THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188839, June 22, 2015
CESAR NAGUIT, Petitioner, v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
The petition lacks merit.
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE MERITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE AFFORDED TO LABOR CASES;
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO LOOK INTO THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTS AND APPLICABLE LAWS OF THIS CASE;
- WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER FIAD BEEN UNLAWFULLY DISMISSED AND THUS IS ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AND FULL BACKWAGES AND OTHER BENEFITS AS WELL AS DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.13
In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., we had the occasion to settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case, we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metis Corporation v. Court of Appeals, is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court's sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that 'no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.' Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the court's sound discretion."In the instant case, petitioner asserts that, due to the unavailability of his former lawyer, he retained the services of a new counsel who has a heavy workload and that the records were forwarded to the latter only a week before the expiration of the period for filing of the petition with the CA.
Then in Labao v. Flores, we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.15cralawlawlibrary
x x x xAs to the substantive aspect of the case, petitioner, in the second and third issues raised, insists on questioning the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC. However, it is settled that in a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, only questions of law may be raised. Questions of fact may not be inquired into. While there are exceptions to this rule, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx Although technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves, they are necessary, however, for an effective and expeditious administration of justice. It is settled that a party who seeks to avail of certiorari must observe the rules thereon and non-observance of said rules may not be brushed aside as "mere technicality." While litigation is not a game of technicalities, and that the rules of procedure should not be enforced strictly at the cost of substantial justice, still it does not follow that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation, assessment and just resolution of the issues. Procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because they may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for compelling reasons.24cralawlawlibrary
(1) the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.25cralawlawlibrary
the Court finds that none exists in the instant case.
Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court, more so when they coincide with those of the LA.26
In any case, even if the case be decided on its merits, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the LA and the NLRC that petitioner was validly dismissed from his employment. As noted by both the LA and the NLRC, substantial evidence exists to show that petitioner committed acts which are tantamount to serious misconduct and willful disobedience of company rules and regulations. On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter noted that, other than his bare allegations, petitioner did not submit proof to support his allegations nor did he provide evidence to counter those which were submitted by respondent.
Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioner's argument that the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him is too harsh and is not commensurate to the infraction he has committed, considering that he has been in respondent's employ for fifteen years and that this is just his first offense of this nature.
The settled rule is that fighting within company premises is a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee.27 Moreover, the act of assaulting another employee is serious misconduct which justifies the termination of employment.28
Also, the Court agrees with respondent's contention that if petitioner's long years of service would be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.29 In addition, where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees, the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent.30 In the present case, all the more should petitioner's years of service be taken against him in light of the finding of the lower tribunals that his violation of an established company rule was shown to be willful and such willfulness was characterized by a wrongful attitude. Moreover, petitioner has never shown any feelings of remorse for what he has done, considering that the lower tribunals found no justification on his part in inflicting injury upon a co-employee. To make matters worse, petitioner even exhibited a seemingly arrogant attitude in insisting to remain silent and rejecting requests for him to explain his side despite having been given numerous opportunities to do so.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in denying petitioner's motion for extension of time to file his petition for certiorari.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated February 13, 2009 and July 15, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 107311, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Del Castillo,*Villarama, Jr., and Mendoza,**JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Raffle dated May 20, 2015.
** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Raffle dated June 22, 2015.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with the Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Isaias P. Dicdican, concurring.
2Rollo, pp. 30-32.
3 See Position Paper for the Complainant, id. at 52-56.
4Rollo, pp. 214-221.
5Id. at 223-230.
6Id. at 268-271.
7Id. at 272.
8Id. at 30-32.
9Id. at 281-284.
10Id. at 286-287.
11Id. at 288-294.
12Id. at 323-324.
13Id. at 11-12.
14 G.R. No. 191215, February 3, 2014, 715 SCRA 153.
15Id. at 163-166, citing the cases of Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., G.R. No. 192908, August 22, 2012, 678 SCRA 738, 747-750, Laguna Melts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 611 Phil. 530 (2009), Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, 627 Phil. 341 (2010), and Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723, 732. (Italics in the original)
16Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189191, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 342, 355.
17Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14, at 537.
18Spouses O and Cheng v. Spouses Javier and Dailisan, 609 Phil. 434, 443 (2009).
19Id.
20 See Napocor v. Spouses Laohoo, et al., 611 Phil. 194, 217-218 (2009).
21Id.
22Laguna Metts v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14, at 534.
23 452 Phil. 621 (2003).
24Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc., supra, at 631-632.
25Arriola v. Filipino Star Ngayon, Inc., G.R. No. 175689, August 13, 2014.
26Emeritus Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. v. Janrie C. Dailig, G.R. No. 204761, April 2, 2014; Oasay, Jr. v. Palacio del Govemador Condominium Corporation, G.R. No. 194306, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA68, 77; Bank of Lubao, Inc. v. Manabat, G.R. No. 188722, February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 772, 779.
27Malaya Shipping Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 351 Phil. 42 1, 429 (1998).
28 See Ha Yuan Restaurant v. NLRC, 516 Phil. 124, 128 (2006); Eastern Paper Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 252 Phil. 618, 619-620 (1989).
29Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 489 Phil. 483, 499 (2005).
30Aparente, Sr. v. NLRC, 387 Phil. 96, 107 (2000).