The total consideration of FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY MILLION PESOS [P560,000,000.00] shall be paid by the VENDEE, without the need of any demand, to the VENDOR in the following manner:
[a] a downpayment in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION [P180,000,000.00] PESOS, to be paid on or before December 28, 1996;
[b] Any and all outstanding payables which the VENDOR owes to the VENDEE in consideration of the cellular phone units and accessories ordered by the VENDOR and delivered by the VENDEE between the initial downpayment date i.e. December 28, 1996 and April 30, 1997, shall be credited to the VENDEE as additional payment of the purchase price.
[c] The remaining balance, after deducting [a] and [b] above, shall be paid on or about April 30, 1997. It is expressly understood however, that the VENDOR shall submit to the VENDEE, on or about April 20, 1997, a Statement of Account updating the deliveries of cellular phones and its outstanding amount in order that the VENDEE can prepare the final payment. In this way, the amount of final payment shall be made to the VENDOR on or before April 30, 1997. Should the VENDOR be delayed in the submission of the said Statement on the stipulated date, the date of payment of the remaining balance shall be automatically adjusted for a period equivalent to the number of days by which the VENDOR is delayed in the submission thereof.6
WHEREFORE, the motion for summary judgment is granted and defendant Piltel is hereby ordered to return or to pay to plaintiff Smartnet the down payment of P180 Million less the forfeited amount of P18 Million and the cash advance of P50 Million, or a net of P112 Million with interest at 6% per annum from the extrajudicial demand of October 20, 1998 until finality of the judgment and after this judgment becomes final and executory, additional legal interest at 12% per annum on the total obligation until the judgment is satisfied.12
WHEREFORE, the motion for execution pending appeal of the Partial Summary Judgment rendered on November 13, 2000 is GRANTED.
Let the corresponding Writ of Execution be issued and implemented accordingly.
We resolve to dismiss the petition.
As pointed out by private respondent, an appeal from a partial summary judgment may be allowed by the trial court under Section 1(g), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:"SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. x x x
No appeal may be taken from:
x x x x
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
x x x x"
Thus, petitioner should have filed, with leave of court, a notice of appeal from the partial summary judgment dated November 13, 2000 before resorting to this special civil action of certiorari. Moreover with the withdrawal and dismissal of private respondent's remaining two causes of action, the summary judgment dated November 13, 2000 ceased to be partial as it may be considered to have completely disposed of the entire case and, therefore, appealable.
Anent the alleged impropriety of a summary judgment, suffice it to say that certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner likewise assails the Order of execution dated April 23, 2001. However, the copy of said Order attached to the urgent manifestation and urgent reiteratory motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is a mere unsigned xerox copy thereof, contrary to the requirement in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the petition be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the order subject thereof. Thus, Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirement, inter alia, that the petition be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the order subject thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. As held in Manila Midtown Hotels and Land Corporation vs. NLRC, certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must observe the rules laid down by law.31
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for insufficiency in form and substance.32
WHEREFORE, defendant's Urgent Manifestation to Post Supersedeas Bond, Urgent Motion to Defer Execution Pending Appeal and the Urgent Motion to Admit Supersedeas Bond are hereby denied for lack of merit.45
It should be noted that after the filing of the instant petition, petitioner appealed to this Court the partial summary judgment dated November 13, 2000 and the Order dated April 23, 2001, declaring the partial summary judgment to have finally disposed of the entire case and granting the motion for execution pending appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 71805, which are the same subject matter of the instant petition.50
I.
A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS THE PROPER REMEDY FROM A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A. SECTION 1(G), RULE 41 OF THE RULES OF COURT DOES NOT APPLY TO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS.
B. A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER THAT CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL.
C. THE RULES AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE DICTATE THAT APPEAL FROM A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE JUDGMENT THAT MAY BE RENDERED IN THE ENTIRE CASE AFTER TRIAL.
D. THE REMEDY OF AN AGGRIEVED PARTY FROM A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
E. EVEN ASSUMING, -ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, THAT SECTION 1, RULE 41 IS APPLICABLE, THE GENERAL RULE EVEN AS STATED IN THE SAME SECTION ITSELF, IS THAT "NO APPEAL MAY BE TAKEN FROM A JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER FOR OR AGAINST ONE OR MORE OF SEVERAL PARTIES OR IN SEPARATE CLAIMS, COUNTERCLAIMS, CROSS-CLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTS, WHILE THE MAIN CASE IS PENDING." MOREOVER, THE EXCEPTION PROVIDED THEREIN IS NOT EVEN MANDATORY.
F. AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION IN THIS CASE, THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS TRULY "PARTIAL", AND NOT FINAL IN THE SENSE THAT IT DISPOSES OF THE ENTIRE CASE.II.
EVEN ASSUMING, ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, THAT APPEAL IS THE PROPER REMEDY FROM A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT BARRED.III.
JUDGE QUILALA COMMITTED PATENT AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.IV.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN PILTEL'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE ISSUES RAISED IN PILTEL'S APPEAL.V.
PILTEL DID NOT COMMIT FORUM SHOPPING.VI.
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE URGENT MANIFESTATION AND URGENT REITERATORY MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER DID NOT ASSAIL THE 23 APRIL 2001 [ORDER]; THE SAID ORDER WAS ASSAILED IN THE ORIGINAL SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION."51
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPINGII.
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ATTENDED THE TRIAL COURT'S ISSUANCE OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENTIII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED PATENT AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
A. THE PLEADINGS READILY AND IMMEDIATELY SHOW THAT THERE ARE MATERIAL DISPUTED FACTS DETERMINATIVE OF THE PARTIES' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH CANNOT BE SETTLED WITHOUT PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE."53
51. From the foregoing statement of the positions of the parties, the following questions of material fact determinative of the parties claim and defenses are glaring:
51.1 Does the Letter constitute a valid, binding, and enforceable agreement between the parties?
51.2 Did the parties intend the Letter to form an integral part of the Contract?
51.3 Was the Letter a material consideration for SMARTNET's entering into the Contract?
51.4 Did PILTEL violate or fail to comply with any of its obligations under the Contract?
51.5 Assuming, arguendo, that the Letter constitutes a valid binding, and enforceable agreement, did PILTEL violate any of its provisions?
51.6 Is PILTEL guilty of fraud or bad faith in the negotiation, performance or execution of the Contract and/or the Letter?
52. BECAUSE OF THE INDISPUTABLE EXISTENCE OF THE FOREGOING MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT WHICH GO INTO THE HEART OF THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, ESPECIALLY SMARTNET'S CLAIM FOR PARTIAL SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OR (IN THE ALTERNATIVE) FOR RESCISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS EVIDENTLY NOT PROPER."54
I.
JUDGE QUILALA GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT HAD BEEN "RENDERED VOID AND INEFFECTIVE AND WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT."55
Clearly, then, in order for Judge Quilala to determine whether or not SMARTNET is entitled to any of the relief it prayed for, it had to resolve, among others, the following issues of fact: Does the Letter constitute a valid, binding, and enforceable agreement between the parties? Did the parties intend the Letter to form an integral part of the Contract? Did PILTEL violate or fail to comply with any of its obligations under the Contract to Sell? Is PILTEL guilty of fraud or bad faith in the negotiation, performance or execution of the Contract to Sell?"56
6.31. In this case, Judge Quilala rendered partial summary judgment notwithstanding the fact that THE PLEADINGS READILY AND IMMEDIATELY SHOW THAT THERE ARE MATERIAL DISPUTED FACTS DETERMINATIVE OF THE PARTIES' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH CANNOT BE SETTLED WITHOUT PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE.
x x x x
The rendition of the foregoing summary judgment is improper because, from the pleadings of the parties and the issues presented at the pre-trial conference, including the issues presented by PILTEL in its pre-trial brief, the following questions of material fact determinative of the parties claim and defenses are glaring:
1. Does the Letter constitute a valid, binding, and enforceable agreement between the parties?
2. Did the parties intend the Letter to form an integral part of the Contract?
3. Was the Letter a material consideration for SMARTNET's entering into the Contract?
4. Did PILTEL violate or fail to comply with any of its obligations under the Contract?
5. Assuming, arguendo, that the Letter constitutes a valid, binding, and enforceable agreement, did PILTEL violate any of its provisions?
6. Is PILTEL guilty of fraud or bad faith in the negotiation, performance or execution of the Contract and/or the Letter?"57
II
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER, RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED PATENT AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN HE DISREGARDED THE LAW AND WELL-ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN RENDERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SMARTNET.
A. SMARTNET [RADIOMARINE] WENT TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS. HENCE, IT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE COURTS.
B. SMARTNET CANNOT RENDER THE CONTRACT VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE THROUGH ITS OWN DEFAULT, BREACH, OR FAILURE.
C. SMARTNET IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST.
D. SMARTNET'S OBLIGATION TO PAY THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE IS VALID, BINDING, ENFORCEABLE AND SUBSISTING.58
83. SMARTNET cannot avoid the Contract by the simple expedient of not paying. Here, the bare truth of the matter is that SMARTNET is invoking its own refusal or failure to comply with its obligation under the Contract to annul or render the Contract ineffective or void.
x x x x
85. SMARTNET is in effect saying that, since it has not paid, and it failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to pay the balance of the purchase price for the Valgoson Property, the Contract is automatically annulled or rescinded.
86. Article 1182 of the Civil Code provides that: "When the fulfillment of the obligation depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void." Thus, in Osmena vs. Rama, it was held that the condition to pay (the balance of the purchase price of shares of stock) as soon as the debtor sells her house is void.
87. Article 1186 of the Civil Code provides that: "The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." The reason for the rule is that ONE MUST NOT PROFIT BY HIS OWN FAULT.
88. In Mana vs. Luzon Consolidated Mines & Co., a company engaged the services of a contractor to construct a road. Halfway, the company directed the contractor to stop work. The contractor sued for the entire contract price. The company refused, asserting that only half of the project was finished. The Court of Appeals sustained the contractor and directed the company to pay the entire contract price, saying that the project is deemed fulfilled because it was the company that voluntarily prevented its completion.
89. The case of Valencia vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and Court of Appeals is even more applicable. There, the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation ("RFC") advertised to the general public an "invitation to bid" for the construction of a building in Davao City. Valencia submitted a bid for the electrical and plumbing works for the building. RFC awarded the plumbing to Valencia. Valencia was asked to put up the performance bond as required under the contract. Valencia did not put up the bond and also did not begin the work. When RFC sued him, among the defenses put up by Valencia was that, since he did not put up a bond, there was no contract since the condition was not complied with. The Supreme Court, affirming the Court of Appeals, held Valencia liable for damages to RFC, saying that:
x x x x
90. Article 1308 of the Civil Code states that: "The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." Thus, in Fernandez vs. Manila Electric Company, the Supreme Court held that the validity and fulfillment of contracts can not be left to the will of one of the contracting parties, and the mere fact that one has made a poor bargain is no ground for setting aside an agreement.59 (citations omitted.)
77. SMARTNET is in effect saying that, since it has not paid, and it failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to pay the balance of the purchase price for the Valgoson Property, the Contract to Sell is automatically annulled or rescinded.
78. SMARTNET cannot avoid the Contract by the simple expedient of not paying. The validity of, compliance with, or fulfillment of a contract cannot be left to the will of one of the parties.
79. Article 1182 of the Civil Code provides that: "When the fulfillment of the obligation depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void." Thus, in Osmena vs. Rama, it was held that the condition to pay (the balance of the purchase price of shares of stock) as soon as the debtor sells her house is void.
80. Article 1186 of the Civil Code provides that: "The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." The reason for the rule is that ONE MUST NOT PROFIT BY HIS OWN FAULT."
81. In Mana vs. Luzon Consolidated Mines & Co., a company engaged the services of a contractor to construct a road. Halfway, the company directed the contractor to stop work. The contractor sued for the entire contract price. The company refused, asserting that only half of the project was finished. The Court of Appeals sustained the contractor and directed the company to pay the entire contract price, saying that the project is deemed fulfilled because it was the company that voluntarily prevented its completion.
82. The case of Valencia vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and Court of Appeals is even more applicable. There, the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation ("RFC") advertised to the general public an "invitation to bid" for the construction of a building in Davao City. Valencia submitted a bid for the electrical and plumbing works for the building. RFC awarded the plumbing to Valencia. Valencia was asked to put up the performance bond as required under the contract. Valencia did not put up the bond and also did not begin the work. When RFC sued him, among the defenses put up by Valencia was that, since he did not put up a bond, there was no contract since the condition was not complied with. The Supreme Court, affirming the Court of Appeals, held Valencia liable for damages to RFC, saying that:
x x x x
83. Article 1308 of the Civil Code states that: "The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." Thus, in Fernandez vs. Manila Electric Company, the Supreme Court held that the validity and fulfillment of contracts can not be left to the will of one of the contracting parties, and the mere fact that one has made a poor bargain is no ground for setting aside an agreement.60
WHEREFORE, PILTEL respectfully prays that judgment be rendered:
1. Annulling, reversing and setting aside the First and Second Assailed Resolutions;
2. Annulling, reversing and setting aside the Resolution of the trial court dated 13 November 2000 and the Order of the trial court dated 30 January 2001.
PILTEL likewise prays for such further or other relief as may be deemed just and equitable under the circumstances.61 (Emphasis supplied.)
2.1. Annul, reverse and set aside the Assailed Resolution dated 13 November 2000 and the assailed Order dated 30 January 2001, AND DENY SMARTNET'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
2.2 (a) Order the lower court to proceed with the trial on the merits of the case; or, in the alternative,
(b) dismiss the Complaint, and order SMARTNET to pay PILTEL:(i) PhP380,000,000.00, representing the balance of the purchase price for the Valgoson Property, plus interest until the same is fully paid;
(ii) PhP5,000,000.00, as moral damages;
(iii) PhP1,000,000.00, as exemplary damages; and
(iv) PhP1,000,000.00, as attorney's fees and costs of litigation."62 (Emphasis supplied.)
2. After due proceedings, judgment be rendered annulling, reversing and setting aside the Order of 23 April 2001 in so far as it grants execution pending appeal.63 (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, PILTEL respectfully prays that judgment be rendered as follows:
a. Annulling, reversing and setting aside (1) the Assailed Resolution dated 13 November 2000, (2) the First Assailed Order dated 23 April 2001, and (3) the Second Assailed Order dated 14 August 2001;
b. Remanding the case to the Trial Court and allow the parties to present evidence on their respective claims and defenses; and
c. Ordering SMARTNET to return the amount of Php131,795,836.38 to PILTEL, plus interest.
PILTEL likewise prays for such further or other relief just and equitable under the circumstances."64 (Emphasis supplied.)
Second, the Petition for Certiorari was superseded by the filing, before the Court of Appeals, of a subsequent appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57119, questioning the Resolution and the two Orders. In this light, there was no more reason for the CA to resolve the Petition for Certiorari.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that a petition for certiorari is available only when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for certiorari cannot coexist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. As the Court has held, these two remedies are "mutually exclusive."
In this case, the subsequent appeal constitutes an adequate remedy. In fact it is the appropriate remedy, because it assails not only the Resolution but also the two Orders.
It has been held that "what is determinative of the propriety of certiorari is the danger of failure of justice without the writ, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies." The Court is satisfied that the denial of the Petition for Certiorari by the Court of Appeals will not result in a failure of justice, for petitioner's rights are adequately and, in fact, more appropriately addressed in the appeal.
Third, petitioner's submission that the Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect is in fact an admission that the two actions are one and the same. Thus, in arguing that the reversal of the two interlocutory Orders "would likely result in the setting aside of the dismissal of petitioner's amended complaint," petitioner effectively contends that its Petition for Certiorari, like the appeal, seeks to set aside the Resolution and the two Orders.
Such argument unwittingly discloses a recourse to forum shopping, which has been held as "the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition." Clearly, by its own submission, petitioner seeks to accomplish the same thing in its Petition for Certiorari and in its appeal: both assail the two interlocutory Orders and both seek to set aside the RTC Resolution.
Hence, even assuming that the Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect because it would lead to the reversal of the Resolution dismissing the Complaint, it would still be denied on the ground of forum shopping.
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law. And there is grave abuse of discretion where the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. x x x.
As a legal recourse, the special civil action of certiorari is a limited form of review. The jurisdiction of this Court is narrow in scope; it is restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Indeed, as long as the courts below act within their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the exercise of their discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by an appeal or a petition for review.72
Petitioners maintain that the order granting partial summary judgment was merely interlocutory in nature and did not dispose of the action in its entirety. They cite the doctrines laid down in Province of Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals and Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, where the Court categorically stated that a partial summary judgment is not a final or appealable judgment.
Petitioners' position is untenable.
The rulings in Province of Pangasinan and Guevarra is not applicable in the case at bar. The said cases specifically delved on the appeal of a partial summary judgment, which did not dispose of all the reliefs sought in the complaint. In the case at bar, other than the admitted liability of petitioners to respondents under the contract growing agreement, all other reliefs sought under the complaint had already been expressly waived by respondent before the trial court. Accordingly, the assailed November 25, 1999 Order of the trial court which granted partial summary judgment in favor of respondent was in the nature of a final order which leaves nothing more for the court to adjudicate in respect to the complaint. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
Endnotes:
* Per Special Order No. 876 dated August 2, 2010.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring; rollo, pp. 77-82.
2 Rollo, pp. 220-224.
3 Id. at 271-272.
4 Id. at 83-85.
5 Id. at 111-114.
6 Id. at 114.
7 Id. at 115.
8 Id. at 170.
9 Id. at 117-132.
10 Id. at 397-412.
11 Id. at 202-219.
12 Id. at 224.
13 Id. at 225-245.
14 Id. at 451-481.
15 Id. at 246-270.
16 Id. at 507-511.
17 Id. at 512-519.
18 Id. at 273-320.
19 Id. at 1350-1370.
20 Id. at 563.
21 Id. at 520-534.
22 Id. at 1407-1432.
23 Id. at 535-537.
24 Id. at 579-580.
25 Id. at 542-578.
26 Id. at 538-541.
27 Id. at 1435-1437.
28 Id. at 1377-1390.
29 Id. at 586-589.
30 CA rollo, pp. 414-415.
31 Rolloi>, pp. 80-81.
32 Id. at 81.
33 Id. at 1438-1449.
34 Id. at 1464-1471.
35 Id. at 1489A-1492.
36 Id. at 608-618.
37 Id. at 1500-1503.
38 Id. at 1507.
39 Id. at 86-110.
40 Id. at 1533-1536.
41 Id. at 1540-1588.
42 Id. at 1589-1592.
43 Id. at 1654-1677.
44 Id. at 1537-1539.
45 Id. at 1539.
46 Id. at 1736-1740.
47 Id. at 668-669.
48 Id. at 670-673.
49 Id. at 1719-1725.
50 Id. at 83-84.
51 Id. at 38-40.
52 Id. at 2309-2326.
53 Id. at 290.
54 Id. at 298-299.
55 Id. at 680.
56 Id. at 719.
57 Id. at 51-53.
58 Id. at 291.
59 Id. at 308-311.
60 Id. at 729-732.
61 Id. at 69-70.
62 Id. at 316.
63 Id. at 616.
64 Id. at 736-737.
65 Santos v. Heirs of Dominga Lustre, G.R. No. 151016, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 120, 128; Briones v. Henson-Cruz, G.R. No. 159130, August 22, 2008, 563 SCRA 69, 84-85; Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation, G.R. No. 174971, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 154, 179-180; Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 157592, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 360, 375; Rural Bank of the Seven Lakes (S.P.C.), Inc. v. Dan, G.R. No. 174109, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 476, 485-486.
66 Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 159323, July 31, 2008, 560 SCRA 719, 734-736.
67 Rollo, pp. 2310-2316.oner. the same damage to petiti orddrs
68 Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company, Incorporated v. Valdez, G.R. No. 150107, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 455, 465.
69 393 Phil. 633, 640-642 (2000).
70 Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169498, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA 690, 700.
71 G.R. No. 124915, February 18, 2008, 546 SCRA 23, 32, citing Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 660, 667 (2000).
72 Apostol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141854, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 80, 92.
73 Supra note 69.
74 Rollo, pp. 2288-2290.
75 Estinozo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150276, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 422, 431; Macawiag v. Balindong, G.R. No. 159210, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 454, 465; Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 410, 420 (2005); People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 617.
76 457 Phil. 771, 782 (2003).
77 Rollo, pp. 1733-1734.
78 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1.