WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, finding the defendants Anita Monasterio-Pe, and Spouses Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan to be unlawfully withholding the property in litigation, i.e., Lot. Nos. 40 and 41 covered by TCT Nos. T-9699 and 9161, respectively, together with the buildings thereon, located at Brgy. Kauswagan, Iloilo City Proper, and they are hereby ordered together with their families and privies, to vacate the premises and deliver possession to the plaintiff and/or his representative.
The defendants are likewise ordered to pay plaintiff reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises in the amount of P15,000.00 per month starting January, 2000 until they actually vacate and deliver possession to the plaintiff and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
Costs against the defendants.
SO DECIDED.5
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. - Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
Respondent alleged in his complaint that petitioners occupied the subject property by his mere tolerance. While tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.19 Respondent sent petitioners a demand letter dated December 1, 1999 to vacate the subject property, but petitioners did not comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.20 Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.21 Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners on March 29, 2000, which was less than a year from December 1, 1999, the date of formal demand. Hence, it is clear that the action was filed within the one-year period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.
Neither is the Court persuaded by petitioners' argument that respondent has no cause of action to recover physical possession of the subject properties on the basis of a contract of sale because the thing sold was never delivered to the latter.
It has been established that petitioners validly executed a deed of sale covering the subject parcels of land in favor of respondent after the latter paid the outstanding account of the former with the Philippine Veterans Bank.
Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. In the instant case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that they had no intention of delivering the subject lots to respondent when they executed the said deed of sale. Hence, petitioners' execution of the deed of sale is tantamount to a delivery of the subject lots to respondent. The fact that petitioners remained in possession of the disputed properties does not prove that there was no delivery, because as found by the lower courts, such possession is only by respondent's mere tolerance.
Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioners' assertion that the filing of the unlawful detainer case was premature, because respondent failed to comply with the provisions of the law on barangay conciliation. As held by the RTC, Barangay Kauswagan City Proper, through its Pangkat Secretary and Chairman, issued not one but two certificates to file action after herein petitioners and respondent failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. The Court finds no error in the pronouncement of both the MTCC and the RTC that any error in the previous conciliation proceedings leading to the issuance of the first certificate to file action, which was alleged to be defective, has already been cured by the MTCC's act of referring back the case to the Pangkat Tagapagkasundo of Barangay Kauswagan for proper conciliation and mediation proceedings. These subsequent proceedings led to the issuance anew of a certificate to file action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Brion,* and Abad, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Special Order No. 975, dated March 21, 2011.
1 Penned by Judge Danilo P. Galvez; rollo, pp. 85-92.
2 Rollo, pp. 93-95.
3 Id. at 59-62.
4 Id. at 64-70.
5 Id. at 83-84.
6 Federico Jarantilla, Jr. v. Antonieta Jarantilla, Buenaventura Remotigue, substituted by Cynthia Remotigue, Doroteo Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla, G.R. No. 154486, December 1, 2010.
7 Emcor Incorporated v. Sienes, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009, 598 SCRA 617, 632.
8 Sevilleno v. Carilo, G.R. No. 146454, September 14, 2007, 533 SCRA 385, 388, citing Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 602 (1998); see Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 540.
9 Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served with fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
10 Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
11 Wee v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 695, 712, citing Mendoza v. Coronel, 482 SCRA 353, 359 (2006).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
16 See Pe v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74781, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA 137.
17 Per G.R. No. 155908.
18 Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. D.M. Consortium, Inc., G.R. No. 147594, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 632, 640.
19 Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 159.
20 Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 315, 329.
21 Id.