G.R. No. 179154 - People of the Philippines v. Roger Perez and Danilo Perez
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 179154 : July 31, 2009]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ROGER PEREZ and DANILO PEREZ, Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated May 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01586. The Court of Appeals had affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated February 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, finding appellants guilty of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. Q-00-94135.
On August 1, 2000, an Information3 was filed charging the accused, now appellants herein, with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of January 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating [with] another person whose true name, identity and whereabouts [have] not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one FULGENCIO MAGLENTE CUYSONA by then and there stabbing him with the use of a bladed weapon, hitting him on his trunk, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Fulgencio Maglente y Cuysona.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented Ariel Baque and Rolando Gangca, two eyewitnesses who allegedly saw the stabbing incident on January 29, 2000, and Araceli Cuysona, widow of the victim Fulgencio Cuysona.
Ariel Baque testified that he was in his house located at 147 Lilac Street, Fairview, Quezon City on January 29, 2000 at about 9:30 in the evening when he saw the victim Fulgencio before the stabbing incident. Baque narrated that Fulgencio was standing in front of a store, which was about four arms length away directly in front of his house, when he saw appellant Danilo Perez stab Fulgencio at the back, followed by appellant Roger Perez, who stabbed Fulgencio at the chest. Thereafter, Fulgencio ran but was blocked by a man with blond hair whom Baque could not name and whom he only knew to be a vendor. The man with the blond hair held Fulgencio's arm so he could not run and the three took turns in stabbing Fulgencio.5
On cross-examination, Baque testified that he is a tricycle driver but on January 29, 2000, he neither drove his tricycle nor went to Cavite as insisted by the defense counsel, but just stayed at home. Baque likewise denied that a certain Marcial Dungallo instructed him to implicate appellant Roger Perez and maintained that he actually saw appellant Roger Perez as one of the three persons who stabbed Fulgencio.6
Rolando Gangca, also a resident of Lilac Street, Fairview, Quezon City, testified that he was in his house on January 29, 2000 at about 9:30 in the evening. He decided to go out to buy a cigarette, but was not able to do so because when he turned at the corner, he saw Jerry Bautista running towards the house of Boy Aguilar. When Gangca looked at the place where Jerry Bautista came from, he saw Fulgencio being stabbed by appellants Danilo Perez and Roger Perez. Gangca saw three persons, two of them stabbing the victim while the other was holding the victim's hands. Appellant Danilo Perez used an icepick while appellant Roger Perez used a stainless steel knife. The two were in front of the victim and took turns stabbing him.7
Araceli Cuysona, Fulgencio's widow, testified that her husband died on January 29, 2000 because he was stabbed; that when he was stabbed, she was in Taiwan; that she spent P877.00 for hospitalization expenses and P30,000.00 for funeral expenses of her husband.8
The defense, for its part, presented SPO1 Resty San Pedro of PNP CPD, Station 5 Police Station, Fairview, Quezon City; Francisco Dayola, Jr.; and appellants Roger Perez and Danilo Perez.
SPO1 Resty San Pedro's testimony on direct examination was dispensed with when the prosecution and the defense stipulated that: (1) at about 10:30 in the evening of November 4, 2000, appellants Roger Perez and Danilo Perez voluntarily surrendered at Fairview Police Station 5 accompanied by their lawyer, Atty. Gaspar Tagalo; (2) both appellants were interviewed by SPO1 San Pedro who was on duty at the time; (3) appellant Danilo Perez admitted to SPO1 San Pedro during the interview that he stabbed to death Fulgencio Cuysona and SPO1 San Pedro reduced the oral admission of Danilo Perez in typewritten (question and answer) form; and (4) SPO1 San Pedro gave the typewritten confession to appellant Danilo Perez who read the same and voluntarily signed the written admission in the presence of his counsel. The defense marked in evidence the following exhibits: Exhibit 8-a, signature of appellant Danilo Perez; Exhibit 8-b, signature of Atty. Gaspar Tagalo; Exhibit 8-c, signature of the Administering Officer; and Exhibit 8-d, Tanong at Sagot No. 8 where he admitted and claimed sole responsibility for killing Fulgencio.9
Likewise, during the hearing on January 28, 2004, the direct examination of appellant Danilo Perez was dispensed with considering that his testimony would only corroborate the testimony of SPO1 Resty San Pedro given during the hearing on December 10, 2003.10
On cross-examination, appellant Danilo Perez testified that he stabbed the victim on January 29, 2000 and that he surrendered and gave a statement to the police only on November 4, 2000 or ten months after the stabbing incident and when there was already a warrant of arrest issued for his apprehension. He likewise identified his written admission marked as Exhibit 8.11
Francisco Dayola testified that at about 10:00 in the evening on January 29, 2000 he was in front of the store of Tatang waiting for it to close as he was fetching his girlfriend, Analyn Ladiao, who worked there. While he was waiting, Rolando Gangca arrived and bought a cigarette and gin and proceeded to the house of Arnel Castro, where Gangca's other friends, namely, Jerry Caber, Daniel Castro and Fernando Sarmiento, were having a drinking spree. At past 10:00 in the evening, Dayola went to appellant Roger Perez' house which was also his residence and reached the same at 10:15 in the evening. Dayola saw that appellant Roger Perez was already sleeping. Dayola helped his co-workers Ferdinand Bascug, Freddie Castillo, Reynoso Sega and Reyco Salige to make suman. After a while, they heard shouts outside the house. They went out and saw Fulgencio lying in front of the store of one Kuya Cesar.12
On cross-examination, Dayola testified that he is employed by appellant Roger Perez and that he is in court by virtue of a subpoena. He confirmed that on January 29, 2000, he was inside the house of appellant Roger Perez preparing rice cake and suman when he heard shouts outside the house. When he went out to find out what the commotion was about, he saw Fulgencio's body lying in front of said Kuya Cesar's store but he did not see who attacked Fulgencio. He inquired what happened to Fulgencio and somebody told him that Fulgencio was stabbed by the cousin of Ariel Baque - a fact which he admitted he failed to mention to the police. He also did not tell Fulgencio's wife who stabbed the victim because she was abroad at that time.13
Appellant Roger Perez testified that he was a jeepney operator and owned a variety store. On January 29, 2000 at about 8:30 in the evening, he was in his house located at 147-D Lilac Street, Fairview, Quezon City having a drink with his fellow co-workers Rolando Gangca, Boy Adilan and Jerry Bautista. After a while, he excused himself from the group to go to sleep since he had work the following day. While he was already sleeping together with his wife, Elvira, and his wife's niece, Mirasol, he heard a commotion and noise outside his house. When he went out, he learned that Fulgencio has been stabbed and was brought by relatives to the hospital. Thereafter, some policemen arrived. He was brought to the Fairview, Quezon City Police Station 5 where he was investigated and his statement taken. But he was allowed to go home at 2:00 in the early morning of January 30, 2000.14
On February 4, 2000 at 7:00 in the morning, he was again apprehended while he was in his house. He learned that Rolando Gangca gave a statement implicating him in the stabbing of Fulgencio, but he told the police that he had nothing to do with the stabbing incident.15
On cross-examination, appellant Roger Perez confirmed that he had a drink with his friends at about 8:30 in the evening of January 29, 2000; that he consumed only a few bottles of beer; that while they were drinking, his brother, appellant Danilo Perez, went home to eat; that at about 10:00 in the evening of the same day, he came to know that Fulgencio had been stabbed; that he did not attend the wake of Fulgencio although he knew the deceased during his lifetime; and that he also knew Ariel Baque and Rolando Gangca with whom he has no quarrel or dispute such that there is no reason for them to testify against him. He added that he learned that he was a suspect in the stabbing of Fulgencio only on February 4, 2000 when the policemen came to his house and that he was present when his brother Danilo Perez voluntarily admitted killing Fulgencio.16
On February 11, 2005, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellants guilty of the crime of murder. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds both accused ROGER PEREZ y CAROLINO and DANILO PEREZ y CAROLINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and applying the provisions of the said Code, hereby sentences each of them to Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the late FULGENCIO CUYSONA the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for the death of the victim, P39,877.00 as actual damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
The period during which the accused was under detention should be deducted from the service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED.17
Appellants seasonably filed their appeal. However, in a Decision dated May 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Quezon City, dated February 11, 2005, in Criminal Case No. Q-00-94135 sentencing accused Roger Perez y Carolino and Danilo Perez y Carolino to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that in addition to the amounts awarded by the court a quo, the additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is awarded to the heirs of the victim Fulgencio Cuysona.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, this appeal.
On February 6, 2008, we required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs. Both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the appellants, however, manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs filed before the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs.
Appellants assign the following errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS SO WEAK TO THE EFFECT THAT BOTH THE TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROGER PEREZ, HENCE, ROGER PEREZ SHOULD BE EXONERATED AND ACQUITTED HIS GUILT NOT BEING ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS POINTED OUT IN SUBSEQUENT ERRORS HEREUNDER ASSIGNED;
II.
THE COURT BELOW ALSO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE "FACT OF DEATH" OR CORPUS DELICTI WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT (SIC) AS AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROGER PEREZ;
III.
THE COURT BELOW LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT CONSPIRACY AND MOTIVE ARE NOT ESTABLISHED BY PROSECUTION EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AGAINST APPELLANT ROGER PEREZ;
IV.
THE LOWER COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ADMITTING AS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THE HEARSAY PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "C"; "E"; AND "F" AS AGAINST ROGER PEREZ;
V.
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT DANILO PEREZ Y CAROLINO REPEATED BY HIS TESTIMONY IN COURT IS CONVERTED INTO A JUDICIAL CONFESSION; AND
VI.
FINALLY, THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING SAID APPELLANT DANILO PEREZ GUILTY OF HOMICIDE ONLY AND THE SENTENCING OF SAID APPELLANT UNDER THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.19
In essence, appellants ask us to resolve the following two issues: (1) Did the prosecution prove the guilt of appellant Roger Perez beyond reasonable doubt? and (2) Did the trial court err in holding appellant Danilo Perez guilty of murder instead of homicide?cralawred
In their brief, appellants claim that the trial court gravely erred in giving full probative value and credence to the testimonies, of the prosecution eyewitnesses, which, appellants argue, were allegedly fabricated, manufactured and perjured. They insist that it was only appellant Danilo Perez who stabbed Fulgencio considering that appellant Roger Perez was already sleeping in their house at that time. Moreover, they aver that the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti or fact of death because it failed to present the medico-legal officer who autopsied the body of Fulgencio and prepared the Medico-Legal Report20 showing the wounds sustained by the victim. Appellants likewise assert that conspiracy and motive were not established, and that Danilo should be convicted of the crime of homicide only.
For its part, the OSG counters that the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses are clear, straightforward, consistent and categorical. It asserts that appellants failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution eyewitnesses to testify falsely against them. The OSG further claims that even without the testimony of the doctor who prepared the Medico-Legal Report, the prosecution was still able to prove the corpus delicti by establishing the fact that the victim died and that such death occurred after he was stabbed by the appellants. Moreover, it argues that proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction and that conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Finally, it claims that Danilo should be convicted of the crime of murder since treachery and abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
After a meticulous review of the records, we affirm appellants' conviction. We shall now discuss the parties' arguments in seriatim.
First, the trial court did not err in appreciating the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses. The legal aphorism is that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its assessment of the probative weight thereof as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect by the appellate courts. The raison d' être for this principle is that the trial court is able to observe and monitor, at close range, the conduct, behavior and deportment of the witnesses as they testify.21 In fact, the rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.22
Applying these guidelines, we find no reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of the prosecution eyewitnesses' credibility. Close review of the records reveal that Baque and Gangca's testimonies are positive, clear and straightforward, without any tinge of falsehood or sign of fabrication. They were subjected to lengthy and rigorous cross-examinations, yet they stuck to their testimonies. Also, not only were the appellants identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses, the latter also testified as to appellants' roles and their specific deeds in the killing. Further, no evidence on record was presented to prove that the prosecution eyewitnesses had any ill motive to prevaricate and falsely pinpoint appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
Second, appellants' defense of denial and alibi must fail. It is jurisprudentially held that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. In this case, Roger failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. In fact, Roger's house was only a few meters away from where the crime happened. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, Roger's defense that he was asleep with his wife in his house when the incident took place must be rejected since his testimony was not even corroborated by his wife whom he claimed to be with him when the victim was stabbed.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a bare alibi and denial, being merely self-serving, is itself hardly given credence. Alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification by an eyewitness. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevail over the twin defenses of denial and alibi.23 Here, prosecution eyewitness Baque positively identified that Roger was present when the stabbing incident occurred. In fact, he was only four arms length away from the crime scene when he saw Roger stabbing the victim.
Third, appellants' contention that Danilo's admission that he alone committed the crime, hence, Roger should be exonerated, must necessarily fail. To uphold this argumentation would leave in the hands of the one accused who elects to plead guilty, the automatic exemption of his co-accused from all criminal responsibility.24 Plainly, this should not be automatically allowed since the culpability or innocence of Roger should be determined based on the evidence of their individual participation in the offense charged. The prosecution clearly proved that Roger participated in the stabbing of Fulgencio.
Fourth, we sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.25
In this case, conspiracy between the appellants was clearly established. Danilo initially stabbed Fulgencio at the back followed by Roger who stabbed the latter at the chest. When the victim tried to run for his life, a man with blonde hair blocked his path and the three continued to stab the victim. These acts undoubtedly showed appellants' unanimity in design, intent and execution. The appellants performed specific acts with closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design26 to bring about the death of Fulgencio.
Also, the claim that Roger lacked the motive to commit the crime will not preclude his conviction. Motive is not an element of the crime of murder. Motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where a reliable eyewitness had fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial in the successful prosecution of a criminal case.27 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Fifth, we are not persuaded by the appellants' claim that the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti. Corpus delicti refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. It does not refer to the autopsy report evidencing the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim nor the testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy or medical examination. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act. While the autopsy report of a medico legal expert in cases of murder is preferably accepted to show the extent of injuries suffered by the victim, it is not the only competent evidence to prove the injuries and the fact of death. It may be proved by the testimonies of credible witnesses.28
The testimony of the doctor who prepared the Medico-Legal Report, therefore, is not crucial in proving corpus delicti. The fact that Fulgencio died and that such death occurred after he was stabbed by appellants was clearly established by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses and the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial. In fact, Danilo himself admitted in his extrajudicial confession that he killed Fulgencio.
Finally, we are not convinced by appellants' asseverations that Danilo should be convicted only of homicide. We agree with the conclusion of the court a quo that the appellants should be convicted of murder. The killing of Fulgencio was attended by treachery and abuse of superior strength, and any one of these two aggravating circumstances may qualify a killing into murder.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.29 The events narrated by the prosecution eyewitnesses point to the fact that Fulgencio could not have been aware that he would be attacked by the appellants. There was no opportunity for him to defend himself, as appellants, suddenly and without provocation, stabbed him at the back and on the chest.
Furthermore, abuse of superior strength attended the killing when the appellants, together with an unidentified person who held the victim's hands, took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. However, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated separately, it being necessarily absorbed in treachery.30
All told, we hold that appellants Roger Perez and Danilo Perez are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01586 finding appellants guilty of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
* Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 658.
** Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 635.
*** Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 664.
1 Rollo, pp. 2-25. Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Rosalinda Asuncion Vicente concurring.
2 CA rollo, pp. 44-54. Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Theresa L. De la Torre-Yadao.
3 Records, pp. 1-2.
4 Id. at 1.
5 TSN, May 8, 2002, pp. 4-12.
6 Id. at 17-21.
7 TSN, June 6, 2002, pp. 4-9.
8 TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 2-4.
9 Records, pp. 396-397. RTC Order dated December 10, 2003.
10 Id. at 416-417. RTC Order dated January 28, 2004.
11 TSN, January 28, 2004, pp. 2-5.
12 TSN, October 8, 2003, pp. 4-8.
13 TSN, November 5, 2003, pp. 3-4.
14 TSN, March 3, 2004, pp. 4-8.
15 Id. at 8-10.
16 TSN, April 14, 2004, pp. 3-6.
17 CA rollo, p. 54.
18 Rollo, p. 24.
19 CA rollo, pp. 67-68.
20 Records, pp. 108-109.
21 People v. Aquinde, G.R. No. 133733, August 29, 2003, 410 SCRA 162, 174.
22 People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547.
23 People v. Borbon, G.R. No. 143085, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 178, 187.
24 People v. Abordo, G.R. No. 107245, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 23, 35.
25 Mangangey v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NOS. 147773-74, February 18, 2008, 546 SCRA 51, 66.
26 People v. Quirol, G.R. No. 149259, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 509, 517.
27 People v. Ducabo, G.R. No. 175594, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 458, 472-473.
28 People v. Quimzon, G.R. No. 133541, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 261, 270-271.
29 Revised Penal Code,
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. − The following are aggravating circumstances:
x x x
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
x x x
30 People v. Loreto, G.R. NOS. 137411-13, February 28, 2003, 398 SCRA 448, 462.
