EN BANC
G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[T]he term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.” The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of “all laws” relating to the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to “enforce and administer all laws” relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:cralavvonlinelawlibrary(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.”
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 3-62.cralawlibrary
2 Id. at 69-71.cralawlibrary
3 Id. at 69. See People v. Jalosjos, 421 Phil. 43 (2001).cralawlibrary
4 In relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.cralawlibrary
5 Specifically, the indeterminate penalty of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.cralawlibrary
6 ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.cralawlibrary
7Rollo, p. 74.cralawlibrary
8 Id. at 398. See Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.cralawlibrary
9 Id. Docketed as Case No. 7433.cralawlibrary
10 Id. at 154.cralawlibrary
11 Id. at 81-96. Penned by Presiding Judge Nancy I. Bantayanon-Cuaresma.cralawlibrary
12 Id. at 97-100. Docketed as Civil Case No. 6479.cralawlibrary
13 SEC. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. - The municipal and metropolitan trial courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of inclusion and exclusion of voters from the list in their respective municipalities or cities. Decisions of the municipal or metropolitan trial courts may be appealed directly by the aggrieved party to the proper regional trial court within five days from receipt of notice thereof, otherwise said decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall become final and executory after said period. The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the time the appeal was received and its decision shall be immediately final and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained by the courts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
14Rollo, pp. 69-71. Issued by COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucento N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.cralawlibrary
15 G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1.cralawlibrary
16 377 Phil. 497, 506-507 (1999).cralawlibrary
17Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC & Cardino v. COMELEC, supra note 15, at 32-33.cralawlibrary
18 G.R. No. 195229, October 12, 2012, 683 SCRA 105, 145.cralawlibrary
19 Id. at 149.cralawlibrary
20 SEC. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. x x x
21 SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.cralawlibrary
22 SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:cralavvonlinelawlibrary(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary23Cipriano v. COMELEC, 479 Phil. 677, 690 (2004).cralawlibrary
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(d) Those with dual citizenship;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
24 SEC. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis supplied)
25 RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, p. 377, citing C & C Commercial Corp. v. National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, 129 Phil. 227 (1967).cralawlibrary
26 Either under the RPC or a special penal law.cralawlibrary
27 Under the RPC, a principal penalty is that which is provided for by law for a felony and which is imposed by the court expressly upon conviction. On the other hand, an accessory penalty is one that is deemed included in the imposition of the principal penalty. (See antonio L. Gregorio, “Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review,” 10th Ed., 2008, p. 240)
28 Under the RPC, and in particular, regarding disqualifications to run for elective office, the difference between a perpetual and a temporary disqualification pertains to its duration. A perpetual penalty lasts for a lifetime (see Lacuna v. Abes, G.R. No. L-28613, August 27, 1968, 24 SCRA 78), while the duration of a temporary disqualification, if imposed as an accessory penalty, is coterminous with the term of the imprisonment sentence. This may be gleaned from Articles 30 and 32 of the RPC which respectively read:cralavvonlinelawlibraryART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
x x x x
ART. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. - The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
Meanwhile, a temporary disqualification which is imposed as a principal penalty shall be from six (6) years and one day to twelve (12) years as stated in Article 27 of the RPC:cralavvonlinelawlibraryART. 27. x x x x
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
29 Under the RPC, the difference between an absolute and a special disqualification pertains to the kinds of effects attendant to the disqualification imposed.
Under Article 30, the penalty of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convict the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office; this effect is cumulative with the other effects of the said penalty namely, (a) deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular election; (b) the disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned; and (c) the loss of the rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Under Article 31, the penalty of perpetual or temporary special disqualification has the following effects: (a) deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected; and (b) disqualification for holding similar offices and employments.
Under Article 32, the penalty of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage has the following effects: (a) depriving the offender the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office; and (b) the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.cralawlibrary
30People v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945, 948 (1936).cralawlibrary
31 Id. at 948-949.cralawlibrary
32Roque, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 69, 196.cralawlibrary
33 See Article 41 of the RPC.cralawlibrary
34 133 Phil. 770 (1968).cralawlibrary
35Aratea v. COMELEC, supra note 18, at 134.cralawlibrary
36Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC & Cardino v. COMELEC, supra note 15, at 27.SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
I CONCUR with the ruling that the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos should be cancelled for his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement in light of the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) final judgment denying Jalosjos’ inclusion as a voter. To the extent that the RTC’s basis for its denial was the perpetual absolute disqualification of Jalosjos arising from the reclusion perpetua imposed on him, I also agree that the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc’s ruling cannot legally be faulted.
I make a reservation, however, on the latter ground to the extent that the perpetual absolute disqualification is motu proprio cited by the Comelec en banc in the exercise of its administrative power and as an independent ground for the cancellation it ordered. From this perspective, I take the position that the perpetual absolute disqualification is an improper ground whose proper place and role is the basis for disqualification, not for the cancellation of a CoC, and one that cannot be made motu propio.
A candidate who has filed an otherwise valid CoC may, for example, put up as a defense that he or she has been granted an absolute pardon that erased the accessory penalties attached to his offense and its penalty (as in the recent case of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada). This example glaringly shows that a perpetual absolute disqualification involves a question of fact that requires the full application of due process and cannot, motu proprio and in the exercise of administrative powers, be simply cited as a ground for the cancellation of a CoC.
The Court should also note that in a cancellation of a CoC situation, time is usually of the essence because a candidate cannot be assured of a timely remedy and would simply be out of the ballot if no opportune remedial measure is applied. Thus, the Comelec cannot be overhasty in exercising its administrative powers and in motu proprio citing factual grounds. (The RTC decision in the present case was a different matter since it directly involved the right to vote in the then immediately coming election and related as well to a cited CoC.)
Additionally, there are conceptual points of distinctions between the cancellation of a CoC and the disqualification of a candidate that I had occasion to discuss in my Dissent in another Jalosjos case – Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections.1 In that case, I held the view that conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of the Local Government Code is a distinct ground for disqualification that is not directly and per se a ground for the cancellation of a CoC. (In this sense, the ground cited by the Comelec en banc, if cited independently of the RTC decision, would not be an appropriate basis for the cancellation of Jalosjos’ CoC.) As I explained it in this Dissent:cralavvonlinelawlibraryTo disqualify, in its simplest sense, is (1) to deprive a person of a power, right or privilege; or (2) to make him or her ineligible for further competition because of violation of the rules. It is in these senses that the term is understood in our election laws.
Thus, anyone who may qualify or may have qualified under the general rules of eligibility applicable to all citizens (Section 74 of the OEC) may be deprived of the right to be a candidate or may lose the right to be a candidate (if he has filed his CoC) because of a trait or characteristic that applies to him or an act that can be imputed to him as an individual, separately from the general qualifications that must exist for a citizen to run for a local public office.
In a disqualification situation, the grounds are the individual traits or conditions of, or the individual acts of disqualification committed by, a candidate as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC and Section 40 of LGC 1991, and which generally have nothing to do with the eligibility requirements for the filing of a CoC.
Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC (together with Section 40 of LGC 1991, outlined below) cover the following as traits, characteristics or acts of disqualification: (i) corrupting voters or election officials; (ii) committing acts of terrorism to enhance candidacy; (iii) overspending; (iv) soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions; (v) campaigning outside the campaign period; (vi) removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda; (vii) committing prohibited forms of election propaganda; (viii) violating rules and regulations on election propaganda through mass media; (ix) coercion of subordinates; (x) threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion; (xi) unlawful electioneering; (xii) release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds; (xiii) solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election; (xiv) declaration as an insane; and (xv) committing subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Section 40 of LGC 1991, on the other hand, essentially repeats those already in the OEC under the following disqualifications:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
d. Those with dual citizenship;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded.
Together, these provisions embody the disqualifications that, by statute, can be imputed against a candidate or a local elected official to deny him of the chance to run for office or of the chance to serve if he has been elected.
A unique feature of "disqualification" is that under Section 68 of the OEC, it refers only to a "candidate," not to one who is not yet a candidate. Thus, the grounds for disqualification do not apply to a would-be candidate who is still at the point of filing his CoC. This is the reason why no representation is required in the CoC that the would-be candidate does not possess any ground for disqualification. The time to hold a person accountable for the grounds for disqualification is after attaining the status of a candidate, with the filing of the CoC.
To sum up and reiterate the essential differences between the eligibility requirements and disqualifications, the former are the requirements that apply to, and must be complied by, all citizens who wish to run for local elective office; these must be positively asserted in the CoC. The latter refer to individual traits, conditions or acts applicable to specific individuals that serve as grounds against one who has qualified as a candidate to lose this status or privilege; essentially, they have nothing to do with a candidate’s CoC.
When the law allows the cancellation of a candidate’s CoC, the law considers the cancellation from the point of view of those positive requirements that every citizen who wishes to run for office must commonly satisfy. Since the elements of "eligibility" are common, the vice of ineligibility attaches to and affects both the candidate and his CoC. In contrast, when the law allows the disqualification of a candidate, the law looks only at the disqualifying trait or condition specific to the individual; if the "eligibility" requirements have been satisfied, the disqualification applies only to the person of the candidate, leaving the CoC valid. A previous conviction of subversion is the best example as it applies not to the citizenry at large, but only to the convicted individuals; a convict may have a valid CoC upon satisfying the eligibility requirements under Section 74 of the OEC, but shall nevertheless be disqualified.2 (emphases ours; citations omitted)
These distinctions, to be sure, are not idle ones in light of the above-mentioned time limitations involved in an election situation. There, too, is the reality, as pointed out above, that a party whose CoC is denied or is cancelled would not be considered a candidate; on the other hand, one who filed a valid CoC but who is subsequently disqualified (e.g., for unlawful electioneering under Sections 68 and 12 of the Omnibus Election Code) was a candidate but was not allowed to be voted for or, after elections, would not be allowed to serve if he would win. Directly relevant to this distinction is Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which allows the substitution of disqualified candidates as has been extensively discussed by Mr. Justice Lucas P. Bersamin in the recent case of Talaga v. Commission on Elections.3
Subject to the above reservation, I fully concur with the majority.Endnotes:
1 G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1.cralawlibrary
2 Id. at 41.cralawlibrary
3 G.R. Nos. 196804 and 197015, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 197.