G.R. No. 186264, July 08, 2013 - DR. LORNA C.FORMARAN, Petitioner, v. DR. GLENDA B. ONG AND SOLOMON S. ONG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 186264, July 08, 2013
DR. LORNA C.FORMARAN, Petitioner, v. DR. GLENDA B. ONG AND SOLOMON S. ONG, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
“WHEREFORE, in the (sic) light of the foregoing, the assailed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Complaint of appellee Lorna C. Formaran is DISMISSED. The appellee, her agents or representatives are ORDERED to vacate the land in question and to restore the same to appellants.”
“According to plaintiff (Petitioner)'s complaint, she owns the afore-described parcel of land which was donated to her intervivos by [her] uncle and aunt, spouses Melquiades Barraca and Praxedes Casidsid on June 25, 1967; that on August 12, 1967 upon the proddings and representation of defendant (Respondent) Glenda, that she badly needed a collateral for a loan which she was applying from a bank to equip her dental clinic, plaintiff made it appear that she sold one-half of the afore- described parcel of land to the defendant Glenda; that the sale was totally without any consideration and fictitious; that contrary to plaintiff’s agreement with defendant Glenda for the latter to return the land, defendant Glenda filed a case for unlawful detainer against the plaintiff who consequently suffered anxiety, sleepless nights and besmirched reputation; and that to protect plaintiff’s rights and interest over the land in question, she was constrained to file the instant case, binding herself to pay P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
In an answer filed on December 22, 1997, defendant Glenda insisted on her ownership over the land in question on account of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the plaintiff in her favor; and that plaintiff’s claim of ownership therefore was virtually rejected by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ibaja-Nabas, Ibajay, Aklan, when it decided in her favor the unlawful detainer case she filed against the plaintiff, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 183. Defendants are also claiming moral damages and attorney’s fees in view of the filing of the present case against them.
Plaintiff’s testimony tends to show that the land in question is part of the land donated to her on June 25, 1967 by spouses Melquiades Barraca and Praxedes Casidsid, plaintiff’s uncle and aunt, respectively. As owner thereof, she declared the land for taxation purposes (Exhibits A-1 to A-5, inclusive). She religiously paid its realty taxes (Exhibit A-6). She mortgaged the land to Aklan Development Bank to secure payment of a loan.
In 1967, defendant Glenda and her father, Melquiades Barraca came to her residence asking for help. They were borrowing one-half of land donated to her so that defendant Glenda could obtain a loan from the bank to buy a dental chair. They proposed that she signs an alleged sale over the said portion of land.
Acceding to their request, she signed on August 12, 1967 a prepared Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit C) which they brought along with them (TSN, p. 22, Ibid), covering the land in question without any money involved. There was no monetary consideration in exchange for executing Exhibit C. She did not also appear before the Notary Public Edilberto Miralles when Exhibit C was allegedly acknowledged by her on November 9, 1967.
A month thereafter, plaintiff inquired from her uncle, Melquiades Barracca if they have obtained the loan. The latter informed her that they did not push through with the loan because the bank’s interest therefore was high. With her uncle’s answer, plaintiff inquired about Exhibit C. Her uncle replied that they crampled (kinumos) the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit C) and threw it away. Knowing that Exhibit C was already thrown away, plaintiff did not bother anymore about the document (TSN, p. 7, Ibid) she thought that there was no more transaction. Besides, she is also in actual possession of the land and have even mortgaged the same.
In 1974, plaintiff transferred her residence from Nabas, Aklan, to Antipolo City where she has been residing up to the present time. From the time she signed the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit C) in August, 1967 up to the present time of her change of residence to Antipolo City, defendant Glenda never demanded actual possession of the land in question, except when the latter filed on May 30, 1996 a case for unlawful detainer against her. Following the filing of the ejectment case, she learned for the first time that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered on May 25, 1991 and was not thrown away contrary to what Melquiades Barraca told her. Moreover, she and Melquiades Barraca did not talk anymore about Exhibit C. That was also the first time she learned that the land in question is now declared for taxation purposes in the name of defendant Glenda.
In closing her direct testimony, plaintiff declared that the filing of the unlawful detainer case against her, caused her some sleepless nights and humiliation. She also suffered hypertension.
Upon the other hand, relevant matters that surfaced from the testimonies of the defendants shows that on June 25, 1967, Melquiades Barraca, father of the defendant Glenda, donated a parcel of land to her niece, plaintiff Lorna C. Formaran (Exhibit 3). At the time of the donation, plaintiff was still single. She married Atty. Formaran only in September, 1967.
Subsequently, on August 12, 1967, Dr. Lorna B. Casidsid, herein plaintiff, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit 1) over one-half portion of the land donated to her, in favor of defendant Glenda. On account of the Sale (Exhibit 1) defendant Glenda was able to declare in her name the land in question for taxation purposes (Exhibit 4) and paid the realty taxes (Exhibits 6, 6-A, 6-B and 6-C). She also was able to possess the land in question.
Defendant Glenda maintained that there was money involved affecting the sale of the land in her favor. The sale was not to enable her to buy a dental chair for she had already one at the time. Besides, the cost of a dental chair in 1967 was only P2,000.00 which she can readily afford.
The document of sale (Exhibit 1) affecting the land in question was not immediately registered after its execution in 1967 but only on May 25, 1991 in order to accommodate the plaintiff who mortgaged the land to Aklan Development Bank on May 18, 1978.
Based on the admissions of the parties in their pleadings, during the pre-trial and evidence on record, there is no contention that on June 25, 1967, the afore-described parcel of land was donated intervivos (Exhibit 3) by spouses Melquiades Barraca and Praxedes Casidsid to therein plaintiff, Dr. Lorna Casidsid Formaran who was yet single. She was married to Atty. Formaran in September 1967. Praxedes was the aunt of Lorna as the latter’s father was the brother of Praxedes.
Following the donation, plaintiff immediately took possession of the land wherein one-half (1/2) thereof is the land in question. Since then up to the present time, is still in actual possession of the land, including the land in question.
Indeed, on May 30, 1996, herein defendant Glenda filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the plaintiff before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ibajay-Nabas, Ibajay, Aklan, docketed there in as Civil Case No. 183. The case was decided on September 2, 1997, (Exhibit 2) in favor of herein defendant Glenda; ordering the herein plaintiff to vacate the land in question.
After the plaintiff acquired ownership by way of donation over the afore-described parcel of land which includes the land in question, she declared the same for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 12533, effective 1969 (Exhibit A-1). Revision caused the subsequent and successive cancellation of Exhibit A-1 by Tax Declaration No. 177, effective 1974 (Exhibit A-2); Tax Declaration No. 183 effective 1980 (Exhibit A-3); Tax Declaration No. 187, effective 1985 (Exhibit A-4); PIN-038-14-001-06-049, effective 1990 (Exhibit A-5); and APP/TD No. 93-001-330, effective 1994 (Exhibit A-6).
The last two Tax Declarations (Exhibits A-5 and A-6) no longer covered the land in question which was segregated therefrom when the Deed of Sale executed on August 12, 1967 (Exhibit C) was registered for the first time on May 25, 1991.
Realty taxes of the afore-described parcel of land, including the land in question, have been paid by the plaintiff since 1967 up to the present time (Exhibit B). However, defendant Glenda paid for the first time the realty taxes of the land in question on January 9, 1995 (Exhibit 6) and up to the present time (Exhibit 6-A and 6- B).
On account of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit C or 1) signed by the plaintiff, during the cadastral survey, the land in question was surveyed in the name of defendant and designated as Lot No. 188 (Exhibit 5) and the other half on the western side was designated as Lot No. 189. The land in question is particularly described as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
A parcel of residential land (Lot No. 188, Cad. Aklan, Bounded on North by Lot No. 196; on the East by Lot No. 187; on the West by Lot No. 189 all of Cad. No. 758-D; and on the South by Mabini St., containing an area of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN (357) SQUARE METERS, more or less.”
“The amplitude of foregoing undisputed facts and circumstances clearly shows that the sale of the land in question was purely simulated. It is void from the very beginning (Article 1346, New Civil Code). If the sale was legitimate, defendant Glenda should have immediately taken possession of the land, declared in her name for taxation purposes, registered the sale, paid realty taxes, introduced improvements therein and should not have allowed plaintiff to mortgage the land. These omissions properly militated against defendant Glenda’s submission that the sale was legitimate and the consideration was paid.
While the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized, it cannot justify the conclusion that the sale is a true conveyance to which the parties are irrevocably and undeniably bound. Although the notarization of Deed of Absolute Sale, vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it does not validate nor make binding an instrument never intended, in the first place, to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto (Suntay vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114950, December 19, 1995; cited in Ruperto Viloria vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119974, June 30, 1999).”
* Per Special Order No. 1484 dated 9 July 2013.cralawlibrary
1 Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, with Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and
2 Stephen C. Cruz, concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-37.cralawlibrary
2 ART. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
ART. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public binds the parties to their real agreement.cralawlibrary
3 Id. at 46-47.