FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013]
ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME SARMIENTO AND GREGORIO BARREDO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Office dated March 27, 1998 STANDS and having become final and having been fully executed, completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case.
No further motion shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.3
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. finding the IPI Employees Union-ALU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of ALU including sales personnel;
2. dismissing, for lack of merit, the charges of contempt filed by the Union against the IPI officials and reiterating our strict directive for a restoration of the status quo ante the strike as hereinbefore discussed;
3. dismissing the Union’s complaint against the Company for unfair labor practice through refusal to bargain;
4. dismissing the IPI petition to declare the strike of the Union as illegal; and
5. directing the IPI Employees Union-ALU and the International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to enter into their new CBA, incorporating therein the dispositions hereinbefore stated. All other provisions in the old CBA not otherwise touched upon in these proceedings are, likewise, to be incorporated in the new CBA.
SO ORDERED.5
WHEREFORE, in the light of the forgoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the motions for reconsideration filed by the International Pharmaceutical, Inc. and the Workers Trade Alliance Unions (WATU) for lack of merit;
2. Ordering the International Pharmaceutical Inc. to reinstate to their former positions with full backwages reckoned from 8 December 1989 until actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other benefits the “affected workers” herein-below listed:
1. Reynaldo C. Menor 24. Carmelita Ygot 2. Geronimo S. Banquirino 25. Gregorio Barredo 3. Rogelio Saberon 26. Dario Abella 4. Estefanio G. Maderazo 27. Artemio Pepito 5. Herbert G. Veloso 28. Anselmo Tareman 6. Rogelio G. Enricoso 29. Merope Lozada 7. Colito Virtudazo 30. Agapito Mayorga 8. Gilbert Encontro 31. Narciso M. Leyson 9. Bebiano Pancho 32. Ananias Dinolan 10. Merlina Gomez 33. Cristy L. Caybot 11. Lourdes Mergal 34. Johnnelito S. Corilla 12. Anecito Cupta 35. Noli Silo 13. Prescillano O. Naquines 36. Danilo Palioto 14. Alejandro O. Rodriguez 37. Winnie dela Cruz 15. Godofredo Delposo 38. Edgar Montecillo 16. Jovito Jayme 39. Pompio Senador 17. Emma L. Lana 40. Ernesto Palomar 18. Koannia M. Tangub 41. Reynante Germininano 19. Violeta Pancho 42. Pelagio Arnaiz 20. Roberto Bordomeo 43. Ireneo Russiana 21. Mancera Vevincio 44. Benjamin Gellangco, Jr. 22. Caesar Sigfredo 45. Nestor Ouano (listed in paragraphs 1 & 9 of the IPI Employees Union-ALU’s Supplemental Memorandum dated 6 March 1991) 23. Trazona Roldan
3. Ordering the International Pharmaceutical Inc. to reinstate to their former positions the following employees, namely:No further motions of the same nature shall be entertained.8(listed in paragraph 3 of the IPI Employees Union-ALU’s Supplemental Memorandum dated 6 March 1991).
- Alexander Aboganda
- Pacifico Pestano
- Carlito Torregano
- Clemencia Pestano
- Elisea Cabatingan
To speed-up the settlement of the issue, the undersigned on 7 February 1995 issued an order directing the parties to submit within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the Order, their respective Computations. To date, only the computation from complainants including those that were not specifically mentioned in the Supreme Court decision were submitted and received by this office.
Upon verification of the Computation available at hand, management is hereby directed to pay the employees including those that were not specifically mentioned in the decision but are similarly situated, the aggregate amount of FORTY-THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIVE AND 87/100 PESOS (P43,650,905.87) involving NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (962) employees, in the manner shown in the attached Computation forming part of this Order. This is without prejudice to the final Order of the Court to reinstate those covered employees.
This Order is to take effect immediately and failure to comply as instructed will cause the issuance of a WRIT OF EXECUTION.14
GROUP NO. OF EMPLOYEES TOTAL CLAIM Those represented by Atty. Arnado 15 P4,162,361.50 Salesman 9 P6,241,535.44 For Union Members 179 P6,671,208.86 For Non-Union Members 33 P1,228,321.09 Employees who ratified the CBA 642 P23,982,340.14 Separated Employees 84 P1,365,136.84 TOTAL 962 P43,650,905.87
1. Barredo, Gregorio P278,700.10 2. Bordomeo, Roberto P278,700.10 3. Cupta, Anecito P278,700.10 4. Delposo, Godofredo P278,700.10 5. Dinolan, Ananias P278,700.10 6. Jayme, Jovito P278,700.10 7. Lozada, Merope P278,700.10 8. Mayorga, Agapito P278,700.10 9. Mergal, Lourdes P278,700.10 10. Pancho, Bebiano P278,700.10 11. Pancho, Violeta P278,700.10 12. Rodriguez, Alejandro P278,700.10 13. Russiana, Ireneo P263,685.10 14. Tangub, Joannis P278,700.10 15. Trazona, Rolsan P275,575.10 TOTAL P4,162,361.50
WHEREFORE, Our Order dated December 24, 1997, is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Motion for Reconsideration/Amend/Clarificatory and Reiteration of Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated January 12, 1998, filed by six (6) salesmen, namely, Geronimo S. Banquirigo, Reynaldo C. Menor, Rogelio Enricoso, Danilo Palioto, Herbert Veloso and Colito Virtudazo as well as the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification filed by Salesman Noli G. Silo, are hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The June 5, 1995 Writ of Execution is now considered fully executed and satisfied.
The Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by Roberto Bordomeo and 231 others, is likewise DENIED, for lack of merit
SO ORDERED.32
For Roberto Bordomeo and 14 others P4,990,401.00 The rest of complainants __33,824,820.41 Total P 38,815,221.41
It is worthy to note that all the decisions and incidents concerning the case between petitioners and private respondent IPI have long attained finality. The records show that petitioners have already been granted a writ of execution. In fact, the decision has been executed. Thus, there is nothing for this Court to modify. The granting of the instant petition calls for the amendment of the Court of a decision which has been executed. In this light, it is worthy to note the rule that final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be amended except only to correct errors which are clerical in nature. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. (Pio Barreto Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 127).
This Court in the case of CA GR No. 54041 dated February 28, 2001, has ruled that the Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 have become final and executory. It may be noted that the said orders affirmed the earlier orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 22, 1995 and August 27, 1996 granting the execution of the decision in the case between petitioners and IPI.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.40
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED CONTRARY TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT:
- HELD THAT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS (WHICH MERELY SEEKS FULL EXECUTION OF DOLE FINAL JUDGMENTS 26 DECEMBER 1990 AND 5 DECEMBER 1991 WOULD AMEND SAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS.
- FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE SET IN PDCP VS. GENILO, G.R. NO. 106705, THAT SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES HAS THE RIGHT TO PROVE THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO THE BENEFITS AWARDED UNDER FINAL JUDGMENTS.
- HELD THAT THE QUESTIONED JUDGMENTS HAD BEEN EXECUTED WHEN THE RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES ADMIT THE CONTRARY.
- HELD THAT DOLE SECRETARY DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN SHE REFUSED TO FULLY EXECUTE THE 1990 AND 1991 DOLE FINAL JUDGMENTS AND ISSUE CORRESPONDING WRITS OF EXECUTION.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case “as the ends of justice may require.” Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.45 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
It is worthy to note that all the decisions and incidents concerning the case between petitioners and private respondent IPI have long attained finality. The records show that petitioners have already been granted a writ of execution. In fact, the decision has been executed. Thus, there is nothing for this Court to modify. The granting of the instant petition calls for the amendment of the Court of a decision which has been executed. In this light, it is worthy to note the rule that final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be amended except only to correct errors which are clerical in nature. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of jurisdiction (Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 127).
This Court in the case of CA GR No. 54041 dated February 28, 2001, has ruled that the Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 have become final and executory. It may be noted that the said orders affirmed the earlier orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 22, 1995 and August 27, 1996 granting the execution of the decision in the case between petitioners and IPI.
There is nothing on the records to support the allegation of petitioners that the Secretary of Labor and Employment abused her discretion. The pertinent portion of the assailed order reads:“Given that this office had already ruled on all incidents of the case in its March 27, 1998 order and the Writ of Execution dated June 5, 1995 had already attained finality and had in fact been completely satisfied through the deposit with the Regional Office of the amount covered by the Writ, the subsequent Motions filed by Atty. Arnado can no longer be entertained, much less granted by this Office. Thus, at this point, there is nothing more to grant nor to execute.”48
x x x x
In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not a merely reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order.49 Showing mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.50 Under the circumstances, the CA committed no abuse of discretion, least of all grave, because its justifications were supported by the history of the dispute and borne out by the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
And, secondly, the records contradict the petitioners’ insistence that the two writs of execution to enforce the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders of the DOLE Secretary were only partially satisfied. To recall, the two writs of execution issued were the one for P4,162,361.50, later reduced to P3,416,402.10, in favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado, and that for P1,200,378.92 in favor of the second group of employees led by Banquerigo.
There is no question that the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado, inclusive of the petitioners, received their portion of the award covered by the September 3, 1996 writ of execution for the amount of P3,416,402.10 through the release of the garnished deposit of IPI at China Banking Corporation. That was why they then executed the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release, the basis for the DOLE Secretary to expressly declare in her July 4, 2001 decision that the full satisfaction of the writ of execution “completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case.”51
Still, the 15 employees demand payment of their separation pay and backwages from March 16, 1995 onwards pursuant to their reservation reflected in the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release they executed on September 11, 1996.
The demand lacked legal basis. Although the decision of the DOLE Secretary dated December 5, 1991 had required IPI to reinstate the affected workers to their former positions with full backwages reckoned from December 8, 1989 until actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, the reinstatement thus decreed was no longer possible. Hence, separation pay was instead paid to them. This alternative was sustained in law and jurisprudence, for “separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated.”52
Under the circumstances, the employment of the 15 employees or the possibility of their reinstatement terminated by March 15, 1995. Thereafter, their claim for separation pay and backwages beyond March 15, 1995 would be unwarranted. The computation of separation pay and backwages due to illegally dismissed employees should not go beyond the date when they were deemed to have been actually separated from their employment, or beyond the date when their reinstatement was rendered impossible. Anent this, the Court has observed in Golden Ace Builders v. Talde:53The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is usually the length of the employee’s service while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.
As to how both awards should be computed, Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines instructs:[T]he award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no illegal dismissal, for under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without just cause and without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or payment of separation pay in lieu thereof:
Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.
The normal consequences of respondents’ illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
x x x x
Clearly then, respondent is entitled to backwages and separation pay as his reinstatement has been rendered impossible due to strained relations. As correctly held by the appellate court, the backwages due respondent must be computed from the time he was unjustly dismissed until his actual reinstatement, or from February 1999 until June 30, 2005 when his reinstatement was rendered impossible without fault on his part.
The Court, however, does not find the appellate court’s computation of separation pay in order. The appellate court considered respondent to have served petitioner company for only eight years. Petitioner was hired in 1990, however, and he must be considered to have been in the service not only until 1999, when he was unjustly dismissed, but until June 30, 2005, the day he is deemed to have been actually separated (his reinstatement having been rendered impossible) from petitioner company or for a total of 15 years.54
As for the portions of the award pertaining to the rest of the employees listed in the April 12, 1995 notice of execution/computation (i.e., those allegedly similarly situated as the employees listed in the December 5, 1991 order of the DOLE Secretary) still remaining unsatisfied, the petitioners are definitely not the proper parties to ventilate such concern in this or any other forum. At any rate, the concern has already been addressed and resolved by the Court in G.R. No. 164633.55
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for its lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 30, 2003; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 240-247; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico, and Hakim S. Abdulwahid concurring.
2 Id. at 167-170.
3 Id. at 170.
4 Id. at 40-53.
5 Id. at 52-53.
6 Id. at 55.
7 Id. at 55-66.
8 Id. at 68-69; 94-95.
9 Id. at 67.
10 Id. at 67 and 69.
11 Id. at 68.
12 Id. at 119-120.
13 Id. at 68-70.
14 Id. at 70.
15 Id. at 72.
16 Id. at 73.
17 Id. at 100-101.
18 Id. at 120-121
19 Id. at 93-114.
20 Id. at 114.
21 Id. at 115-133.
22 Id. at 133.
23 Id. at 134.
24 Id. at 137.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 137-138.
28 Id. at 138.
29 Id. at 134-141.
30 Banquerigo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164633, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA169.
31Rollo, pp. 142-152.
32 Id. at 151-152.
33 Id. at 315-316.
34 Id. at 168.
35 Id. at 169.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 167-170.
38 Id. at 240.
39 Id. at 240-247.
40 Id. at 246-247.
41 Id. at 248-255.
42 Id. at 258-260.
43 Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
44 G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 580.
45 Id. at 594-595.
46 Philippine National Bank v. Perez, G.R. No. 187640 and 187687, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 317, 332.
47 Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 8, 20.
48Rollo, p. 246.
49 Tan v. Antazo, G.R. No. 187208, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 337, 342.
50Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc., G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012.
51 Rollo, p. 170.
52Velasco v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 161694, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 686, 699.
53 G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 283.
54 Id. at 288-291.
55Supra note 30.