consisting of four hundred (400) shares of stock each, or twenty (20%) percent each of the shares of stock of Prime (Annexes "C" and "C-1")."Question: Based on your personal knowledge, do you affirm or deny the said allegation?x x x x
MR. GAPUD: Madam Consul, I think I can only affirm that which pertains to me, namely: the Deed of Assignment that I signed. I will leave it to Mr. Campos to affirm his Deed of Assignment.41x x x x
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: May we continue?
Showing you the said Annex "C" now marked as Exhibit "F" for purposes of this proceeding, do you affirm or deny the authenticity of this document?
MR. GAPUD: Yes, I affirm.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Is it really true that you assigned your 400 shares to Ramon U. Cojuangco?
MR. GAPUD: Yes.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
VICE CONSUL HERNANDEZ: Can we note your objection and let Mr. Gapud answer?That the incorporators signed the deeds of assignment as nominees of Marcos, moreover, is consistent with another statement of Gapud which reveals that he received virtually nothing in return for the PHI shares he assigned to Cojuangco.
So the aforesaid Deeds of Assignments obviously will be with the knowledge and upon authorization and order of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is this correct?
MR. GAPUD: Considering that Prime Holdings, Inc. was incorporated upon the instructions of former President Marcos, obviously all the nominees would act only upon his authorization. That's my answer. 43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: How much did you receive as consideration for assigning your shares to him?Moreover, as with Campos's testimony, the minority considers Gapud's supposed ignorance of PHI's holdings in PTIC as undermining his credibility, basing this finding on the following portion of his testimony:
MR. GAPUD: The consideration for the assignment was that upon my assignment, first, my fiduciary responsibilities as nominee were extinguished, and secondly, I had transferred and extinguished any and all liabilities under the subscription payable.44 (Underscoring supplied)
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Do you know anything about the Philippine Telecommunication Investment Corporation (PTIC), 46% of the capital stock of which is owned by Prime Holdings, Inc.?Even a cursory reading of the question posed to Gapud, however, would suffice to clarify what he meant to say. Clearly, Gapud was not being asked whether he knew anything about PHI's holdings in PTIC but only whether he knew anything about PTIC itself as a corporation. Gapud's meager knowledge about PTIC, in spite of PHI's holdings therein, far from being incredible, is perfectly consistent with his admission that he was merely a Marcos nominee. Why expect him to be knowledgeable of PTIC when the person really interested in PTIC was neither him nor anyone else in PHI but their principal - Marcos?
MR. GAPUD: Well, very little except for that which I have read from the newspapers.45
The foregoing statements of de Guzman clearly support the thesis of the Republic that PHI is a dummy of the Marcoses, it having been completely organized by associates of Campos, who had categorically testified to having organized PHI for the benefit of President Marcos. On the other hand, there is hardly any evidence on Cojuangco's role in the organization of PHI to substantiate the thesis that the same was beneficially owned by him.
Q: So, you were an in-house counsel for UNILAB? A: Yes, sir. Q: What was Mr. Jose Yao Campos' position or role in UNILAB at that time, in 1969? A: When I joined UNILAB he was Chairman of the Board, sir. Q: Was he also the majority stockholder of UNILAB? A: Yes, sir, I think he is a majority stockholder. 46 x x x x Q: Now the original list of stockholders of Prime Holdings, Inc. were Jose D. Campos, Jr., Rolando C. Gapud, Renato E. Lirio, Gervasio T. Gaviola and Ernesto S. Abalos for four hundred shares each. Do you know Mr. Jose D. Campos, Jr.? A: Yes, sir. Q: Who is he? A: He is the son of Mr. Jose Y. Campos, sir. Q: And do you know Rolando C. Gapud? A: Yes, sir. Mr. Rolando C. Gapud used to be a consultant of United Laboratories, sir. Q: And as a consultant what were his duties and functions? A: The way I understand his relationship was that he is a consultant on financial matters of the company as well as Mr. Campos, sir. Q: How about Mr. Renato E. Lirio, do you know him? A: Yes, sir. Mr. Renato E. Lirio is an officer of Greenfield Development Corporation which is a sister company of United Laboratories, sir. Q: So, he works with Mr. Jose Yao Campos? A: Yes, sir. Q: And Gervasio T. Gaviola, do you know him? A: Yes, sir. Gervasio T. Gaviola was the Treasurer of the company, United Laboratories, sir. Q: And Ernesto S. Abalos? A: Mr. Ernesto S. Abalos was the Finance Vice President of United Laboratories, sir. Q: Did they all work for Mr. Jose Y. Campos? A: Yes, sir . 47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A little further on, the deposition began to dwell on the matter of deeds of assignment in blank having been issued in relation to PHI shares.
Q: And you testified that all of these five (5) original stockholders of Prime Holdings, Inc. worked for Mr. Campos? A: Yes, sir. Q: So, the following year of 1978 you were still Corporate Secretary of Prime Holdings, Inc.? A: Yes, sir. Q: And were you still taking instructions from Mr. Campos the following year 1978 with regard to Prime Holdings, Inc.? A: Yes, sir. Q: And how long after that did you continue to take instructions from Mr. Campos with regard to Prime Holdings, Inc.? A: Possibly until, again I'm not too sure about this, but he distanced himself in many operations even of United Laboratories when he had a heart attack in 1979, sir. Q: So are you saying that you took instructions from Mr. Campos with regard to Prime Holdings, Inc. until 1979 when Mr. Campos had a heart attack? A: Yes, that is the possibility of having instructions from him because after that he really was very inactive in all these corporations and it was then that Mr. Gapud who took over, sir.48 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, by affirming that PHI was organized by Campos, by identifying all the incorporators and himself as Campos associates, and by revealing that the office of PHI was within the premises of Campos –controlled UNILAB, de Guzman substantially corroborates the Campos and Gapud testimonies.
Q: Was it the standard operating procedure in Jose Yao Campos holdings companies that the stock certificates of the stockholders would be endorsed in blank? A: Yes, sir. Q: And who would hold custody or possession of those blank endorsed stock certificates? A: In the case of many of the corporations I think including Prime Holdings, Inc. these are not fully paid shares and therefore, I knew that no stock certificates have been issued, sir. Q: So, specifically in the case of Prime Holdings, Inc. there were no stock certificates issued because the subscriptions were not fully paid? A: Yes, sir. Q: Do you know if the stockholders of Prime Holdings, Inc., this is prior to 1981, had executed Deed of Assignment in blank for their subscriptions to PHI shares? A: Yes, sir, the standard operating procedure in the companies of Mr. Campos is that all the subscribers would have either a Deed of Assignment signed or a Deed of Trust, sir. Q: And you are referring to these holding companies that Mr. Campos, a number of holding companies that Mr. Campos have caused to be incorporated, these are the companies? A: Yes, sir. Q: You said Deed of Trust, would there be a designated trustee? A: No, sir. Q: So, these are Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Trust, the beneficiary of which would be left blank? A: Yes, sir. Q: But the assignors or the trustees or grantors would all sign, would all execute these Deeds? A: Yes, sir. Q: Who would have possession, you mentioned standard operating procedure or SOP, under that SOP who would hold the blank deeds? A: A copy of which usually two (2) copies are made, sir. Q: Two (2) originals? A: No. Q: Xerox copies? A: No, one original and one xerox copy and the original will be included in the records, sir. Q: The records of that particular company? A: Yes, sir, and the other one we give it to the Treasurer. Q: Of that particular company? A: No, to Mr. Gaviola, sir Q: Mr. Gaviola was the Treasurer of Prime Holdings, Inc. wasn't he? A: I think he is because he is always, was the Treasurer of many of the companies of Mr. Campos, sir. Q: So, there is the SOP also, Mr. Gervacio Gaviola is the Treasurer of Prime Holdings, Inc.? A: Yes, sir. 49x x x x Q: Now, who would hold the records of these companies which would include those blank Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Trust? A: Well, the actual custodian of that will be the Legal Department who has all the legal files, sir. Q: Was it not or would you consider it risky have (sic) blank Deeds of Assignment or blank Deeds of Trust of all the shares in this companies be right there in the records, be among the corporate records somebody could take them and put in their names? A: Maybe there is some risk there but you see, sir, the people in the Legal Department are well trusted by all of us, they have been with the company for many years and the competence that they have established with us and nobody would even get those records without let's say order of Mr. Campos or me as the Corporate Secretary, sir . Q: And who were these trusted people of the Legal Department? A: The lawyers, sir. Q: Could you give us the names? A: Yes, two of them died and one of them retired, Mr. Urbano Francisco was the only survivor, sir. Q: Can I have the names of those who died? A: Ed Halagao, I cannot remember the other one, sir. Q: These are the trusted lawyers of the Legal Department of UNILAB? A: Yes, sir. 50x x x x Q: Do you know, so what happened to those blank Deeds of Assignment and Deeds of Trust of Prime Holdings, Inc. that were entrusted with the trusted lawyers of UNILAB? A: When Prime Holdings, Inc.'s records were delivered, all those records, all those papers are with the records, sir. Q: So, you are referring to the 1982 delivery to the representative of Mr. Ramon U. Cojuangco? A: Yes, sir, except two (2) Deeds of Assignment which were I think made directly afterward when Mr. Gapud and Mr. Jose Campos, Jr. made the direct assignments to persons actually designated in the Deeds of Assignment, sir. Q: Who were those? A: The shares of Mr. Gapud was (sic) given to Mr. Ramon U. Cojuangco, Mr. Campos, Jr. I can't remember to whom he made the assignment, sir. 51x x x x Atty. Madamba: Mr. Witness, it appears on page 3 of your Articles of Incorporation that the principal office of the corporation, that is the Prime Holdings, Inc., will be established at or located at Mandaluyong. Was that principal office duly established? Witness: There was no actual office established but that is supposed to be within United Laboratories, sir. 52 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Cojuangco was elected President and took over the management of PHI in 1981 with the cooperation of the Marcos nominees who, it must be emphasized, still held the majority stockholding as of that date;Clearly, all these circumstances mark out Cojuangco either as a nominee of Marcos as was Gapud whom he replaced as President of PHI or, at the very least, a close associate of Marcos. As such, the PCGG which is charged, under E.O. No. 154 issued by President Aquino pursuant to her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution, with assisting the President in regard to, inter alia,
As the remaining incorporators on the Board divested their shares only in 1983, Cojuangco managed a Marcos-controlled corporation for at least two years;
The simultaneous divestment of shares by the three remaining incorporators on the Board to Cojuangco's close relatives in 1983 were with the knowledge and authorization of their principal - President Marcos.
The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship55 (Underscoring supplied),can and must recover for the Republic the 111,415 PTIC shares being held by PHI, they bearing the character of ill-gotten wealth whether they be in the hands of Marcos or those of Cojuangco.
One, evidence indicating manifest partiality and favorable treatment by the former President towards the alleged trustees, as demonstrated by active interplay between him and such trustees and/or presidential interventions which have resulted in inexplicable benefits to the trustees or to the corporations held by him through such trustees; andThe foregoing statement is, it bears emphasis, not a direct quote by the Sandiganbayan from the ruling of this Court in BASECO, but the graft court's inference from its reading of the decision. Such inference is thus valid only to the extent that it was logically contemplated in the BASECO decision itself.
Two, the existence of documents and records in the possession of the former President which, through indorsements and/or assignment made thereon in blank by his trustees, provide the legal instrumentation for him to assert, now or in the future, ownership or control over the properties held by his trustees and/or to recover such properties from them.57
Endnotes:
1Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), p. 14.
2 The majority takes exception, however, to the minority observation in its discussion of G.R. No. 150367 that the Republic's bid to have Imelda Marcos on the witness stand seems to imply that it cannot prove its case without such testimony, and other statements of similar import.
3Rollo (G.R. No. 153459) Vol. I, pp. 9-81.
4 Id. at 39.
5 Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. IV, p. 2594 and 2600.
6Id. at 2606.
7Id. at 2623-2624.
8Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. III, p. 1730.
9Id. at 1734.
10Id. at 1738-1739.
11Id. at 1434-1437.
12Id. at 1438-1439.
13Id. at 2320-21.
14Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. IV, p. 2564.
15Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. IV, p. 2564.
16Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. III, p. 2325.
17Id. at 2322.
18Id. at 2324.
19 Id. at 2323.
20Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. IV, p. 2876.
21Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. I, p. 432-433.
22 Amending Executive Order No. 14 "DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS, MRS. IMELDA R. MARCOS, MEMBERS OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, CLOSE RELATIVES, SUBORDINATES, CLOSE AND/OR BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, DUMMIES, AGENTS AND NOMINEES".
23Vide Sandiganbayan Decision: "The degree of proof required of the Republic to prove its case is, as is the rule in any other civil case, by a "preponderance of evidence." (Rollo at 29).
24 93 PHIL 257 (1953).
25Id., 269.
26 154 SCRA 703 (1987).
27Id., 712.
28 33 SCRA 243 (1970).
29Id. at 247.
30 This Court, in PCGG v. Peña, observing "the great extent of the [PCGG's] accomplishments despite its limited resources," took note of the report of then PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz as of the end of 1987 which mentioned, among others, the following accomplishments:
"297 Companies were subject to sequestration (including those whose sequestration was lifted and those surrendered companies of J.Y. Campos and those holding companies whose investments in shares were affected by Writs of Sequestration) x x x
"SURRENDERED LANDS BY JOSE YAO CAMPOS
Total area in sq. m. of all surrendered properties 19,684,435.45 sq. m.
Disposed to DAR (202 IRC titles) with total area of 13,997,529 sq. m.
Remaining balance of 75 titles recommended for disposal, with total area of 5,686,906.45 sq.m."
(159 SCRA 556, 575-578 [1988]; underscoring supplied)
31Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. III, pp. 1440-1443.
32Rollo G.R. No. 153459), Vol. I, p. 557 (item 4.16).
33Rollo (G.R. 153207) at 2063-2065.
34Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. I, p. 14.
35Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. I, pp. 1647-1649.
36 322 SCRA 790 (2000).
37Id. at 797.
38 4. 1 Did you and your business associates also "disclaim completely any interest" in Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) and "make it clear to the former President that we hold such interests on his behalf"?
ANSWER: Ma'm, as I said, I don't know that Prime Holdings has such holdings of the PTIC shares that you referred to.
5. The records of [PTIC] show that Luis T. Rivilla owned approximately P4,565,750 worth of shares of stock in PTIC and that some time in 1978-1980, he transferred approximately P2,903,762 worth of such shares to Prime Holdings, Inc. Who was the true or beneficial owner of the shares of stock in PTIC transferred by Luis T. Rivilla to [PHI] in 1978-1980?
ANSWER: Any matter that pertain to PTIC, I don't have any knowledge of, Ma'm.
5.1 Please describe in detail the basis of your knowledge, belief, or information on the true ownership of these shares in PTIC transferred by Luis T. Rivilla to [PHI].
ANSWER: As I stated, I don't know anything about that PTIC - what is referred to there.
5.2 Did Prime Holdings, Inc. pay anything to Luis T. Rivilla or to anyone else for the transfer of these shares? What or how much was paid? What was the form of payment? To whom was the payment or payments made?
ANSWER: Ma'm, I don't really know.
5.3 Please elaborate, if you can, on what you know about the circumstances surrounding the transfer of PTIC shares by Luis T. Rivill to [PHI] in 1978-1980.
ANSWER: Again, I don't know, Ma'm.
6. The records of [PTIC] also show that Ramon U. Cojuangco owned approximately P12,382,550 worth of shares of stock in PTIC and that some time in 1978-1980, he transferred approximately P7,213,538 worth of such shares to Prime Holdings, Inc. Who was the true or beneficial owner of the shares of stock in PTIC transferred by Ramon U. Cojuangco to [PHI] in 1978-1980?
ANSWER: The same answer, Ma'm. I don't know.
6.1 Please describe in detail the basis of your knowledge, belief or information on the true ownership of the shares in PTIC transferred by Ramon U. Cojuangco to [PHI].
ANSWER: I don't know Ma'm.
6.2 Did [PHI] pay anything to Ramon U. Cojuangco or to anyone else for the transfer of these shares? What or how much was paid? What was the form of payment? To whom was the payment or payments made?
ANSWER: I don't know, Ma'm.
6.3 Please elaborate, if you can, on what you know about the circumstances surrounding this transfer of PTIC shares by Ramon U. Cojuangco to [PHI].
ANSWER: I don't know.
7. Did you ever have any discussions or correspondences with President Marcos regarding his beneficial ownerhip or the beneficial ownership by any member of his family, directly or indirectly, of shares of stock in [PLDT], [PTIC] or [PHI]?
ANSWER: No, Ma'm." (Rollo [G.R. NO. 153207] at 2065-2067; underscoring supplied)
39People v. Gusmo, 422 SCRA 580, 588 (2004).
40Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), Vol. III, p. 1681.
41Id. at 1681-1682.
42Id. at 1684-1685.
43Id. at 1710.
44Id. at 1685.
45 Id. at 1680.
46Id. at 1460.
47 Id. at 1471-1473.
48Id. at 1484-1485.
49Id. at 1488-1491.
50Id. at 1492-1494.
51Id. at 1494-1495.
52Id. at 1641.
53Joaquin v. Navarro, supra.
54 "Creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government," promulgated February 28, 1986.
55 Section 2.
56 No. L-75885, May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181 (1987).
57 Draft Ponencia at 66.
58 "By the clear terms of the law, the power of the PCGG to sequester property claimed to be "ill-gotten" means to place or cause to be placed under its possession or control said property, or any building or office wherein any such property and any records pertaining thereto may be found, including "business enterprises and entities," " for the purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving, the same " until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth "ill-gotten". . ." (supra, 208-209; underscoring supplied)
59 No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556, 574 (1988).
60 Id. at 566.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
We are therefore constrained to find that the Republic's documentary evidence, to the extent that they are mere photocopies, or are otherwise unidentified, unauthenticated, and constitutive of hearsay, may not be justifiably relied upon by this Court, nor may their integrity be assumed, for their purpose of establishing the facts, or for supporting the theory pursued by the Republic.The Sandiganbayan, in fine, ruled that the Republic failed to prove by preponderant evidence that PTIC as well as the disputed shares in PLDT belonged to the Marcoses.
More particularly, there is no competent evidence to show that defendant Ferdinand Marcos had any hand in PTIC, or in the acquisition by the defendants Cojuangco in their own names of any of their shares therein. There is no competent evidence to establish or even infer, the existence of a relationship of trust between the defendants Cojuangco and defendant Ferdinand Marcos with PTIC, or to establish that presidential concessions, benefits, or other incentives that could have improved the financial and operational situation of PTIC, PLDT, and PHI, were accorded said companies by defendant Ferdinand Marcos. Accordingly, there is no competent evidence to prove the Republic's allegation that the PLDT shares herein were ill-gotten.
On the other hand, there is evidence for the defense which establishes the fact that all shares in PHI were vested upon defendant Ramon U. Cojuangco and his family. Thus documents were offered in evidence plainly naming and identifying Ramon U. Cojuangco and members of his family as assignees of PHI shares, and in the absence of blank Deeds of Assignment and/or Deeds of trust executed by stockholders of PHI, said corporation may not be said to have been organized for defendant Marcos's benefit. To reiterate, it is the existence of such blank Deeds of Assignment and/or Deeds of Trust that distinguishes corporations asserted to be owned by defendant Ferdinand Marcos from the others.
More importantly, with the assignment of PHI shares specifically to defendant Ramon U. Cojuangco and members of his family, defendant Ferdinand Marcos lost the essential legal instrumentation or mechanism upon which he could have claimed the shares in ownership or compel the reconveyance thereof to him.
Likewise, there is, by the evidence, sufficient basis to conclude that the defendants Cojuangco acquired the shares in their names in PTIC as the actual and beneficial owners thereof. In fact, based on plaintiff's own offered document, it is clear and indubitable that defendants Cojuangco were original stockholders of PTIC, hence held some of their shares therein as early as 1967. These shares have been claimed by them in actual and beneficial ownership. When defendant Ramon U. Cojuangco died on May 6, 1984, the 76,779 PTIC shares registered in his name were declared as part of his estate. 1
VICE CONSUL HERNANDEZ. –As gleaned from the deposition of Gapud, there is practically no consideration for the transfer by Gapud of his shares to Cojuangco:
So the aforesaid Deeds of Assignments obviously were with the knowledge and upon authorization and order of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is this correct?
MR. GAPUD. Considering that Prime Holdings, Inc. was incorporated upon the instructions of former President Marcos, obviously all the nominees would act only upon his authorization. That's my answer.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO. How much did you receive as consideration for assigning your shares to him?Deposition of de Guzman
MR GAPUD. The consideration for the assignment was that upon my assignment, first, my fiduciary responsibilities as nominee were extinguished, and secondly, I had transferred and extinguished any and all liabilities under the subscription payable.
The preponderance of evidence lies with the Republic with respect to the 111,415 shares of PTIC registered in the name of PHI. Such evidence consists of the statement of Campos as corroborated by the statements of Gapud and De Guzman.
- Cojuangco was elected President and took over the management of PHI on 1981 with the cooperation of the Marcos nominees who, it must be emphasized, still held the majority stockholding as of that date;
- As the remaining incorporators on the Board divested their shares only in 1983, Cojuangco managed a Marcos-controlled corporation for at least two years;
- The simultaneous divestment of shares by the three remaining incorporators on the Board to Cojuangco's close relatives in 1983 were with the knowledge and authorization of their Principal - President Marcos.
Annex A referred to by Campos included PHI.
- My relationship with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos dates back to the time when he was first elected as Congressman of the then Philippine Congress. The relationship continued when he was then elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter I assisted in the organization and acquisition of some business ventures for the former President. Following his directive I instructed my lawyers and requested the assistance of my other business associates and officers of the company to organize, establish and manage these business ventures for and on behalf of the President;
- The companies that we have organized for and on behalf of former President Marcos are listed in Annex "A" attached herewith;
- In the organization, administration and management of the abovenamed corporations, it was my policy that whenever such a corporation is organized for and on behalf of the intended beneficiaries, I execute and I require all my said business associates to execute a Deed of Trust or Deed of Assignment duly signed in favour of an unnamed beneficiary and to deliver the original copy thereof to the former President. It is in fact my policy and procedure that we disclaim completely any interest in any of such businesses and make it clear to the former President that we hold such interests on his behalf;
- In the latter part of 1979 suffered a severe heart attack and was confined in the intensive care unit of the Makati Medical Center. x x x
- Occasioned by the withdrawal of my active participation in the management of the abovenamed corporations, Mr. Rolando C. Gapud who was my financial consultant took over the direct responsibility of directing, managing and administering all the activities of the said corporations. However, since Mr. Gapud did not have the administrative staff to efficiently manage the businesses, he requested me that all the employees and officers involved in the organization should continue to remain in the companies even only in a nominal capacity considering that they had previously disclaimed any interest therein. It is for this reason that Rolando C. Gapud and my business associates, namely, Mariano K. Tan, Jose D. Campos, Jr., Luciano E. Salazar, Francisco G. De Guzman, Guillermo C. Gastrock, Ernesto S. Abalos, Gervasio T. Gaviola, Rodolfo Dimaano, Manuel Engwa, Lourdes F. Florentino, Florentin, Daniel Q. Tan and Elizabeth S. Campos continued to be named stockholders in these corporations although they did not have any financial interest therein. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
3. In your Sworn Statement, page 2, you stated that with respect to the corporations you held in trust for President Marcos, it was your "policy" that whenever such a corporation was organized, you executed, and you required all your business associates to execute, A Deed of Trust or Deed of Assignment in favor of an "unnamed beneficiary", and delivered the originals thereof to President Marcos. x x x Was this "policy" followed in the case of [PHI]? x x xThe admissions of Campos are judicial; hence, conclusive on him and his successors-in-interest. The same can be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 2All proofs submitted by him and his successors contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by him or not. 3The admissions of Campos are even admissions against interest, and, hence, trustworthy. For their part, the Cojuangcos failed to allege, much less show, that the admissions of Campos were made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
ANSWER: All the corporations I organized " that was the standard policy " that we surrendered direct to President Marcos.
3.1 Was it also your policy to deliver to President Marcos the stock certificates that you and your business associates held in trust for him?
ANSWER: Yes, Ma'm.
3.2 If stock certificates that you and your business associates held in trust for President Marcos were delivered to him was it also your policy to have the stock certificates indorsed in blank? Were the stock certificates in {PHI} indorsed in blank?
ANSWER: If there are certificates issued in Prime Holdings, it is the same way it was delivered to him. If there is such certificate issued, it is indorsed in blank and follow the same pattern for all the corporations. Whatever we have decided, we deliver, sign in blank and deliver to him.
3.3. Did you and your business associates deliver to President Marcos the stock certificates issued by [PHI]" If not, what did you and your business associates do with the stock certificates?
ANSWER: If Prime Holdings certificates have been issued, as I said Ma'm, it is delivered to the President.
4. In your Sworn Statement, page 2, you also stated that "it is in fact my policy and procedure that we disclaim completely any interest" in the business organized for President Marcos and "make it clear to the former President that we held such interests in his behalf" . . . . Was this "policy and procedure" followed in the case of [PHI]? xxx
ANSWER: The policy is followed by every corporation that we organized for the President.
4.1 Did you and your business associates also "disclaim completely any interest" in ... (PTIC) and "make it clear to the former President that we hold such interests on his behalf"?
ANSWER: Ma'm, as I said, I don't know that Prime Holdings has such holdings of the PTIC shares that you referred to. ("Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: How much did you receive as consideration for assigning your shares to him [referring to Ramon Cojuangco]?This lack of consideration renders the acquisition by the Cojuangcos of the said PHI shares of no juridical effect.
MR. GAPUD: The consideration for the assignment was that upon my assignment, first, my fiduciary responsibilities as nominee were extinguished, and secondly, I had transferred and extinguished any and all liabilities under the subscription payable.
VICE CONSUL HERNANDEZ: Can we note your objection and let Mr. Gapud answer.Given the lack of consideration and the authority given by Pres. Marcos therefor, it would thus appear that the deeds of assignment executed by the PHI incorporators in favor of Ramon Cojuangco and his family were forged for the purpose of conveying management and control of PHI to the latter who likewise acted for and in behalf of Pres. Marcos.
So the aforesaid Deeds of Assignments obviously will be with the knowledge and upon authorization and order of former Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, is this correct?
MR. GAPUD: Considering that Prime Holdings, Inc. was incorporated upon the instructions of former President Marcos, obviously all the nominees would act only upon his authorization. That's my answer.
VICE CONSUL HERNANDEZ: So the deposition ends.
Endnotes:
1 Assailed Partial Decision, pp. 32-33.
2 Rule 129, Section 4, Revised Rules of Evidence.
3Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229.
4 Executive Order No. 14 provides that "civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil action under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection with (said EO Nos. 1 and 2) may be filed separately from and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by preponderance of evidence.
5Republic v. Court Appeals, 204 SCRA 160.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines on the PLDT shares subject of separate trial is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.The arguments and counter-arguments of the herein four (4) main sets of litigants (the Republic, the Marcoses, the Cojuangcos and the Yuchengcos) on a menu of issues presently pressed in pleadings after pleadings are as numerous as they are extensive. What is more, the parties, along the way, squeezed the rules of procedure to the hilt, thus adding incidental matters to an already complex proceedings. So as not to be sidetracked, or, worse still, waylaid thereby and thus neglect, if not altogether miss, the proverbial tree for the forest, the Court shall limit itself and shall accord particular focus only to what it perceives to be material determinative facts and matters which led to the filing of the instant petitions. Towards the same end, the Court shall condense the several issues raised into two (2) core questions for resolution, to wit:
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and the Complaint-in-Intervention DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
As may thus be gathered from the above averments, petitioner Republic, as plaintiff a quo, seeks to recover from respondents Cojuangcos/PHI, the following PTIC shares of stock, viz: (1) the 111,415 shares in PHI's name; (2) the 76,779 and the 21,525 shares in the name of Ramon U. Cojuangco and Imelda O. Cojuangco, respectively. The desired recovery is predicated on the postulate that the three, as defendants a quo, are mere dummies/nominees/conduits of the Marcos family in the control of PLDT.
- This is a civil action against Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, . . . Imelda Cojuangco, the Estate of Ramon Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc. to recover from them ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property which they . . . had acquired and accumulated in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, . . . thus resulting in their unjust enrichment during Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos' 20 years of rule . . .
.- The wrongs committed by Defendants, acting singly or collectively and in unlawful concert with one another. . . include the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal and public trust . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
- Among the assets acquired by Defendants in the manner above-described . . . are funds and other property listed in Annex "A" hereof and made an integral part of this Complaint, [including, but not limited to the following]:
xxx xxx xxxc. Stocks
Shares of stocks in numerous corporations . . ., including about 2.4 million shares of . . . [PLDT] valued, at current market prices, approximately P1.6 Billion pesos and covered by shares of stock in . . . (PTIC) registered in the names of Prime Holdings Inc. (PHI), Ramon Cojuangco and the latter's associates.
During his lifetime, Ramon U. Cojuangco held 76,779 shares of stock in PTIC, while Imelda O. Cojuangco held 21,525 shares of stock in her own name, the beneficial and actual ownership of which is that of defendants Ferdinand Marcos and his family.
Defendant Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) held 111,415 shares which in truth and in fact belong to defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family. This stockholding of defendants Marcos and his family in PTIC, through Ramon U. Cojuangco and PHI, constitutes the majority stockholding in PTIC. PTIC, in turn, is the biggest stockholder of PLDT shares. In the manner above stated, defendants Marcos and his family effectively controlled PLDT. (Underscoring in the Original; Words in bracket, added)
11. Answering defendant PHI specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 20 (a) and 20 (b) of plaintiff's Complaint. Insofar as the facts alleged in paragraph 20 (c) thereof, defendant PHI respectfully alleges that: (a) Defendant PHI is the registered stockholder of 111,415 shares in . . . (PTIC); that "during his lifetime" Ramon U. Cojuangco held 76,779 shares of stock in PTIC; that Imelda O. Cojuangco held 21,525 shares of stock "in her name", but answering defendant specifically denies that these shares registered in said names are owned, actually and/or beneficially, by Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family.Respondent Cojuangcos' Answer dated June 9, 1990, 6 to the same Amended Complaint contains virtually the same material averments as those in PHI's answer. And like PHI, the Cojuangcos also pray for the dismissal, as to them, of the Amended Complaint.xxx xxx xxx
The truth of the matter is that the members of the family of the late Ramon U. Cojuangco own all the outstanding shares in PHI in full legal and beneficial ownership . . . .
2. The . . . (PLDT), . . . is one of the assets listed in Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint [of the Republic] . . . .
3. The Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corp. (PTIC) was organized . . . with the primary purpose to " . . . otherwise deal in all securities, shares of stocks and bonds of the [PLDT]." x x x . PTIC is the single biggest corporate stockholder of PLDT.3.1. PTIC's capital stock were originally subscribed by . . ., among others: defendants Ramon Cojuangco and Imelda Cojuangco both of whom held shares of stock in their respective names as trustees . . .for and in behalf of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, . . . and family . . . . All shares of stock in PTIC acquired and registered in their respective names subsequent to the incorporation were likewise acquired and held for and behalf of said principals.
3.2. On 7 December 1967, defendant Ramon Cojuangco and Mr. Luis T. Rivilla,. . . executed an agreement whereby . . . (67,392) shares of PTIC, which were held in their names were transferred, . . . unto defendant Imelda R. Marcos in consideration of the extinguishment of [their] loan of . . .(P3,400,000.00) . . . .xxx xxx xxx
3.4. Mrs. Marcos subsequently authorized Messrs. Cojuangco and Rivilla, their assigns, . . . to hold said 67,392 PTIC shares for and in her behalf on the understanding, agreement and recognition of her true, lawful and beneficial ownership thereof.
4. Sometime in 1977, defendants Ramon Cojuangco and Imelda Cojuangco likewise acquired for and in behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos and their family approximately . . . (54,349) fully paid shares of stock in PTIC from General Telephone and Electronics, Inc. (GTE), an American company. Again, this share acquisition was on the understanding, agreement and recognition that defendant Cojuangcos were mere trustees/nominees of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos and their family.xxx xxx xxx
5. All the shares of stock of PTIC registered in the name of defendants Ramon Cojuangco, Imelda Cojuangco, their assigns, nominees and representatives, . . ., were never acquired and held in their own right, . . . since they have always been held by them as trustees/nominees for and in behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos and family - the true, lawful and beneficial owners thereof.xxx xxx xxx
6. On 05 October 1977, . . .. (PHI) was organized . . . as an investment and holding company. PHI's principal asset at present is the . . . (111,415) PTIC shares of stock registered and held in PTIC.
6.1 PHI was incorporated to serve as the holding company of all the PTIC shares owned by Mr. and Mrs. Marcos and family, in addition to those being held by trustees/nominees . . . . For this purpose, PHI was organized with the following as incorporators [Jose D. Campos, Rolando C. Gapud, Renato E. Lirio, Gervaso T. Gaviola and Ernesto S. Abalos, with 400 shares each], all of whom are the trustees/nominees of the Marcoses:xxx xxx xxx
6.3 In 1978, . . . (111,415) shares of stock in PTIC were transferred and registered in the name of PHI. These PTIC shares came from various sources, including from registered stockholders of PTIC.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTIONIn their answer to the Amended Complaint-in-Intervention, which they later manifested as serving as their answer to the Second Amended Complaint-in-Intervention, respondents Cojuangcos/PHI set up, inter alia, by way of affirmative defense, the following grounds: (1) lack of cause of action, since the PTIC and PHI shares of stock in the name of the late Ramon U. Cojuangco and members of his family were lawfully acquired by them; (2) neither of the Marcos spouses was a member of the Ramon U. Cojuangco group, so that they (the Marcos spouses) have no interest whatsoever over any share in the said corporations; and (3) no jurisdiction has been acquired by the Sandiganbayan over the Amended Complaint-in-Intervention for non-payment of the proper docket fees.
- In the early to mid-1960's, the largest block of stock of . . . [PLDT] was held by General Telephone & Electronics Corporation ("GTE"), which held 28% of its outstanding stock.
In 1967, GTE decided to divest its shareholdings in PLDT. . . . GTE agreed to sell its PLDT shares to the Ramon U. Cojuangco group, which included . . . Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or . . . Imelda R. Marcos, Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco and Imelda O. Cojuangco, and their nominees.
The Ramon U. Cojuangco group caused. . . (PTIC) to be formed for the purpose of purchasing GTE's 28% stockholdings in PLDT. xxx.- In 1967, PTIC was owned by the following: GTE received 25% of PTIC as part of the consideration for selling its shareholding in PLDT to PTIC. Approximately 57% of the PTIC stock was divided among the Ramon U. Cojuangco group.
Gregorio Romulo and Leonides Virata each received 3% of PTIC for their services rendered . . . .
The remaining 12% of PTIC was divided among various persons. Plaintiff-in-intervention Yuchengco - . . . who already controlled 10% of PLDT " purchased 7.75% of the stock in PTIC (18,720 shares) . . . . He placed the 7.75% shares in the name of . . . Y Realty Corporation.- Some time after PTIC's acquisition of 28% of PLDT, Gregorio Romulo and Leonides Virata . . . approached . . . Yuchengco and offered to sell their respective 3% shareholdings in PTIC to him for P300,000.00 each. Plaintiff-in-intervention Yuchengco agreed to buy.
- But, the Ramon U. Cojuangco group learned of the agreed sale and sent Atty. Alberto Meer to . . . Yuchengco to inform him that . . . President Marcos objected to his acquiring additional shares in PTIC. xxxx Yuchengco was instructed to pay the purchase price of P600,000.00 and to transfer the 6% stockholdings to the Ramon U. Cojuangco group. Otherwise, . . . Yuchengco was told, his business interests would suffer.
Gregorio Romulo, upon finding out, also strenuously objected to selling to the Ramon U. Cojuangco group.
But, . . . Yuchengco and Gregorio Romulo complied as they could not do otherwise. xxx Yuchengco paid the P600,000.00 price. The 6% stockholdings of Gregorio Romulo and Leonides Virata were transferred to the Ramon U. Cojuangco group and eventually to. . .[PHI].- xxx Yuchengco was the victim of illegal coercion and duress of the Marcos regime. He was coerced into giving up Gregorio Romulo's and Leonides Virata's 6% shareholdings in PTIC . . . .
xxx Yuchengco was prevented by the same illegal coercion and duress and by force majeure (Martial Law) from seeking judicial relief until after the ouster of the former regime.- Consequently, . . . [PHI] holds the 6% stockholdings in PTIC, and all dividends and distributions attributable thereto, in constructive trust for . . .
xxx xxx xxxSECOND CAUSE OF ACTIONxxx xxx xxx
- On 22 November 1967 - at about the time GTE sold out its PLDT shares to PTIC and received 25% of PTIC - GTE through its . . ., John J. Douglas, entered into a "put and call" agreement with . . . Yuchengco for GTE's 25% stockholdings in PTIC. xxx
- But, as with the Leonides Virata and Gregorio Romulo shares, - Yuchengco was prevented from acquiring GTE's 25% shares in PTIC by exercise of his "put and call" agreement with GTE.
- In February 1976, GTE was compelled by the Ramon U. Cojuangco group to waive its 25% stockholdings in PTIC for free. At a meeting in Tokyo with Ted Brophy, . . . and Ramon U. Cojuangco, [and 3 others], Brophy waived the 25% stockholdings, notwithstanding plaintiff's "put and call" agreement with GTE. Said 25% stockholdings in PTIC were re-issued to the Ramon U. Cojuangco group for a nominal amount and eventually transferred to . . . [PHI].
xxx xxx xxx- Again, . . . Yuchengco . . . was coerced into not exercising his "put and call" agreement with GTE for the latter's 25% stockholdings in PTIC, when he was otherwise ready, willing and able to do so. xxx.
Plaintiff-in-intervention Yuchengco was prevented by the same illegal coercion and duress and by force majeure (Martial Law) from seeking judicial relief until after the ouster of the former regime.- Consequently, . . .[PHI] and the owners of . . . [PHI] - whether they be (a) the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco and Imelda O. Cojuangco (b) plaintiff Republic and the PCGG, or (c) the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos - hold the 25% stockholdings in PTIC, and all dividends and distributions attributable thereto, in constructive trust for plaintiff-in-intervention Yuchengco, and should be compelled to turn over the same to him.
ALTERNATIVE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTIONxxx xxx xxx
- In the event the Honorable Court should adjudge that . . . Yuchengco is not entitled to recover, under the Second Cause of Action, the 25% shareholdings in PTIC formerly belonging to GTE, then plaintiffs-in-intervention are at least entitled to recover 4.6% of said 25% shareholdings, as demonstrated below.
20.1. xxx Y Realty Corporation owns 7.7% of the stock in PTIC, and . . . Yuchengco is entitled to recover the 6% shareholdings formerly belonging to Gregorio Romulo and Leonides Virata . . . - for a total of 13.75%.
20.2. When GTE was coerced by the Ramon U. Cojuangco group to waive its 25% stockholdings in PTIC in February 1976, the remaining stockholders of PTIC were entitled to a pro-rata distribution of said 25% stockholdings - which were instead wholly re-issued to the Ramon U. Cojuangco group for a nominal amount and eventually transferred to . . . [PHI].
20.3. Thus, plaintiffs-in-intervention, with 13.75% of the remaining 75% stock, were entitled to 4.6% of the 25% stockholdings formerly belonging to GTE."
[It is thus prayed] –
On the first cause of action,
(a) xxx Ordering . . . [PHI] to turn over the 6% PTIC shareholdings including stock, cash and other dividends and stock splits thereon, to . . . Yuchengco; and
(b) Adjudging plaintiff-in-intervention Yuchengco to be the true owner of said 6% PTIC [formerly Virata's and Romulo's], shareholdings;
On the second cause of action
(a) Ordering . . . [PHI] to turn over the 25% PTIC shareholdings (formerly of GTE), including all . . . dividends and stock splits thereon, to . . . Yuchengco [as true owner thereof]; and xxx
On the alternative third cause of action,
(a) Ordering defendant-in-intervention [PHI] to turn over 4.6% of its PTIC shareholdings (plaintiffs-in-intervention's pro-rata share of GTE's former 25% shares), including all stock, cash and other dividends and stock splits thereon, to plaintiffs-in-intervention; and
(b) Adjudging plaintiffs-in-intervention to be the true owners of said 4.6% PTIC shareholdings." (Underscoring as found in the original; Emphasis and words in bracket added).
Be that as it may, the prosecution's Opposition to Motion to Quash, dated 3 April 2001, specifically mentions only defendant Imelda Marcos' admission that Ferdinand Marcos acquired the properties mentioned in paragraph 19 of the complaint; hence, other than this fact, said prosecution may not propound any question that may violate her right against self-incrimination, upon proper and timely objection.In the meantime, petitioner Republic continued presenting other witnesses, relying - as it would later claim - on the oral assurance given by the graft court during the hearing on March 26, 2001 that it would allow the Republic to present Mrs. Marcos as its adverse or hostile witness.xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, defendant Imelda Marcos' Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 June 2001, is hereby denied, and the subpoena earlier issued stand. However, in lieu of the testimony of said defendant in court, the plaintiff may, instead, make use of the provisions in Rule 26 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. 16
1) Order dated May 30, 2001, 22 denying the Republic's respectful motion for additional time to complete the presentation of evidence and Resolution of August 27, 2001, 23 denying the motion to reconsider the May 30, 2001 order; andIt is the Republic's submission that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion when it issued the aforementioned assailed orders and resolution considering that:
2) Order dated September 5, 2001, 24 directing the Republic to submit its offer of evidence within 30 days from that date.
On the basis of the foregoing arguments, petitioner Republic prays, by way of relief, that this Court, upon the annulment of the assailed Orders and Resolution subject of its petition in G.R. No. 150367, direct the respondent court to allow the Republic to complete its presentation of evidence, and compel respondent Mrs. Marcos to take the witness stand.
- THE ASSAILED ORDERS . . . AMOUNT TO A DEPRIVATION OF THE REPUBLIC'S SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED RIGHT TO THE FULL RECOVERY OF THE MARCOSES' ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH.
- THE ASSAILED ORDERS BLATANTLY VIOLATED THE REPUBLIC'S RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE RESPONDENT COURT, AFTER ISSUING AND SUSTAINING THE VALIDITY OF THE SUBPOENA TO IMELDA MARCOS, DENIED PETITIONER'S PLEA TO PRESENT HER AS ADVERSE/HOSTILE WITNESS AND TO COMPLETE THE PRESENTATION OF THE REPUBLIC'S EVIDENCE.
- BY ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDERS, THE RESPONDENT COURT VIOLATED THE REPUBLIC'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW INASMUCH AS IT BARRED THE REPUBLIC FROM PRESENTING IMELDA MARCOS AS ADVERSE/HOSTILE WITNESS, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE REPUBLIC CONSISTENTLY AND CATEGORICALLY ASSERTED ITS RIGHT TO PRESENT HER AS SUCH WITNESS.
- BY ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDERS, THE RESPONDENT COURT RENDERED NUGATORY ITS OWN SUBPOENA DIRECTED TO IMELDA MARCOS, WHOSE VALIDITY THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD ALREADY SUSTAINED WITH FINALITY.
- BY ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDERS, THE RESPONDENT COURT CAPRICIOUSLY SUBORDINATED THE PROCESS OF LAW TO EXPEDIENCY AND DISPATCH.
- BY ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDERS, THE RESPONDENT COURT DEPRIVED THE REPUBLIC OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY BARRED THE REPUBLIC FROM PRESENTING, AMONG OTHER EVIDENCE, IMELDA MARCOS, A VITAL AND MATERIAL WITNESS WHOSE TESTIMONY WITH RESPECT TO HER CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS COJUANGCOS WILL BUTTRESS THE REPUBLIC'S CAUSE OF ACTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0002 NOT ONLY AGAINST HER, BUT ALSO AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS COJUANGCOS.
- THE ASSAILED ORDERS BETRAY THE RESPONDENT COURT'S GLARING, ALL-TOO-TRANSPARENT TURNABOUT INASMUCH AS THEY IRONICALLY SUPPRESSED THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE RESPONDENT COURT'S OWN SUBPOENA TO IMELDA MARCOS, EVEN AS THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD ALREADY SUSTAINED THE VALIDITY OF THAT SUBPOENA.
Whether the properties, assets, and funds sought to be recovered by the plaintiff are ill-gotten or lawfully acquired;Subsequent events show that the scheduled July 10, 2000 hearing was cancelled at the instance of petitioner Republic's counsel. The July 14, 2000 hearing was also cancelled and reset to July 31, 2000. The July 31, 2000 hearing was likewise cancelled but the parties agreed, however, for the continuation of trial on August 11 and 18, 2000 in the morning and on September 13, 18, 20 and 25, 2000, morning and afternoon sessions.
It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that the respondent court issued, in the May 28, 2001 hearing, its Order of even date directing petitioner Republic to terminate the presentation of its evidence on the hearing of May 30, 2001. The May 28, 2000 Order is, as earlier stated, what moved petitioner Republic to file its "Respectful Motion for Additional Time To Complete Presentation Of Evidence". 26
- The scheduled hearing on December 5, 2000 was cancelled because the Republic's witness was not available.
- Petitioner Republic filed a motion to reset the January 29, 30 and 31, 2001 hearings, its Special Counsel having just received his assignment order for Civil Case No. 0002.
- On January 29, 2001, petitioner Republic manifested its intention to call Mrs. Marcos on the witness stand, but requested for additional hearing dates, pleading that it will not be ready to present Mrs. Marcos within its allotted time. Respondents Cojuangcos/ PHI offered to stipulate on the testimony of the Republic's intended witness, one Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo.
- Respondent court cancelled the January 29, 2001 hearing and required the parties to make an appearance at the next scheduled hearing, January 30, 2001, as previously set.
- The January 30, 2001 schedule was cancelled, as requested by petitioner Republic, owing to lack of witness. In addition, the same petitioner also asked for the cancellation of the three (3) succeeding scheduled hearings, i.e., January 31, February 1 and 2, 2001, and instead requested for a February 9, 2001 setting, undertaking to present Mrs. Marcos on that date, then rest its case, with or without her testimony.
- The February 9, 2001 setting was reset, owing to the unavailability on that day of the Republic's intended witness, Mrs. Marcos, who, Atty. Evangelista of PCGG explained, was physically indisposed. Acting on the Republic's request for a month to present Mrs. Marcos, the respondent court granted the desired resetting to March 12, 13, 14 and 15, 2001, on the condition that the Republic will have to rest its case with or without her testimony.
- On March 12, 2001, the Republic requested to reset the scheduled hearing. Respondent court gave the Republic another opportunity to present its evidence and accordingly reset the hearings to March 26, 27, and 28, 2001, as previously scheduled.
- On March 26, 2001, the Republic presented Lourdes Magno, the PCGG record custodian. Her direct, cross and redirect examinations were done that day. Ms. Magno was followed on March 27, 2001, by Rosalie Sarthou of the BIR. Respondents Cojuangcos/PHI manifested that the Republic had until the next trial date to finish its presentation of evidence.
- After the parties, in the March 28, 2001 hearing, were through with Ms. Sarthou, the Republic requested and was granted five additional trial dates, i.e., May 7, 9, 16, 28, and 30, 2001, for the presentation of further evidence.
- The hearing on May 7, 2001 was cancelled and reset to May 9, 2001. On May 9, 2001, Republic presented Mr. Danilo Daniel, a PCGG Director, after which the presentation of further evidence was continued to May 28, and 30, 2001.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED (SIC) GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS PARTIAL DECISION DATED MAY 6, 2002 WHEN IT DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT AND/OR HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS CONSIDERING THAT:Petitioner Republic thus pray for a judgment: (1) reversing and setting aside the Partial Decision dated April 25, 2002; and (2) ordering respondents Cojuangcos/PHI, their assignees, nominees, and agents to RETURN and RECONVEY to the Republic "(a) the 111,415 PTIC shares in the name of Prime Holdings, Incorporated (PHI) ceded and conveyed by Ramon U. Cojuangco and Luis T. Rivilla to PHI; (b) the 76,779 PTIC shares in the name of Ramon U. Cojuangco; and (c) the 21,525 PTIC shares in the name of Imelda O. Cojuangco, for being ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH of Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family". 27
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN PARTIAL DECISION DATED MAY 6, 2002 DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE BASIC REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 14, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITION THAT "NO DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY EXPRESSING THEREIN THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED," HENCE, PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN RULED IN ITS PARTIAL DECISION DATED MAY 6, 2002 AGAINST THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AFTER ADMITTING THE SAME IN EVIDENCE, THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
- THE PARTIAL DECISION DATED MAY 6, 2002 IS FATALLY FLAWED AS IT FAILED OR OMITTED TO MENTION VITAL FACTS AND REFUSED TO CONSIDER MATERIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER TO SUPPORT ITS COMPLAINT AND REFUSED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE WHICH THE SANDIGANBAYAN ITSELF HAD IN FACT ALREADY ADMITTED.
- PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS AS ITS ADVERSE/HOSTILE WITNESS, ALSO IN A MANNER VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONER'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN DISREGARDED THE DECLARATIONS UNDER OATH/JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT IMELDA MARCOS POSITIVELY IDENTIFYING AND CLAIMING OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT SHARES IN PLDT, WHICH DECLARATION LIKEWISE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES AND CONFIRMS THE ACTUAL AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP BY RESPONDENTS MARCOS OF SAID SHARES OR, THEIR PRINCIPAL-NOMINEE RELATIONSHIP.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED UNDUE HASTE IN DECIDING THE CASE, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF ITS MANDATED DUTY TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH IN ALL MATTERS IN CONTROVERSY."
WHEREFORE, with this Pretrial Order, the pretrial stage of this case with respect to plaintiff-in-intervention Y Realty Corporation is hereby terminated.At the initial scheduled hearing on July 26, 2001 for the presentation of their evidence as plaintiffs-in-intervention, the Yuchengcos were unable to present any witness to testify on their behalf. Likewise, on July 30, 2001, the Yuchengcos manifested that the subpoenaed Atty. de Guzman and Atty. Mercado-Ferrer were not in court. This development prompted respondents Cojuangcos/PHI to counter-manifest that De Guzman's and Mercado-Ferrer's testimonies need not be taken anymore, both having already been deposed and subjected to cross-examination, for which reason they (Cojuangcos/ PHI) have waived their right to cross-examine.
As agreed upon by all the parties, let the trial on the merits be set on July 26 and 30, 2001 for the reception of evidence for said plaintiff-intervenor, and on August 7, 29, 2001 and September 5 and 12, 2001 for the turn of the defendants-intervenors to present their evidence. 36
When this case was called for hearing today, Atty. Laurence Arroyo appeared for the plaintiffs-in-intervention, . . ., and moved for the cancellation of today's hearing as his . . . witnesses are not present in Court.On August 15, 2001, the Yuchengcos moved for a reconsideration of the respondent court's Resolution of May 24, 2001, as reiterated in the open-court Order decreed on July 12, 2001. The desired reconsideration was, however, denied per the respondent court's Resolution dated September 5, 2001. 38
The Court reminded the plaintiffs-in-intervention that precisely the parties agreed on the trial dates for them to present and terminate the presentation of their respective evidence, i.e., the hearings for plaintiffs-in-intervention were set on July 26, 30, and August 7, 2001 and for defendants-in-intervention on August 29, September 5 and 12. It appears that the plaintiffs-in-intervention failed to present their evidence on July 26, 30, and in today's hearing.
In view thereof, the plaintiffs-in-intervention are hereby deemed to have waived their right to present further evidence and let the reception of evidence by the defendants-in-intervention be set on August 29, September 5, and 12, 2001 at 8:30 in the morning, as previously scheduled and agreed upon by the parties. 37
RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS AND ORDER, ALL OF WHICH CONSTITUTE AN ARBITRARY DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY.In the meantime, on August 21, 2001, the Yuchengcos moved for a reconsideration of the Order of August 7, 2001, 39 but their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the respondent court per its Resolution dated September 28, 2001, 40 saying:
xxx it appearing that the court, in various instances, had accorded plaintiffs-in-intervention the opportunities to present their evidence but failed altogether to do so, thus effectively delaying the early disposition of the instant case which has been pending for the last fourteen (14) years.The Yuchengcos received their copy of the Resolution of September 28, 2001 on October 8, 2001.
(1) Resolution dated May 24, 2001, denying their "Urgent Motion To Suspend Trial Pending Discovery" and its Supplement;Apropos the Yuchengcos' Second Amended Complaint-in-Intervention, respondent Cojuangcos/PHI filed on September 20, 2001 a "Motion For Summary Judgment". 41 They contended that the pleadings and affidavits on record failed to tender any genuine issue on the alleged coercion and duress allegedly exerted by the late Pres. Marcos and/or the Cojuangco group. According to them, the desired recovery of PLDT shares sought under the Second Amended Complaint-in-Intervention is anchored on such coercion and duress employed.
(2) Order dated July 12, 2001, denying their verbal motions for the re-setting of the agreed pre-trial and trial dates insofar as their complaint-in-intervention is concerned or, in the alternative, for a change in the order of trial so that Cojuangcos/ PHI be made to present their evidence in relation to the complaint of petitioner Republic ahead of them (Yuchengcos), and the Resolution dated September 5, 2001, denying reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 24, 2001 and of the Order of July 12, 2001; and
(3) Resolution dated August 7, 2001, declaring them as being deemed to have waived their right to present evidence, and the Resolution dated September 28, 2001, denying reconsideration of the Resolution of August 7, 2001.
- The Sandiganbayan gravely erred when it insisted on rendering the questioned Partial Decision despite the pendency of G.R. NOS. 149802 and 150320.
- The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in confining the presentation of petitioners' evidence to three (3) hearing dates spanning less than two (2) weeks.
- The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in granting respondents PHI/Cojuangcos' Motion for Summary Judgment.
- The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in finding that the subject PTIC shares do not partake of the character of ill-gotten wealth. (Petition, G.R. No. 153207, pp. 33-34)
The concept of "final judgment", as distinguished from one which has "become final" (or "executory" as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move . . . and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term, "final and executory".Following Investments, Inc., the remedy of an appeal from the interlocutory May 24, 2001 Order was unavailing to the Yuchengcos, thus the propriety of their coming to this Court, with respect to that order, in G.R. No. 149802 via a special action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of the Court.xxx xxx xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory", e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, . . . . Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. (at pp. 339-340)
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. 44As the rule now thus stands, the 60-day reglementary period within which to file a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned from notice of the resolution or order sought to be nullified, save when a motion for reconsideration is timely filed in which case the 60-day period shall start from receipt of the denial of such motion.
We stress that the resolution of the complaint-in-intervention, along with the principal case, is long overdue. What the Supreme Court has said in this regard four years ago has acquired even greater urgency today –It cannot be gainsaid that the respondent court merely exercised its discretion to order - and to be guided by such order - the termination of the respective presentation of evidence by both petitioners Yuchengcos and Republic or to set a limiting timetable for such presentation. We are loathe to disturb such exercise of judicial discretion which has spawned the petitions for certiorari in G.R. No. 150320 and G.R. No. 150367. For, jurisprudence teaches that certiorari lies only when the tribunal acts without or oversteps its jurisdiction, or gravely abuses its discretion, 47 as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. 48 The abuse must, in fine, be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. 49'xxx Eleven years have passed since the government started its search for and reversion of such alleged ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is adequate proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought now . . ."
xxx Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case even if its findings are not correct.Complementing Lee is Ampeloquio, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals 51 where we wrote:
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors or jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts. (At pp. 402-03)
xxx If every error committed by the trial court were to be a proper object of review by certiorari, the trial would never come to an end and the appellate courts' dockets would be clogged ad infinitum with the aggrieved parties-litigants filing petitions against every interlocutory order of the trial court. Such a situation could only undermine the proper conduct of litigation before the courts and ought not to be tolerated if we are to enhance the prompt administration of justice at every level of the judicial hierarchy.In the light of the foregoing doctrinal holdings, we can say without fear of contradiction that not every erroneous interlocutory order, if that be the case, is correctible by certiorari. We grant certiorari only upon clear showing that the trial court issued its challenged interlocutory order without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Conversely, absent the vitiating element of want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is unavailing as a remedy.
In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial judge over the proceedings had before him implies the absence of any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance with which it may be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is not a willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion which should always be exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and justice. As was said in the case of The Styria vs. Morgan (186 U.S., 1, 9): "The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should not be a word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action." So in the case of Goodwin vs. Prime (92 Me., 355), it was said that "discretion implies that in the absence of positive law or fixed rule the judge is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of equity and justice."It cannot be stressed enough that postponements have a way of causing delays of the vexatious kind. With this in mind and with respect to the specific issue before us, we are now confronted with the task of harmonizing two (2) basic, but not necessarily irreconcilable, rights etched no less in the Bill of Rights. We refer to the right to due process, on one hand, and the right to speedy trial, on the other. This undertaking becomes all the more made difficult by the stark reality that these petitions involve "ill-gotten wealth" reputedly amassed by the Marcos family, their friends and former business associates where, as in several like cases, the Court itself dictated a resolution in "utmost dispatch", albeit acknowledging in the same breath that "over and above the exigencies of recovering ill-gotten wealth, we must carry out the more pressing constitutional task of seeing to it that all parties are afforded due processes and substantial justice", stressing that this burden extends "[E]ven to those suspected . . . of having acquired and/or accumulated ill-gotten wealth..." 54
There being no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in the court below in such cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide a court of appeal in reviewing his action in the premises, and such courts will not therefore attempt to control the exercise of discretion by the court below unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate action" or the exercise of mere "arbitrary will," or in other words that his action in the premises amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the right of an appellate court to review judicial acts which lie in the discretion of inferior courts may properly be invoked upon a showing of a strong and clear case of abuse of power to the prejudice of the appellant, or that the ruling objected to rested on an erroneous principle of law not vested in discretion.
The doctrine, supported by numerous citations of authority, is thus stated in the Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice (vol. 2, pp. 416, 418):
Abuse of discretion. - Accordingly, where the power is so exercised as to deprive a party of a legal right, or unduly benefit one party at the expense of the other, or where, generally, the injustice or inexpediency of the act is so clear as to show beyond a reasonable doubt the violation of equitable considerations, the act of decision is always reviewable in some form on appeal, as an abuse of power.
"Presumption. - The presumption on appeal that the exercise of discretionary powers was sound is very strong. The appellant must rebut it by showing a strong and clear case of abuse of power to his prejudice, or that the decision below rested on an erroneous principle of law not vested in discretion. A mere mistake of judgment, or a difference in opinion between the appellate and the trial court, is not sufficient."
B. TrialIt is thus abundantly clear that the mandatory continuous trial scheme, the guidelines on trial, and, to a significant level, the ideal articulated in Republic (PCGG) vs. Sandiganbayan 64 to resolve "ill-gotten wealth cases" with utmost dispatch, circumscribed, in a way, the respondent court's otherwise wide latitude in the conduct of its proceedings. At bottom, then, respondent court acted with some degree of circumspection and, doubtless, well within its authority when, in its assailed issuances in G.R. No. 150367, it refused to accommodate petitioner Republic with additional trial dates and ordered it to file its formal offer of exhibits and rest its case. The same conclusion applies to petitioner Yuchengcos in G.R. No. 150320. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be ascribed on the respondent court in (i) proceeding to hear the evidence of the Yuchengcos on the agreed trial dates of July 26 and 30 and August 7, 2001, (ii) refusing to reset the hearings to later dates, and (iii) declaring them to have effectively waived their right to present further evidence when they were still without evidence or witness on the last trial date. There is hardly any dispute that these were trial dates previously agreed upon and to which the Yuchengcos committed to abide. And under the cited Guidelines on Trial, petitioner Yuchengcos were bound to complete the presentation of their evidence within the trial dates assigned to them. Likewise, at the end of the trial dates, they were deemed to have completed with the presentation of their evidence. It would be an aberration for the Court to fault and reverse the graft court for following what it has enjoined the latter to observe in the first place.
(5) The judge shall conduct trial with utmost dispatch, with judicious exercise of the court's power to control trial proceedings to avoid delay.xxx xxx xxx
(7) The trial shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from initial hearing. Appropriate disciplinary sanctions may be imposed on the judge and the lawyers for failure to comply with this requirement due to causes attributable to them.
(8) Each party is bound to complete the presentation of his evidence within the trial dates assigned to him. After the lapse of said dates, the party is deemed to have completed the presentation of evidence. However, upon verified motion based on compelling reasons, the judge may allow a party additional trial dates in the afternoon; provided that said extension will not go beyond the three-month limit computed from the first trial date except when authorized in writing by the Court Administrator, Supreme Court.
The right of a defendant in a criminal case (to be exempt from being a witness against himself) signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal cases in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. In other words - unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him - the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically states, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. (Emphasis supplied)Lest we be misunderstood, this Court's concurrence with Mrs. Marcos is really nothing more than being faithful with what was taught in the oft-cited case of Cabal vs. Kapunan, 69 to wit:
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in consequence of a default or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power. (23 Am. Jur. 599, italics in the original)Assayed against the cited jurisprudence, respondent Mrs. Marcos can, as was her bent, refuse to testify altogether, notwithstanding the express allegations she made in the pleadings adverted to by petitioner Republic.
In Black's Law Dictionary a "forfeiture" is defined to be "the incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some requirement of law". It may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of duty. (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255)
As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves is applicable thereto.xxx xxx xxx
The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable criminally to prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer would tend to expose him to a xxx forfeiture xxx." (Am. Jur. Sec. 43, p. 48) (Italics in the original)
As we see it, Mr. Romulo's deposition is virtually a hearsay account and should, therefore, be disregarded, being itself inadmissible in evidence. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be based on personal knowledge of the declarant, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Therefore, in determining whether summary judgment is proper, statements contained in affidavits, which would be inadmissible in evidence (such as statements of opinion, belief and hearsay) must be disregarded. So it must be with the Romulo deposition.
"ATTY. QUISUMBING: Q: And who were the major stockholders in that corporation i.e. [PTIC]? A: The stockholders involved is the Gentel who turned over their equity to PLDT into the corporation and it was assumed that this company formed in the Bahamas would be the body agent of PLDT which in turn would buy all those equipments from Gentel through the Bahamas corporation paying Gentel its share with a large commission, I do not know. Q: When you said Gentel, are you referring to General Telephone & Electronics Corporation you have mentioned? A: Yes, sir. Q: And ? who held the interest in PTIC eventually? A: What resulted, from my point of view, was while in Manila, I received word that I was the owner of 3% shares in PTIC, I immediately wired my office in New York and wanted to know if I could hold the shares in my name or if they wanted to transfer to them but I had the offer and I wanted to know definitely what was the position of the Headquarters with regards to this. Q: And what was their position? A: Our position was the acquired 3% do not mean anything to us of a company that is from PLDT, at least one regular share of the PLDT had no or rather IT&T had no interest in PLDT except to acquire if it could be acquired and we have quite to iron in the fire at that time so I don?t know now. Q: Who else held stockholding interest? A: I was informed that Leo Virata had 3%, Tony Meer had 3%, Oscar Africa had 1% or 2% and the rest were distributed among the relatives and in-laws of Cojuangco, oh yes, Mr. Alfonso Yuchengco. I don?t know if awarded or allowed to possess the 7% of the original shares. ATTY. FRANCISCO: I would like to request for the striking of the testimony of the witness from the record, that is hearsay because he claimed that he was merely informed of the other interests. ATTY. LEANO: I adopt the manifestation of counsel. xxx xxx xxx COMMISSIONER: ALL objections are recorded. ATTY. QUISUMBING: Q: Did you subsequently make any confirmation of the information that you received? A: Yes, but I never saw a piece of paper, I was told by Ramon Cojuangco and Antonio Meer about this information after their return from their trip abroad and that we successfully negotiated the purchase of PLDT. Q: And what was the role of then President Marcos in this acquisition? ATTY. LEANO: No basis. ATTY. FRANCISCO: Leading.xxx xxx xxx COMMISSIONER: But the witness may answer the question if he so desire. A: I believe that I can answer the question by simply telling the Court how we were informed that PLDT was available apparently because I am only told this. The person that found that this PLDT was going to be sold to Ninoy Aquino was his cousin Danding Cojuangco, his cousin told the President and the President asked Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto to go to the offices of PLDT and stop all ways then he signed for Monching Cojuangco because he felt that a transaction of this nature, of this large was beyond the abilities of Danding . . . I do not know but that was then transmitted to us by Monching Cojuangco, I do not know and I cannot testify to the veracity of this story but what we were told that in order to meet us ? ATTY. FRANCISCO: I move to strike out the answer of the witness for being hearsay. ATTY. PALMA: Counsel for Prime Holding adopts the same objection. ATTY. LEANO: For Mrs. Cojuangco, the same objection for being hearsay. COMMISSIONER: All objections recorded. xxx xxx xxx ATTY. QUISUMBING: Q: So General Telephone and Electronics Corporation was paid the monthly fee and who made those payment on the fees? ATTY. LEANO: The best evidence would be the payment. A: I believe it was already PLDT that is being privy to the financial method, PLDT is not answering definitely who came, who held but much later on, every interest then was bought up by at that time Chairman of the Board of the DBP and that our friend Alfonso Yuchengco may eventually had PTIC but since we were, at least was completely out of the picture, I did not know whether it was true or not but since Leo Virata was still at that time very much involved with PLDT because of the guarantee issued by DBP during the time of Licaros, I believe he has reason to at least suspect that the company of General Telephone had negotiated with Mr. Yuchengco, I do not know if this is true, I have not spoken to Mr. Yuchengco about this matter, he has not asked me to speak about this. I decided this because naturally it is always a matter of motive, my motive is that long before Senator Salonga made sequestration, I was sequestered and so with Leo Virata and I felt my repose had been dead a long time that whoever enjoyed the benefits of that sequestration should at least be taken to proper authorities or in turn make amends of the years that they have illegally enjoyed the recourse which is substantial and which at today?s prices must be worth an awful of money. Q: Now, you mentioned Licaros of the DBP ? ATTY. LEANO: I object, may I move for the striking out of the answer for being hearsay. ATTY. PALMA: Same objection for being hearsay. div> ATTY. FRANCISCO: It is not responsive to the question. ATTY. LEANO: All his statements are hearsay, all his statements are mere expression of opinion and under the law, the best evidence should be the document. xxx xxx xxx COMMISSIONER: All objections are recorded. ATTY. QUISUMBING: Q: You mentioned the DBP and Licaros, were they connected then at that time and how? A: In the purchase of eventually of PLDT, it required the guaranty of the DBP that any future commitments made by this group will be guaranteed by the Philippine government. Q: What specifically was guaranteed by the DBP? A: Of my knowledge, it was required that the agreed purchase price be guaranteed by DBP to Gentel. Q: Do you remember the figure? And the guarantee of the DBP was given in favor of whom? A: It was released by order of Mr. Licaros in favor, I believe of PTIC. Q: Which is the PTIC, what did you mean by PTIC, what firm? A: That PTIC is the Philippine Telecommunications Investment Company. Q: So the DBP issued a guaranty, guaranteeing PTIC an obligation to whom? A: To Gentel. Q: Was there an intermediary bank involved in the U.S.? A: In the later operation, I only remember the Irving Trust lending $1million to Ramon Cojuangco in order to pay the options of this group to purchase PLDT from Gentel. xxx xxx xxx Q: You spoke of this sequestration or rather the sequestration of yours and of Leo Virata, what did you mean by that, will you give us specifics? A: I will give you the specifics as I know it happened to me personally. Leo Virata and I decided to bail out because we did not like what was going on, we offered our shares to Alfonso Yuchengco, he offered to pay them but being honorable, we have to tell Ramon Cojuangco and Tony Meer that in turn have a meeting in the new PLDT building where across from the office of Tony and Ramon was a lunch and we were told that our shares had to be given to Pasig, now what that mean, I do not know, there is approximately no way to verify that. Those words were enough for Ramon, to tell Monching, go ahead and take these two and you will be taken cared of later on, he was never paid, I found out this. Q: While you say you do not know exactly what Pasig means, who used the word Pasig? A: Monching, Ramon Cojuangco. Q: What do you understand of Pasig? ATTY. LEANO: May I make another objection insofar as the estate is concerned because of the testimony of the witness, we would like to manifest our continuing objection to any and all questions and matters that would affect the estate of Ramon Cojuangco, we are making this objection in behalf of the widow whom we are representing in behalf of the estate. COMMISSIONER: The objection is recorded. A: Now, this is the way we were told, and Mr. Cojuangco, there was a pre-long negotiation in that lunch between Mr. Virata, myself and later, Mr. Yuchengco. I do not know how the thing terminated because I was asked by Mr. Virata to go home because I get very violent, I did not like being treated that way by anybody and that is it, I went home and much later on because I refused to discuss this with anybody, I found out that Mr. Yuchengco was never paid but that he paid me, I know he did because I used in my name to pay a corporate obligation to the RCBC bank which is I believe was his bank. Q: Now, you said that you got violently angry, so what did you understand by the word Pasig? A: I cannot specify because in my mind, at that time there was a turmoil, too much I understand we have been drinking since lunch time and this was about 4:00 in the afternoon, so what was conveyed to me by the words Pasig, I cannot definitely say now but I do know what it conveyed in those days the long regime of powers that were in control at that time. Q: You said that you have never been treated that way before, you refer to your selling, to your offer to sell to Yuchengco but being forced to sell to another? ATTY. LEANO: He never said that, may we just make our objection. Q: What were forced to do that made you angry? A: What made me angry was, I know that the company had a tremendous future, when Mr. Yuchengco gave me a visit in the hospital seven years ago on my stroke, not now, he mentioned the fact that he had never been reimbursed of the money that he advanced to me and that I thought that was terrible. Q: Now let us go back to your reasons as well as of the reasons Leo Virata in getting rid of this 3% share each in PTIC, what were those reasons exactly that made you decide to sell out? A: Normally, inspection of the corporation means to look to the corporation papers, I never did, or they are signed by the incorporators in terms of the original documents at the buyers? list, I never saw them, we understood that PTIC was in operation, pay regular dividends, I never saw them, so naturally I asked the man who got me in to all this things in the first place, what happened, he said, I do not know, I have not received anything either, so let us get rid of this and we have thought most likely the buyer is Mr. Alfonso Yuchengco. Q: What happened to your offer to Yuchengco? A: He accepted it, I and Leo Virata arrived and we decided to tell Monching and Tony that we had sold our shares to Mr. Yuchengco. Apparently Leo told Ramon this only and by the time we arrived in the PLDT building, he had already apparently consulted and we were told that the Pasig did not like and said go ahead and you will be taken cared of which much later on told me never happened. Doon ako nagalit, masiyado nanag pag-oonse. Well, anyway now, there is nothing more demanding of persons at their state that being locked in a hospital room for years and in the usual reading, I decided whoever enjoyed those shares, better make good and since I have read in the newspapers about investigation of PTIC which seem to get out the cloud, I decided to do this, maybe to give some clue to the investigation of PTIC, I don?t know. Q: And what was the figure agreed upon with Mr. Yuchengco? A: Apparently . . . ATTY. LEANO I just want to make the same objection for being hearsay. ATTY. QUISUMBING: These objections are to be used during the presentation of evidence not at the taking of the deposition. Just remember that. ATTY.LEANO: But we want to make our objection. xxx xxx xxx COMMISSIONER: All objections are recorded. A: I do not know anymore that anybody else, after this maybe stray bit of information will be remembered later on but none right now and I was reviewing over my mind time and again, my participation in the whole affair, I was eventually and I was used in that way as a means to get IT&T into their negotiation and let Gentel to the bargaining if only to show that they could afford to buy Gentel, in effect, they were closing the deal, leaving IT&T to force Gentel to sit down and negotiate with them. That was the idea because unfortunately, IT&T did not work for them but for this group apparently that I do not know anymore. Q: My last question only is, how much is the figure for the sale of this 3% A: I understand, well, I used part of it to pay an obligation worth P636,000.00, it was an obligation with the defunct T.J. Wolfe that was bought by me which appears in its book that amount or a little bit more with RCBC, now the balance maybe used by Mr. Virata for something else, I do not know. x x x CROSS EXAMINATION:
BY ATTY. LEANO xxx xxx xxx Q: Was Tony Meer present in that meeting? A: He was always in the meeting . . . . (TSN of the Deposition of Gregorio L. Romulo, August 3, 1987 pp. 12 –37). 72
SEC. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition [for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceedings in the case.The governing rule, in fine, is that to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of certiorari proceedings, there must be an interrupting restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. 73 There was none in the instant case. Accordingly, it was in order for the respondent court to proceed with the separate trial in Civil Case No. 0002 and necessarily in rendering a judgment, in this instance, the Partial Decision, which, in its estimation, is called for by the facts and law of the case.
One, evidence indicating manifest partiality and favorable treatment by the former President towards the alleged trustees, as demonstrated by active interplay between him and such trustees and/or presidential interventions which have resulted in inexplicable benefits to the trustees or to the corporations held by him through such trustees; andThe respondent court dismissed the Republic's Amended Complaint as against the Cojuangcos/ PHI on the finding that the former has not adequately discharged its burden of proving, by the threshold preponderance of evidence required in "ill-gotten wealth" cases, that the subject PLDT shares are ill-gotten. Wrote the respondent court:
Two, the existence of documents and records in the possession of the former President which, through indorsements and/or assignment made thereon in blank by his trustees, provide the legal instrumentation for him to assert, now or in the future, ownership or control over the properties held by his trustees and/or to recover such properties from them. (At p. 23)
xxx the Republic has failed to provide such "proof of authenticity or reliability" of the documents offered by it in evidence. Thus almost all the documents offered by the Republic are photocopies, and no effort was undertaken . . . to submit the originals of said documents, or to have them properly identified, or to otherwise justify the admission of mere photocopies. Not surprisingly, defendants . . . objected to the admission of the Republic's documentary exhibits, citing violation of the Best Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure ["Rules"], the Rules on Presentation of Documentary Evidence (Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules), the Hearsay Evidence Rule, and the rule as to Purpose/s of Documentary Evidence (Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules)." (at p. 31)Excepting, petitioner Republic tags the respondent court's determinative finding as a "sweeping conclusion" or "bare generalization". Pressing the point, petitioner Republic argues that the Partial Decision did not identify with particular specificity which evidence failed to hurdle the bar of admissibility for being "mere photocopies" or "are otherwise unidentified, unauthenticated, and constitutive of hearsay". 77
Indubitably, petitioner Republic calls attention to the sworn declarations of Messrs. Jose Yao Campos, Roland C. Gapud and Atty. Francisco de Guzman (Campos, Gapud and de Guzman, respectively, hereafter) as alleged proof of its theory of the case, i.e., that the disputed PLDT shares are in fact owned by the Marcos family and that respondents Cojuangcos/PHI are but dummies/nominees/conduit for the Marcos family to control PLDT. It is, hence, our task to scrutinize the sworn declarations of Campos et al., to ascertain if they indeed prove the facts adverted to by petitioner Republic, failing which would naturally impel this Court to affirm the Partial Decision insofar as it dismissed the Republic's Amended Complaint against the respondents Cojuangcos/PHI.
- PHI was registered by Jose Y. Campos on November 8, 1977 with a paid-up capital of a measly Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and utilizing as place of business the address of UNILAB, a corporation owned and controlled by Jose Y. Campos, and with UNILAB's officers and directors, namely Rolando Gapud, Renato Lirio, [etc.] . . . and Gervacio Gaviola managing PHI xxx albeit, said managing officers and directors had no financial interest whatsoever in PHI.
- On May 2, 1978, Ramon U. Cojuangco, ceded and conveyed in favor of PHI by way of Deed of Assignment dated May 2, 1978, some 44,023 shares of stock of PTIC . . . . On that same date, also by way of Deed of Assignment . . . Ramon U. Cojuangco ceded and conveyed in favor of PHI another 33,696 shares of stock of PTIC . . . . Also on the same date, Luis Tirso Rivilla ceded and conveyed in favor of PHI another 33,696 shares . . . . Ramon U. Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla were compensated by PHI for said PTIC shares of stock which all in all sum up to 111,415 shareholdings in the name of PHI. xxx
- From the foregoing evidence, there is no doubt that respondent PHI is a corporation which was formed and organized and maintained by the former dictator, President Ferdinand E. Marcos through confessed dummies, Jose Yao Campos and Rolando C. Gapud, who, in conspiracy with Ramon U. Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla, sought to acquire for the Marcoses the single biggest majority shareholdings in PLDT.
- The foregoing is confirmed by the declarations of confessed nominees/cronies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos: Jose Y. Campos, Roland C. Gapud and Atty. Francisco de Guzman.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, respondents Cojuangcos cannot lawfully acquire ownership of title over the PHI shares of stocks, because the same constitute the Marcos ill-gotten wealth, formed and/or acquired in violation of the 1973 Constitution. xx (Petition, G.R. No. 153459, pp. 69-90)
"xxx a discussion between me and Mr. Ramon Diaz, a member of the Commission [PCGG} who inquired about certain assets and properties that I might be holding in favour (sic) of certain beneficiaries and which . . . are now about to be claimed by the Philippine Government.
- My relationship with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos dates back to the time when he was first elected as Congressman . . . [and] continued when he was then elected President . . . . Thereafter I assisted in the organization and acquisition of some business ventures for the former President. Following his directive I instructed my lawyers and requested the assistance of my other business associates and officers of the company to organize, establish and manage these business ventures for and on behalf of the President;
- The companies that we have organized for and on behalf of former President Marcos are listed in Annex "A" attached herewith;
- In the organization, administration and management of the abovenamed corporations, it was my policy that whenever such a corporation is organized for and on behalf of the intended beneficiaries, I execute and I require all my said business associates to execute a Deed of Trust or Deed of Assignment duly signed in favour (sic) of an unnamed beneficiary and to deliver the original copy thereof to the former President. It is in fact my policy and procedure that we disclaim completely any interest in any of such businesses and make it clear to the former President that we hold such interests on his behalf;
- In the latter part of 1979 I suffered a severe heart attack . . . . Because of this . . ., I requested former President Marcos to relieve me of my responsibilities regarding the businesses that have been entrusted to me and following such request, I signed and delivered to him a Certification dated January 1980, attached herewith as Annex "B" to the effect that my family including my wife and children expressly disclaimed any interest in the businesses that I have been holding in his behalf and they acknowledged the truthfulness, authenticity and validity of various Deeds of Trust and Deeds of Assignment which I and my business associates signed and executed as aforementioned covering properties, interest and shares of stock of the corporations listed therein.
- Occasioned by the withdrawal of my active participation in the management of the above named corporations, Mr. Rolando C. Gapud who was my financial consultant took over the direct responsibility of directing, managing and administering all the activities of the said corporation. However, since Mr. Gapud did not have the administrative staff to efficiently manage the businesses, he requested me that all the employees and officers involved in the organization should continue to remain in the companies even only in a nominal capacity considering that they had previously disclaimed any interest therein. It is for this reason that Roland C. Gapud and my business associates, namely, . . . Francisco G. de Guzman, . . . Ernesto Abalos, Gervasio T. Gaviola, . . ., Renato E. Lirio, Rafael de Guzman, [etc.] . . . continued to be named stockholders in these corporations although they did not have any financial interest therein;
"2.2 The records show that [PHI] owns approximately 46% of the stock of . . . (PTIC) which in turn owns approximately 28% of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). The records of this Civil Case No. 0002 show that PCGG has sequestered 111,415 shares of stock in PTIC registered in the name of [PHI]. Was anything with respect to PTIC delivered to the PCGG by Atty. De Guzman or anyone else in your behalf? Please describe with specificity the things that were delivered.Contextually, the only conclusion the Court can plausibly attach to the above response of Mr. Campos is that he had no knowledge about PHI's shareholdings in PTIC. His answers, such as "Ma'm, as I said I don't know that Prime Holdings has such holdings of the PTIC shares that you referred to", and "Any matters that pertain to PTIC I don't have any knowledge' say as much. It is also a fact deducible from Mr. Campos' sworn declarations that he adhered to a set of pattern or practice when he organized corporations for then Pres. Marcos. Thus, he declared that he, his family and his associates executed deeds of trust or assignment in favor of an unnamed beneficiary, and there disclaim any interest in the corporations that he (Mr. Campos) organized for Pres. Marcos. Or, they indorsed the stock certificates in blank. And, all of such deeds or certificates were delivered to the late President. Yet, Mr. Campos was unable to declare with certitude if these patterns and practices were followed vis-Ã -vis PHI. Accordingly, the question begging an answer is whether there truly exists, in respect to PHI shares, certificates indorsed in blank or deeds of trust or assignment in favor of an unnamed beneficiary delivered to the late President. If there is one person who can provide a satisfactory answer to this question, it is Mr. Campos. But he is not saying anything. Under this scenario, we cannot see our way clear on how the sworn declarations of Mr. Campos could have, as asserted by petitioner Republic, proved that respondent PHI was merely incorporated to hold the PTIC shares, that in turn would have proved that PHI together with respondents Cojuangcos were mere dummies of the Marcos family to hold the controlling share of PLDT.
ANSWER: As I said, I don't know that Prime Holdings has any holdings of PTIC.
3. In your Sworn Statement, page 2, you stated that with respect to the corporations you held in trust for President Marcos, it was your "policy" that whenever such a corporation was organized, you executed, and you required all your business associates to execute, a Deed of Trust or Deed of Assignment in favor of an "unnamed beneficiary", and delivered the originals thereof to President Marcos. x x x. Was this "policy" followed in the case of [PHI]? xxx
ANSWER: All the corporations that I organized " that was the standard policy " that we surrendered direct to President Marcos.
3.1. Was it also your policy to deliver to President Marcos the stock certificates that you and your business associates held in trust for him?
ANSWER: Yes, Ma'm.
3.2. If stock certificates that you and your business associates held in trust for President Marcos were delivered to him was it also your policy to have the stock certificates indorsed in blank? Were the stock certificates in [PHI] Inc. indorsed in blank?
ANSWER: If there are certificates issued in Prime Holdings, it is the same way it was delivered to him. If there is such certificate issued, it is indorsed in blank and follow the same pattern for all the corporations. Whatever we have decided, we deliver, sign in blank and deliver to him.
3.3 Did you and your business associates deliver to President Marcos the stock certificates issued by [PHI]? If not, what did you and your business associates do with the stock certificates?
ANSWER: If Prime Holdings certificates have been issued, as I said Ma'm, it is delivered to the President.
4. In your Sworn Statement, page 2, you also stated that "it is in fact my policy and procedure that we disclaim completely any interest" in the businesses organized for President Marcos and "make it clear to the former President that we held such interests in his behalf". xxx. Was this "policy and procedure" followed in the case of [PHI]? xxx
ANSWER: The policy is followed by every corporation that we organized for the President.
4.1 Did you and your business associates also "disclaim completely any interest" in . . . (PTIC) and "make it clear to the former President that we hold such interests on his behalf"?
ANSWER: Ma'm, as I said, I don't know that Prime Holdings has such holdings of the PTIC shares that you referred to.
5. The records of . . . (PTIC) show that Luis T. Rivilla owned approximately P4,565,750 worth of shares of stock in PTIC and that some time in 1978-1980, he transferred approximately P2,903,762 worth of such shares to [PHI]. Who was the true or beneficial owner of the shares of stock in PTIC transferred by Luis T. Rivilla to [PHI] in 1978-1980?
ANSWER: Any matters that pertain to PTIC, I don't have any knowledge of, Ma'am.
xxx
ANSWER: Consul Morales, just to make everything short, after my heart attack in 1979, Mr. Gapud took over the management of the corporations that belonged to the President . . . I did not participate anymore in anything of the President's corporations managed by Mr. Gapud after my heart attack and after he took over the management of those corporations. It is because of health reasons that I was compelled not only to relinquish that to the President, but also my own companies and "
xxx xxx xxx
10. Did you ever have any discussions or correspondence with anyone other than President Marcos, Ramon U. Cojuangco or Rolando C. Gapud regarding the beneficial ownership by President Marcos or any member of his family, directly or indirectly, of shares of stock in PLDT, PTIC, or Prime Holdings, Inc.?
ANSWER: No, Ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
11. In your Sworn Statement, pages 2-3, you stated that because of a heart attack in the latter part of 1979, you requested President Marcos to relieve you or your responsibilities regarding the businesses entrusted to you, and that Rolando C. Gapud took over the direct responsibility of directing, managing and administering all the activities of the said corporations. xxx
ANSWER: Yes, Ma'm.
11.1 Please describe in detail the circumstances surrounding the transfer, if any, of the direct responsibility of directing, managing and administering all the activities of PHI] to Mr. Gapud?
ANSWER: As I stated Ma'am, Prime Holdings has been a holding company. The only assets are the stock certificates and there is nothing. I think - at that time I transferred - there is nothing Mr. Gapud has to manage to do because it's a shared corporation. (Words in bracket added)
"CONSUL AGUILUCHO:Continuing his deposition-taking on December 11, 1995, Mr. Gapud also said:
On paragraph 4 of Exhibit "E", Mr. Gaviola stated:"That I have no personal knowledge of the operation of Prime Holdings, Inc. as Mr. Rolando C. Gapud handled all the directing, managing and administering of all the activities of the said corporation."Question: Based on your personal knowledge, do you affirm or deny the contents of the said paragraph 4 of Exhibit "E"?
MR. GAPUD: I affirm. xxx
Madam Consul, I would like to make a clarification here. Because Mr. Gaviola says I handled all the directing and managing and administering of all the activities. Prior to the heart attack of Mr. Campos I recall that he was also involved in the administration of this company. So, with that clarification I affirm paragraph 4.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: For how long did you manage [PHI]?
MR. GAPUD: I would estimate maybe two or three years after Mr. Campos' heart attack.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Do you know anything about the . . . (PTIC), 46% of the capital stock of which is owned by [PHI]?
MR. GAPUD: Well, very little except for that which I have read from the newspapers.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Do you know the PTIC owns 25% of the common voting stock of the . . . PLDT?
MR. GAPUD: Yes.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO : Do you know the beneficial owner or owners of [PHI]?
MR. GAPUD : What I know . . . is the shares of stock and/or the assignments endorsed in blank were delivered to President Marcos by Mr. Campos.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: The heirs of Ramon U. Cojuangco, namely: Imelda O. Cojuangco and her children . . .claim that they own . . .(80%) percent of the outstanding capital stock of [PHI], while the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco allegedly owns the remaining twenty (20%) percent.
Question: Based on your personal knowledge, do you affirm or deny the said allegation?
MR. GAPUD: I do not know. I can neither affirm or deny.
CONCUL AGUILUCHO: The said heirs also alleged that [PHI] was incorporated on 5 October 1977 with the following stockholders, namely: Rolando C. Gapud, Renato E. Lirio, Jose D. Campos, Jr., Gervasio T. Gaviola and Ernesto S. Abalos, with 400 shares each, . . . .
Question: Based on your personal knowledge, do you affirm or deny the said allegation?
MR. GAPUD: I affirm.
CONCUL AGUILUCHO: Did you really own the 400 shares of the Prime Holdings?
MR. GAPUD: No.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: For whom did you hold those 400 shares?
MR. GAPUD: Well, as I said earlier the shares and/or assignment indorsed in blank were delivered by Mr. Campos to President Marcos.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: The same heirs likewise alleged:"In separate Deeds of Assignment dated 18 February 1981, two (2) of the incorporators of Prime Holdings, namely: Rolando C. Gapud and Jose D. Campos, Jr., assigned and conveyed to Messrs. Ramon U. Cojuangco and Oscar Africa, respectively, all their shareholdings in Prime, consisting of four hundred (400) shares of stock each, or twenty (20%) percent each of the shares of stock of Prime (Annexes "C" and "-1").Question: Based on your personal knowledge, do you affirm or deny the said allegation?
xxx
MR. GAPUD: Madam Consul, I think I can only affirm that which pertains to me, namely: the Deed of Assignment that I signed. I will leave it to Mr. Campos to affirm his Deed of Assignment.
ATTY. MANALAYSAY: Madam Consul General, in view of the identification by the witness of the Deed of Assignment, may we request that the same be marked as our Exhibit "1" (Cojuangco)xxx xxx xxx
ASST. SOLICITOR GENERAL DEL ROSARIO: Do you identify this as your signature?
MR. GAPUD: Yes.xxx xxx xxx
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: May we continue?
Showing you the said Annex "C" now marked as Exhibit "F" for purposes of this proceeding, do you affirm or deny the authenticity of this document?
MR. GAPUD: Yes, I affirm.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Is it really true that you assigned your 400 shares to Ramon U. Cojuangco?
MR. GAPUD: Yes.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: How much did you receive as consideration for assigning your shares to him?
MR. GAPUD: The consideration for the assignment was that upon my assignment, first, my fiduciary responsibilities as nominee were extinguished, and secondly, I had transferred and extinguished any and all liabilities under the subscription payable.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Do you know if Ramon U. Cojuangco received the said shares for himself or for anybody else?
MR. GAPUD: I don't know.
xxx xxx xxx. 82 (Underscoring added)
"VICE CONSUL HERNANDEZ: No. 5, regarding [PHI] which was one of the companies organized for former President Ferdinand E, Marcos, as stated by deponent Jose Y. Campos in his Sworn Statement (EXHIBIT "D") and affirmed by you also, and the various Deeds of Assignment of shares in Prime Holdings, Inc. by the listed Stockholders-Nominees in favor of the late Ramon U. Cojuangco and his children, respectively, namely:Like Mr. Campos before him, Mr. Gapud also seems to be without personal knowledge of whether or not PHI owned shares in PTIC. He admits that whatever he knows about PHI's holding in PTIC, if there be any, is based only on what he has read from the newspapers. True it is that he acknowledged not actually owning the 400 PHI shares in his name. But when asked for whom he held such shares, he hedged on his answer, saying: "Well, as I said earlier the shares and/or assignment indorsed in blank were delivered by Mr. Campos to President Marcos". Mr. Gapud, however, would later contradict himself with respect to the disposition of the said 400 PHI shares with his statement that he assigned what on paper was his PHI shares to the late Ramon U. Cojuangco. Clearly, it would have been implausible for him to make the assignment to Mr. Cojuangco if the covering certificates had previously been delivered to Pres. Marcos. He also affirmed that his assignment of PHI shares to Mr. Cojuangco was for a consideration, albeit this consisted of being freed from his fiduciary responsibilities as nominee and of the extinguishment of his liabilities on his subscription.
Deed of Assignment dated February 18, 1981 signed by you and marked EXHIBIT "F";
Deed of Assignment dated February 18, 1981 signed by JOSE D. CAMPOS, JR., copy marked EXHIBIT "F-1";
Deed of Assignment dated June 1983 signed by RENATO E. LIRIO, copy marked as EXHIBIT "F-2";
Deed of Assignment dated June 1983 signed by GERVACIO T. GAVIOLA, copy marked as EXHIBIT "F-3";
Deed of Assignment dated June 1983 signed by ERNESTO S. ABALOS, copy marked EXHIBIT "F-4";
Deed of Assignment dated July 1983 signed by OSCAR T. AFRICA, copy marked EXHIBIT "F-5";
The aforesaid Deeds of Assignments obviously will be with the knowledge and upon authorization and order of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is this correct?
ATTY. MANALAYSAY: Your Honor, before the witness answers the question, we would like to reiterate our objection insofar as the question referring to Mr. Oscar T. Africa is concerned. We are objecting to the question on the ground that Mr. Gapud would be incompetent to testify with respect to Mr. Africa, considering that Mr. Africa is not among the stockholders-nominees mentioned by Mr. Campos or Mr. Gapud as far as Prime Holdings is concerned and Mr. Africa is not among the incorporators of Prime Holdings, Inc.xxx xxx xxx
VICE CONSUL HERNANDEZ: Can we note your objection and let Mr. Gapud answer?
So the aforesaid Deeds of Assignments obviously will be with the knowledge and upon authorization and order of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is this correct?
MR. GAPUD: Considering that [PHI] was incorporated upon the instructions of former President Marcos, obviously all the nominees would act only upon his authorization. That's my answer. 83
In esse, Atty. Guzman merely reiterated facts deducible from the sworn declarations of Mr. Campos and Mr. Gapud, foremost of which is that PHI was among the corporations organized upon Mr. Campos' instructions and that for all the corporations of Mr. Campos, deeds of trust or assignment were executed. Atty. De Guzman's statements are also affirmatory of the fact that Mr. Gapud assigned PHI shares in his name to Mr. Cojuangco. Interestingly, however, Atty. De Guzman disclosed a detail about the formation and the running of PHI not heretofore known, i.e., that there were two copies of the deeds of trust or assignment, one a machine copy, and the other, the original, that was kept in the records of the company. But of particular significance from this disclosure is the actuality that until the time that Mr. Cojuangco assumed the chairmanship and presidency of PHI and the records were delivered to him (Cojuangco), the deeds of trust or assignment were on file with the records, "except two (2) Deeds of Assignment which were xxx made directly afterward when Mr. Gapud and Mr. Jose Campos, Jr. made the direct assignments to persons actually designated in the Deeds of Assignments".
ATTY. QUISUMBING: But as of 1978 . . . Prime Holdings, Inc. [PHI] was incorporated on instruction of Mr. Jose Yao Campos in 1977, so as of 1978 [PHI] was still a holding company of Mr. Campos? xxx xxx xxx Witness: Please repeat the question. Atty. Quisumbing :The records in the Securities and Exchange Commission indicate that [PHI] was incorporated in October of 1977 and you already testified that [PHI] was incorporated on instructions of Mr. Campos? Witness: Yes sir: Q: And you also testified that Prime Holdings is a holding company? A: Yes, sir. Q: Of Mr. Campos? A: I said holding company, you asked me what is the nature of the company and I think you clarified the question, a holding company is one that hold assets and I said yes, sir, that?s how I understand a holding company. Q: And you testified that all of these five (5) original stockholders of [PHI] worked for Mr. Campos? A: Yes, sir. Q: So, the following year of 1978 you were still Corporate Secretary of [PHI]? A: Yes, sir. Q: And were you still taking instructions from Mr. Campos the following year 1978 with regard to [PHI]? A: Yes, sir. Q: And how long after that did you continue to take instructions from Mr. Campos with regard to [PHI]? A: xxx I?m not too sure about this, but he distanced himself in many operations even of United Laboratories when he had a heart attack in 1979, sir. Q: So you are saying that you took instructions from Mr. Campos with regard to [PHI] until 1979 when Mr. Campos had a heart attack? A: Yes, that is the possibility of having instructions from him because after that he really was very inactive in all these corporations and it was then that Mr. Gapud who took over, sir. Q: In 1979? A: Yes, sir. Q: By the way, in 1979 after Mr. Campos suffered this heart attack and I believe that was late 1979, did Mr. Campos also retire from active involvement in UNILAB? A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q: After 1979 when Mr. Gapud took over, are you aware if there are any transfers of shares of stocks in [PHI] to other people? A: Yes, sir. Q: Will you tell us about that? A: My recollection is, Mr. Gapud himself made a Deed of Assignment but I don?t remember to whom the Deed of Assignment, in whose favor. Q: What year was that? A: I cannot recall the year, sir. Q: But this was in 1979? A: I suppose so, sir. Q: Now, did Mr. Gapud assign his four hundred shares to Mr. Ramon U. Cojuangco? A: I think the document will show because I cannot recall as to the person who made the assignment, sir, I?m sorry, I don?t really have a single paper of the records, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q: Was it the standard operating procedure in Jose Yao Campos holdings companies that the stock certificates of the stockholders would be endorsed in blank? A: Yes, sir. Q: And who would hold custody or possession of those blank endorsed stock certificates? A: In the case of many of the corporations I think including [PHI] these are not fully paid shares and therefore, I knew that no stock certificates have been issued, sir. Q: So, specifically in the case of [PHI] there were no stock certificates issued because the subscriptions were not fully paid? A: Yes, sir. Q: Do you know if the stockholders of [PHI], this is prior to 1981, had executed Deed of Assignment in blank for their subscriptions to PHI shares? A: Yes, sir, in the standard operating procedure in the companies of Mr. Campos is that all the subscribers would have either a Deed of Assignment signed or a Deed of Trust, sir. Q: And you are referring to these holding companies that Mr. Campos, a number of holding companies that Mr. Campos have caused to be incorporated, these are the companies? A: Yes, sir. Q: You said Deed of Trust, would there be a designated trustee? A: No, sir. Q: So, these are Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Trust, the beneficiary of which would be left blank? A: Yes, sir. Q: But the assignors or the trustees or grantors would all sign, would all execute these Deeds? A: Yes, sir. Q: Who would have possession, you mentioned standard operating procedure or SOP, under that SOP who would hold the blank deeds? A: A copy of which usually two (2) copies are made, sir. Q: Two (2) originals? A: No. Q: Xerox copies? A: No, one original and one xerox copy and the original will be included in the records, sir. Q: The records of that particular company? A: Yes, sir, and the other one we give it to the Treasurer. Q: Of that particular company? A: No, to Mr. Gaviola, sir. Q: Mr. Gaviola was the Treasurer of [PHI] wasn?t he? A: I think he is because he is always, was the Treasurer of many of the companies of Mr. Campos, sir. Q: So, there is the SOP also, Mr. Gervacio Gaviola is the Treasurer of [PHI]? A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q: Do you know, so what happened to those blank Deeds of Assignment and Deeds of Trust of [PHI] that were entrusted with the trusted lawyers of UNILAB? A: When [PHI?s] records were delivered, all those records, all those papers are with the records, sir. Q: So, you are referring to the 1982 delivery to the representative of Mr. Ramon U. Cojuangco? A: Yes, sir, except two (2) Deeds of Assignment which were I think made directly afterward when Mr. Gapud and Mr. Jose Campos, Jr. made the direct assignments to persons actually designated in the Deeds of Assignment, sir. Q: Who were those? A: The shares of Mr. Gapud was given to Mr. Ramon U. Cojuangco, Mr. Campos, Jr. I can?t remember to whom he made the assignment, sir. Q: Does the name Atty. Africa ring a bell? A: Yes, sir. Q: Would he be the person who was the assignee of the shares of either Mr. Gapud or Mr. Campos, Jr.? A: Well, I think so, sir. Q: Now, this was in the year 1981, do you recall that? A: No, sir. Q: Do you recall it might be 1982? A: I have no idea as to the year when this was made, sir. Q: But you testified that there was a change of ownership of [PHI] that led to the change of officers including yourself in 1982? A: I didn?t say ownership, sir. I said that when there was a change when Mr. Ramon Cojuangco became the Chairman, just on time when he said there will be a change of officer that is why they got the records from me. Q: So, are you saying that there was no change of ownership in [PHI] in 1981, 1982? A: Except the assignments made by the two (2) persons, sir. That is what I know. xxx xxx xxx Q: You indicated earlier that those change of officers of [PHI] in 1982, who were the new officers that took over? A: I do not know, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q: Who do you know was changed among the officers of [PHI] Holdings, Inc. A: Mr. Gapud as the Chairman and President, sir. Q: Was replaced? A: Was replaced by Mr. Cojuangco, sir. Q: By Mr. Ramon Cojuangco? A: Yes, sir. Q: And this is about 1982? A: Possibly I cannot recall the exact date, sir. xxx xxx xxx Atty. Quisumbing: You testified earlier that Mr. Cojuangco became the President? Witness: Yes, sir. I testified to that effect because that was the instruction given to me that the succeeding minutes of the annual meeting Mr. Gapud told me that the new Chairman and President will be, was Mr. Ramon Cojuangco, sir. Q: And that was the instruction of Mr. Gapud? A: Yes, sir. Q: He was the President and Chairman before Mr. Cojuangco? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, did you have any involvement in [PHI] after 1982 A: None, sir. Q: And you testified that all the records that you were holding of [PHI] were taken from you in 1982 A: Yes, sir. Q: By Mr. Gapud? A: Yes, sir. Q: Do you know who if ( sic ) he retained those records or if he turned it over to the new Chairman and President? A: Well, he told me he will be turning it over to the Cojuangcos, sir. Q: And those include the blank Deeds of Assignment and Deeds of Trust? A: I suppose so, sir. 84 (Underscoring and the word "PHI" in bracket in lieu of the words "Prime Holdings Inc." added)
Mr. Ramon Cojuangco
Manila
Philippine Islands
Dear Mr. Cojuangco:
We have received your cable on July 18, 1967 to Mr. Douglas in which you confirmed that an appointment had been secured for Mr. Brophy to meet with your principal during the week of August 13, 1967, the date and hour to be finalized upon Mr. Brophy's arrival.
Based on this assurance, the "Proposal with Respect to the Sale of General Telephone & Electronics Corporation's Stockholdings in [PLDT] to a Philippine Group" dated June 6, 1967 will remain open until 4:30 p.m. New York time on August 31, 1967, and unless accepted by that time (or further extended) will expire.
Article VIII. D. of the proposal shall be deemed to be modified in this respect by this letter.
I assure you of Mr. Brophy's cooperation with you in pursuing the proposal and hope that during your meetings you will be able to reach a mutually satisfactory solution to any questions which may arise.Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) LESLIE H. WARKER'
The Brophy letter to Mr. Braderman 87 referred to above reads:October 9, 1967
Dear Mr. Braderman:
In accordance with your request to Mr. Stratton Anderson of our Washington Office, I am enclosing a copy of a "Proposal with Respect to the Sale of General Telephone & Electronics Corporation's Stockholdings in [PLDT] to a Philippine Group', dated June 6, 1967, together with a letter of July 18, 1967 amending the Proposal, and a copy of a press release issued by this Corporation upon the completion of the step provided for in Article VIII E.P. of the proposal.
The "principal" referred to in the July 18 letter is President Marcos.
Since the transaction has not been completed, and we cannot be sure at this time that it will be completed, we would prefer not to submit a detailed memorandum concerning the background of the Proposal. I would, however, be glad to discuss it with you on the telephone and answer any questions you may have.
"SEC. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:A contrary ruling would otherwise put the recovery suits beyond the pale of the law on admissibility of evidence. This could not have been the intention of then President Corazon C. Aquino when she issued EO No. 14, series of 1986, supra, providing that "technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be applied strictly to [said ill-gotten wealth cases]."
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written, or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be."
xxx Eleven years have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud of illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.A little over six years (6) later, in July 2003, the Court, in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 91 repeated the same message imparted in the earlier Republic case, although the clause "[A]lmost two decades have passed" was used, and aptly so, in lieu of "[E]leven years have passed".
"Hence, a claim for recovery of properties alleged by the Republic to have been ill-gotten cannot proceed under the mere presumption that said properties are indeed ill-gotten. Before that characterization can be appended to the properties sought to (be) recovered, there must be proof of such claim. The characterization cannot arise on the basis of public notoriety. In the case at bar, the Republic failed to present the proof required to characterize the PLDT shares as ill-gotten. As a necessary consequence of this failure, its claim for recovery thereof cannot succeed." (at p. 41)In amplification of the foregoing, I reiterate what I wrote in my "COMMENT" (Annex "A" hereof) to the DISSENTING (now majority) OPINION of Justice Morales and my "REJOINDER" (Annex "B" hereof) to her reply to my comment.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo (G.R. 150367), p. 564. An earlier resolution of November 19, 2001; Rollo (G.R. 150369), p. 564.] consolidated the petition in G.R. No. 150320 with the petition in G.R. No. 149802.
2 EO 1 created the PCGG to assist the President in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former Pres. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates; EO 2 asserted that ill-gotten assets are in the form of, among others, trust accounts and shares of stock, and EO 14, as amended, vested the Sandiganbayan exclusive & original jurisdiction over all cases of ill-gotten wealth.
3 Penned by Justice Narciso S. Nario and concurred in by Justices Rodolfo Palatao and Nicodemo Ferrer; Rollo (G. R No. 153459), pp. 9- 81.
4 Rollo (G.R. No. 150367), pp. 72 et seq.
5Ibid., pp. 118 et seq.
6Ibid., pp. 110 et seq.
7Ibid., pp. 124 et seq.
8Ibid., pp. 163-171.
9Ibid., pp. 203 et seq.
10Id., pp. 213 et seq.
11Id., pp. 582 et seq.
12Id., pp. 589 et seq.
13Id., pp. 420-432.
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 150367), p. 222.
15Ibid., pp. 333-334.
16Ibid., pp. 318.
17Ibid., pp. 277 et seq.
18Ibid., pp. 65-66.
19Ibid., pp. 68 et seq.
20Ibid., p. 71; In the same order, the trial court made reference to the manifestation of Cojuangco/PHI that, instead of presenting their witness on the witness stand, they are submitting the deposition of Mr. Campos, Atty. De Guzman and Atty. Mercado Ferrer as evidence.
21 Annex "BB" and "CC", respectively, of the Petition in G.R. 153459.
22 See Note No. 18, supra.
23 See Note No. 19, supra.
24 See Note No. 20, supra.
25 Partial Decision, p. 17; See Note No. 3, supra.
26 See Note No. 17, supra.
27 Petition, G.R. No. 153459, p. 167.
28 Reported in 344 SCRA 290.
29 Rollo (G.R. No. 149802), pp. 106 et seq.
30 Ibid., pp. 90 et seq.
31 Id., pp. 100 et seq.
32Id., p. 58 et seq
33 Sec. 8. Suspension of Actions.- The suspension of actions shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. Article 2030 of the Civil Code provides for suspension of action: 1. If willingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed by one of the parties; or 2. If it appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceedings, offered to discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer.
34 Rollo (G.R. No. 149802), p. 61
35Ibid., pp.184-185; July 26 would later be included as intervenors' hearing date.
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 150367), pp. 302 et seq.
37 Rollo (G.R. No. 150320), pp. 78-79.
38 Rollo (G.R. No. 149802), p. 61.
39 See Note No. 37, supra.
40 Rollo (G.R. No. 150320), p. 80.
41 Rollo, (G.R. No. 153207), pp. 689-714.
42 See Note No. 3, supra.
43 147 SCRA 334 [1987].
44 As amended by SC Adm. Memo. No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1, 2000.
45 148 SCRA 280 [1987].
46 269 SCRA 334 [1999].
47Litton Mills, Inc. vs. Galleon Trader, Inc., 163 SCRA 489 [1988].
48Butuan Bay Export Corp. vs. CA, 97 SCRA 297 [1980].
49Pure Foods Corp. vs. NLRC, 171 SCRA 415 [1989].
50 393 SCRA 397, 402-403 [2002]
51 333 SCRA 465 [ 2000], citing Espiritu vs. Solidum, 52 SCRA 131[1973].
52PNB vs. Donasco, 7 SCRA 409 [1963].
53 34 Phil. 80, 96-97 [1916].
54Republic [PCGG] vs. Sandiganbayan [First Division], 258 SCRA 685 [1996].
55Ynot vs. IAC, 148 659 [1987], quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter.
56David vs. Aquilisan, 94 SCRA 707 [1979 ], citing other cases.
57Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization vs. Laguesma, 254 SCRA 565 [1996].
58 406 SCRA 575, citing DBP vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 362.
59Stronghold Insurance Co. vs. CA, 205 SCRA 605.
60Acosta vs. People, 5 SCRA 774 [1962].
61Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden, 78 Phil. 599 [1947].
62Linis vs. Rovira, 61 Phil. 137, 139 [1935] .
63People vs. Maceda, 188 SCRA 532 [1990]; Perez vs. Perez, 73 SCRA 517 [1976].
64 See Note No. 54, supra .
65 Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
66 See Note No. 2, supra.
67Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1921].
68 175 SCRA 216 [1989].
69 6 SCRA 1059 [1962].
70Carcon Development Corp. vs. CA, 180 SCRA 348 [1989].
71Evadel Realty and Development Corporation vs. Soriano, 357 SCRA 395 [2001].
72 Rollo (G.R. No. 153207), pp. 1597 et seq.
73Yasay vs. Desierto, 300 SCRA 494 [1998], citing Reyes vs. Comelec, 254 SCRA 514 [1996]; People vs. Almendras, et al., 401 SCRA 555, 571 [2003].
74 150 SCRA 181 [1987].
75Silverio vs. PCGG, 155 SCRA 60 [1987]; Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376 [1987].
76 See Note No. 3, supra.
77 Petition, G.R. No. 150459, pp. 41-42.
78 See Note No. 2, supra.
79 Petition, G.R. No. 153459, p. 61.
80 Exhibit "MMM"; Rollo (153459) pp. 549 et seq.
81 Transcript, EXHIBIT ZZZ to ZZZ-1-N.
82 TSN, pp. 14 to 19, EXHIBIT "000-4"; Rollo (G.R. No.153459), pp. 1679-1685.
83 Ibid., pp. 1709-1710.
84 Rollo (G.R. No. 153207), pp. 1323 et seq.
85Santiago vs. De los Santos, 61 SCRA 146 [1974].
86 Rollo (G.R. No. 153459), p. 1716.
87Ibid., p. 1717.
88 SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.- An authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
89 Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. VI, 99 ed., p. 229.
90 269 SCRA 316 [1999], See Note No. 46.
91 406 SCRA 190 [2003].
92 177 SCRA 668 [1989].
93 See Note No. 74, supra.
". . . are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationships, resulting in their unjust enrichment, and causing damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines."1The alleged ill-gotten assets in this case are shares of stock in Prime Holdings Inc. (PHI) which, in turn, holds shares in Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC), a shareholder in the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). The Republic's case is premised on the theory that PHI is a "dummy corporation," not owned by private respondent Cojuangco family, but merely held in beneficial trust for former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
"In the organization, administration and management of the above-named corporations, as it was my policy that whenever such a corporation is organized for and on behalf of the intended beneficiaries, I execute and I require all my said associates to execute a Deed of Trust or Deed of Assignment duly signed in favor of an unnamed beneficiary and to deliver the original copy thereof to the former President. It is in fact my policy and procedure that we disclaim completely any interest in any such business and make it clear to the former President that we hold such interests on his behalf."In his affidavit, Campos named PHI as one of the companies he organized for President Marcos. Yet, when asked if the modus operandi was applied to PHI as it was with the other Marcos dummy corporations, he vacillated,2 thus:
"3. In your Sworn Statement, page 2, you stated that with respect to the corporations you held in trust for President Marcos, it was your "policy" that whenever such a corporation was organized, you executed, and you required all your business associates to execute, a Deed of Trust or Deed of Assignment in favor of an "unnamed beneficiary," and delivered the originals thereof to President Marcos. xxx Was this "policy" FOLLOWED IN THE CASE OF [PHI]" xxxCampos also testified that he had never communicated in any manner whatsoever with President Marcos, his alleged principal, nor with Ramon Cojuangco regarding Marcos' beneficial ownership of shares of stock in PHI or PTIC or Prime Holdings, Inc., thus:
ANSWER: "All the corporations I organized - that was the standard policy - that we surrendered direct to President Marcos.'"
"7. Did you ever have any discussions or correspondences with President Marcos regarding his beneficial ownership or the beneficial ownership by any member of his family, directly or indirectly, of shares of stock in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) or Prime Holdings, Inc."Considering the fact that Campos - by his own admission - was the organizer of dummy corporations for Marcos, it is contrary to human experience that he never had any discussion with the former President about PHI, if indeed it was such a dummy corporation.
Answer: No, Ma'am.
xxx
Did you ever have any discussions or correspondences with Ramon U. Cojuangco regarding the beneficial ownership by President Marcos or any member of his family, directly or indirectly, of shares of stock in PLDT, PTIC or Prime Holdings, Inc.?
Answer: No, Ma'am."
"Q: Was it the standard operating procedure in Jose Yao Campos holdings companies that the stock certificates of the stockholders would be endorsed in blank?If, according to the Republic's own witness, the shares of a Marcos dummy corporation are covered by a Deed of Assignment endorsed to an unnamed beneficiary, then Atty. De Guzman's above admissions are fatal to the Republic's case. His categorical declaration is that the blank Deeds of Assignment and Deeds of Trust covering PHI shares were not delivered to Marcos, but to Ramon U. Cojuangco.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And who would hold custody or possession of those/ bank endorsed stock certificates?
A: In the case of many of the corporations I think including Prime Holdings, Inc. these are not fully paid shares and therefore, I knew that no stock certificates have been issued, sir.
Q: So, specifically in the case of Prime Holdings, Inc. there were no stock certificates issued because the subscriptions were not fully paid?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know if the stockholders of Prime Holdings, Inc., this is prior to 1981, had executed Deed of Assignment in blank for their subscription to PHI shares?
A: Yes, sir, the standard operating procedure in the companies of Mr. Campos is that all the subscribers would have either a Deed of Assignment signed or a Deed of Trust, sir.
Q: And you are referring to these holding companies that Mr. Campos, a number of holding companies that Mr. Campos have caused to be incorporated, these are the companies?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said Deed of Trust, would there be a designated trustee?
A: No, sir.
Q: So, these are Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Trust, the beneficiary of which would be left blank?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But the assignors or the trustees or grantors would all sign, would all execute these Deeds?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who would have possession, you mentioned standard operating procedure or SOP, under the SOP who would hold the blank deeds?
A: A copy of which usually two (2) copies are made, sir.
Q: Two (2) originals?
A: No.
Q: Xerox copies?
A: No. One original and one Xerox copy and the original will be included in the records, sir.
Q: The records of that particular company?
A: Yes, sir, and the other one we give it to the Treasurer.
Q: Of that particular company?
A: No, to Mr. Gaviola, sir.
Q: Mr. Gaviola was the Treasurer of Prime Holdings, Inc. wasn't he?
A: I think he is because he is always, was the Treasurer of many of the companies of Mr. Campos, sir.
Q: So, there is the SOP also, MR. Gervacio Gaviola is the Treasurer of Prime Holdings, Inc.?
A: Yes, sir.xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, who would hold the records of these companies which would include those blank Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Trust?
A: Well, the actual custodian of that will be the Legal Department who has all the legal files, sir.
Q: Was it not or would you consider it risky that the blank Deeds of Assignment or blank Deeds of Trust of all the shares in this companies he right there in the records, be among the corporate records, that somebody could take them and put their names?
A: Maybe there is some risk there but you see, sir, the people in the Legal Department are well trusted by all of us. They have been with the company for many years and considering the competence that they have established with us, nobody would even get those records without, let's say order of Mr. Campos or me or the Corporate Secretary, sir.
Q: And who were these trusted people of the Legal Department?
A: The lawyers, sir.
Q: Could you give us the names?
A; Yes, two of them died and one of them retired. Mr. Urbano Francisco was the only survivor, sir.
Q: Can I have the names of those who died?
A: Ed Halagao, I cannot remember the other one, sir.
Q: These are the trusted lawyers of the Legal Department of UNILAB?
A: Yes, sir.xxx
Q: Do you know what happened to those blank deeds of Assignment of Deeds of Trust of Prime Holdings, Inc. that were entrusted with the trusted lawyers of UNILAB?
A: When Prime Holdings, Inc.'s records were delivered, all those records, all those papers are with the records, sir.
Q: So, you are referring to the 1982 delivery to the representative of Mr. Ramon U. Cojuangco?
A: Yes, sir, except two (2) Deeds of Assignment which were I think made directly afterwards when Mr. Gapud and Mr. Jose Campos, Jr. made the direct assignments to persons actually designated in the Deeds of Assignment, sir.
Q: Who were those?
A: The shares of Mr. Gapud was (sic) given to Mr. Ramon U. Cojuangco, Mr. Campos, Jr. I can't remember to whom he made the assignment, sir.
Witness Gapud testified that he assigned his PHI shares to Ramon U. Cojuangco - not Marcos, thus:In fact, while he could have easily identified Marcos as the beneficial owner of PHI, witness Gapud - who succeeded Campos as President of PHI - refused under oath to do so. Instead:
"CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Is it really true that you assigned your 400 shares [in Prime Holdings] to Ramon U. Cojuangco?
MR. GAPUD: Yes.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: How much did you receive as consideration for assigning your shares to him?
MR. GAPUD: The consideration for this assignment was that upon my assignment, first, my fiduciary responsibilities as nominee were extinguished, and secondly, I had transferred and extinguished any and all liabilities under the subscription payable.
CONSUL AGUILUCHO: Do you know if Ramon Cojuangco received the said shares for himself or for anybody else?
MR. GAPUD: I don't know."
"CONSUL AGUILUCHO: The heirs of Ramon U. Cojuango, namely Imelda O. Cojuangco and her children... claim that they own eighty (80) percent of the outstanding capital stock of Prime Holding, while the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco allegedly owns the remaining twenty (20) percent? Question: Based on your personal knowledge, do you affirm or deny the said allegation?The majority of my colleagues hold that "Gapud's statement relating to subsequent execution of deeds of assignment to Cojuangco and his kin does not detract from the prior delivery of blank deeds to the former President, especially so in this case where, by Gapud's own recounting, he and his co-incorporators executed the 1981 and 1983 Deeds of Assignment with the knowledge and authorization of the same person to whom the earlier deeds were delivered - President Marcos."
MR. GAPUD: I do not know. I can neither affirm nor deny."
"When a formal deed of assignment is executed by the transferor in favor of a transferee, for the purpose of assigning shares of stock, endorsement and delivery requirements stated in Section 63 of the Corporation Code are deemed substantially complied with. This mode of transfer covers a situation where no certificate of stock has been issued or where the stock certificate is not in the possession of the transferor-stockholder so that the shares of stock may be transferred by means of a deed of assignment."3Additionally, the Republic failed to prove that Marcos had a subsisting interest in PHI. There had been no intervention on his part in the affairs of PLDT, PTIC, or PHI. Nor did he issue instructions that "hugely and inexplicably benefited" these companies indicating he had any actual interest therein.
When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.So must it be in this case. On the assumption that the Republic has presented a persuasive case, it may not be said that the defendants do not have in their favor an equally persuasive one. Even were we to find the balance of evidence to be just about at equipoise, the Republic's instant claim - as a matter of law - must fall.
Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weaknesses of defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action."6
Similarly:
"We are at a loss to determine which position is correct. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to decide the issues under the rule of burden of proof.
Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is any doubt on which the evidence preponderates the party having the burden of proof falls upon that issue, that is to say, if the evidence touching on disputed facts is equally balanced, or if it does not produce a just, rational belief of its existence, or it leaves the mind in a state of perplexity the party holding the affirmative as to such fact must fail. (23 C.J. 11-12)"7
Endnotes:
1 First Whereas Clause, Executive Order No. 2 (1986).
2 Deposition of 18 December 1995, Transcript, Exhibit ZZZ to ZZZ-1-N.
3Id. at 807.
4 No. L-75885, May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181.
5Ibid, at 228.
6Sapu-an, et al. vs. CA, G.R. No. 91869, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 701, 705-706.
7Pilar Development Corp. vs. IAC, No. L-72283, December 12, 1986, 146 SCRA 215.
8 6 SCRA 1059, citing Katigbak vs. Solicitor General, et al., G.R. No. 19328, December 22, 1989.