THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 173808 : September 17, 2008]
FERNANDA ARBIAS, Petitioner, v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
As to the issue that muniments of title and/or tax declarations and tax receipts/payments do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of ownership, the same cannot hold through (sic) anymore it appearing from the records that the muniments of titles as presented by the herein applicant are coupled with open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an owner, hence, it can be given greater weight in support of the claim for ownership. The [herein petitioner] is a private individual who is qualified under the law being a purchaser in good faith and for value. The adverse, open, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in the concept of owner of the [petitioner] started as early as in 1992 when their predecessors in interest from Lourdes Jardeleza then to the herein [petitioner] without any disturbance of their possession as well as claim of ownership. Hence, uninterrupted possession and claim of ownership has ripen (sic) into an incontrovertible proof in favor of the [petitioner].Respondent, through the OSG, filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal19 of the above Decision. In its Brief20 before the Court of Appeals, respondent questioned the granting by the RTC of the application, notwithstanding the alleged non-approval of the survey plan by the Director of the Land Management Bureau (LMB); the defective publication of the notice of initial hearing; and the failure of petitioner to prove the continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessor-in-interest.
Premises considered, the Application of Petitioner Fernanda Arbias to bring Lot 287 under the operation of the Property Registration Decree is GRANTED.
Let therefore a DECREE be issued in favor of the [petitioner] Fernanda Arbias, of legal age, married to Jimmy Arbias and a resident of Golingan St. Poblacion, Estancia, Iloilo and after the Decree shall have been issued, the corresponding Certificate of Title over the said parcel of land (Lot 287) shall likewise be issued in favor of the petitioner Fernanda Arbias after the parties shall have paid all legal fees due thereon.18
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court dated June 26, 2000 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the application for original registration of title is hereby DISMISSED.21The appellate court declared that the Certification of the blueprint of the subject lot's survey plan issued by the Regional Technical Director of the Lands Management Services (LMS) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) was equivalent to the approval by the Director of the LMB, inasmuch as the functions of the latter agency was already delegated to the former. The blueprint copy of said plan was also certified22 as a duly authentic, true and correct copy of the original plan, thus, admissible for the purpose for which it was offered.
Petitioner ascribes error on the part of the Court of Appeals for failing to conclude that she and her predecessor-in-interest possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and that the said property had already been classified as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner contends that her documentary and testimonial evidence were sufficient to substantiate the said allegations, as correctly and conclusively pronounced by the RTC. Petitioner likewise points out that no third party appeared before the RTC to oppose her application and possession other than respondent. Respondent, then represented by the City Prosecutor, did not even adduce any evidence before the RTC to rebut petitioner's claims; thus, respondent, presently represented by the OSG, is now estopped from assailing the RTC Decision. Petitioner finally maintains that assuming her possession was indeed not proven under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, instead of dismissing it outright.I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO AS IT DID NOT OBJECT TO PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE AND PRESENT PROOF TO REFUTE THE SAME.II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DEPARTING FROM THE WELL SETTLED RULE THAT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT A QUO, WHICH IS IN BEST POSITION TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR, CONDUCT AND ATTITUDE OF THE WITNESS AT THE TRIAL, ARE GIVEN MORE WEIGHT AND MUCH MORE THAT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR THE REPUBLIC IN THE COURT BELOW.III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LOT IN QUESTION CEASES (sic) TO BE PUBLIC LAND IN VIEW OF PETITIONER'S AND THAT OF HER PREDECESSOR'S-IN-INTEREST POSSESSION EN CONCEPTO DE DUENO FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR TITLING WITHOUT REMANDING THE INSTANT CASE FIRST TO THE COURT A QUO FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO THE RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASES OF VICENTE ABAOAG VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 045 Phil. 518 AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO ET. AL., G.R. NO. 60413, OCTOBER 31, 1990.
Quite obviously, the above-quoted statements made by petitioner during her testimony, by themselves, are nothing more than self-serving, bereft of any independent and objective substantiation. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner cannot thereby rely on her assertions to prove her claim of possession in the concept of an owner for the period required by law. Petitioner herself admitted that she only possessed the property for six years. The bare claim of petitioner that the land applied for had been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest, Jardeleza, for 30 years, does not constitute the "well-nigh inconvertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration.34
Direct Examination of Fernanda Arbias:
Atty. Rey Padilla:Q: You said you bought this property from the Spouses Jardeleza. Can you tell us how long did they possess the subject property? A: 30 years. Q: And you said you bought this property sometime in the year 1993. After 1993, do you know if anybody filed claim or ownership of the subject property? A: No, Sir. Q: Can you tell us if anybody disturbed your possession in the subject property? A: No, Sir. Q: Are you possessing the subject property in concept of the owner open and continuous? A: Yes, Sir. Q: What are the improvements you introduced in the subject property? A: I have the intention to put up my house.32 Cross Examination of Fernanda Arbias:
Prosecutor Nelson Geduspan:Q: How long have you been in open, continuous, exclusive possession of this property? A: Almost six (6) years. Q: And before that it is Lourdes Jardeleza who is in open, continuous and in actual possession of the property? A: Yes, Sir. Q: Of your own knowledge, aside from this predecessor Lourdes Jardeleza, has anybody had any claim of the property? A: No, Sir.33
ALL CORNERS ARE OLD POINTS.Petitioner's reliance on the above inscription is misguided. In Menguito v. Republic,36 we held that an applicant cannot rely on the notation in the blueprint made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer indicating that the property involved is alienable and disposable land. We emphasized therein that -
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PROJ. 44 BLK-1 PER LC MAP. 1020 APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY ON JULY 26, 1933. COORDINATES OF BLLM#1 N=1266998.39, E=516077.19 LAT 11o 27' 27.4" N, LONG 123o 08' 9.9" E.35 (Emphasis supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation x x x indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.37
Endnotes:
* Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 3 October 2007.
1Rollo, pp. 8-23.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 24-33.
3Rollo, pp. 34-35.
4 Penned by Judge Julio L. Villanueva; rollo, pp. 80-82.
5Rollo, pp. 36-37.
6 Id. at 38-41.
7 Id. at 41.
8 Id. at 157.
9 See Section 6, paragraph 2(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
10Rollo, p. 157.
11 Id. at 157.
12 Id. at 25.
13 Id. at 158.
14 Id.
15 The Office of the Provincial Sheriff certified the posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing of LRC Case No. N-1025 in a conspicuous place on the subject property and on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of the Municipality of Estancia, Iloilo, where the subject property is situated. (Rollo, p. 158.) The National Printing Office issued a Certificate of Publication dated 29 June 1999, which stated that the Notice of Initial Hearing relative to LRC No. N-1025 was published in the Official Gazette issued on 21 June 1999 and the last issue had been officially released on 29 June 1999. (Rollo, p. 159.) The LRA itself issued a certification dated July 1999 on sending copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing by registered mail on 21 May 1999 to all adjoining owners and to every person named in the Notice whose address is known and to all government agencies and offices concerned. (Rollo, p. 158.) An Affidavit of Publication from Balita, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, through its Advertising Manager Ponciano C. Sillano, was also submitted to the RTC attesting that a Notice of Initial Hearing of LRC No. N-1025 was published in said newspaper on 29 May 1999 (Rollo, pp. 158-159), with the attached newspaper clippings of the Notice as published in the said newspaper (Rollo, p. 142).
16Rollo, p. 25.
17 Id. at 26.
18 Id. at 81-82.
19 Id. at 56-57.
20 Id. at 58-78.
21 Id. at 31.
22 By Fabiola C. Cabarot, Chief of the Records Section of the Surveys Division, LMS, DENR in Iloilo City (Rollo, p. 27).
23Rollo, pp. 98-105.
24 Id. at 34-35.
25Spouses Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 606, 622 (1998).
26 Id.
27 Sec. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
28 Exhibit "M" for Petitioner, rollo, p. 36-37.
29Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246, 2 March 1993, 219 SCRA 339, 347-348.
30 Exhibit "E" for Petitioner, rollo, pp. 42-43.
31 Exhibit "F" for Petitioner, rollo, p. 44.
32Rollo, p. 29.
33 Id. at 29-30.
34Republic v. Lee, 274 Phil. 284, 291 (1991), cited in Turquesa v. Valera, 379 Phil. 618, 631 (2000).
35Rollo, p. 31.
36 401 Phil. 274 (2000).
37 Id. at 287-288.
38Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 317 Phil. 374, 376 (1984), cited in Edaño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83995, 4 September 1992, 213 SCRA 585, 593.
39Maloles v. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548, 552-553 (1913), cited in Edaño v. Court of Appeals, id.
40Republic v. Sayo, G.R. No. 60413, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 71, 76.
41 See Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, 26 October 2007, 537 SCRA 513, 529-530.
42 Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked when they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases in which the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x. the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 319, 329 [1999].)
43 45 Phil. 518 (1923).
44 Supra note 40.
45 The Court stated in the above case that, upon a review of the Royal Decrees of Spain, it reached the conclusion that:
Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers of the land which they occupied, or even tenants at will. (Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias.) In the Royal Cédula of October 15, 1754, we find the following: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that (sic) ancient possession as a valid title by prescription." We may add that every presumption of ownership under the public land laws of the Philippine Islands is in favor of the one actually occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of subsequently enacted registration land [acts]. (Abaoag v. Director of Lands, supra note 43 at 521-522.)