SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196357, April 20, 2015
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DELFIN DELA CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS SPOUSE, CARMELITA DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., REPRESENTED BY MR. CARLOS C. SALINAS AND/OR TECTO BELGIUM N.V., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the June 18, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105930 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed therewith and affirming the January 23, 2007 Decision3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in OFW (M) 03-12-3155-00 (CA No. 046453-05). Said NLRC Decision reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's May 30, 2005 Decision4 which, in turn, granted the late Delfin Dela Cruz's (Delfin) claims for sickness allowance and disability benefits filed against respondents Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. and/or Tecto Belgium N.V. (respondents). Also assailed in this petition is the CA's March 29, 2011 Resolution5 denying the Motion for Reconsideration6 filed by the heirs of Delfin (petitioners).
Factual Antecedents
The facts, as summarized by the CA in its assailed Decision, are as follows:
The late Delfin Dela Cruz was contracted for the position of [Oiler] by x xx Philippine Transmarine Carriers[,] Inc., a local manning agent for and in behalf of the latter's principal, Tecto Belgium N.V.[,] under the following terms and conditions as provided for in the Contract of Employment:
Duration of contract - 9 months Position - OILER Basic Monthly Salary - $535.00 per month Hours of Work - 44 hours per week Overtime - $298/month fixed overtime - US$3.50/hour after 85 hours Vacation Leave w/ - 8 days/month with Seniority Bonus Pay US$7.50/month Point of Hire - Manila, Philippines
As required by law and by the employment contract, [Delfin] underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was declared Fit for Sea Service. [His] work includes observing routine watch, taking records of pressure of temperature of all working apparatus, obeying all orders and commands of the engineers, and maintaining cleanliness of machinery and engine room.
[Delfin] left the Philippines on 16 August 2000 and immediately embarked the vessel "Lady Hilde" on 17 August 2000. While on board, he felt gradual chest pains and pain [in] his upper abdominal region. On 26 [June] 2001, while performing his regular duties, he was hit by a metal board on his back. He, thereafter, requested medical attention and was given medications and advised to be given light duties for the rest of the week. Upon the vessel's arrival at a convenient port on 16 August 2001, his contract expired and [he] was signed off from the vessel. He xxx reported to xxx [respondents] as required. He also sought medical assistance but was not [extended] such.
On 13 November 2003, [Delfin] went to De Los Santos Medical Center for proper medical attention[.] [There,] he underwent X-Ray and MRI of the [Thoracic] Spine. Afterwards, he was not employed by xxx [respondents] because he was already incapacitated to engage in his customary work. He filed his claim for sickness allowance from the same manning agency but the same was not [granted].
His [condition] deteriorated[.] [Thereafter, he was] admitted at St. Luke's Medical Center, where he was diagnosed to be suffering from [malignant] peripheral nerve sheath tumor [MPNST]. He shouldered his medical expenses x x x.
On 4 December 2003, he filed a complaint before the NLRC to, claim payment for sickness allowance and disability compensation. x x x
[Respondents] filed [a] Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription, the claim having [been] filed beyond one year from the date of the termination of the contract. [Delfin] countered x x x that the applicable prescription period is 3 years, according to the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The parties, thereafter, submitted their position papers. [Delfin] claimed [for] medical reimbursement and sickness allowance, permanent disability compensation, and damages and attorney's fees.
[Delfin], on one hand, asseverated in his complaint that he is entitled to sickness allowance because of the incident when he was hit by a metal board on his back, which required medical attention. Furthermore, [Delfin] averred that he is entitled [to] sickness allowance because his inability to work and perform his usual occupation after he acquired the sickness while on board, lasted for more than 120 days. This is also the basis of his claim for permanent disability compensation. [Delfin] also claimed that attorney's fees should be paid for the expenses he incurred due to the filing of the suit and that moral damages may be paid as well for injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation.
[Respondents], on the other hand, averred that the medical condition of [Delfin] was not acquired or suffered during the term of his employment, that said medical condition is not work-related, and[,] therefore, the said illness is not compensable under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Furthermore, [respondents] asseverated that more than two years had elapsed from the time of the tennination of [Delfin's] employment in August 2001 up to the time the claim was filed in November 2003, and thus the illness was not acquired during the period of employment. [Respondents] also argued that the company[-]designated physician neither issued any certification as regards the medical condition of [Delfin] nor conducted a post[-] employment medical examination, after he was discharged from the vessel in August 2001.
On 6 May 2005, Pelfin] passed away, x x x7
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents, jointly and severally, to pay complainant DELFIN C. DELA CRUZ, SIXTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$60,000.00) representing total permanent disability compensation, sickness allowance of US$2,140.00 or its equivalent in local currency at the time of actual payment plus ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award by way of attorney's fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 23 January 2007 by the NLRC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14
A Petition filed under Rule 45 shall raise only questions of law. But when the findings of the labor tribunals and the CA are in conflict with each other, the Court may make its own examination of the evidence on record |
The 1996 POEA SEC concerning permanent disability claims and sickness allowance applies to this case. |
In view of the Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] issued by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated 11 September 2000 on the implementation of certain amendments of the Revised Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on board Ocean-Going Vessels as contained in DOLE Department Order No. 04 and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, both Series of 2000, please be advised of the following:
1. Section 20, Paragraphs (A), (B) and (D) of the former Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on board Ocean-Going Vessels, as provided in DOLE Department Order No. 33, and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, both Series of 1996 shall apply in lieu of Section 20 (A), (B) and (D) of the Revised Version; (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
xxxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS:
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel;
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
4. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event that the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employment caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. (Emphasis supplied)
The 3-day mandatory reporting requirement must be strictly observed since within 3 days from repatriation, it would be fairly manageable for the physician to identity whether the disease x xx was contracted during the term of his employment or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment.
x x x x
x x x Moreover, the post-employment medical examination within 3 days from x xx arrival is required in order to ascertain [the seafarer's] physical condition, since to ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits. It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness considering the passage of time. In such a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims.
We see no reason to disturb the lower tribunals' finding. While Serna's verified claim with respect to his July 14, 1999 visit to the petitioner's office may be seen by some as a bare allegation, we note that the petitioners' corresponding denial is itself also a bare allegation that, worse, is unsupported by other evidence on record. In contrast, the events that transpired after the July 14, 1999 visit, as extensively discussed by the CA above, effectively served to corroborate Serna's claim on the visit's purpose, i.e., to seek medical assistance. Under these circumstances, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it affirmed the labor arbiter ruling and gave credence to Serna on this point. Under the evidentiary rules, a positive assertion is generally entitled to more weight than a plain denial. (Emphasis supplied)
Patient is a diagnosed case of Malignant Peripheral Nerve Sheath Tumor. (2003 SLMC)[.] He also had several episodes of pathologic fractures: x x x
Sixteen hours prior to admission, while in bed, trying to change position, patient suddenly heard a cracking [sound], which was followed by shooting pain on the left thigh, intermittent, localized, aggravated by movement, with no alleviating factors, x x x (Emphases supplied)39
The record of the case will reveal that complainant is suffering from two (2) compensable sicknesses, one (1) affecting his abdomen and two (2) affecting his back down to his legs.41
The fact that respondent passed the company's PEME is of no moment. We have ruled that in the past the PEME is not exploratory in nature. It was not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant's medical condition. The PEME merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service," it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. In short, the "fit to work" declaration in the respondent's PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment. Thus we held in NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. v. NLRC:
While a PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform petitioners of a seafarer's true state of health. The PEME could not have divulged respondent's illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory. (Emphases supplied)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 29-57.
2 CA rollo, pp. 271-284; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Manuel M. Barrios.
3 Id. at 42-48; penned by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and concurred in by Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan.
4 Id. at 170-176; penned by Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes.
5 Id. at 309-310.
6 Id. at 288-301.
7 Id. at 272-275.
8 Id. at 170-176.
9 Id. at 175-176.
10 Id. at 42-48.
11 Id. at 54-56.
12 Id. at 2-29.
13 Id. at 271-284.
14 Id. at 283.
15 Id. at 288-301.
16 Id. at 309-310.
17Rollo, p. 222.
18Heirs of Antonio Feraren v. Court of Appeals (Former 12th Division), G.R. No. 159328, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 569, 574.
19Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 177116, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 87, 96.
20 CA rollo, p. 117-126.
21Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Delgado, 577 Phil. 459, 466-467 (2008); reiterated in Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Philippines) Inc., G.R. No. 185412, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 309 318-319.
22Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, G.R. No. 172086, December 3, 2012, 686 SCRA 676, 685.
This is in stark contrast to the 2000 POEA SEC which explicitly requires that the injury or illness ought to be work-related in order for a claim for disability benefits to be granted. Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC reads:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: x xx
23 Id. at 686.
24 Id. at 685.
25Manota v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 179607, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 61, 70.
26 Id. at 70-71.
27 Id. at 71.
28 Id.
29 See Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA SEC cited earlier
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Supra note 25 at 72-73.
Although Manota involves 1989 POEA SEC, said rationale is also applicable here as the 1996 revised version contains the same pertinent provisions as the 1989 POEA SEC.
33 See Jebsen's Maritime, Inc. v. Undag, G.R. No. 191491, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 670, 681-682, citing Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 184722, March 15, 2010 615 SCRA 529 543-544.
34 Supra note 22 at 689-690.
35 It is widely known that the most common cause of rib fractures or injuries is a direct blow to the chest (see http://www.emedicinehealth.com/fractured rib health/article em.htm, last accessed on April 14, 2015). However, although it is possible to suffer rib fractures as a result of a blow to the upper back (see http://www.physioadvisor.com.aU/10661750/rib-fracture-broken-rib-phvsioadvisor.htm:last accessed on April 14, 2015), it must be pointed out that petitioners were unable to expound on how the rib fracture came to be and connect it to the blow suffered by Delfin. For instance, petitioners could have shown that the blow was sustained at the upper back, not the lower portion thereof, and that it was strong enough to cause the fracture to Delfin's rib. This petitioners did not do.
36 As stated in Delfin's Position Paper, CA rollo, p. 72.
37 Both dated November 13,2003, id. at 92 and 93, respectively.
38 Id. at 150-153.
39 Id. at 150.
40 In an article entitled, "Evaluation of the Risk of Pathologic Fractures Secondary to Metastatic Bone Disease (see http://www.bonetumor.org/evaluation-pathologic-fracture-risk-due-tumor; last accessed on April 14, 2015)," it was discussed that:
Unlike fractures of normal bone, pathologic fractures occur during normal activity or minor trauma due to weakening of the bone by disease. Conditions associated with pathologic fractures include underlying metabolic disorders, primary benign tumors, and primary and metastatic malignant tumors. (Emphasis supplied.)
We note that Delfin's Death Certificate, CA rollo, p. 162, lists "bone cancer" as the immediate cause of his death; while "multiple organ failure [due] to Malignant Peripheral Nerve Sheath Tumor" and "Malignant Peripheral Nerve Sheath Tumor" were the antecedent and underlying causes, respectively, thereof.
41 CA rollo, p. 79.
42 Id. at 145-146.
43Nahas v. Olarte, G.R. No. 169247, June 2, 2014.
44 Supra note 21 at 321-322; citing Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division), G.R. No. 186180, March 22, 2010, 616 SCRA 362, 378-379.
45The President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. BTL Construction Corporation, G.R. Nos. 176439 and 176718, January 15,2014,713 SCRA 455,472-473.
46Philman Marine Agency, Inc. (now DOHLE-PHILMAN Manning Agency, Inc.) v. Cabanban, G.R. No. 186509, July 29, 2013, 702 SCRA 467, 494.