29 NOV. 1999
MR. CLEMENT CHENG
SIR:
I UNDERSTAND MY TARDINESS WHATEVER REASON I HAVE AFFECTS SOMEHOW THE DELIVERY SCHEDULE OF THE COMPANY, THUS DISCIPLINARY ACTION WERE IMPOSED TO ME BY THE MANAGEMENT. AND ON THIS END, ACCEPT MY APOLOGIES AND REST ASSURED THAT I WILL COME ON TIME (ON OR BEFORE 8:30 AM) AND WILLINGNESS TO EXTEND MY SERVICE AS A COMPANY DRIVER. WHATEVER HELP NEEDED. (sic)
RESPECTFULLY YOURS,
(SGD.) DIOSDADO BITARA, JR.9
Upon Our review of the record of the case, We perceive no abuse of discretion as to compel a reversal. Appellant failed to adduce convincing evidence to show that the Labor Arbiter in rendering the assailed decision has acted in a manner inconsistent with the criteria set forth in the foregoing pronouncement.
Neither are we persuaded to disturb the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter a quo. The material facts as found are all in accordance with the evidence presented during the hearing as shown by the record.
WHEREFORE, finding no cogent reason to modify, alter, much less reverse the decision appealed from, the same is AFFIRMED en toto and the instant appeal DISMISSED for lack of merit.26
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. In lieu of the assailed Resolution and Order of the respondent NLRC, a NEW DECISION is hereby rendered declaring petitioner Diosdado Bitara, Jr. to have been Illegally Dismissed and, thus, entitled to the following:
- Reinstatement or if no longer feasible, Separation Pay to be computed from the commencement of his employment in August 1988 up to the time of his termination on April 1, 2000, including his imputed service from April 1, 2000 until the finality of this decision, based on the salary rate prevailing at the said finality;
- Backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, computed from April 1, 2000 up to the finality of this decision, without qualification or deduction; and
- 5-day Service Incentive Leave Pay for every year of service from the commencement of his employment in August 1988 up to its termination on April 1, 2000.29
xxx The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. xxx Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision - not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision - the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. xxx33
xxx [J]udicial review does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and NLRC based their determinations, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not said public respondents had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.34 The said rule directs us to merely determine whether there is basis established on record to support the findings of a tribunal and such findings meet the required quantum of proof, which in this case, is substantial evidence. Our deference to the expertise acquired by quasi-judicial agencies and the limited scope granted to us in the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction restrain us from going so far as to probe into the correctness of a tribunals evaluation of evidence, unless there is palpable mistake and complete disregard thereof in which case certiorari would be proper.35
We are seriously considering your termination from service, and for this reason you are directed to submit a written explanation, within seventy-two hours from your receipt of this notice, why you should not be terminated from service for failure to report for work without verbal or written notice or permission on March 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16, 2000. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
We have time and again, verbally and formally, called your attention to your negligence from your tardiness and your frequent absences without any notice but still, you remain to ignore our reminder. As you know, we are in need of a regular driver and your action greatly affected the operation of our company. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx [P]rivate respondents absences, as already discussed, were incurred with due notice and compliance with company rules and he had not thereby committed a “similar offense” as those he had committed in the past [to wit: gambling, for which he was preventively suspended; habitual tardiness for which he received several warnings; and violation of company rules for carrying three sacks of rice, for which he was required to explain.] xxx To refer to those earlier violations as added grounds for dismissing him is doubly unfair to private respondent.43 (Emphasis supplied.)
The imputed absence and tardiness of the complainant are documented. He faltered on his attendance 38 times of the 66 working days. His last absences on 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16 March 2000 were undertaken without even notice/permission from management. These attendance delinquencies may be characterized as habitual and are sufficient justifications to terminate the complainants employment.44
xxx It bears stressing that petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated incidents but manifested a pattern of habituality. xxx The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by him should not be taken singly and separately but in their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate and independent of each other.46
ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) xxx
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
xxx
Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative xxx to terminate his employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of those rights and prerogative is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.52
While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the disposition of cases involving termination of employment since it affects one's source or means of livelihood, it should not be overlooked that the benefits accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain the services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. The law in protecting the rights of the employees authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.54 It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer. Justitia nemini neganda est (Justice is to be denied to none).55
Furthermore, We believe that private respondents failed to afford petitioner due process. The allegation of private respondents that petitioner refused to sign the memoranda dated March 17 and 21, 2000 despite receipt thereof is not only lame but also implausible. First, the said allegation is self-serving and unsubstantiated. Second, a prudent employer would simply not accept such mere refusal, but would exert effort to observe the mandatory requirement of due process. We cannot accept the self-serving claim of respondents that petitioner refused to sign both memoranda. Otherwise, We would be allowing employers to do away with the mandatory twin-notice rule in the termination of employees. We find more credible the claim of petitioner that he was illegally dismissed on April 1, 2000 when the lawyer of the company informed him, without prior notice and in derogation of his right to due process, of his termination by offering him a 1-month salary as separation pay. The petitioners immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal on April 27, 2000 reinforced Our belief that petitioner was illegally dismissed and was denied due process.58 (Emphasis in the original.)
xxx Bare and vague allegations as to the manner of service and the circumstances surrounding the same would not suffice. A mere copy of the notice of termination allegedly sent by respondent to petitioner, without proof of receipt, or in the very least, actual service thereof upon petitioner, does not constitute substantial evidence. It was unilaterally prepared by the petitioner and, thus, evidently self-serving and insufficient to convince even an unreasonable mind.61
The clear policy of the Labor Code is to grant service incentive leave pay to workers in all establishments, subject to a few exceptions. Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations63 provides that “[e]very employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.” Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served “within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the employee started working, including authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which case said period shall be considered as one year.”64 It is also “commutable to its money equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of the year.”65 In other words, an employee who has served for one year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or he may collect its monetary value. xxx66 (Emphasis supplied.)
[P]rivate respondents bear the burden to prove that employees have received these benefits in accordance with law. It is incumbent upon the employer to present the necessary documents to prove such claim. Although private respondents labored to show that they paid petitioner his holiday pay, no similar effort was shown with regard to his service incentive leave pay. We do not agree with the Labor Arbiters conclusion that petitioners service incentive leave pay has been used up by his numerous absences, there being no proof to that effect.68
Endnotes:
* Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 1174 dated 9 January 2012.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 131-141.
2 Id. at 161.
3 Id. at 87-89 and 90-91. Resolution dated 29 June 2001 and Order dated 21 February 2002 of the First Division, National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 027871-01 both penned by Presiding Commissioner Roy V. Señeres with Commissioners Vicente S.E. Veloso and Alberto R. Quimpo, concurring.
4 Id. at 62-64. Decision dated 21 December 2000 of Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion in NLRC NCR Case No. 04-02393-2000.
5 Rollo, p. 13. Petition dated 29 June 2005; Id. at 73. Respondents Position Paper dated 19 July 2000, Annex “G” of the Petition; Id. at 65. Complainants Position Paper dated 20 July 2000, Annex “F” of the Petition.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 74. Respondents Position Paper [petitioners in the instant petition] dated 19 July 2000, Annex “G” of the Petition.
8 Id. at 85. Respondents Position Paper [petitioners in the instant petition] dated 19 July 2000, Annex “G-12” of the Petition.
9 Id. at 86.
10 Id. at 82-84. Respondents Position Paper [petitioners in the instant petition] dated 19 July 2000, Annex “G-9” to “G-11” of the Petition.
11 Id. at 74.
12 Id. at 87. Annex “G-14” of the Petition.
13 Id. at 89. Affidavit dated 29 July 2000, Annex “G-16” of the Petition.
14 Id. at 88. Annex “G-15” of the Petition.
15 Id. at 75. Respondents Position Paper [petitioners in the instant petition] dated 19 July 2000, Annex “G-2” of the Petition.
16 CA rollo, pp. 16-17. Complaint dated 27 April 2000, Annex “C” of the Petition for Certiorari dated 3 June 2002 brought before the Court of Appeals.
17 Id. at 17.
18 Id. at 18-25. Position Paper [of respondent in the instant petition] dated 19 July 2000, Annex “D” of the Petition before the Court of Appeals.
19 Id. at 19. [Note: The dates were corrected to March 11-16, 2000 in his Reply to Respondents Position Paper.]
20 Id. [Note: The date was changed to 17 March 2000 in his Reply to Respondents Position Paper.]
21 Id.
22 Id. at 21 [Note: The date was corrected to 11 March 2000 in his Reply to Respondents Position Paper.]
23 Id.
24 Id. at 49-57. Reply to Respondents Position Paper [of respondent in the instant petition] dated 6 November 2000.
25 Rollo, pp. 62-64. Labor Arbiters Decision dated 21 December 2000 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 04-02393-2000.
26 Id. at 59. Resolution dated 29 June 2001 of the National Labor Relations Commission.
27 CA rollo, pp. 90-91. Order dated 21 February 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission.
28 Id. at 2-14. Petition for Certiorari dated 3 June 2002.
29 Rollo, pp. 44-45.
30 Id. at 46.
31 This Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the respondents comment on the petition on account of the following circumstances:
The petition was filed on 4 July 2005 after the petitioner was granted an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file the same.
On 17 August 2005, respondent was required to COMMENT thereon. For failure to comply with the resolution, several court directives were issued culminating in the following: (a) the arrest and detention of respondents counsel Atty. Virgilio Morales at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) until he has complied with the directives of this Court; (b) the release of Atty. Morales from the custody of the NBI in view of his health condition and pending receipt of respondents comment on the formers motion to withdraw as counsel; (c) the imposition of several court fines against respondent, which respondent, nonetheless, did not pay; and (d) the numerous reiteration of the earlier directives with a warning that respondents comments shall be deemed waived should he fail to pay the fines and file the required comments. Id. at 110, 117-118, 120, 123, 127, 140, 148.
After the transfer of the case to the First Division on 15 June 2010, this Court resolved to dispense with the payment of court fines and the filing of the comment on the petition by the respondent. Id. at 176.
32 China Banking Corporation v. Cebu Printing and Packaging Corporation, G.R. No. 172880, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 154, 166.
33 Beluso v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 457-458 citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142051, 24 February 2004, 423 SCRA 605.
34 Travelaire & Tours Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 131523, 20 August 1998, 294 SCRA 505, 510 citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36, 50 (1995).
35 Id. at 510-511 citing PMI Colleges v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121466, 15 August 1997, 277 SCRA 462.
36 Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Agad, G.R. No. 162017, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 196, 207 citing AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520, 23 June 2009, 590 SCRA 633, further citing Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 160368, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 792, 803.
37 Bughaw, Jr. v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 173151, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 307, 316-318 citing Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and Challenge Socks Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165268, 8 November 2005, 474 SCRA 356, 363-364.
38 Rollo, p. 87. Memorandum dated 17 March 2000 issued by Davis Cheng.
39 Id. at 107-108. Affidavits both dated 15 August 2000 of Delia Abalos and Ritchie Distor. Id. at 103. Affidavit dated 9 November 2000 of Mary Ann Bitara.
40 Id. at 108.
41 Id. at 107.
42 322 Phil. 352 (1996).
43 Id. at 364-365.
44 Rollo, pp. 63-64. Decision dated 21 December 2000 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 04-2393-2000.
45 479 Phi. 459 (2004).
46 Id. at 470-471 citing National Service Corporation v. Leogardo, Jr., No. L-64296, 20 July 1984, 130 SCRA 502, 509.
47 Rollo, p. 41. Decision dated 18 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70965.
48 Id. at 85. Memorandum dated 23 June 1999.
49 Valiao v. CA, et al., supra note 45.
50 Id. at 469.
51 Id. citing JGB and Associates, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109390, 7 March 1996, 254 SCRA 457, 463.
52 Id. at 471 citing Maya Farms Employees Organization v. NLRC, G.R. No. 106256, 28 December 1994, 239 SCRA 508, 515.
53 G.R. No. 157202, 28 March 2007, 519 SCRA 233.
54 Id. at 248 citing Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 106370, September 8, 1994, 236 SCRA 371, 378-379 further citing Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Alonzo, G.R. No. 78090, July 26, 1991, 199 SCRA 617, 622.
55 Id. at 248-249 citing Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, id. at 379.
56 Bughaw, Jr. v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, supra note 37 at 320-321 citing Pastor Austria v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 371 Phil 340, 357 (1999).
57 CA rollo, p. 52. Reply to Respondents Position Paper in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-04-02393- 2000.
58 Rollo, pp. 42-43. Decision dated 18 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70965.
59 Supra note 37.
60 Id. at 321.
61 Id. at 322.
62 G.R. No. 105892, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 149.
63 Id. at 175.
64 Id. citing Section 3, Rule V, Book III, Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code.
65 Id. citing Section 5, Rule V, Book III, Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code.
66 Id.
67 Exodus International Construction Corporation v. Guillermo Biscocho, G.R. No. 166109, 23 February 2011.
68 Rollo, pp. 43-44. Decision dated 18 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70965.