1. INSURANCE PRODUCT; PAYMENT OF DEBT OF INSURED PARTY BY HIS WIFE; FEAR AND INTIMIDATION. — the evidence in this case leaves the court without any doubt that the appellant paid the debt of her husband in order to obtain the release of the balance of the insurance money of which she was in dire need; and not because she feared the litigation threatened by appellee C. In every step she took she had the advice of two able lawyers whose advice she accepted and followed. There is no basis in the advice for a finding that she paid her of suffering an imminent and serious injury at the hands of the appellee C. Article 1267 of the Civil Code inapplicable. (Cf. Martinez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, 15 Phil., 252; and Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil., 769.)

The plaintiff-appellant is the widow of Walter E. Jones who perished in the fire which destroyed his residence in Pasay, Rizal, in November 24, 1929. His life was insured for $50,000 with the manufacturers Life Insurance Company of Toronto and for P10,000 with the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation Limited for both of which the appellee, E. E. Elser, is the Manila representative. The appellant was the beneficiary named in both policies.

It appears from Exhibit 20 dated January 9, 1930, that the Manufacturers Life Insurance Company had some doubt as to the cause of the insured’s death and insisted on thorough investigation. By a cable dated February 13, 1930, the company again asked for full report on any suspicious circumstances indicating suicide. On February 15, 1930, Elser made a full report (Exhibit 21) as to the circumstances of Jones’s death and on March 18, 1930, the company approved the claim and authorized payment.

The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, after their doubts as to the cause of Jone’s death were cleared up by a thorough investigation, finally authorized payment of their accident policy on April 3, 1930. As Elser had assured the manufacturers Life Insurance Company that the Employers Liability Corporation, the accident company, would approve the claim, payment of the policies of the former company was withheld until the latter company acted finally. Immediately after the receipt of the cable of April 3, 1930 (Exhibit 26), authorizing payment of the accident policy, the appellee Elser on April 4, 1930, paid the appellant in full in the manner hereinafter indicated and the appellant signed receipts, Exhibits 31 and 32, in full satisfaction of her claims as the policies of both companies. The P100,000 due under the policy of the Manufacturers Life Insurance Company was paid in two checks: one for P20,000 which the appellant endorsed and delivered to Francisco A. Delgado and one for P80,000 retained by her. The gist of the present action is that the appellant accepted, endorsed and delivered to Francisco A. Delgado the said check for P20,000 under duress and intimidation. Seven thousand seventeen pesos and two centavos of the said P20,000 was delivered to the China Banking Corporation in payment of a past due promissory note executed by Walter E. Jones upon which the appellee P. D. Carman was an accommodation endorser. The ultimate facts may be sifted out from the evidence as follows: In the interval between the date of the death of Jones (November 24, 1929) and April 4, 1930, when the said payments were made, the appellee Carman and his attorney had several interviews with the appellant there being present her uncle, Alberto Barretto, and her attorney, Alfredo Chicote, both of them able and experienced lawyers. In these conferences Carman and his attorney insisted that Jones had received the entire proceeds of the said promissory note to the China Banking Corporation, on which Carman was an accommodation endorser, and that Jones had assured the endorser that his insurance would respond for said debt if not paid in his lifetime. They further insisted that a moral obligation rested on the widow to pay this debt. Mrs. Jones, by advice of her counsel, agreed to put P50,000 of the insurance money in escrow until the final determination of her liability, if any, on this debt. This was not satisfactory to Carman whose attorney thereupon, under date of March 24, 1930 (Exhibit D) wrote to Barretto:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . that unless Mrs. Angeles Tapia Jones, the widow, agrees to save Messrs. Carman and Few harmless in this matter, I shall be obliged to bring an injunction suit tomorrow to prevent E. E. Elser from paying any insurance moneys whatsoever to her.



"Unless I have a satisfactory reply from you by tomorrow, Tuesday, at 8:30 a. m., I regret to state that I shall proceed to file suit as above stated. I sincerely trust this will be unnecessary because of the reflection against the good name of the late Walter E. Jones and of the possibility that, as a result of evidence which may be brought out in court, grave doubt may arise as to the manner in which he met his death."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under date of March 25, 1930 (Exhibit C), Carman’s attorney wrote to the insurance companies in care of Elser that Carman claimed an interest in the proceeds of the policies on the life of Walter E. Jones and demanded that no payment should be made until Carman was fully protected against liability on account of said promissory note. Under date of April 2, 1930, Carman’s attorney wrote a letter to Mrs. Jones, the appellant, which concludes as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In view of the foregoing, therefore, and of the apparently deliberate delay which has taken place in this matter I regret to advise that unless the liability of my clients, Messrs. Carman and Few has been taken care of absolutely by Friday noon, April 4, 1930, I have been instructed to bring action to protect my clients’ interest in respect of insurance on the life of your deceased husband. I shall regret exceedingly to take such action but my clients feel that since you have taken the position that they should suffer thru the deceit practiced by your deceased husband in respect of his insurance money, you yourself will likewise have to suffer as, in the event suit is brought by my clients in this matter, we shall be obliged to allege not only fraud but that your deceased husband met his death thru other than accidental means.

"I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. E. E. Elser, the representative of the insurance companies interested in this insurance, for his information and guidance."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the morning of April 4, 1930, as above stated, Elser, in his office, at the request of the appellant and in the presence of her counsel Barretto and Chicote, prepared, signed and delivered to the appellant the check for P80,000 and to Delgado, the check for P20,000. Thereupon she signed receipts for the same. He testified that although ha had voluntarily and without security loaned money to the appellant, he never demanded or required that he should be reimbursed out of the proceeds of said policies and he never took part in any of the conferences above mentioned relating to the claim of Carman. He further testified that he notified Mcfie that he would pay the money due on the policies immediately upon receiving authority from the companies regardless of the demands of Carman’s attorneys unless he was restrained by an order of the court. As above stated, he received that authority on April 3, 1930, and the money was paid on April 4, 1930.

Did Mrs. Jones pay her husband’s debt with the China Banking Corporation upon which Carman was endorser because she was coerced or intimidated by the statement in the letter of Carman’s attorney of April 2, 1930, as follows: "in the event suit is brought by my clients in this matter, we shall be obliged to allege not only fraud but that your deceased husband met his death thru other than accidental means" ?

Circumstances may be conceived in which such a veiled threat might constitute intimidation which would annul a juristic act under the provisions of article 1267 of the Civil Code. The pertinent part of said article is as follows: "Intimidation exists when one of the contracting parties is inspired with a reasonable and well-grounded fear of suffering an imminent and serious injury to his person or property, or to the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants.

"In order to determine the extent of the intimidation, the age, sex, and status of the person must be considered." Disregarding the opinion and hearsay evidence, we are convinced that the appellant paid said debt under the advice of her counsel, Barretto and Chicote, voluntarily and because she was in dire need of the P80,000 which she received at the same time she endorsed the check P20,000 to Delgado. She testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"P. Cuando se expidieron los cheques, usted estaba representada por los Sres. Chicote y Barretto,