SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199660, July 13, 2015
U-BIX CORPORATION AND EDILBERTO B. BRAVO, Petitioners, v. VALERIE ANNE H. HOLLERO, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated August 9, 2011 and Resolution3 dated December 7, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 117199, which affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Resolution4 dated June 29, 2010 and Resolution5 dated September 27, 2010 denying the appeal of petitioners U-Bix Corporation and Edilberto B. Bravo (petitioners) from Labor Arbiter Enrique S. Flores, Jr.'s (Labor Arbiter Flores) Order6 dated April 16, 2010 approving the recomputation of the monetary award in favor of respondent Valerie Anne, H. Hollero (respondent) and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for reimbursement of training costs plus interest, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses, docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-05-03696-97. On the other hand, respondent filed against petitioners a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages, backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-08-05988-97. The two complaints were later on consolidated.
In a Decision7 dated February 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter found respondent's dismissal to be valid; she was also ordered to reimburse the amount spent by petitioners for her training, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. Finding respondent to have been illegally dismissed, it awarded her backwages from the date of her dismissal up to the date of the NLRC Decision and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to strained relations. Anent petitioners' complaint for reimbursement, the NLRC held that the same is one for collection of sum of money over which it has no jurisdiction. Hence, the dispositive portion of the NLRC Resolution dated July 12, 1999:9cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated February 8, 1999, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered as follows:Petitioners' Petition for Certiorari before the CA was dismissed through a Decision11 dated January 8, 2007. Since petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereto was likewise denied by the CA,12 they elevated the case before this Court.
A. Dismissing the complaint of the [petitioner] U-BFX CORPORATION, in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-03696-97 for lack of jurisdiction; and
B. Finding the dismissal of [respondent] Valerie Anne H. Hollero in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-05988-97 to be illegal thereby ordering [petitioners] U-BIX CORPORATION/Edilberto B. Bravo to pay the former the following:
1. Backwages P520,000.002. Separation Pay 60,000.00;and TOTAL P580,000.00
All other claims for damages are dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.10
Finding the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution to be well taken, the same is hereby GRANTED.Accordingly, Labor Arbiter Flores issued a Writ of Execution23 dated April 20, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the corresponding Writ of Execution be issued pursuant to the re-computed monetary award in the amount of P3,270,512.8[2].
SO ORDERED.22
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A perusal of the bond, however, revealed that the Certification of Accreditation and Authority of Jose Midas P. Marquez, Supreme Court Administrator, covers an authority to transact surety business in relation to CIVIL/SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES ONLY filed/pending before the Regional Trial Courts of Caloocan City, City of Manila, Las Piñas City, Makati City, Marikina City, Mandaluyong City, Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Pasay City, Pasig City and Quezon City x x x.26 Clearly, the authority does not include labor cases filed before the NLRC. Thus, as far as the NLRC is concerned, the [s]upersedeas bond posted by U-Bix Corporation has no force and effect.Anent the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and to Lift Order of Garnishment, it held as follows:
Assuming only that it is authorized, it failed to present proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond as required by Section 6(c) of Rule 6, NLRC Rules of Procedure. U-Bix failed to perfect its appeal. Therefore, the Order appealed from has attained finality.27
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As mentioned earlier, the Order approving the judgment award has become final and executory, thus, the issuance of the writ of execution is proper. There is nothing more left to be done except its execution.28Hence:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal, Omnibus Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and to Lift Order of Garnishment filed by U-Bix Corporation and Edilberto Bravo are DENIED for lack of merit.Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was dismissed in a Resolution30 dated September 27, 2010.
SO ORDERED.29
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition filed in this case is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions issued by the Third Division of the National Labor Relations Commission dated June 29, 2010 and September 27, 2010 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-03696-97 is hereby AFFIRMED.As petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration36 was likewise denied in a Resolution37 dated December 7, 2011, they are now before this Court through this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
SO ORDERED.35
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Issues
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE NLRC'S DECISION DISMISSING OUTRIGHT PETITIONERS' APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE ACCOMPANYING SUPERSEDEAS BOND WAS INVALID, CONSIDERING THAT:
- MAPFRE INSULAR INSURANCE CORPORATION IS A BONDING COMPANY ACCREDITED BY BOTH THE NLRC AND THE SUPREME COURT.
- PETITIONER BRAVO'S SIGNATURE IN THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES HIS PERSONAL GUARANTEE OF THE SUPERSEDEAS BOND.
- PETITIONERS' MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT SUCH THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES RAISED THEREIN WAS WARRANTED.38
Article 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. x x xIn case of a surety bond, the applicable Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC requires that the same should be accompanied by original and certified true copies of the following:
x x x x
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphasis supplied)
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a) | a joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel and the bonding company, attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until final disposition of the case; |
b) | an indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and bonding company; |
c) | proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond; provided, that a check shall not be considered as an acceptable security; |
d) | a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commission; |
e) | certificate of registration from the Securities Exchange Commission; |
f) | certificate of authority to transact surety business from the Office of the President; |
g) | certificate of accreditation and authority from the Supreme Court; and |
h) | notarized board resolution or secretary's certificate from the bonding company showing its authorized signatories and their specimen signatures. |
relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as bases of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.47It must be emphasized, however, that "the policy of liberal interpretation is qualified by the requirement that there must be exceptional circumstances to allow the relaxation of the rules. Absent exceptional circumstances, [the Court adheres] to the rule that certain procedural precepts must remain inviolable x x x."48 After all, an "appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it."49 The Court adheres to the strict interpretation of the rule in this case in the absence of exceptional circumstance or compelling reason to depart from the same.
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The computation of separation pay is based on the length of the employee's service; and the computation of backwages is based on the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.Clearly, therefore, respondent is entitled to backwages computed from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the date of the finality of the Court's October 31, 2008 Decision in the illegal dismissal case on March 12, 2009. The Court, thus, finds the subject recomputation of money award to be in order.
The basis of computation of backwages
The computation of backwages depends on the final awards adjudged as a consequence of illegal dismissal, in that:
First, when reinstatement is ordered, the general concept under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, computes the backwages from the time of dismissal until the employee's reinstatement. The computation of backwages (and similar benefits considered part of the backwages) can even continue beyond the decision of the labor arbiter or NLRC and ends only when the employee is actually reinstated.
Second, when separation pay is ordered in lieu of reinstatement (in the event that this aspect of the case is disputed) or reinstatement is waived by the employee (in the event that the payment of separation pay, in lieu, is not disputed), backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.
Third, when separation pay is ordered after the finality of the decision ordering the reinstatement by reason of a supervening event that makes the award of reinstatement no longer possible x x x backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.
The above computation of backwages, when separation pay is ordered, has been the Court's consistent ruling. In Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court Appeals Sixth Division, we explained that the finality of the decision becomes the reckoning point because in allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point.
We may also view the proper computation of backwages (whether based on reinstatement or an order of separation pay) in terms of the life of the employment relationship itself.
When reinstatement is ordered, the employment relationship continues. Once the illegally dismissed employee is reinstated, any compensation and benefits thereafter received stem from the employee's continued employment. In this instance, backwages are computed only up until the reinstatement of the employee since after the reinstatement, the employee begins to receive compensation from his resumed employment.
When there is an order of separation pay (in lieu of reinstatement or when the reinstatement aspect is waived or subsequently ordered in light of a supervening event making the award of reinstatement no longer possible), the employment relationship is terminated only upon the finality of the decision ordering the separation pay. The finality of the decision cuts-off the employment relationship and represents the final settlement of the rights and obligations of the parties against each other. Hence, backwages no longer accumulate upon the finality of the decision ordering the payment of separation pay since the employee is no longer entitled to any compensation from the employer by reason of the severance of his employment.51 (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied)
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Endnotes:
* Per Special Order No. 2088 dated July 1, 2015.
** Per Special Order No. 2087 (Revised) dated July 1, 2015.
*** Per Special Order No. 2079-A dated June 29, 2015.
1 Under Rule 45 of the RULES OF COURT.
2 CA rollo, pp. 415-428; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Agnes Reyes-Carpio.
3 Id. at 482-483.
4 Id. at 34-37; penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Alex A. Lopez and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III.
5 Id. at 39-40.
6 Id. at 111-117.
7 As culled from the NLRC Order dated July 12, 1999, id. at 42-63, 42, 43, since no copy of the Labor Arbiter's Decision is attached to the records.
8 Id. at 43.
9 Id. at 42-63; penned by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Ireneo B. Bernardo.
10 Id. at 62.
11 Id. at 65-73; penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin (now also a member of this Court).
12 As culled from this Court's Decision dated October 31, 2008, id. at 75-89, 80.
13 Id. at 75-89; penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales and concurred in by Acting Chief Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Associate Justices Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Arturo D. Brion.
14 As culled from Labor Arbiter Flores' Order dated April 16, 2010, id. at 111-117, 115.
15 Id. at 111.
16 Id. at 92.
17 Id. at 93-98.
18 Id. at 110.
19 Id. at 99-105.
20 Id. at 106-108.
21 Id. at 111-117.
22 Id. at 116.
23 Id. at 118-122.
24 Id. at 123-144.
25 Id. at 34-37.
26 Id. at 35.
27 Id. Emphasis in the original.
28 Id. at 36.
29 Id. Emphasis in the original.
30 Id. at 39-40.
31 Petition for Certiorari, id. at 3-28, 14-25.
32 Id. at 415-428.
33Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
x x x x
34 Section 6. Bond. - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court, and shall be accompanied by original or certified true copies of the following:
a) a joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel, and the bonding company, attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.
b) a copy of the indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and bonding company; and
c) a copy of security deposit or collateral securing the bond.
A certified true copy of the bond shall be furnished by the appellant to the appellee who shall verify the regularity and genuineness thereof and immediately report to the Commission any irregularity.
Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine, the Commission shall cause the immediate dismissal of the appeal.
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
35 CA rollo, p. 427.
36 Id. at 453-467.
37 Id. at 482-483.
38Rollo, p. 38.
39 Id. at 471-473.
40En Banc Resolution No. 03-13, Series of 2013.
41Accessories Specialist, Inc. v. Alabama, 581 Phil. 517, 530 (2008).
42Cordova v. Keysa's Boutique, 507 Phil. 147, 158 (2005).
43 Id. at 159.
44Adasa v. Abalos, 545 Phil. 168, 184 (2007).
45Aquino v. Aure, 569 Phil. 403, 419 (2008).
46Republic Cement Corporation v. Guinmapang, 613 Phil. 294, 300-301 (2009).
47 Id. at 301, citing Chronicle Securities Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 486 Phil. 560, 568 (2004).
48Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, Inc., 552 Phil. 226, 235 (2007).
49Accessories Specialist, Inc. v. Alabama, supra note 41.
50 G.R. No. 170904, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 330.
51 Id. at 350-352.cralawred