Private respondent Geraldine L. Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional Health Care Representative since 1 August 1992. Sometime in April 2003, Velasco had a medical work up for her high-risk pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which resulted in her extending her leave of absence. Velasco filed her sick leave for the period from 26 March to 18 June 2003, her vacation leave from 19 June to 20 June 2003, and leave without pay from 23 June to 14 July 2003.
On 26 June 2003, while Velasco was still on leave, PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager, herein petitioner Ferdinand Cortez, personally served Velasco a "Show-cause Notice" dated 25 June 2003. Aside from mentioning about an investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding "unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks" and instructing her to submit her explanation on the matter within 48 hours from receipt of the same, the notice also advised her that she was being placed under "preventive suspension" for 30 days or from that day to 6 August 2003 and consequently ordered to surrender the following "accountabilities;" 1) Company Car, 2) Samples and Promats, 3) CRF/ER/VEHICLE/SOA/POSAP/MPOA and other related Company Forms, 4) Cash Card, 5) Caltex Card, and 6) MPOA/TPOA Revolving Travel Fund. The following day, petitioner Cortez together with one Efren Dariano retrieved the above-mentioned "accountabilities" from Velasco's residence.
In response, Velasco sent a letter addressed to Cortez dated 28 June 2003 denying the charges. In her letter, Velasco claimed that the transaction with Mercury Drug, Magsaysay Branch covered by her check (no. 1072) in the amount of P23,980.00 was merely to accommodate two undisclosed patients of a certain Dr. Renato Manalo. In support thereto, Velasco attached the Doctor's letter and the affidavit of the latter's secretary.
On 12 July 2003, Velasco received a "Second Show-cause Notice" informing her of additional developments in their investigation. According to the notice, a certain Carlito Jomen executed an affidavit pointing to Velasco as the one who transacted with a printing shop to print PFIZER discount coupons. Jomen also presented text messages originating from Velasco's company issued cellphone referring to the printing of the said coupons. Again, Velasco was given 48 hours to submit her written explanation on the matter. On 16 July 2003, Velasco sent a letter to PFIZER via Aboitiz courier service asking for additional time to answer the second Show-cause Notice.
That same day, Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch. The following day, 17 July 2003, PFIZER sent her a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing to be held on 22 July 2003. Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of the said letter that she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the July 22 hearing "can be tackled during the hearing of her case" or at the preliminary conference set for 5 and 8 of August 2003. She likewise opted to withhold answering the Second Show-cause Notice. On 25 July 2003, Velasco received a "Third Show-cause Notice," together with copies of the affidavits of two Branch Managers of Mercury Drug, asking her for her comment within 48 hours. Finally, on 29 July 2003, PFIZER informed Velasco of its "Management Decision" terminating her employment.
On 5 December 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of Velasco illegal, ordering her reinstatement with backwages and further awarding moral and exemplary damages with attorney's fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the same but deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages.5
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainant was illegally dismissed. Respondents are ordered to reinstate the complainant to her former position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages and to pay the complainant the following:
- Full backwages (basic salary, company benefits, all allowances as of December 5, 2003 in the amount of P572,780.00);
- 13th Month Pay, Midyear, Christmas and performance bonuses in the amount of P105,300.00;
- Moral damages of P50,000.00;
- Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00;
- Attorney's Fees of 10% of the award excluding damages in the amount of P67,808.00.
The total award is in the amount of P758,080.00.6
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal and the motion praying for the deposit in escrow of complainant's payroll reinstatement are hereby denied and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is affirmed with the modification that the award of moral and exemplary damages is deleted and attorney's fees shall be based on the award of 13th month pay pursuant to Article III of the Labor Code.8
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the NLRC dated 20 October 2004 as well as its Resolution of 14 December 2004 is hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Having found the termination of Geraldine L. Velasco's employment in accordance with the two notice rule pursuant to the due process requirement and with just cause, her complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby DISMISSED.10
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the dismissal of private respondent Geraldine Velasco is AFFIRMED, but petitioner PFIZER, INC. is hereby ordered to pay her the wages to which she is entitled to from the time the reinstatement order was issued until November 23, 2005, the date of promulgation of Our Decision.11
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for raising substantially factual issues.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiter's decision ordering her reinstatement until November 23, 2005, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velasco's dismissal valid.13
The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of the Court.15 (Emphases supplied.)
The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by the Labor Arbiter] for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 [including the issuance of a writ of execution] were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the light of the purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be prevented. x x x In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under Republic Act No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. x x x23 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Dear Ms. Velasco:
Please be informed that, pursuant to the resolutions dated 20 October 2004 and 14 December 2004 rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission and the order dated 24 May 2005 issued by Executive Labor Arbiter Vito C. Bose, you are required to report for work on 1 July 2005, at 9:00 a.m., at Pfizer's main office at the 23rd Floor, Ayala Life-FGU Center, 6811 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, Metro Manila.
Please report to the undersigned for a briefing on your work assignments and other responsibilities, including the appropriate relocation benefits.
For your information and compliance.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Ma. Eden Grace Sagisi
Labor and Employee Relations Manager24
It is well-settled that when a person is illegally dismissed, he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. In the event, however, that reinstatement is no longer feasible, or if the employee decides not be reinstated, the employer shall pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Such a rule is likewise observed in the case of a strained employer-employee relationship or when the work or position formerly held by the dismissed employee no longer exists. In sum, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement if viable or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and (2) backwages.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Anent the directive of the NLRC in its September 3, 1994 Decision ordering Citibank "to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the date it reinstated complainant in the payroll (computed at P60,000.00 a month, as found by the Labor Arbiter) up to and until the date of this decision," the Court hereby cancels said award in view of its finding that the dismissal of Genuino is for a legal and valid ground.
Ordinarily, the employer is required to reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code, which states:
x x x x
If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund.
Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision.34 (Emphases supplied.)
On this score, the Court's attention is drawn to seemingly divergent decisions concerning reinstatement pending appeal or, particularly, the option of payroll reinstatement. On the one hand is the jurisprudential trend as expounded in a line of cases including Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora, while on the other is the recent case of Genuino v. National Labor Relations Commission. At the core of the seeming divergence is the application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code x x x.x x x x
The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:
x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.
The opposite view is articulated in Genuino which states:If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries [he] received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from [his] employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund.
Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
It has thus been advanced that there is no point in releasing the wages to petitioners since their dismissal was found to be valid, and to do so would constitute unjust enrichment.
Prior to Genuino, there had been no known similar case containing a dispositive portion where the employee was required to refund the salaries received on payroll reinstatement. In fact, in a catena of cases, the Court did not order the refund of salaries garnished or received by payroll-reinstated employees despite a subsequent reversal of the reinstatement order.
The dearth of authority supporting Genuino is not difficult to fathom for it would otherwise render inutile the rationale of reinstatement pending appeal.
x x x x
x x x Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family.36
Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the mundane realities of human experience, the "refund doctrine" easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a dismissed employee. The employee, to make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a final unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of insolvency.
Advisably, the sum is better left unspent. It becomes more logical and practical for the employee to refuse payroll reinstatement and simply find work elsewhere in the interim, if any is available. Notably, the option of payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer, even if the employee is able and raring to return to work. Prior to Genuino, it is unthinkable for one to refuse payroll reinstatement. In the face of the grim possibilities, the rise of concerned employees declining payroll reinstatement is on the horizon.
Further, the Genuino ruling not only disregards the social justice principles behind the rule, but also institutes a scheme unduly favorable to management. Under such scheme, the salaries dispensed pendente lite merely serve as a bond posted in installment by the employer. For in the event of a reversal of the Labor Arbiter's decision ordering reinstatement, the employer gets back the same amount without having to spend ordinarily for bond premiums. This circumvents, if not directly contradicts, the proscription that the "posting of a bond [even a cash bond] by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement."
In playing down the stray posture in Genuino requiring the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries in case a final decision upholds the validity of the dismissal, the Court realigns the proper course of the prevailing doctrine on reinstatement pending appeal vis-á -vis the effect of a reversal on appeal.
x x x x
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. x x x.37 (Emphasis supplied.)
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 42-44.
2 Id. at 65-66.
3 Id. at 307-323; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring.
4 Id. at 187-201.
5 Id. at 307-310.
6 Id. at 201.
7 Id. at 234-248; penned by NLRC Commissioner Ernesto C. Verceles with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Tito F. Genilo, concurring.
8 Id. at 247.
9 Id. at 265-266.
10 Id. at 322-323.
11 Id. at 43.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 175122), p. 238.
13 Id. at 403.
14 449 Phil. 437 (2003).
15 Id. at 446.
16 Rollo, pp. 394-415.
17 Id. at 405.
18 G.R. Nos. 142732-33 and 142753-54, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 342.
19 Rollo, p. 411.
20 Id. at 304.
21 345 Phil. 1057 (1997).
22 In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
23 Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 21 at 1075-1076.
24 Rollo, p. 304.
25 Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 143219, November 28, 2006, 508 SCRA 346, 352.
26 Norkis Trading Co., Inc. v. Gnilo, G.R. No. 159730, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 279, 289.
27 Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138379, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 84, 95.
28 Rollo, pp. 305-306.
29 495 Phil. 140 (2005).
30 Id. at 159.
31 F.R.F. Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 313 Phil. 493, 502 (1995).
32 Golden Ace Builders v. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010.
33 Supra note 18.
34 Id. at 363-364.
35 G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 479.
36 Id. at 488-491.
37 Id. at 491-493.