FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 43361. August 21, 1937. ]
THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, applicant, v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Oppositor-Appellee. CIRIACO CHUNACO and JOSE ARAMBURO, Oppositors-Appellants.
Vera & Vera and J. E. Blanco for Appellants.
Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC LAND; REGISTRATION; CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP BY PRIVATE PARTIES. — Appellants claim that they and their predecessors in interest have been since time immemorial in the continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of lot No. 3 under a bona fide claim of ownership and that, therefore, they are entitled to the registration of the same under provisions of Act No. 496 or, in the alternative, under the beneficial provisions of Act No. 926, section 54, paragraph 6 and Act No. 2874, Chapter VIII, section 45, paragraph (b), respectively. No claim is made that the lot had been acquired either by purchase from or composition title with the Government (Royal Decree of June 25m 1880). No step was even taken towards securing possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 and the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893. The appellants, therefore, cannot invoke the provisions of section 19, paragraph 3, of Act No. 496, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2164, which require that an applicant for registration of title must claim "to own or hold any;and provisions of the Mortgage Law of the Philippine Islands and the general regulations for the execution of same." (Fernandez Hermanos v. Director of Lands, 57 Phil., 929, 933.)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSORY INFORMATION. — The failure of the appellants’ predecessors in interest to legalize their possession of the land in question by the institution of possessory information proceedings for the gratuitous grant of title from the Spanish Government, thereby perfecting and converting their possessory right into one of ownership caused the land to revert to the Government. (Fuster v. Director of Lands, G. R. No. 40129, 61 Phil., 1015; Li Seng Giap & Co. vs Director of Lands, 59 Phil., Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands, 59 Phil., 600.)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "EX POST FACTO" LAWS. — The appellants also invoke the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874 and contend that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed the land not only "For a period of ten years next preceding the 26th day of July 1904" as said Act No. 926 provides, but from the year 1874. They claim that the repeal of Act No. 926 by Act No. 2874 cannot adversely affect their vested right of ownership under the former Public Land Law because of the constitutional inhibition against the enactment of ex post facto law or bill of attainder. The constitutional provision that no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted cannot be invoked to protect allegedly vested civil rights, because it is, only applicable to criminal proceedings, and not to civil proceedings which affect private rights retrospectively (See Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil., 74; Payanaga v. Wolfe, 2 Phil., 146; U. S. v. Ang Kan Ko, 6 Phil., 376; Concepcion v. Garcia, 54 Phil., 81; and U. S. v. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370; 51 Law. ed., 1098; 27 Sup. Ct Rep., 742; 11 ann. Cas., 688).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION OF CLAIM. — Section 54 of Act No. 926 provides that." . . persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor . . . ." No application was filed under Act No. 926 by the appellants or their predecessors in interest, and it is clear that without such application no confirmation of their claims could be had and much less the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. Under these circumstances, no vested right could have accrued to them.
5. ID.; ID.; POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION. — The claim that the appellants should, in the alternative, be the recipients of the beneficial provisions of Act No. 2874 (par. [b], sec. 45) is also without merit. Paragraph (b), section 45 of Act No. 2874 substantially incorporates paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The possession and occupation under both laws must not only be under a bona fide claim of ownership but must also be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LAND. — It has been uniformly held by this court that to justify judicial confirmation of title to a public agricultural land, the claimant must move prove actual and physical occupation of said land, and that the possession must be continuous, open, exclusive, notorious, adverse and under a bona fide claim of ownership from July 26, 1894 up to the date of the filing of the application or at least up to July 1, 1919 when Act No. 2874 was enacted. The appellants, to be sure, attempted to prove the elements of the required possession. We find, however, the evidence in this point unsatisfactory.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTINUITY OF POSSESSION. — The appellants’ claim of ownership, fails for lack of sufficient proof of continuity of possession on their part or on the part of their predecessors in interest during the time required by section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No. 2874. (Heirs of Luno v. Marquez, 48, Phil., 855; Government of the Philippine Islands v. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil., 374, 380; Fernandez Hermanos v. Director of Lands, supra.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTS OF DOMINION. — "While grazing live stock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show a possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing live stock upon it, without substantial inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a plea of limitations, and this is especially true where the claimant used no means to restrain the live stock to any particular land, or where the live stock of others was not excluded from the land. Such a use, it has been said, is to be deemed merely permissive, whether the lands are public or private, and may be terminated at any time." (2 C. J., pp. 67, 68.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSESSMENT AS PROOF OF TITLE. — Assessment alone is of title value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property in the declarant (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil., 607; Casimiro v. Fernandez, 9 Phil., 562; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil., 384). Neither is the alleged offer (Exhibit 7, p. 37, rec.) made by the appellant J. A. any concession or evidence of ownership (Director of Lands v. Abdul, G. R. No. 36867, Phil., 932); nor does the issuance of a certificate or repurchase by the provincial treasurer of Camarines Sur in favor of J. A. upon the redemption payment of the accrued taxes on the land up to 1929 vest in him any title or operate as an estoppel against the Government. The repurchase certificate was "issued with the understanding that it does not acknowledged a better right to the properties being redeemed by said J. A. than that had by their former owners prior to the forfeiture thereof and without prejudice to the right of the Government to contest the title thereto, if deemed necessary, in proper proceedings." The purchaser of land forfeited by the Government for nonpayment of taxes only acquires the interest held by the delinquent owner, and the Government is not deemed to have included in the conveyance the title which it holds over the land. (Government of Philippine Islands v. Adriano, 41 Phil., 112.)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSORY INFORMATION. — The failure of the appellants’ predecessors in interest to legalize their possession of the land in question by the institution of possessory information proceedings for the gratuitous grant of title from the Spanish Government, thereby perfecting and converting their possessory right into one of ownership caused the land to revert to the Government. (Fuster v. Director of Lands, G. R. No. 40129, 61 Phil., 1015; Li Seng Giap & Co. vs Director of Lands, 59 Phil., Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands, 59 Phil., 600.)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "EX POST FACTO" LAWS. — The appellants also invoke the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874 and contend that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed the land not only "For a period of ten years next preceding the 26th day of July 1904" as said Act No. 926 provides, but from the year 1874. They claim that the repeal of Act No. 926 by Act No. 2874 cannot adversely affect their vested right of ownership under the former Public Land Law because of the constitutional inhibition against the enactment of ex post facto law or bill of attainder. The constitutional provision that no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted cannot be invoked to protect allegedly vested civil rights, because it is, only applicable to criminal proceedings, and not to civil proceedings which affect private rights retrospectively (See Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil., 74; Payanaga v. Wolfe, 2 Phil., 146; U. S. v. Ang Kan Ko, 6 Phil., 376; Concepcion v. Garcia, 54 Phil., 81; and U. S. v. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370; 51 Law. ed., 1098; 27 Sup. Ct Rep., 742; 11 ann. Cas., 688).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION OF CLAIM. — Section 54 of Act No. 926 provides that." . . persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor . . . ." No application was filed under Act No. 926 by the appellants or their predecessors in interest, and it is clear that without such application no confirmation of their claims could be had and much less the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. Under these circumstances, no vested right could have accrued to them.
5. ID.; ID.; POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION. — The claim that the appellants should, in the alternative, be the recipients of the beneficial provisions of Act No. 2874 (par. [b], sec. 45) is also without merit. Paragraph (b), section 45 of Act No. 2874 substantially incorporates paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The possession and occupation under both laws must not only be under a bona fide claim of ownership but must also be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LAND. — It has been uniformly held by this court that to justify judicial confirmation of title to a public agricultural land, the claimant must move prove actual and physical occupation of said land, and that the possession must be continuous, open, exclusive, notorious, adverse and under a bona fide claim of ownership from July 26, 1894 up to the date of the filing of the application or at least up to July 1, 1919 when Act No. 2874 was enacted. The appellants, to be sure, attempted to prove the elements of the required possession. We find, however, the evidence in this point unsatisfactory.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTINUITY OF POSSESSION. — The appellants’ claim of ownership, fails for lack of sufficient proof of continuity of possession on their part or on the part of their predecessors in interest during the time required by section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No. 2874. (Heirs of Luno v. Marquez, 48, Phil., 855; Government of the Philippine Islands v. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil., 374, 380; Fernandez Hermanos v. Director of Lands, supra.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTS OF DOMINION. — "While grazing live stock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show a possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing live stock upon it, without substantial inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a plea of limitations, and this is especially true where the claimant used no means to restrain the live stock to any particular land, or where the live stock of others was not excluded from the land. Such a use, it has been said, is to be deemed merely permissive, whether the lands are public or private, and may be terminated at any time." (2 C. J., pp. 67, 68.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSESSMENT AS PROOF OF TITLE. — Assessment alone is of title value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property in the declarant (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil., 607; Casimiro v. Fernandez, 9 Phil., 562; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil., 384). Neither is the alleged offer (Exhibit 7, p. 37, rec.) made by the appellant J. A. any concession or evidence of ownership (Director of Lands v. Abdul, G. R. No. 36867, Phil., 932); nor does the issuance of a certificate or repurchase by the provincial treasurer of Camarines Sur in favor of J. A. upon the redemption payment of the accrued taxes on the land up to 1929 vest in him any title or operate as an estoppel against the Government. The repurchase certificate was "issued with the understanding that it does not acknowledged a better right to the properties being redeemed by said J. A. than that had by their former owners prior to the forfeiture thereof and without prejudice to the right of the Government to contest the title thereto, if deemed necessary, in proper proceedings." The purchaser of land forfeited by the Government for nonpayment of taxes only acquires the interest held by the delinquent owner, and the Government is not deemed to have included in the conveyance the title which it holds over the land. (Government of Philippine Islands v. Adriano, 41 Phil., 112.)
D E C I S I O N
LAUREL, J.:
On February 12, 1930, the Province of Camarines Sur, thru its provincial fiscal, filed with Court of First Instance of said province an application for the registration of several parcels of land comprised in the agricultural school site of the province. The Director of Lands opposed the registration on the ground that these parcels are public lands. An opposition was also filed on January 19, 1931, by Ciriaco Chunaco but only with respect to lot No. 3 of Plan II-12638, Amd., Exhibit A. Jose Aramburo, who had sold this lot to Ciriaco Chunaco, joined the latter on account of his warranty in case of eviction.
The present controversy relates only to lot No. 3 as the other parcels of land had already been adjudicated by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur to the applicant and the Insular Government. The parties appear to have agreed upon the identity of the controverted lot (t. s. n., pp. 15, 147).
After hearing, His Honor, Judge Eulalio Garcia, on October 29, 1934, denied the application of the Province of Camarines Sur, overruled the opposition of Ciriaco Chunaco and Jose Aramburo, and declared lot No. 3 public land which had been reserved by the Governor-General on October 19, 1933 for use as site of the Camarines Sur Agricultural School. The oppositors, Ciriaco Chunaco and Jose Aramburo, moved for reconsideration and new trial which motion was denied. Exception was taken and the case finally elevated to this court by bill of exceptions.
Oppositors by their counsel assign ten errors all of which, however, — with the exception of the last one with reference to the alleged error in refusing a new trial — may be reduced to one single proposition, namely: Whether or not upon the evidence presented, the court below erred in declaring lot No. 3 public land subject to reservation by the Chief Executive for the stated public purpose, instead of adjudicating the same and ordering its registration in the name of the oppositor-claimant Ciriaco Chunaco.
Appellants claim that they and their predecessors in interest have been since time immemorial in the continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of lot No. 3 under a bona fide claim of ownership and that, therefore, they are entitled to the registration of the same under the provisions of Act No. 926, section 54, paragraph 6, and Act No. 2874, Chapter VIII, section 45, paragraph (b), respectively.
The appellants called to the witness-stand eight witnesses to substantiate their claim. Documentary evidence was also presented and admitted (Exhibits 1 to 23). No claim is made that the lot had been acquired either by purchase from or composition title with the Government (Royal Decree of June 25, 1880). No step was even taken towards securing possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 and the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893. The appellants, therefore, cannot invoke the provisions of section 19, paragraph 3, of Act No, 496, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2164, which require that an applicant for registration of title must claim "to own or hold any land under a possessory information title, acquired under the provisions of the Mortgage Law of the Philippine Islands and the general regulations for the execution of same." (Fernandez Hermanos v. Director of Lands, 57 Phil., 929, 933.) The failure of the appellants’ predecessors in interest institution of possessory information proceedings for the gratuitous grant of title from the Spanish Government, thereby perfecting and converting their possessory right into one ownership, caused the land to revert to the Government. (Fuster v. Director of Lands, G. R. No. 40129, 61 Phil., 1015; Li Seng Giap & Co. v. director of Lands, 59 Phil., 687; Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands, 59 Phil., 600.) In the first cited case, this court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No existe en autos prueba alguna que demuestre que Secerino Tamayo y Juan de la Cruz, ni sus companeros, hayan solicitado la composicion de los terrenos en controversia de acuerdo con el mencionado Regalmento, cuyo objetivo era precisamente el legitimar la posesion de los que poseian ilegitimamente terrenos del Estado, ni de que se hayan acogido a los beneficios del Real Decreto de 13 de febrerode 1894 que tenia por especial fin dar una vez mas oportunidad a dichos poseedores a que pudiesen obtener titulo gratuito previos los tramites de informacion posesoria, ni tampoco a los del Real Decreto de 21 de febrero de 1895. Si fueres cierto, como la solocitante apelada Antonia C. Fuster ha tratado de probar, que Severino Tamayo y Juan se la Cruz y companeros hubieran estado en posesion continua del referido terreno y lo hubieran estado cultivando por medio de inquilinos hasta que traspasaron sus derechos sobre el mismo a Matias Fuster el 15 de mayo de 1895 (Exh. I), no se comprende como no se habian acogido ni a los beneficios del Real Decreto de 25 de junio de 1880, para lo cual tenian tiempo hasta el 17 de abril de 1894, ni a los beneficios del Real Decreto de 13 de febrero de 1894, ni a los de Real Decreto de 21 de febrero de 1895, para legitimar su posesion y adquirir titulo gratuito de propiedad sobre dicho terreno. Si hubiesen estado tan empenados en cultivar el citado terreno, hasta el extremo de poner encargados en el,
The present controversy relates only to lot No. 3 as the other parcels of land had already been adjudicated by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur to the applicant and the Insular Government. The parties appear to have agreed upon the identity of the controverted lot (t. s. n., pp. 15, 147).
After hearing, His Honor, Judge Eulalio Garcia, on October 29, 1934, denied the application of the Province of Camarines Sur, overruled the opposition of Ciriaco Chunaco and Jose Aramburo, and declared lot No. 3 public land which had been reserved by the Governor-General on October 19, 1933 for use as site of the Camarines Sur Agricultural School. The oppositors, Ciriaco Chunaco and Jose Aramburo, moved for reconsideration and new trial which motion was denied. Exception was taken and the case finally elevated to this court by bill of exceptions.
Oppositors by their counsel assign ten errors all of which, however, — with the exception of the last one with reference to the alleged error in refusing a new trial — may be reduced to one single proposition, namely: Whether or not upon the evidence presented, the court below erred in declaring lot No. 3 public land subject to reservation by the Chief Executive for the stated public purpose, instead of adjudicating the same and ordering its registration in the name of the oppositor-claimant Ciriaco Chunaco.
Appellants claim that they and their predecessors in interest have been since time immemorial in the continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of lot No. 3 under a bona fide claim of ownership and that, therefore, they are entitled to the registration of the same under the provisions of Act No. 926, section 54, paragraph 6, and Act No. 2874, Chapter VIII, section 45, paragraph (b), respectively.
The appellants called to the witness-stand eight witnesses to substantiate their claim. Documentary evidence was also presented and admitted (Exhibits 1 to 23). No claim is made that the lot had been acquired either by purchase from or composition title with the Government (Royal Decree of June 25, 1880). No step was even taken towards securing possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 and the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893. The appellants, therefore, cannot invoke the provisions of section 19, paragraph 3, of Act No, 496, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2164, which require that an applicant for registration of title must claim "to own or hold any land under a possessory information title, acquired under the provisions of the Mortgage Law of the Philippine Islands and the general regulations for the execution of same." (Fernandez Hermanos v. Director of Lands, 57 Phil., 929, 933.) The failure of the appellants’ predecessors in interest institution of possessory information proceedings for the gratuitous grant of title from the Spanish Government, thereby perfecting and converting their possessory right into one ownership, caused the land to revert to the Government. (Fuster v. Director of Lands, G. R. No. 40129, 61 Phil., 1015; Li Seng Giap & Co. v. director of Lands, 59 Phil., 687; Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands, 59 Phil., 600.) In the first cited case, this court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No existe en autos prueba alguna que demuestre que Secerino Tamayo y Juan de la Cruz, ni sus companeros, hayan solicitado la composicion de los terrenos en controversia de acuerdo con el mencionado Regalmento, cuyo objetivo era precisamente el legitimar la posesion de los que poseian ilegitimamente terrenos del Estado, ni de que se hayan acogido a los beneficios del Real Decreto de 13 de febrerode 1894 que tenia por especial fin dar una vez mas oportunidad a dichos poseedores a que pudiesen obtener titulo gratuito previos los tramites de informacion posesoria, ni tampoco a los del Real Decreto de 21 de febrero de 1895. Si fueres cierto, como la solocitante apelada Antonia C. Fuster ha tratado de probar, que Severino Tamayo y Juan se la Cruz y companeros hubieran estado en posesion continua del referido terreno y lo hubieran estado cultivando por medio de inquilinos hasta que traspasaron sus derechos sobre el mismo a Matias Fuster el 15 de mayo de 1895 (Exh. I), no se comprende como no se habian acogido ni a los beneficios del Real Decreto de 25 de junio de 1880, para lo cual tenian tiempo hasta el 17 de abril de 1894, ni a los beneficios del Real Decreto de 13 de febrero de 1894, ni a los de Real Decreto de 21 de febrero de 1895, para legitimar su posesion y adquirir titulo gratuito de propiedad sobre dicho terreno. Si hubiesen estado tan empenados en cultivar el citado terreno, hasta el extremo de poner encargados en el,
