[Petitioner] x x x averred that [respondent] has committed serious violations of the security rules in the workplace. On January 31, 2004, he was charged with conduct unbecoming for which he was required to explain. Months after, he and four (4) other co-security guards failed to attend a mandatory seminar. For this, he was suspended for seven (7) days. On June 5, 2004, [respondent] displayed his discourteous and rude attitude upon his superior. He said to him in a high pitch of (sic) voice, "ano ba sir, personalan ba ito, sabihin mo lang kung ano gusto mo." On June 8, 2004, [petitioner] required him to explain why no disciplinary action should be meted against him.
Again, on January 22, 2005, seven security guards, including [respondent], were made to explain their failure to report for duty without informing the office despite the instruction during their formation day which was held a day before. On January 31, 2006, Roy Datiles, Detachment Commander, reported that [respondent] confronted and challenged him in a high pitch and on top of his voice rudely showing discourtesy and rudeness. Being his superior, Datiles recommended the relief of [respondent] in the detachment effective January 31, 2006. By order of the Operations Manager, he was relieved from his post at the Philippine Heart Center. He was directed to report to the office. On February 10, 2006, he got his cash bond and firearm deposit. Despite his voluntary resignation, [petitioner] sent him a letter through registered mail to report for the office and give information on whether or not he was still interested for report for duty or not. [Respondent] did not bother to reply. Neither did he report to the office.3
This office is of the view that [respondent] was constructively dismissed. [Petitioner's] defense that [respondent] voluntarily resigned on February 10, 2006 is unsubstantiated (Annex "G"). What appears on record is the pro-forma resignation dated 04 October 2004 (Annex "D") long before this complaint was filed. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the allegation. [Petitioner] failed to discharge the burden.
The general rule is that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation. The Supreme Court in Shie Jie Corp. vs. National Federation of Labor, G.R. No. 153148, July 15, 2005, held:"By vigorously pursuing the litigation of his action against petitioner, private respondent clearly manifested that he has no intention of relinquishing his employment which is, wholly incompatible [with] petitioner[']s assertion, that he voluntarily resigned."
In Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. vs. Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, Feb. 28, 2005, it was ruled that the execution of the alleged "resignation letters cum release and quitclaim" to support the employer's claim that respondents voluntarily resigned is unavailing as the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation.
Further it is significant to note that [respondent] was even required by [petitioner] to undergo a "Re-Training Course" conducted from February 20, 2006 to March 1, 2006 (Annex "F"). It is not only absurd but unbelievable that [respondent] who according to [petitioner] voluntarily resigned on February 10, 2006 and yet participated in the said "Re-Training Course" after his alleged resignation.
In this case, [respondent] was not posted since he was relieved from his post on January 30, 2006 until the filing of the instant complaint on August 2, 2006 or for a period of more than six (6) months. In Valdez vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 87, the Supreme Court held that, "However, it must be emphasized that such temporary activity should continue for six months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be held liable for constructive dismissal.
This office is in accord with [respondent's] argument that the letter sent to the latter to report for work is an absurdity considering [petitioner's] claim that [respondent] voluntarily resigned. x x x.4
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [respondent] to have been constructively dismissed. [Petitioner is] ordered to reinstate [respondent] to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits. Further, [petitioner] Nationwide Security & Allied Services, Inc. is ordered to pay [respondent] the following monetary awards[:]
- Backwages (see computation) 148, 125.00
- Prop. 13th Month Pay
1/06 - 1/30/06 = 97 mo.P450 x 30 x 1/12 x .97 1,091.25
TOTAL AWARD 149,216.25
x x x x
SO ORDERED.5
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED deleting the award of backwages and order of reinstatement. [Respondent] is directed to report immediately and [petitioner is] ordered to accept him. [Petitioner is] also ordered to pay his 13th month pay in the amount of P1,091.25 as ordered in the Decision.
SO ORDERED.7
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 27 March 2008 and 11 June 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division) in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-08-06365-06; NLRC CA NO. 051626-07 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 29 November 2006 of Labor Arbiter Enrique L. Flores, Jr. is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against [petitioner].
SO ORDERED.9
When a security guard is placed on a "floating status," he does not receive any salary or financial benefit provided by law. Due to the grim economic consequences to the employee, the employer should bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be assigned.12
It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases?
With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v. Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel involving the same parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute resolution dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d) no bearing" on the latter case because the two cases involved different subject matters as they were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.
Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.
Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 148680 and since petitioner's liability for DST on its health care agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the minute resolution in that case (which is not even binding precedent) in its favor.
It would have been illogical for herein petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said complaint.
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 46-63.
2 Id. at 68-69.
3 Id. at 156-157.
4 Id. at 110-112.
5 Id. at 114-115.
6 Id. at 155-159.
7 Id. at 158.
8 Supra note 1.
9 Id. at 63.
10 Supra note 2.
11 Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, G.R. No. 160940, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 110, 116-117.
br>12 Pido v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 169812, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 609, 616-617.
13 CRC Agricultural Trading v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 177664, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 138, 148.
14 Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506, 515 (2003).
15 BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. v. Aparecio, G.R. No. 153290, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 300, 313-314.
16 497 Phil. 621 (2005).
17 G.R. No. 177414, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 226.
18 Rollo, p. 221.
19 NLRC NCR 00-08-09249-04 (CA No. 046155-05); rollo, pp. 142-153.
20 Id. at 153.
21 G.R. No. 179206, September 26, 2007.
22 G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 413, 446-447.
23 349 Phil. 760, 767 (1998).
24 Soliman Security Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 433 Phil. 902, 910 (2002); Valdez v. NLRC, supra, at 765-766; Superstar Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81493, April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 74, 77.
25 ART. 279. Security of Tenure. ” In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
26 Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, supra note 11, at 118-119.