SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. EDNA A. AZOTE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Social Security Commission (SSC) assails the August 13, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its October 29, 2013 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122933, allowing respondent Edna A. Azote (Edna) to claim the death benefits of her late husband, Edgardo Azote (Edgardo).
The Antecedents:
On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the Social Security System (SSS), were married in civil rites at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City, Albay (RTC). Their union produced six children4 born from 1985 to 1999. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated beneficiaries. Thereafter or on September 7, 2001, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries.5
On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer), as dependent, born on October 9, 1982. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. The benefits, however, would be stopped once a child would attain the age of 21.6
On March 13, 2007, Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo.7 She insisted that she was the legitimate wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was published in a newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default.8
In the Resolution,9 dated December 8, 2010, the SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit. Citing Section 24(c) of the SS Law, it explained that although Edgardo filed the Form E-4 designating Edna and their six children as beneficiaries, he did not revoke the designation of Rosemarie as his wife-beneficiary, and Rosemarie was still presumed to be his legal wife.
The SSC further wrote that the National Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to one Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved. The SSC stated that there must be a judicial determination of nullity of a previous marriage before a party could enter into a second marriage.10
In an order,11 dated June 8, 2011, the SSC denied Edna’s motion for reconsideration. It explained that it was incumbent upon Edna to prove that her marriage to the deceased was valid, which she failed to do. It further opined that Rosemarie could not be merely presumed dead, and that death benefits under the SSS could not be considered properties which may be disposed of in a holographic will.12
In the assailed August 13, 2013 Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the resolution and the order of the SSC. It held that the SSC could not make a determination of the validity or invalidity of the marriage of Edna to Edgardo considering that no contest came from either Rosemarie or Elmer.13
The CA explained that Edna had established her right to the benefits by substantial evidence, namely, her marriage certificate and the baptismal certificates of her children.14 It ruled that Edgardo made a deliberate change of his wife-beneficiary in his 1994 E-4 form, as such was clearly his voluntary act manifesting his intention to revoke his former declaration in the 1982 E-4 form.15 The 1994 E-4 form submitted by Edgardo, designating Edna as his wife, superseded his former declaration in his 1982 E-4 form.16
It further opined that the Davac case cited by the SSC was not applicable because there were two conflicting claimants in that case, both claiming to be wives of the deceased, while in this case, Edna was the sole claimant for the death benefits, and that her designation as wife-beneficiary remained valid and unchallenged. It was of the view that Rosemarie’s non-appearance despite notice could be deemed a waiver to claim death benefits from the SSS, thereby losing whatever standing she might have had to dispute Edna’s claim.17
In the assailed October 29, 2013 Resolution,18 the CA denied the SSC’s motion for reconsideration.19
Hence, the present petition.
GROUNDS
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMMISSION IS BEREFT OF AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND MEMBER EDGARDO AZOTE.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND FINDING HER ENTITLED TO THE SS BENEFITS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DESIGNATION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS WIFE-BENEFICIARY IS VALID.20
SEC. 8. Terms Defined. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:x x x x
(e) Dependents - The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.x x x x
(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary. (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SSS, as the primary institution in charge of extending social security protection to workers and their beneficiaries is mandated by Section 4(b)(7) of RA 8282 to require reports, compilations and analyses of statistical and economic data and to make an investigation as may be needed for its proper administration and development. Precisely, the investigations conducted by SSS are appropriate in order to ensure that the benefits provided under the SS Law are received by the rightful beneficiaries. It is not hard to see that such measure is necessary for the system’s proper administration, otherwise, it will be swamped with bogus claims that will pointlessly deplete its funds. Such scenario will certainly frustrate the purpose of the law which is to provide covered employees and their families protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death, with a view to promoting their well-being in the spirit of social justice. Moreover and as correctly pointed out by SSC, such investigations are likewise necessary to carry out the mandate of Section 15 of the SS Law which provides in part, viz:
Sec. 15. Non-transferability of Benefits. – The SSS shall pay the benefits provided for in this Act to such [x x x] persons as may be entitled thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Endnotes:
* Designated Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No. 1977, dated April 15, 2015.
1Rollo, pp. 32-56.
2 Id. at 58-74. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.
3 Id. at 75-76.
4 (1) Joanna Rea A. Azote (September 15, 1985); (2) Edgardo A. Azote, Jr. (May 20, 1987); (3) Edgar Allan A. Azote (June 30, 1988); (4) Erwin John A. Azote (February 11, 1995); (5) Edgardo A. Azote, Jr. II (February 27, 1998); and (6) Jhoaenne Edrailynee A. Azote (June 24, 1999). id. at 12.
5 Id. at 36-37.
6 Id. at 78-79.
7 Id. at 60.
8 Id. at 79.
9 Id. at 78-81.
10 Id. at 81.
11 Id. at 82-84.
12 Id. at 83.
13 Id. at 64.
14 Id. at 65.
15 Id. at 70.
16 Id. at 70.
17 Id. at 72.
18 Id. at 75-76.
19 Id. at 85-89.
20 Id. at 39.
21SSS v. De Los Santos, 585 Phil. 684 (2008); and Signey v. SSS, 566 Phil. 617 (2008).
22Rollo, pp. 40-42.
23 Id. at 48-49.
24 Id. at 50-51.
25 AN ACT FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM THEREBY AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1161, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE SOCIAL SECURITY LAW
26 Section 2, R.A. No. 8282.
27Rollo, p. 67.
28Signey v. Social Security System, 566 Phil. 617, 627 (2008).
29 SEC. 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. - (a) The Commission. - For the attainment of its main objectives as set forth in Section 2 hereof, the Commission shall have the following powers and duties:
x x x
(b) The Social Security System. - Subject to the provision of Section four (4), paragraph seven (7) hereof, the SSS shall have the following powers and duties:
x x x
(7) To require reports, compilations and analyses of statistical and economic data and to make investigation as may be needed for the proper administration and development of the SSS
30 G.R. No. 170195, March 28, 2011, 646 SCRA 462, 480.
31Rollo, p. 101.
32 Id. at 98.
LEONEN, J.:
It should be remembered that the benefits or compensation allowed an employee or his beneficiary under the provisions of the Social Security Act are paid out of funds which are contributed in part by the employees and in part by the employers' (commercial or industrial companies members of the System). . . . As these funds are obtained from the employees and the employers, without the Government having contributed any portion thereot: it would be unjust for the System to refuse to pay the benefits to those whom the employee has designated as his beneficiaries. The contribution of the empioyee is his money; the contribution of the employer is for the benefit of the employee. Hence the beneficiary should primarily be the one to profit by such contributions. This is what is expressly provided in above-quoted Section 13 of the law.
It should also be noted that the Social Security System is not a law of succession. Its purpose is to provide social security, which means funds for the beneficiary, if the employee dies, or for the employee himself and his dependents if he is unable to perform his task because of illness or disability, or is laid off by reason of the termination of the employment, or because of temporary lay-off due to strike, etc. It should also be remembered that the beneficiaries of the System are those who are dependent upon the employee for support. . . .
. . . .
. . . It was subsequently known that Lim Hoc had a wife and children in Communist China; the omission by him of their existence and names in the records of the employer must have been due to the fact that they were not at the time, at least, dependent upon him. If they were actually dependents, their names would have appeared in the record of the employer. The absence in the record of his employee of their existence and names must have been due to the lack of communication, of which We can take judicial notice, between Communist China and the Philippines, or to the express desire of Lim Hoc to extend the benefits of his contributions to the System to his "friend and co-worker", to the exclusion of his wife[.]
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that. the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first first spouse.10 (Emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1 Rep. Act No. 8282 ( 1997), An Act Further Strengthening the Social Security System thereby amending for this purpose Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law.
2 Rep. Act No, 8282 (1997), sec. 24 (c).
3 Rep. Act No. 8282 (1997), sec. 24 (c).
4Valencia v. Manila Yacht Club, 138 Phil. 761 (1969) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc], citing Rural Transit Employees Association, et al. v. Bachrach Trailsportation Co., Inc., et al., 129 Phil. 503 [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc].
5Benguet Comolidated Inc. v. SSS, 119 Phil. 890 (1964) [Per J. Barrera, En Banc].
6Dycaico v. Social Security System, 513 Phil. 23 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]. See also GSIS v. Montesclaros, 478 Phil. 573 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
7 113 Phil. 703 (1961) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
8 In Suarnaba v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 175 Phil. 8 (1978) [Per J. Santos, Second Division], this court held that the parish certificate attesting to the marriage of petitioner and the deceased, other parol evidence, and the presumption that "a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" clearly show that the petitioner is the legal wife of the deceased employee and, therefore, her claim to con1pensation benefits as legal wife and dependent of the deceased should have been approved, especially where no other person claimed to be the wife of the deceased employee.
9 529 Phil. 249 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
10 Id. at 262-263, citing 1 A. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 282 (1999 ed.).
11 585 Phil. 684 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R. T., Third Division].
12 566 Phil. 617 (2008) (Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
13 Act No. 2710 (1917), An Act to Establish Divorce.
Sec. 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.
. . . .
Sec. 11. The dissolution of the bonds of matrimony shall have the following effects:
First. The spouses shall be free to marry again.
Second. The minor children shall remain in the custody of the innocent spouse unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian.
Third. The children shall, with regard to their parents, retain all rights granted to them by law as legitimate children; but upon the partition of the estate of said parents they shall bring to collation everything received by them under the provisions of the second paragraph of section nine.
14 Exec. Order No. 209 (1987), The Family Code of the Philippines.
15 Exec. Order No. 209 (1987), Title II.
16 Exec. Order No. 209 ( 1987), Title 11, art. 63 (I).
17 Exec. Order No. 209 (1987), Title I, chapter 3. Void and Voidable Marriages.