WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2004 and the Order dated March 16, 2004 of the RTC, Branch 56, Angeles City in Civil Case No. 10405 are hereby AFFIRMED.3
What matters most is the fact that the requirements for "Compulsory Acquisition" of private lands, especially the indispensable ones, to wit: (1) valuation of the subject property by the proper government agency which is the LBP; (2) DAR's "Notice of Land Valuation" to petitioner and; (3) most importantly, the deposit of the amount of land valuation in the name of petitioner after he rejected the said amount, were substantially complied with in the instant case.
Considering therefore that there was material and substantial compliance with the requirements for the "Compulsory Acquisition" of the subject land, the acquisition of the same is indubitably in order and in accordance with law.24
As the disputed property was eventually acquired through Compulsory Acquisition, its reconveyance to the petitioners was properly disallowed by the DAR. The certifications by other government agencies that the land was identified as a resettlement area [are] of no avail as the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.
x x x x
Indeed, it is to the best interest of the public that the litigation regarding the reconveyance of the disputed property between the same parties for the same grounds must come to an end, the matter having [been] already fully and fairly adjudicated by the DAR, this Court and the Supreme Court which had declined to disturb the judgment of this Court.26
A perusal of the record of this case as well as the evidence adduced by the parties shows that the facts required for the proper computation and/or determination of just compensation for the plaintiff's property i.e., land value of the property in accordance with the Listasaka, capitalized net income, comparable sales and market value pursuant to the corresponding tax declaration, are unavailable and insufficient.
WHEREFORE, for the Court to properly determine and fix the just compensation to be accorded to [respondent's] property, the reopening of this case for the purpose of the presentation of additional evidence is hereby ordered.
Let the reception of aforesaid additional evidence be set on April 22, 2003 at 8:30 am.
x x x x46
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the [respondent], Enrique Livioco, and against the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines with a determination that the just compensation of Livioco's property, consisting of 24.2088 hectares located at Mabalacat, Pampanga is worth Php700.00 per square meter.
Defendants Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines are, therefore, ordered to pay [respondent] the amount of Php700.00 per square meter multiplied by 24.2088 hectares representing the entire area taken by the government from the plaintiff.48
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. -- In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessments made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
LAND BANK's valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, that should make the final determination of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. Land Bank's valuation had to be substantiated during the hearing before it could be considered sufficient in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO No. x x x84
Endnotes:
* In lieu of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro per Special Order No. 884 dated September 1, 2010.
1 Rollo, pp. 57-64. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo Zenarosa.
2 Id. at 66.
3 CA Decision, p. 8; id. at 64.
4 Section 74, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3844, AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE (effective August 8, 1963), reads:
Section 74. Creation. - To finance the acquisition by the Government of landed estates for division and resale to small landholders, as well as the purchase of the landholding by the agricultural lessee from the landowner, there is hereby established a body corporate to be known as the "Land Bank of the Philippines," hereinafter called the "Bank," which shall have its principal place of business in Manila x x x
5 Section 64, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, READS:
Sec. 64. Financial Intermediary for the CARP. - The Land Bank of the Philippines shall be the financial intermediary for the CARP, and shall insure that the social justice objectives of the CARP shall enjoy a preference among its priorities.
6 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 155279-R.
7 Testimony of Enrique Livioco taken on October 17, 2002, p. 26.
8 CA rollo, p. 125.
9 Id.
10 Records, Vol. II, pp. 476-477.
11 Rules and Regulations Amending the Valuation of Lands Voluntarily Offered Pursuant to Executive Order No. 229 and Republic Act No. 6657 and those Compulsorily Acquired Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657.
12 Rules and Regulations Amending Certain Provisions of Administrative Order No. 17 which Governs the Valuation of Lands Voluntarily Offered Pursuant to Executive Order No. 229 and Republic Act No. 6657 and Compulsorily Acquired Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657.
13 Land Valuation Worksheet, CA rollo, pp. 158-162.
14 Livioco received the Notice of Land Valuation from DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa on August 8, 1991 (Id. at 129).
15 Livioco was informed by LBP's Land Valuation and Landowners Compensation Office on August 19, 1991 (Id. at 130).
16 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61529, p. 3; id. at 167.
17 On April 4, 1993.
18 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61529, p. 3; CA rollo, p. 167.
19 Exhibit 1, Defendant's Formal Offer of Exhibits, p. 3.
20 Enrique Livioco v. Department of Agrarian Reform, CA-G.R. SP No. 45486 (Plaintiff's Formal Offer of Evidence, p. 5). The TCT CLOA-Numbers do not appear on record. There is likewise no record showing the date when title was transferred to the Republic.
21 Sps. Enrique Livioco and Beatriz M. Livioco v. Department of Agrarian Reform, CA-G.R. SP No. 61529, p. 4; id. at 17.
22 Id. The relevant portions read:
"The DARAB decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 12, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45486 entitled "Enrique M. Livioco vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, et al."
The Court of Appeals' decision was then challenged before the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 133837 (Enrique Livioco vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, et al.) The Supreme Court however denied the petition in a Resolution dated July 6, 1998 for "failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case."
23 Enrique Livioco v. Department of Agrarian Reform, CA-G.R. SP No. 45486 (supra note 20 at 2-13). Penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
24 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 45486, p. 12; id. at 13.
25 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61529, p. 4; id. at 17.
26 Id. at 8-10; id. at 21-23. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Amelita G. Tolentino.
27 Exhibit "4," Defendant's Formal Offer of Exhibits, p. 7.
28 Exhibit "5;" id. at 10.
29 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-5.
30 Exhibit D-1, Plaintiff's Formal Offer of Evidence, p. 24.
31 Exhibit "E;" id. at 25.
32 Exhibit "F;" id. at 26.
33 Exhibit "G;" id. at 27.
34 Exhibit "I;" id. at 31.
35 Exhibit "K-1;" id. at 34.
36 Duplicate TSN Folder, Testimony of Franklin Olay dated October 17, 2002, pp. 34-39.
37 Exhibit "J," Plaintiff's Formal Offer of Evidence, p. 32.
38 Duplicate TSN Folder, Testimony of Franklin Olay dated October 17, 2002, pp. 36-38.
39 Exhibit L, Plaintiff's Formal Offer of Evidence, p. 36.
40 Records, Vol. I, p. 4.
41 Id. at 51-54.
42 Id. at 53.
43 Duplicate TSN Folder, Testimony of Teresie Pineda Garcia dated November 26, 2002, pp. 2-10.
44 Id. at 5.
45 Duplicate TSN Folder, Testimony of Alfredo B. Pandico dated November 26, 2002, pp. 11-17.
46 Records, Vol. I, p. 127.
47 Duplicate TSN Folder, Proceedings of July 10, 2003, pp. 2-5.
48 Records, Vol. I, pp. 191-196.
49 Id. at 197-207.
50 Id. at 245-248.
51 Id. at 261.
52 Id. at 283-284.
53 CA rollo, pp. 317-324.
54 CA Decision, p. 7; id. at 323.
55 Id. at 7-8; rollo, pp. 63-64.
56 Records, Vol. II, pp. 370-385.
57 Id. at 398.
58 Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 28; rollo, p. 333.
59 Id. at 34-37; id. at 339-342.
60 Id. at 32-35; id. at 337-340.
61 Id. at 21-22; id. at 326-327.
62 Id. at 23; id. at 328.
63 Id. at 24-28; id. at 329-333.
64 Respondent's Memorandum, pp. 12-14; id. at 360-362.
65 Id. at 15-17; id. at 363-365.
66 Id. at 17-22; id. at 363-370.
67 Id. at 23; id. at 371.
68 Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149621, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 590, 613.
69 Id.
70 Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214, 318-319.
71 CA rollo, p. 125.
72 CA-G.R. SP Nos. 61529 and 45486. Both cases also involve the parties herein, Livioco and the LBP, hence the factual and legal conclusions in these two decisions are binding on the two parties.
73 Section 65, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, reads:
Section 65. Conversion of Lands. - After the lapse of five years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
Executive Order No. 129-A, series of 1987, (Reorganization Act of the Department of Agrarian Reform) is also instructive on the matter:
Section 4. Mandate. The Department shall be responsible for implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and for such purpose, it is authorized to:
x x x x
k) Approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses;
x x x x
Section 5. Powers and Functions. Pursuant to the mandate of the Department, and in order to ensure the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, the Department is hereby authorized to:
x x x x
l) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by law;
x x x x
74 Section 20, Republic Act No. 7160, The Local Government Code:
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearing for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area, at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-Six fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as the "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law," shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
The case of Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 471, 478-483) explains the effect of reclassification and the necessity for conversion in this wise:
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from conversion.
x x x x
The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of conversion despite having undergone reclassification was underscored in the case of Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that reclassification of land does not suffice:
In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was merely reclassified. Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.
x x x x
The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The Code explicitly provides that "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
75 A DAR Conversion Clearance is no longer necessary when the LGUs expropriate agricultural lands for a public purpose (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993, 222 SCRA 173, 181). The expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs was further clarified by DAR in its Administrative Order No. 2, series of 2009, which reads:
17. Pursuant to Section 4 of RA 9700, an LGU may, through its Chief Executive and/or an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain on agricultural lands for public use, purpose or welfare of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation to agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) on these lands, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. The power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the ARBs, and such offer was not accepted. In cases where the land sought to be acquired has been issued with a Notice of Coverage or is already subject to voluntary offer to sell (with letter-offer submitted to the DAR) the concerned LGU shall suspend the exercise of its power of eminent domain until after the LAD process has been completed and the title to the property has been transferred to ARBs.
76 National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, 480 Phil. 470, 480 (2004).
77 Curata v. Philipppine Ports Authority, supra note 70 at 319.
78 Section 26, Republic Act No. 6657 reads:
Sec. 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. - Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in 30 annual amortizations at 6 percent interest per annum. The payments for the first three years after the award may be at reduced amounts as established by the PARC x x x
The LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded to the beneficiary; and this mortgage may be foreclosed by the LBP for non-payment of an aggregate of three annual amortizations. The LBP shall advise the DAR of such proceedings and the latter shall subsequently award the forfeited landholding to other qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land, as provided herein, has been foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently disqualified from becoming a beneficiary under this Act.
79 Duplicate TSN folder, Testimony of Enrique Livioco dated October 17, 2002, pp. 28-30.
80 While this case was pending, a supervening event occurred with the advent of RA 9700, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms (CARPER). In this new law which became effective on July 1, 2009, Congress saw fit to declare that "all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be computed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended." In turn, Section 17 of RA 6657 was amended to read as follows:
In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the value of the standing crop, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, the assessment made by government assessors, and seventy (70%) percent of the zonal valuation of the BIR, translated into a basic formula by the DAR shall be considered, subject to the final decision of the proper court. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. (Emphasized portions show the amendments.)
Pursuant to this authority, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 2, series of 2009, which provided in D(2) thereof that "all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowner shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended." In its transitory provisions in Chapter VI, however, the administrative order makes an exception to the application of the amended Section 17. It states: "x x x with respect to land valuation, all claim folders received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009 shall be valued in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA No. 9700."
Thus, the amended Section 17 has no retroactive effect insofar as the claim folders already received by LBP prior to the effectivity of RA 9700 are concerned. The prospective application of the amended provision is proper in order to avoid possibly prejudicing vested rights of parties.
In the case at bar, the claim folder was first forwarded by DAR to the LBP in 1990 and the amended claim folder must have been received by LBP before August 2001 (the date when they notified Livioco of the amended valuation). Since both dates of receipt occurred prior to July 1, 2009, it is Section 17 of RA 6657 that should control the challenged valuation.
81 Landbank of the Philippines v. Rufino, G.R. Nos. 175644 and 175702, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 399, 406-412; Landbank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, G.R. No. 175175, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 31, 39-41; Landbank of the Philippines v. Dizon, G.R. No. 160394, November 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 66, 76-78; Lee v. Landbank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170422, March 7, 2008, 548 SCRA 52, 59; Landbank of the Philippines v. Lim, G.R. No. 171941, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 129, 134; Allied Banking Corporation v. Landbank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175422, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 301, 311-312.
82 G.R. No. 165428, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 426, 439.
83 Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 68 at 611.
84 Landbank of the Philippines v. Luciano, supra note 82.
85 Landbank of the Philippines v. Dizon, supra note 81; Landbank of the Philippines v. Luciano, supra note 82; Allied Banking Corporation v. Landbank of the Philippines, supra note 81 at 319.
86 Landbank of the Philippines v. Dizon, supra note 81 at 80; Landbank of the Philippines v. Luciano, supra note 82 at 439-440; Allied Banking Corporation v. Landbank of the Philippines, supra note 81 at 319.
87 Defendant Land Bank of the Philippines' Formal Offer of Exhibits, pp. 1 and 6-8.
88 Landbank of the Philippines v. Luciano, supra note 82; Allied Banking Corporation v. Landbank of the Philippines, supra note 81 at 319.
89 Eusebio v. Luis, G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 576, 586-587, citing Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr. (G.R. No. 50147, August 3, 1990, 188 SCRA 300):
"The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara is that -
... where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., 'just not only to the individual whose property is taken,' but to the public, which is to pay for it."
Although there are agrarian cases which hold that just compensation should be valued at the "time of payment," (Office of the President v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 711, 716 (2001); Landbank of the Philippines v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 166777, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 181, 187; Landbank of the Philippines v. JL Jocson and Sons, G.R. No. 180803, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 373, 380-381) these decisions are not applicable in the case at bar. Said cases involved the issue of choosing between an earlier law (Presidential Decree No. 27, by which the property was acquired) and a later law (RA 6657, which was enacted while the issue of just compensation in these cases was still pending). The Court ruled that the seizure of the properties covered by PD No. 27 did not occur upon the effectivity of PD 27 but upon the actual payment of just compensation. Since the prevailing law at the time of payment was already RA 6657, the landowners have the right to be compensated under the new law. As aptly summarized in Landbank of the Philippines v. Natividad (G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 441, 451-452):
"Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. x x x"
Unlike the above-cited cases, Livioco's property was acquired and to be paid under only one law, i.e., RA 6657. There is no situation here which requires the Court to choose between the law prevailing at the time of acquisition and the law prevailing at the time of payment.
Since Livioco's property was acquired under RA 6657 and will be valued under RA 6657, the question regarding the "time of taking" should follow the general rule in expropriation cases where the "time of taking" is the time when the State took possession of the same and deprived the landowner of the use and enjoyment of his property.
90 Decision in CA-GR SP No. 45486, p. 4; Plaintiff's Formal Offer of Evidence, p. 5. The Court cannot consider September 20, 1991 (the date when LBP informed the Register of Deeds that it has earmarked the amount in favor of Livioco) as the date of taking because there is no indication on record that Livioco's title was cancelled and a new one issued in favor of the Republic on that date. What is clear from the records is the year when CLOAs were awarded, which conclusively shows an actual "taking" of Livioco's property.
91 A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or CA regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where: | LV | = | Land Value |
CNI | = | Capitalized Net Income | |
td> | CS | = | Comparable Sales |
MV | = | Market Value per Tax Declaration |
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant, and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x. 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2
In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2 exceed the lowest value of land within the same estate under consideration or within the same barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from receipt of claimfolder.
A.4 In all of the above, the computed value using the applicable formula shall in no case exceed the LOs offer in case of VOS.
The LOs offer shall be grossed up from the date of the offer up to the date of receipt of claimfolder by LBP from DAR for processing.
A.5 For purposes of this Administrative Order, the date of receipt of claimfolder by LBP from DAR shall mean the date when the claimfolder is determined by the LBP to be complete with all the required documents and valuation inputs duly verified and validated, and is ready for final computation/ processing.
A.6 The basic formula in the grossing-up of valuation inputs such as LOs offer, Sales Transaction (ST), Acquisition Cost (AC), Market Value Based on Mortgage (MVM) and Market Value per Tax Declaration (MV) shall be:
Grossed-up
Valuation Input = Valuation input x
Regional Consumer Price
Index (RCPI) Adjustment
Factor
x x x x
92 Landbank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, 464 Phil 83, 100 (2004); Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, supra note 70 at 358.
93 Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 727, 756 (1999); Landbank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 246, 257-258 (1995); Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 68 at 609-610.
94 Records, Vol. I, p. 261.
95 See Landbank of the Philippines v. Gallego, Jr., G.R. No. 173226, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 680, 694-695.
96 See Landbank of the Philippines v. Dizon, supra note 81 at 80; Allied Banking Corporation v. Landbank of the Philippines, supra note 81 at 319.
97 See Heirs of Lorenzo v. Landbank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166461, April 30, 2010. In this case, Agrarian Case No. 210632 was remanded to the Court of Appeals and was directed to submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within forty-five (45) days from notice of the Decision.