EN BANC
[G.R. No. 38996. October 31, 1933. ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDRES R. SERRANO, Defendant-Appellant.
Sixto Brillantes and F. V. Vergara, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. HOMICIDE; EVIDENCE; DYING DECLARATION. — In prosecution for homicide, conviction of guilt may be mainly based on ante-mortem statements of the deceased.
2. EVIDENCE; HEARSAY; DYING DECLARATION. — It is not essential to the admissibility of a dying declaration that the declarant had expressly stated that he had lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that at the time he made the declaration he did not expect to survive the injury resulting in his death.
2. EVIDENCE; HEARSAY; DYING DECLARATION. — It is not essential to the admissibility of a dying declaration that the declarant had expressly stated that he had lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that at the time he made the declaration he did not expect to survive the injury resulting in his death.
D E C I S I O N
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, finding the appellant guilty of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
In seeking a reversal of said judgment, counsel for the appellant has assigned four errors, all of which relate to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to sustain the judgment of conviction.
In convicting the appellant, the lower court relied mainly on the ante-mortem statements of the deceased Eduardo Savellano and on the testimony of Cirilo Serrano. Appellant contends that Exhibit A was not admissible as an ante-mortem statement, for the reason that Eduardo Savellano did not expressly state therein that he expected to die. The circumstances under which the statement was made, however, justified the lower court in taking it into consideration as a dying declaration. In People v. Ancasan (53 Phil., 779, 781), this court said: "Under the second assignment of error, counsel argues that the statements made by the deceased to his wife very shortly before his death could not be regarded as a dying declaration inasmuch as the deceased did not directly state that he at that time believed that death was impending. A sufficient answer to this contention is that it is not necessary to the validity or admissibility of a dying declaration that the declarant expressly state that he has lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died."cralaw virtua1aw library
As to the theory of the defense that the deceased, Eduardo Savellano, might have been accidentally wounded by Cirilo Serrano, it is sufficient to say that the facts disclosed by the record fails to sustain such a theory. On the other hand, the evidence clearly points to the appellant as the author of the death of Eduardo Savellano. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Street, Hull, Vickers and Butte, JJ., concur.
In seeking a reversal of said judgment, counsel for the appellant has assigned four errors, all of which relate to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to sustain the judgment of conviction.
In convicting the appellant, the lower court relied mainly on the ante-mortem statements of the deceased Eduardo Savellano and on the testimony of Cirilo Serrano. Appellant contends that Exhibit A was not admissible as an ante-mortem statement, for the reason that Eduardo Savellano did not expressly state therein that he expected to die. The circumstances under which the statement was made, however, justified the lower court in taking it into consideration as a dying declaration. In People v. Ancasan (53 Phil., 779, 781), this court said: "Under the second assignment of error, counsel argues that the statements made by the deceased to his wife very shortly before his death could not be regarded as a dying declaration inasmuch as the deceased did not directly state that he at that time believed that death was impending. A sufficient answer to this contention is that it is not necessary to the validity or admissibility of a dying declaration that the declarant expressly state that he has lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died."cralaw virtua1aw library
As to the theory of the defense that the deceased, Eduardo Savellano, might have been accidentally wounded by Cirilo Serrano, it is sufficient to say that the facts disclosed by the record fails to sustain such a theory. On the other hand, the evidence clearly points to the appellant as the author of the death of Eduardo Savellano. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Street, Hull, Vickers and Butte, JJ., concur.
