SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205298, September 10, 2014
LEOPOLDO QUINTOS Y DEL AMOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations and contusions on the different parts of his body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution which would produce homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention applied on him that prevented his death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Robert dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and several lacerations on the different parts of her body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution which would produce homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention applied on him that prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Felomina dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Freddie dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty one (1) degree lower than the imposable penalty which is Prision Mayor in its full extent, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused, the accused is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum.
Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Dela Cruz, the amounts of (a) Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php 57,286.00 as actual damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8341
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php 1,650.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8342
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day or arresto mayor as minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php 3,750.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos have undergone preventive imprisonment, they shall be credited in the service of their sentences with the time they have undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.10
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Joint Decision dated October 20, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the State’s evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of the crime, and establishing self-defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the elements of the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.19
We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants’ allegations that they were acting in self-defense because the victims were committing unlawful aggression. We found the following loopholes:
First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were shouting for the brothers of Pedro to come out of the house. No actual sudden or imminent attack, however, was performed. It has been ruled that mere intimidating or threatening words, even if said aloud, do not constitute unlawful aggression. Thus, in People vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an[d] intimidating or threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening stance or posture.
Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting for his brothers to go out, but then, Pedro was the one who went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes had some anger or aggression at that time, it was definitely not directed at Pedro.
Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela Cruz engaged in a fist fight. Robert turned and ran towards his mother, Felomina to allegedly get a bolo which was in Felomina’s possession and concealed under a towel. If this is true, Robert had already retreated and was trying to arm himself to level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedro’s narration, it cannot be definitely said that the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants with the determined intention to inflict serious harm on Pedro.
Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his brother Lando Quintos who was lying on the ground and being attacked by the deceased Freddie dela Cruz. According to him, he hacked Freddie before the latter could stab Lando. Pedro would like to impress upon the court that Lando was also involved in the fight against the dela Cruzes. However, in the same testimony, Pedro said that it was he alone who was fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and that his brothers, including Lando, were “just there, sir, pacifying.”
Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired, surprisingly, accused-appellants did not report the incident to the police. During cross-examination, Pedro admitted that:It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that accused-appellants, who vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties, did not report the incident to the police. Pedro’s alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital did not prevent them from doing so. Pedro had at least three brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando; not to mention his mother and sister, who could have easily gone to the police to report the alleged attack upon them by the dela Cruzes. This omission, therefore, casts doubt on the veracity of the account of the accused-appellants.
Q: After you were threatened and you did not report of the alleged incident that happened on January 15 as what you are telling now? A: No sir. Q: In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital and you were treated you did not even rel[a]y to the police or even to your barangay the alleged incident which you are now narrating, am I correct? A: I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated to the hospital I was brought directly to the jail, sir.
Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and the other victims negate[s] the accused-appellants’ claim of self-defense. According to the medical certificate of Freddie dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest, septicemia and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death certificate, it was further stated that Freddie dela Cruz suffered “amputation of left and right hand.” Meanwhile, with respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez, testified that the victim suffered lacerated wounds on the forehead, lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela Cruz, she also suffered almost similar lacerated wounds.
It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already explained, the wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, negate accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense.
We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence presented by the prosecution and this Court believes that the version of the latter is more credible and consistent with the truth. As a matter of fact, by simply admitting that they attacked Freddie dela Cruz and the two other victims, the case against the accused-appellants had become irrefutable. x x x.22
x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or mo[r]ality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1767 dated 27 August 2014.
1 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
2Rollo, pp. 32-48. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring.
3 Id. at 50-51.
4 Id. at 72-91. Penned by Presiding Judge Robert P. Fangayen.
5 Records, Vol. 2, p. 1.
6 Id., Vol. 3, p. 1.
7 Id., Vol. 1, p. 49.
8 Id., Vol. 1, p. 185.
9Rollo, p. 88.
10 Id. at 90-91.
11 Id. at 47.
12 Id. at 21.
13 Serra v. Mumar, G.R. No. 193861, 14 March 2012, 668 SCRA 335.
14Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 199294, 31 July 2013, 703 SCRA 118, 126.
15Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, G.R. No. 169067, 6 October 2010, 632 SCRA 338, 345.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18Belbis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 181052, 14 November 2012, 685 SCRA 518, 533.
19 G.R. No. 172606, 23 November 2011, 661 SCRA 159, 166-167.
20 TSN, 10 November 2009, pp. 11-13; TSN, 30 June 2009, pp. 10-11.
21People v. Aleta, 603 Phil. 571, 581 (2009), citing People v. Caabay, 456 Phil. 792 (2003).
22 Rollo, pp. 42-45.
23People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 721 (2009).
24 People v. Durana, 333 Phil. 148, 156 (1996).
25 Supra note 23, at 720.