SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013
EDILBERTO U. VENTURA, JR., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES PAULINO AND EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
[w]hen Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street. The amortizations, together with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which Esteban requested as advance payment, were considered part of the purchase price of the Delpan properties. Evangeline likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas properties and [she] shouldered his medical expenses.8
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person shall be illegal and void from its performance unless:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. x x x
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which [the] fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non- existent by the courts.13
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
[w]ith respect to the property located at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio St. Vitas, Tondo, Manila covered by TCT No. 141782, formerly Marcos Road, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila, [Evangeline] declared that part of it was first acquired by [her] father Esteban Abletes sometime in 1968 when he purchased the right of Ampiano Caballegan. Then, in 1970, she x x x bought the right to one-half of the remaining property occupied by Ampiano Caballegan. However, during the survey of the National Housing Authority, she allowed the whole lot [to be] registered in her father’s name. As proof thereof, she presented Exhibits “8” to “11” x x x. [These documents prove that] that she has been an occupant of the said property in Vitas, Tondo even before her father and Socorro Torres got married in June, 1980.14cralawlibrary
Anent the parcels of land and improvements thereon 903 and 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, x x x Evangeline professed that in 1978, before [her] father met Socorro Torres and before the construction of the BLISS Project thereat, [her] father [already had] a bodega of canvas (lona) and a sewing machine to sew the canvas being sold at 903 Del Pan Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she was also operating Vangie’s Canvas Store at 905 Del Pan [Street], Tondo, Manila, which was evidenced by Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued in her favor on 09 November 1998 x x x. When the BLISS project was constructed in 1980, [the property] became known as Unit[s] D-9 and D-10. At first, [her] father [paid] for the amortizations [for] these two (2) parcels of land but when he got sick [with] colon cancer in 1993, he asked [respondents] to continue paying for the amortizations x x x. [Evangeline] paid a total of P195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as shown by the 37 pieces of receipts x x x and the aggregate amount of P188,596.09 for Unit D-10, [as evidenced by] 36 receipts x x x.15
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED and the challenged Decision of the court a quo STANDS.
SO ORDERED.18
x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.25
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
[R]egistration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor's consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
[s]ettled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.30
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1567 dated 11 October 2013.cranad
** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1564 dated 11 October 2013.cranad
1Rollo, pp. 69-81. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurring.cranad
2 Id. at 89-90.cranad
3 Id. at 36-48. Penned by Presiding Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina.cranad
4 Id. at 11.cranad
5 Id. at 15.cranad
6 Id. at 11.cranad
7 Id. at 10.cranad
8 Id. at 12.cranad
9 Id. at 42.cranad
10 Id. at 44.cranad
11 Id. at 45.cranad
12 384 Phil. 661 (2000).cranad
13Rollo, p. 44, citing Niñal v. Badayog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000).cranad
15 Id. at 47-48.cranad
16 Id. at 48.cranad
17 Id. at 69-81.cranad
19 Id. at 77, citing Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 825 (2003).cranad
20 Id. at 77.cranad
21 Id. at 78.cranad
22 Id. at 82-87.cranad
23 Id. at 89-90.cranad
24 G.R. No. 159310, 24 February 2009, 580 SCRA 175.cranad
25Rollo, p. 15, citing Borromeo v. Descallar, supra.cranad
26 Id.cranad
27Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, 3 July 2013, citing Acre v. Yuttikki, 560 Phil. 495 (2007).cranad
28Rollo, p. 16.cranad
29 Id. at 79.cranad
30 Id. at 80.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary