At the core of the controversy are several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares) which from part of a larger expanse with an area of 372 hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Originally owned by the MAnila Golf and Country Club, he property was aquired by the [herein repondent EMRASON] in 1965 for the purpose of developing the same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes".
Sometime in 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2264, otherwise known as the "Loval Autonomy Act", enacteed Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter referred to as Ordinance No. 1, enitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."
In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an authority to convert and development its aforementioned 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision, ataching to the apllication detailed development plans and development proposals from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel Corporation. Acting thereon the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A (Ordinance "No. 29-A, for brevity), approving [EMRASON's] application. Ordinance No. 29-A pertinently reads:"Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to approve the application for subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two (372) Hectares situated in Barrios Bocal and Langkaan, named as Traveller's Life Homes.
Resolved that the Municipal Ordinance regarding subdivision regulations existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed by the subdivision ".
Subsequently, [EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to proceed with property development.
It appears, however, that the actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay owing to the confluence of events. Among these was the fact that the property in question was then mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation.
On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution.
On September 23, 1988, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite addressed a letter to [EMRASON], stating in part, as follows:"In reply to your letter of June 2, 1988, we wish to clarify that the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite, has approved the development of your property situated in Barrios Bukal and Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with a total area of 3 72 hectares, more or less, into residential, industrial, commercial and golf course project.
This conversion conforms with the approved Development Plan of the Municipality of Dasmariñas Cavite ".
Then came the Aquino government's plan to convert the tenanted neighboring property of the National Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate to be managed through a joint venture scheme by NDC and the Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall conversion package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to remain at the NDC property, with three (3) hectares each. However, the size of the NDC property turned out to be insufficient for both the demands of the proposed industrial project as well as the government's commitment to the tenant-farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was thus tasked with acquiring additional lands from the nearby areas. The DAR earmarked for this purpose the subject property of [EMRASON].
On August 29, 1990, then OAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew protest from [EMRASON]. All told, these notices covered 303.38545 hectares of land situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite owned by [EMRASON].
In the meantime, [EMRASON] filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, separate petitions to nullify the first three sets of the above notices. Collectively docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92, these petitions were subsequently referred to the Office of the Regional Director, Region IV, which had jurisdiction thereon. In his referral action, the Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator directed the DAR Region IV, through its Operations Division, to conduct a hearing and/or investigation lo determine whether or not the subject property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition.
Forthwith, the DAR regional office conducted an on-site inspection of the subject property.
In the course of the hearing, during which [EMRASON] offered Exhibits :'A" to "UU-2" as documentary evidence, [EMRASON] received another set of notices of acquisition. As lo be expected, [EMRASON] again protested.
On August 28, 1992, the Legal Division of DAR, Region IV, through Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, rendered a decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property covered thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, as follows;''WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing x x x, considering that the notices of acquisition dated August 29, 1990 relative to the 39 hectares partly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19298; notices of acquisition all dated April 3, 1991 relative to the 131.41975 hectares partly covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. x x x; notices of acquisition all dated August 28, 1991 relative lo the 56.9201 hectares covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. x x x; and notices of acquisition all dated May 15, 1992 relative to the 76.0456 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. xx, all located at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite and owned by petitioner EM RAMOS and SONS, INC. are null and void on the ground that the subject properties are exempted from CARP coverage pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, therefore, the aforesaid notices of acquisition be cancelled and revoked. "
The DOJ Opinion adverted to, rendered by then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.
On September 3, 1992, the Region IV DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to the Office of the Agrarian Reform Secretary, it being his view that Hearing Officer Baguilat's decision ran contrary to the department's official position "to pursue the coverage of the same properties and its eventual distribution to qualified beneficiaries particularly the Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of the government to deliver to them the balance of thirty-nine hectares x x x".
On January 6, 1993, the herein respondent DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao [(DAR Secretary Garilao)] issued an order, the decretal portion of which partly reads:"WHEREFORE, in the interest of law and justice, an order is hereby rendered:
1. Affirming the Notices of Acquisition dated August 29, 1990, April 3, 1991, August 28, 1991 and May 15, 1992 covering 303.38545 hectares of the property owned by the E.M. RAMOS & SONS, INC, located at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite x x x;
x x x x
3. Directing the OAR field officials concerned to pursue (he coverage under RA 6657 of the properties of E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. for which subject Notices of Acquisition had been issued.
SO ORDERED".
Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied by the [DAR Secretary Garilao] in his subsequent order of January 6, 1993, [EMRASON] appealed to the Office of the President where the recourse was docketed as O.P. Case No. 5461.
On February 7, 1996, the Office of the President, through herein respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona [(Deputy Executive Secretary Corona)], rendered the herein assailed decision x x x, dismissing [EMRASON's] appeal on the strength of the following observation:"To recapitulate, this Office holds that [EMRASON's] property has remained AGRICULTURAL in classification and therefore falls within the coverage of the CARP, on the basis of the following:br>
- [EMRASON] failed to comply with the mandatory requirements and conditions of Municipal Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, specifically, among others, the need for approval of the National Planning Commission through the Highway District Engineer, and the Bureau of Lands before final submission to the Municipal Council and Municipal Mayor;
- [EMRASON] failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 152, dated December 16, 1968, and
- The certification of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) in 1981 and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB) in 1992 that the property of [EMRASON] is agricultural".
Undaunted, [EMRASON] interposed a motion for reconsideration, followed later by another motion whereunder it invited attention to legal doctrines involving land conversion recently enunciated by no less than the Office of the President itself.
On May 14, 1996, the [Deputy Executive Secretary Corona] came out with his second challenged issuance denying [EMRASON's] aforementioned motion for reconsideration x x x.5
For one, whether or not the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite had in place in the early seventies a general subdivision plan is to us of no moment. The absence of such general plan at that time cannot be taken, for the nonce, against the [herein respondent EMRASON]. To our mind, the more weighty consideration is the accomplished fact that the municipality, conformably with its statutory-conferred local autonomy, had passed a subdivision measure, I.e., Ordinance No. 1, and had approved in line thereto, through the medium of Ordinance No. 29-A, [EMRASON's] application for subdivision, or with like effect approved the conversion/classification of the lands in dispute as residential. Significantly, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite, in his letter of September 23, 1988 to [EMRASON], clarified that such conversion conforms with the approved development plan of the municipality.
For another, the requirement prescribed by the cited Section 16[a] of Ordinance No. 1 relates to the approval in the first instance by the National Planning Commission of the final plat of the scheme of the subdivision, not the conversion from agricultural to residential itself. As [EMRASON] aptly puts it:"x x x the final plat or final plan, map or chart of the subdivision is not a condition sine qua non for the conversion x x x as the conversion was already done by the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite. Municipal Ordinance NO. 29-A merely required that the final plat, or final plan x x x of the subdivision be done in conformity with Municipal Ordinance No. 1, the same to be followed by (he subdivision itself. [EMRASON] therefore did not have to undertake the immediate actual development of the subject parcel of lands as the same had already been converted and declared residential by law. x x x " (Petition, pp. 17 and 18).
[EMRASON's] pose has the merit of logic. As may be noted, Ordinance No. 29-A contained two (2) resolutory portions, each interrelated to, but nonetheless independent of, the other. The first resolution, reading -"Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to approve the application for subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two (372) Hectares situated in Barrios Bocal and Langkaan, named as Travellers Life Homes "
approved the application for subdivision or the conversion of the 372-hectare area into residential, while the second, reading -"Resolved that the Municipal Ordinance regarding subdivision regulations existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed by the subdivision "
provides that the subdivision owner/developer shall follow subdivision regulations, it will be noted further that the second resolution already referred to the [EMRASON's] property as "'subdivision", suggesting that the Municipal Council already considered as of that moment [EMRASON's] area to be for residential use.
Another requirement which [EMRASON] allegedly failed to comply with is found in Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 152, series of 1968, which pertinently provides -"1. All Municipal Boards or City Councils, and all Municipal Councils in cities and municipalities in which a subdivision ordinance is in force, shall submit three copies of every proposed subdivision plan for which approval is sought together with the subdivision ordinance, to the National Planning Commission for comment and recommendation ".
This Court is at a loss to understand how [EMRASON] could be expected to heed a directive addressed to local government legislative bodies. From a perusal of the title of A.O. No. 152, it is at once obvious from whom it exacts compliance with its command, thus: "REQUIRING THE MUNICIPAL BOARDS OR CITY COUNCILS AND MUNICIPAL COUNCILS TO SUBMIT PROPOSED ORDINANCES AND SUBDIVISION PLANS TO THE NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION, BEFORE TAKING ACTION ON THE SAME, AND TO FORWARD A COPY OF THEIR APPROVED SUBDIVISION ORDINANCES TO THE SAID COMMISSION".
To be sure, [EMRASON] cannot be made to bear the consequences for the non-compliance, if this be the case, by the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite with what A.O. 152 required. A converse proposition would be antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play.11
Foregoing considered, this Court holds that everything needed to validly effect the conversion of the disputed area to residential had been accomplished. The only conceivable step yet to be taken relates to the obtention of a conversion order from the DAR, or its predecessor, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR.) under its rather intricate procedure established under Memorandum Circular No. 11-79. But then, this omission can hardly prejudice the [herein respondent EMRASON] for the DAR7MAR guidelines were promulgated only in 1979, at which time the conversion of [EMRASON's] property was already a fait accompli.
Like the conversion procedure set up under Memorandum Circular No. 11-79, the revised methodology under the CARL cannot also be made to apply retroactively to lands duly converted/classified as residential under the aegis of the Local Autonomy Act. For, as a rule, a statute is not intended to affect transactions which occurred before it becomes operational (Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, Vol. I, 1983 ed.; p. 23). And as the landmark case of Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 225 SCRA 278, teaches:"Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectively of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR x x x.
x x x x
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is hound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the underdeveloped portions x x x within the coverage of CARL".
It may be so, as the assailed decision stated, that in Natalia the lands therein involved received a locational clearance from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB, formerly the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission [HSRC], as residential or commercial, a factor [EMRASON] cannot assert in its favor. This dissimilarity, however, hardly provides a compelling justification not to apply the lessons of Natalia. This is because the property involved in this case, unlike that in Natalia, underwent classification/conversion before the creation on May 13, 1976 of the HSRC, then known as the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (P.D. No. 933). Furthermore, what is recognized as the HSRC's authority to classify and to approve subdivisions and comprehensive land use development plans of local governments devolved on that agency only upon its reorganization on February 7, 1981, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 648 known as the Charter of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Section 5 of the same executive order invested the HSRC with the above classifying and approving authority. In fine, the property of [EMRASON] went into the process of conversion at the time when the intervention thereon of the HSRC, which was even then non-existent, was unnecessary. Shortly before the creation of the HSRC, it would appear that to provincial, city, or municipal councils/boards, as the case may be, belong the prerogative, albeit perhaps not exclusive, to classify private lands within their respective territorial jurisdiction and approve their conversion from agricultural to residential or other non-agricultural uses. To paraphrase the holding in Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 554, once a local government has, pursuant to its police power, reclassified an area as residential, that determination ought to prevail and must be respected.12
It is worthy to note that the CARL defines "agricultural lands" as "lands devqtedto agricultural activity x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial lands" (Sec. 3[c]). Guided by this definition, it is clear that [herein respondent EMRASON's] area does not fall under the category of agricultural lands. For, let alone the reality that the property is not devoted to some agricultural activity, being in fact unirrigated, and, as implied in the decision of the DAR Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, without duly instituted tenants, the same had been effectively classified as residential. The bare circumstance of its not being actually developed as subdivision or that it is underdeveloped would not alter the conclusion. For, according to Natalia, what actually determines the applicability of the CARL to a given piece of land is its previous classification and not its current use or stages of development as non-agricultural property.
As a pragmatic consideration, the disputed area, in terms of its location in relation to existing commercial/industrial sites and its major economic use, is more suitable for purposes other than agriculture. In this connection, this Court notes that the property is situated at the heart of the CALABARZON, and, as Annex "C" of the petition demonstrates, lies adjacent to huge industrial/commercial complexes. The San Miguel-Monterey meat plant, the NDC-Marubeni complex and the Reynolds Aluminum plant may be mentioned. For sure, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite, obviously cognizant of the economic potential of certain areas in the Municipality of Dasmariñas has, by Resolution No. 105, series of 1988. declared defined tracts of lands in the Municipality of Dasmariñas as "industrial-residential-institutional mix."13
As a final consideration, we will address the [herein petitioners] OAR Secretary's and Buklod's joint concern regarding the propriety of the preliminary injunction issued in this case. They alleged that the issuance is violative of Section 55 of the CARL which reads:"SEC. 55. No Restraining Order or Preliminary
Injunction. - No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated agencies in any case, dispute, controversy arising from, necessary to, or in connection with the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform". (Underscoring added.)
As will be noted, the aforequoted section specifically mentions the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) of which the DAR Secretary is the Vice Chairman, or any of its duly designated agencies as protected from an injunctive action of any court. These agencies include the PARC Executive Committee, the PARC Secretariat, which the DAR Secretary heads, and. on the local level, the different Agrarian Reform Action Committees (Sees. 41 to 45, R.A. No. 6657).
From the records, there is no indication that the [petitioner] Agrarian Reform Secretary acted vis-á-vis the present controversy for, or as an agency of, the PARC. Hence, he cannot rightfully invoke Section 55 of the CARL and avail himself of the protective mantle afforded by that provision. The PARC, it bears to stress, is a policy-formulating and coordinating body (Sec. 18. E.O. 229, July 22, 1987) without express adjudicatory mandate, unlike the DAR Secretary who, as department head, is "vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" (Sec. 50. R.A. 6657). Thus, it is easy lo accept the proposition that the [petitioner] Agrarian Reform Secretary issued his challenged orders in the exercise of his quasi-judicial power as department head.14
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the challenged decision dated February 7, 1996 and the resolution of May 14, 1996 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5461 are hereby NULLIFIED, VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the notices of acquisition issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform covering the 372-hectare property of the [herein respondent EMRASON] at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite declared VOID.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on September 30, 1996 is hereby made permanent.15
1] THE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE INVOKED BY [EMRASON] AS CONVERSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION ENACTED ON JULY 9, 1972 BY THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE IS IMPOTENT BECAUSE THE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE IMPOSED CONDITIONS WHICH [EMRASON] NEVER COMPLIED. NO COMPLIANCE NO CONVERSION.
2] AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED ORDINANCE WAS ENACTED, A LAND REFORM LAW WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT GRANTING SECURITY OF TENURE TO THE FARMERS SO THAT A LANDOWNER CANNOT ARBITRARILY CONVERT AN AGRICULTURAL LAND INTO A DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS (R.A. 3844).
3] A MERE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE CANNOT NEGATE LAND REFORM RIGHTS GRANTED TO THE FARMERS BY LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT UNDER R.A. 3844 AND SUBSEQUENT LAWS. LAND REFORM LAW BEING A SOCIAL LEGISLATION IS PARAMOUNT.
4] LAND REFORM IS A CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE LANDLESS FARMERS SO THAT THE LAND REFORM LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AND APPLIED IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF RELIEVING THE FARMERS FROM THEIR POVERTY AND BONDAGE. THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THIS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO FAVOR THE LANDLORD [EMRASON].
5] THE COURT OF APPEALS ISSUED A RESTRAINING ORDER/INJUNCTION AGAINST THE CLEAR PROHIBITION IN THE CARL (SEC. 55 RA 6657) AND SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF BY REFUSING TO GRANT THE PETITIONER FARMERS A HEARING INSPITE OF THE PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY RA 7902 (SEC. ]).17
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE, WAS AUTHORIZED, UNDER THE LOCAL AUTONOMY ACT, TO CLASSIFY AND/OR RECLASSIFY LANDS CONSIDERING THAT WHAT WAS CONFERRED THEREUNDER WAS ONLY ZONING AUTHORITY, THUS, RENDER THE EXERCISE THEREOF BY THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE, ULTRA VIRES;II.
EVEN ASSUMING, IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI, THAT THE AUTHORITY TO CLASSIFY AND RECLASSIFY LANDS IS POSSESSED BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, STILL THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE ALLEGED PASSAGE OF ORDINANCE NO. 29-A OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE, AS A VALID MEASURE RECLASSIFYING SUBJECT AGRICULTURAL LAND TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USE CONSIDERING THAT THE SAID APPROVAL OF THE SUBDIVISION, PER LETTER OF THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, FAILED TO COMPLY WITH EXISTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE MATTER AND, THEREFORE, NONCOMPLYING AND INEFFECTUAL; ANDIII.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE NATALIA REALTY CASE DUE TO SUBSTANTIAL DISSIMILARITY IN FACTUAL SETTING AND MILIEU.18
SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national land use plan shall be instituted by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), in accordance with the Local Government Code, for the purpose of properly identifying and classifying farmlands within one (1) year from effectivity of this /Vet. without prejudice to the implementation of the land acquisition and distribution." (Emphases supplied.)
SEC. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city councils and municipal and regularly organized municipal district councils. - x x x
x x x x
Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. ” Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning. (Emphases supplied.)
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations" for the municipality. Clearly, the law docs not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter oi' fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding x x x."25 (Emphases supplied.)
The appellant argues that Ordinance No. 1 is a zoning ordinance which the Municipal Council is authorized to adopt. McQuillin in his treaties on Municipal Corporations (Volume 8, 3rd ed.) says:Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. It is comprehensive where it is governed by a single plan for the entire municipality and prevails throughout the municipality in accordance with that plan. It is partial or limited where it is applicable only to a certain part of the municipality or to certain uses. Fire limits, height districts and building regulations are forms of partial or limited zoning or use regulation that are antecedents of modern comprehensive zoning, (pp. 11-12.)
The term "zoning," ordinarily used with the connotation of comprehensive or general zoning, refers to governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. This regulation must and does utilize classification of uses within districts as well as classification of districts, inasmuch as it manifestly is impossible to deal specifically with each of the innumerable uses made of land and buildings. Accordingly, (zoning has been defined as the confining of certain classes of buildings and uses to certain localities, areas, districts or zones.) It has been stated that zoning is the regulation by districts of building development and uses of property, and that the term "zoning" is not only capable of this definition but has acquired a technical and artificial meaning in accordance therewith. (Zoning is the separation of the municipality into districts and the regulation of buildings and structures within the districts so created, in accordance with their construction, and nature and extent of their use. It is a dedication of districts delimited to particular uses designed to subserve the general welfare.) Numerous other definitions of zoning more or less in accordance with these have been given in the cases, (pp. 27-28.)28
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another. (Emphasis supplied.)
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion, x x x. (Italics supplied.)
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearing for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (X) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
(d) When approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657. (Emphases supplied.)
SEC. 12. Rules for the interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act. -
1. Implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist.
2. The general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of doubt so as to give more power to local governments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare and material progress of the people in the community.
3. Vested rights existing at the time of the promulgation of this law arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other, should be governed by the original terms and provisions of the same, and in no case would this act infringe existing rights.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" and "Salus populi est suprema lex" Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as arc those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, el al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., p. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, el al. vs. IAC, supra).
x x x x
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safely, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.33 (Emphases supplied.)
a. Final plat of subdivision - As essential requirements before a subdivision is accepted for verification by the Bureau of Lands, the final plat of the scheme of the subdivision must comply with the provision of this ordinance. Application for plat approval shall be submitted to the Municipal Mayor and shall be forwarded to the National Planning Commission thru the Highway District Engineer for comment and/or recommendations, before action is taken by the Municipal Council. The final approval of the plat shall be made by the Municipal Mayor upon recommendation of the Municipal Council by means of a resolution. (Emphasis supplied.)
Resolved, As it is hereby Resolved to approve the application for subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two Hectares (372) situated in barrio Bocal and Langkaan, named as Travellers Life Homes.37 (Efriphasis supplied.)
Resolved, that this municipal ordinance regarding subdivision regulations existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed by the subdivision.38 (Emphases supplied.)
b. Review, evaluate and approve or disapprove comprehensive land use development plans and zoning ordinances of local government; and the zoning component of civil works and infrastructure projects of national, regional and local governments; subdivisions, condominiums or estate development projects including industrial estates, of both the public and private sectors and urban renewal plans, programs and projects: Provided, that the land use Development Plans and Zoning Ordinances of Local Governments herein subject to review, evaluation and approval of the commission shall respect the classification of public lands for forest purposes as certified by the Ministry of Natural Resources: Provided, further, that the classification of specific alienable and disposable lands by the Bureau of Lands shall be in accordance with the relevant zoning ordinance of: Local government where it exists; and provided, finally, that in cities and municipalities where there are as yet no zoning ordinances, the Bureau of Lands may dispose of specific alienable and disposable lands in accordance with its own classification scheme subject to the condition that the classification of these lands may be subsequently change by the local governments in accordance with their particular zoning ordinances which may be promulgated later. (Emphases supplied.)
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law."All right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J.S. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount, 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).47 (Emphasis supplied.)
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to Ihose already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people, x x x.48
Tracts of land in the Municipality of Carmona from the People's Technology Complex to parts of the Municipality of Silang, parts of the Municipalities of Dasmariñas, General Trias, Trece Martires City, Municipalities of Tanza and Naic forming the strip of land traversed by the Puerto Azul Road extending two kilometers more or less from each side of the road which are hereby declared as industrial-residential-institutional mix. (Emphases supplied.)
The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's decision was based on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes as residential. It is our considered view, however, that a tax declaration is not conclusive of (he nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-á-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes.
xxxx
The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial or C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose," as gleaned from Ordinance No. 363.52 (Emphases supplied.)
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" arc only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continue to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace, x x x The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the eifectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent OAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined ''agricultural land" thus -"x x x Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (BLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use."
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657." Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.53 (Emphases supplied.)
Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Acl No. 6657. agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as industrial land. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land by the following administrative agencies: (a) the Bureau of Lands, when it approved the subdivision plan of the property consisting of 728 subdivision lots; (b) the National Planning Commission which approved the subdivision plan subdivided by the LDC/CAI for the development of the property into a low-cost housing project; (c) the Municipal Council of Carmona, Cavite, when it approved Kapasiyahang Blg. 30 on May 30, 1976; (d) Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. Estrella, on July 3, 1979, when he granted the application of the respondent for the development of the Hakone Housing Project with an area of 35.80 hectares upon the recommendation of the Agrarian Reform Team, Regional Director of Region IV, which found, after verification and investigation, that the property was not covered by P.D. No. 27, it being untenanted and not devoted to the production of palay/or corn and that the property was suitable for conversion to residential subdivision: (e) by the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development; (f) the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission which issued a location clearance, development permit, Certificate of Inspection and License to Sell to the LDC/private respondent: and, (g) the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board which also issued to the respondent CAI/LDC a license to sell the subdivision lots." (Emphases supplied.)
Lands already classified and identified as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15, 1988 - the date of effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) - are outside the coverage of this law. Therefore, they no longer need any conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).58
We cannot likewise overlook the decision of the trial court in the case for final injunction and damages. The dispositive portion of said decision held that the petitioner does not have trademark rights on the name and container of the beauty cream product. The said decision on the merits of the trial court rendered the issuance of the writ of a preliminary injunction moot and academic notwithstanding the fact that the same has been appealed in the Court of Appeals. This is supported by our ruling in La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, to wit:Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before judgment when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and only when his complaint shows facts entitling such reliefs xxx and it appearing that the trial court had already granted the issuance of a final injunction in favor of petitioner in its decision rendered after trial on the merits xxx the Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition having been rendered moot and academic. An injunction issued by the trial court after it has already made a clear pronouncement as to the plaintiffs right thereto, that is, after the same issue has been decided on the merits, the trial court having appreciated the evidence presented, is proper, notwithstanding the fact that the decision rendered is not yet final xxx. Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered on the merit of the main case for injunction. The merit of the main case having been already determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have any force and effect, (italics supplied)
La Vista categorically pronounced that the issuance of a final injunction renders any question on the preliminary injunctive order moot and academic despite the fact that the decision granting a final injunction is pending appeal. Conversely, a decision denying the applicant-plaintiffs right to a final injunction, although appealed, renders moot and academic any objection to the prior dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction.60
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.” Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions; xxx. (Emphasis supplied.)
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years.
It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion 10 Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention lo give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention, thus:SECTION 1. Who may intervene, - A person who has a Icga) interest in the mailer in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intcrvenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed al any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest,' which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.68
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Endnotes:
* Per Raffle dated July 19,2010.
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 131481), pp. 22-41; penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia with Associate Justices Eugenio S. LAbitoria and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, concurring.
2 Id. at 54-59.
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 131624), pp. 89-109; penned by Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona (now Chief Justice of this Court).
4 Id. at 110-113.
5 Rollo (G.R. No. 131481), pp. 22-27.
6 CA rollo, p. 96; penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia with Associate Justices Romeo J. Callejo and Anemia G. Tuquero, concurring.
7 Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
8 CA rallo, p. 107-109.
9 Id. at 164-165.
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 131481), p. 29.
11 Id. at 34-36.
12 Id. at 36-37.
13 Id. at 38.
14 Id. at 40.
15 Id. at 41.
16 Id. al 103.
17 Id. at 13-14.
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 131624), pp. 16-17.
19 G.R. No. 103302, August 12, 1993,225 SCRA 278.
36 Section 1(d) of Ordinance No.1.
37 Exhibit "G," Exhibits Folder, p. 42.
38 Id.
20 Section 72 of the Public Land Act, in particular, reads:
SEC. 72. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, if he approves the recommendations of the Director of Lands, shall submit the matter to the President of the end that the latter may issue a proclamation reserving the land surveyed, or such part thereof as he may deem proper, as a town site, and a certified copy of such proclamation shall be sent to the Director of Lands and another to the Register of Deeds of the province in which the surveyed land lies.
21 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, Amending for the Purpose Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as Amended. Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. 22
22183 Phil. 176(1979).
23 G.R. No. 104786, Januarv 27, 1994, 229 SCRA 554, 559.
24 The latest amendment to the CARL is Republic Act "No. 9700, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary Reforms, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as Amended, and Appropriating Funds Therefor[,]" or more commonly known as the CARPER Law, which took effect on July 1, 2009 and extended CARP implementation for another five years, or until June 30, 2014.
25 Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., supra note 22 at 186-187.
26 Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 457, 476 (2001).
27 113 Phil. 789(1961).
28 Id. at 800-801.
29 453 Phil. 373(2003).
30 Id. at 382-383.
31 DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1999.
32 G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991,201 SCRA 508.
33 Id. at 513-515.
34 Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. "No. 97753, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 448, 463.
35 National Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 917-918 (2000).
39 Office ofthe President Administrative Order No, 152, dated December 16, 1968.
40 Id.
41 United BF Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. The (Municipal) City Mayor, Parañaque City, G.R. No. 141010, February 7,2007,515 SCRA 1, 12.
42 PENALTY. Violation of any provision or provisions of this ordinance shall upon conviction, be penalized by a fine of not more than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than SIX MONTHS (6) or by both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. Each day that the violation of this ordinance continues shall be deemed a separate offense, after the date of the court decision is rendered.
If the violation is committed by a firm, a corporation, partnership or any other juridical person, the manager managing partners of the person changed with the management, of such firm, corporation, partnership or juridical person shall be criminally reasonable.
43 Executive Order No. 648.
44 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. WMC Resources Int'l Ply. Ltd.,G.R. No. 162331, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 315, 328.
45 DAR records, p. 273.
46 16 204 Phil. 126(1982).
47 Id. at 135.
48 Ortigas & Co., Ltd, v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 615, 622-623 (2000).
49 See the List of Subdivisions within the Jurisdiction of Dasmarinas, Cavite (Exhibits Folder, Exhibit "QQ." pp. 195-200) and Certification dated September 23, 1988 (Exhibits Folder, Exhibit "S,"p. 116).
50 Resolution No. 105, Office of Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Province of Cavite, Id.
51 CA RP exemption
52 Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23 at 558-559.
53 Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform,, supra note 19 at 282-284.
54 473 Phil. 64 (2004).
55 Id. at 92-93.
56 Id. at 94-95.
57 503 Phil, 154(2005).
58 Id. at 157.
59 429 Phil. 1-10(2002).
60 Id. at 151-152.
61 1) UNDER THE LAW APPLICABLE AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED
CONVERSION, [EMRASON] HAD ONE (1) YEAR WITHIN WHICH TO IMPLEMENT THE CONVERSION; OTHERWISE, THE CONVERSION IS DEEMED TO BE IN BAD FAITH (Sec. 36 Agricultural Land Reform Code, R.A. 3844).
2) BY VIRTUE OF THE AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE (R.A. 3844) WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON AUGUST 8, 1963; THE FARMERS CULTIVATING THE PROPERTY WERE GRANTED A LEGISLATIVE SECURITY OF TENURE AS AGRICULTURAL LESSEE (Sec. 7) WHICH CANNOT BE NEGATED BY A MERE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE;
3) SINCE 1972 TO THE PRESENT, [EMRASON] DID NOT PERFORM ANY ACT TO IMPLEMENT THE ALLEGED CONVERSION OF THE PROPERTY INTO A RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISION SUCH AS SUBDIVIDING THE TITLES IN ACCORDANCE WITH A SUBDIVISION PLAN; DECLARING THE PROPERTY AS RESIDENTIAL LOTS AND OBTAINING THE PROPER DOCUMENTATION FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICES;
4) [EMRASON] IS ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING THE ALLEGED CONVERSION IN 1972 BECAUSE IT CONTINUED TO USE THE FOR AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY BY LEASING THE SAME FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES AND PAYING REAL ESTATE TAX THEREON UNDER "AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY;"
5) THE LEASEHOLD TENANCY UNDER R.A. 3844 IS MANDATORY SO THAT THE FARMERS REPRESENTED BY HEREIN INTERVENOR HAVE A VESTED RIGHT OVER. THE PROPERTY (Sec. 4);
6) GIVEN THE MANDATE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION FOR A MEANINGFUL LAND REFORM, IT IS INEVITABLE THAT THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION IS SUBJECT TO LAND REFORM;
7) FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE DAR IS CONCLUSIVE WHICH SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPELLING REASONS, THE PRESENCE OF MORE THAN 300 FARMERS WITHIN THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WHO HAVE CULTIVATED THE LAND FOR DECADES CLEARLY SHOWS THE IMPERATIVE NECESSITY OF GRANTING THE FARMERS THE SALUTARY EFFECTS OF LAND REFORM. (CA rollo, pp. 281-282.)
62 Prudential Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 136371, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 485, 498.
63 Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155, 185-186 (1997).
64 Del Rosario v. Bonga, 402 Phil. 949, 960 (2001).
65 SEC. 166. Definition of Terms. -As used in Chapter 1 of this Code:
x x x x
(2) "Agricultural lessee" means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil Jaw lessee as understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines.
66 SEC. 166. Definition of Terms. - As used in Chapter I of this Code:
x x x x
(15) "Farm worker" includes any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code explicitly stales otherwise and any individual whose work has ceased as consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment.
67 G.R. No. 185954, February 16,2010, 612 SCRA 702.
68 Id. at 712-713.
69 Rollo (G.R. No. 131481), p. 29.
70 Gelos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86186, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 608, 616.
71 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 246, 262 (1995).