Home of ChanRobles Virtual Law Library

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 14957. March 16, 1920. ]

VICENTE GARCIA VALDEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARIA SOTERAÑA TUASON, Defendant-Appellee.

Williams, Ferrier & Sycip for Appellant.

Ramon Sotelo for Appellee.

SYLLABUS


1. DIVORCE; LIMITED DIVORCE ARROGATED. — Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature declaring that divorces shall operate to dissolve the bonds of matrimony and defining the conditions under which divorces may be granted has the effect of abrogating the limited divorce formerly recognized in these Islands.

2. STATUTES; REPEAL BY IMPLICATION. — While repeals by implication are not favored, nevertheless when there is a plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy between two laws, the later expression of the Legislative will must be given effect.

3. ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN REPEALING EFFECT OF AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE LAWS. — There is a clear distinction between affirmative and negative statutes in regard to their repealing effects upon prior legislation, which may be expressed by saying that while an affirmative statute does not impliedly repeal the prior law unless an intention to effect the repeal is manifest, a negative statute repeals all conflicting provisions unless the contrary intention is disclosed.

4. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF REPEALING CLAUSE. — The circumstance that a statute which is inconsistent with prior laws does not contain a clause repealing generally all laws and parts of laws inconsistent therewith does not prevent it from operating by implication to repeal such inconsistent laws.

5. CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. — It is not incumbent on the appellee, who occupies a purely defensive position and is seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error. Only an appellant is required to make such assignments.


D E C I S I O N


STREET, J.:


This is a petition for divorce, filed by Vicente Garcia Valdez on April 2, 1918, in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against his wife, Maria Soteraña Tuason Upon hearing the cause the trial judge found that the charge of adultery was not sustained by the evidence; and he refused to grant relief. The complaint was accordingly dismissed at the petitioner’s costs. From this judgment the petitioner appealed.

On March 11, 1917, Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature, relating to the subject of divorce, became effective in the Philippine-Islands. This enactment introduced the radical innovation of causing the divorce to operate, after the expiration of one year from the date of the decree, as a dissolution of the bonds of matrimony. Another feature of the same Act pertinent to the present controversy is a provision to the effect that a petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband and cannot be granted except upon conviction of the guilty party in. a criminal prosecution (secs. 1, 8).

The petition in the present case does not allege, nor is it in fact claimed by the petitioner, that the respondent has at any time been convicted of the offense of adultery. It results that the divorce sought in this proceeding. cannot be granted if Act No. 2710 is applicable to the case. It is, however, insisted for the petitioner that supposing the fact of adultery on the part of the respondent to be proved, he is entitled to a divorce of the character recognized by the law prevailing in these Islands prior to the passage of Act No. 2710, that is to say, a divorce a mensa et throto, or decree of judicial separation, entailing as one of its consequences the dissolution of the ganancial partnership and liquidation of the community assets. In other words it is supposed that the absolute divorce conceded under certain conditions by Act No. 2710 is an additional remedy, and not exclusive of the remedy of the limited divorce formerly allowed. The question thus raised is one of law, and in the view we take of the case it is determinative of the appeal.

The law of divorce as it formerly existed in this jurisdiction was summed up in a few words by Justice Willard, speaking for this Court in Benedicto v. De la Rama (3 Phil. Rep., 34, 45) , as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) That Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for divorce; (2) that the only ground therefor is adultery; (3) that an action on that ground can be maintained by the husband against the wife, or by the wife against the husband; and (4) that the decree does not dissolve the marriage bond."cralaw virtua1aw library

Comparing the propositions thus stated with the provisions of Act No. 2710, it is quite manifest that the divorce consisting of judicial separation without the dissolution of the bonds of matrimony, which was formerly granted for the adultery o
Top of Page