1. EMINENT DOMAIN; INTERPLEADER; JURISDICTION TO STAY PAYMENT OF INDEMNITY. — In a condemnation proceeding the trial court ordered that a certain sum of money be paid by way of part indemnity to some of the owners of the land. Before was paid a person holding a judgment against one of the land owners filed a motion in the condemnation proceeding praying that the order for the payment of the money be revoked and that the treasurer be ordered to retain the money. Upon hearing, the motion was granted and the provincial treasurer was ordered to retain the money for the purpose of action of parties an opportunity to settle the controversy by an action of interpleader. Held: That in ordering the retention of the money pending an action of interpleader, the court acted within its jurisdiction and that a writ of certiorari to the court would not issue.

2. ID.; JUDGMENT; EFFECT OF AS TO PERSON NOT A PARTY. — A person who is not a party to a condemnation proceeding is not bound by a judgment therein ordering the payment of indemnity for the taking of the land in question to some other person.

3. ID.; TITLE; TIME WHEN PASSING. — In condemnation proceedings the title to the land does not pass to the plaintiff until the indemnify is paid.

4. JUDGMENT; JURISDICTION TO STAY EXECUTION. — Whenever necessary to promote the ends of justice, courts have power temporarily to stay executions of judgments rendered by them.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari. The record shows that in the month of November, 1924, the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, brought an action for the expropriation of several parcels of land adjoining each other and apparently forming one continuous tract which was to be used for school purposes. Aquilino Calvo, one of the petitioners herein, was the owner of one of the parcels for which he held certificate of title No. 25100, upon which a mortgage in favor of the petitioner Vicente T. Fernandez for the sum of P2,500, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, had been recorded by way of memorandum. The memorandum also contained a recital to the effect that Fernandez recognized an encumbrance upon the land for P1,200 in favor of the petitioner Martin Jamias. All of the three petitioners were made parties defendant in the expropriation proceedings.

The commissioners, appointed by the Court of First Instance for the appraisal of the land to be expropriated, fixed the value of the parcel described in the aforesaid certificate of title No. 25100 in the sum of P6,943.25, and, in a decision dated November 25, 1925, the respondent judge approved the report of the commissioners upon that point. The municipality, being dissatisfied with the award, the provincial fiscal took the preliminary steps for an appeal to this court, but, subsequently, on June 23, 1926, filed a withdrawal of the appeal, which was approved by the respondent judge on the 20th of the following month.

In the meantime the respondent, Juana Ordoñez, holding a judgment against the petitioner Calvo, levied upon all "rights, interests, actions, and participation," which Calvo "had or might have" in the land in question, the levy being recorded on the certificate of title on December 23, 1925. On January 22, 1926, pursuant to the levy, all the rights, title, and interests, which Calvo had or might have in the land, were sold by the sheriff to the plaintiff in execution, the herein respondent Juana Ordoñez, the certificate of sale being duly entered by memorandum on the aforesaid certificate of title on January 23, 1926. On the same date, counsel for Juana Ordoñez filed a motion in the expropriation proceedings alleging that she had acquired all the rights and interests of the defendant Calvo, and asking that she be substituted for him as defendant in said expropriation proceedings. This motion was denied by the court in an order dated May 27, 1926.

On June 29, 1926, the respondent judge, in connection with the withdrawal of the appeal of the municipality of San Quintin, plaintiff in the expropriation proceedings, declared final the decision of November 25, 1925, in said proceedings and ordered the provincial treasurer to pay to the defendants therein, Aquilino Calvo, Vicente T. Fernandez and Martin Jamias the sum of P4,353.05, the amount of a deposit made by the municipality as part payment of the value of the land expropriated. On the following day June 30, 1926, counsel for Juana Ordoñez filed a motion in the said proceedings praying that the order for the payment of P4,353.05, be revoked and that the provincial treasurer be ordered to retain the money. The motion was opposed by counsel for Calvo, Fernandez, and Jamias on the ground that Juana Ordoñez was not a party to the action and had no right to appear in the case, but on July 20, 1926, the respondent judge granted the motion, revoked the order of June 29, 1926 for the payment of the money to the herein petitioners, and, for the purpose of affording the parties an opportunity to settle the controversy by an action of interpleader, ordered the provincial treasurer to retain the money mentioned in said order until further orders of the court. The petitioners immediately filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, and they thereupon brought the present action in this court. It may be noted that two weeks later the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan brought an action in the Court of First Instance of that province requiring the various claimants to interplead and litigate their adverse claims among themselves.

The petitioners’ contention is that the decision or judgment of November 25, 1925, definitely settled their right to receive the indemnity for the expropriation of the parcel in question, and that said judgment having been declared final and non-appealable, the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the provincial treasurer to retain the money awarded to the petitioners, thus preventing the execution of the judgment.

This contention is clearly untenable. Assuming that the judgment of November 25, 1925, constituted a final determination of the petitioners’ right to receive the award — a proposition which is plausibly disputed by the respondent — it is to be observed that Juana Ordoñez was not a party to the expropriation proceedings and therefore is not bound by that judgment. She acquired her alleged rights subsequently to the rendition of the judgment, indemnity not having been paid, the title to the land, stands subrogated to his right to the indemnity for its expropriation proceedings. Her claim that he through the purchase of Calvo’s interest in the land, stands subrogated to his right to the indemnity for its expropriation, has therefore the appearance of validity and she is clearly entitled to a judicial determination of the claim. That may properly be accomplished in an action is now pending. In these circumstances, it was not only the right but the duty of the respondent judge to stay the execution of his judgment. Whenever necessary to promote the ends of justice, courts have the undoubted power temporarily to stay executions of judgments rendered by them. (Sawin v. Mount Vernon Bank, 2 R. I., 382; State ex rel. Newell v. Third District Court, 37 Utah, 418.)

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied with the costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson,, Street, Malcolm, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.