THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188464, July 29, 2015
ALBERTO J. RAZA, Petitioner, v. DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. AND MAMORU ONO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision1 dated December 22, 2008 and Resolution2 dated April 14, 2009 which upheld the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in its Resolutions dated May 31, 2006 and July 31, 2006 that petitioner was validly dismissed by respondents.
The facts of the case follow.
Petitioner Alberto J. Raza (Raza) was hired as a driver by respondent Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. (Daikoku) on January 11, 1999. Eventually, he was assigned to drive for the other respondent, the company president Mamoru Ono (Ono). Raza claims that his working days and hours depended on Ono's schedule and needs, so it was not unusual for him to be ordered to work from very early in the morning up to past midnight of any day, including Sundays.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the evening of July 21, 2003, Raza dropped Ono off at the latter's residence called the Pacific Plaza Condominium in Makati City. But Raza, instead of parking the company vehicle at the condominium building's parking area, drove the vehicle to his home and parked it there overnight. The next morning, as Raza was about to fetch Ono, the latter confronted him and asked why the vehicle was not at the condominium parking lot. Raza replied with a lie, telling Ono that he parked the car at the condominium building but in the wrong slot. Three (3) days later, on July 24, 2003, Raza was served a company Notice of Violation of the Code of Conduct for Dishonesty. On July 25, 2003, Raza submitted his written explanation wherein he admitted bringing the car to his home without permission and lying about it to Ono.4 He apologized for these infractions but he also indicated that he was previously told by Ono that he could use the car if he needed to.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The company's Investigation Committee conducted a hearing wherein Raza again admitted bringing the car home and lying about it to Ono, but Raza reiterated that there were previous occasions when Ono authorized him to bring the vehicle home.6 The Committee then recommended the suspension of Raza for twelve (12) days without pay for the offenses of parking the company vehicle at home without authority and for lying about it.7 However, disregarding such recommendation, the company's General Affairs Manager Gerardo Gaytano sent a letter dated August 7, 2003 terminating Raza's services for dishonesty.8 Respondents explain that the harsher punishment was imposed because at the meeting of the board of directors, Ono denied permitting Raza to use the company car and even presented a report from the Pacific Plaza Security Office stating that from May 1, 2003 to July 20, 2003, Raza did not park the company car at the said building for a total of thirty-one (31) instances, all without authority nor permission.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, Raza filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for damages and attorney's fees.
On January 15, 2005, Labor Arbiter Lita V. Alibut rendered a Decision10 in favor of Raza as complainant. In NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-9-18127-03-L, the said officer ruled as follows:
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WHEREFORE, finding the complainant's dismissal unlawful, respondents are hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and (are) further ordered solidarily to pay complainant backwages from the time of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement minus the salary corresponding to the suspension period of twelve days plus 10% of the total award for attorney's fees computed as follows:The Labor Arbiter found that the allegations of Raza's infractions, such as his repeated use of the company vehicle without permission, are unsubstantiated by evidence.12 She ruled that although the company alleges that there were thirty-one (31) prior incidents of Raza taking the company vehicle, allegedly reported by the condominium security guard, Raza was not confronted with the same in the notice of violation and neither was it presented during the deliberations by the investigating committee. And even if such report was admitted, the Labor Arbiter still sustained Raza's explanation that he was permitted to do so by Ono and that there were times when Raza would work until 1:30 in the morning and was told to report back to work at 7:00 in the morning of the same day, or with just a few hours of rest in between.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySO ORDERED.11
FULL BACKWAGES: A. Basic pay From 8/14/03 to 1/14/05 P 12,000 x 17.03 = P204,360.00B. 13th month pay P 204,360 ÷ 12 = 17,030.00C. Service Incentive Leave Pay P 12,000 ÷ 30 x 5 days x 17.03 ÷ 12 = 2,838.33 P224,228.33Less: P12,000 ÷ 30 x 12 days = 4,800.00TOTAL: P219,428.33Attorney's fee of P219,428.33 x 10% = P 21,942.83
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Complainant's Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.Raza filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution23 dated July 31, 2006.
The assailed Decision dated January 15, 2005 of the Labor Arbiter is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered declaring that complainant was validly dismissed from his employment. Nevertheless, for failure to reinstate complainant Alberto J. Raza pursuant to the Labor Arbiter's Decision, respondent DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. is hereby ordered to pay him his wages from 11 March 2005 up to the promulgation of this Resolution, provisionally computed as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySO ORDERED.22
Basis pay: (3/11/05 – 5/11/06) (P8,790.00 x 14 months) = P123,060.0013th month pay: (P123,060.00/12 mos.) = 10,255.55Service Incentive Leave Pay: (P8,790.00/30 x 5 days x 14 mos. / 12) = 1,709.17TOTAL = P135,024.72
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed rulings STAND.The CA rejected Raza's allegation that respondents' motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's August 31, 2005 Resolution was filed late with the NLRC, stating that Raza failed to substantiate such allegation with evidence.29 Then, it found that Raza's dishonesty, consisting of parking the vehicle at his home overnight and lying about it to Ono, is deserving of the sanction of dismissal.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.28
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The issues for this Court's resolution are procedural and substantive: whether the respondents' Motion for Consideration dated October 21, 2005 was submitted on time with the NLRC, and whether petitioner Alberto J. Raza committed infractions or violations of company rules that merit the penalty of dismissal from employment.I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED OCTOBER 21, 2005 SUBMITTED BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY FILED OUT OF TIME AND IN TRAVESTY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT ALLOWED THE IMPOSITION OF A GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE PENALTY ON THE ALLEGED INFRACTION COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
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ART. 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct.55 It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.56 For misconduct to justify dismissal under the law, (a) it must be serious, (b) must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; x x x.
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Section 2. Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of labor disputes.Further, under Section 10, Rule VII of both the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure and the 2011 NLRC Rules it is also identically stated that:
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Section 10. Technical rules not binding. – The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
In any proceeding before the Commission, the parties may be represented by legal counsel but it shall be the duty of the Chairman, any Presiding Commissioner or Commissioner to exercise complete control of the proceedings at all stages.
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And far more importantly, it is precisely at the stage of the filing of the position paper that the parties are required to submit “supporting documents and affidavits” to bolster their causes of action or defenses, as the case may be.72 Hence, it was just proper and the most opportune time that the said report was presented at that stage and at the level of the Labor Arbiter.
Then, too, it is with the Labor Arbiter that Raza had the chance to refute, contradict or deny the veracity of the report. He had every opportunity to present his own controverting evidence to impeach the credibility of such evidence. He did none of that, however. Instead, Raza admitted in his Reply that he indeed brought the car to his own house “for a number of times,” albeit allegedly with prior “knowledge, permission and tolerance” of his superior.73 Although he was unclear whether such “number of times” corresponds with the number of incidents reflected in the security guards' report, what is more important is his admission of the fact of bringing home the car more than a few times. He did not deny nor disprove that he committed such acts, even when he was given the chance to do so. In administrative proceedings, one may not claim having been denied due process when one has been given ample opportunity to be heard, for the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.74 It is evident in the case at bar that Raza was not barred from being heard nor that he had an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
Also, unlike the Labor Arbiter, the Court does not excuse Raza's acts by considering his allegedly long working hours or the fact that he was allegedly duty-bound to report for work very early in the morning and get dismissed late at night, including Sundays and holidays. Even if such working conditions were true, then it only makes Raza entitled to overtime, night differential and holiday pay, if ever such remain unpaid to him, a claim which he does not even make in his complaint. But certainly, such does not justify his acts of appropriating the use of company property for his own personal gain without prior permission. The fact that he is often tired right after driving Ono to the latter's residence every night and the fact that he is still required to report early the next day does not entitle him to the use of the company car as his own service vehicle, as such entails risks and expenses to the company that the latter has not consented to facing. The Court likewise fails to see how the personal use of the car could have greatly benefited Raza's work performance, since he himself claimed in his Position Paper that he did not live far, as he also resided in Makati City, which is the same city as his master Ono's residence.75ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Court has previously upheld as legal the dismissal of employees for using the employer's vehicle for their own private purposes without prior permission or authority. In Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao,76 the Court held that “a rule prohibiting employees from using company vehicles for private purposes without authority from management is a reasonable one.” Thus, an employee who used the company vehicle twice in pursuing his own personal interests, on company time and deviating from his authorized route, all without permission, was held to have been validly dismissed, for, as the Court held, to condone the employee's conduct will erode the discipline that an employer should uniformly apply so that it can expect compliance to the same rules and regulations by its other employees.77 In another case, Family Planning Organization of the Philippines v. NLRC,78 the Court also affirmed the dismissal of an employee who used the company vehicle twice without permission and for personal reasons, noting that employees must yield obedience to the rule against unauthorized use of company vehicles because this is proper and necessary for the conduct of the employer's business or concern.79ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While the Court remains invariably committed towards social justice and the protection of the working class from exploitation and unfair treatment, it, nevertheless, recognizes that management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.80 The aim is always to strike a balance between an avowed predilection for labor, on the one hand, and the maintenance of the legal rights of capital, on the other.81 Indeed, the Court should be ever mindful of the legal norm that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.82ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated December 22, 2008 and Resolution dated April 14, 2009 are AFFIRMED. The Labor Arbiter, unless barred by mootness or some other legal cause, is hereby ORDERED TO PROCEED WITH THE EXECUTION of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the NLRC WITH DISPATCH.83ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No costs.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No. 2112 dated July 16, 2015.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 57-64.
2Id. at 78.
3Rollo, p. 57; CA rollo, pp. 11, 125.
4Id. at 57-58; id. at 11-12, 123.
5Id.; id.
6 CA rollo, p. 144.
7Rollo, p. 58; id. at 12, 141-145.
8Id.; id. at 12, 148-149.
9Id. at 106; id. at 129.
10 CA rollo, pp. 23-29.
11Id. at 29.
12Id. at 28.
13Id. at 27-28.
14Id. at 61-63.
15Id. at 64-74.
16Id. at 75-78.
17 Penned by Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog, III, with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Tito F. Genilo concurring; id. at 86.
18 CA rollo, pp.85-96.
19Id. at 91.
20Id.
21Id. at 94-95.
22Id. at 95-96. The Court, in Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. v. Raza, 606 Phil. 796, 805 (2009), held that this Resolution dated May 31, 2006 of the NLRC is final and executory as to Daikoku.
23 Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Tito F. Genilo concurring; id. at 104-105;
24 CA rollo pp. 109-110.
25Id. at 111-113.
26Id. at 174-178.
27Id. at 257-264. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Mariano Del Castillo (now a member of the Supreme Court) and Romeo Barza concurring.
28Id. at 263.
29Id. at 260-262.
30Id. at 262-263.
31Id. at 281.
32Rollo, p. 19.
33Id. at 19-20; CA rollo, p. 80.
34Id.
35 Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Buklod Ng Manggagawa Sa Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation, 542 Phil. 618, 624-625 (2007).
36San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino Workers v. San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation, Inc., 474 Phil. 223, 237 (2004); Gerlach v. Reuters Limited, Phils., 489 Phil. 501, 512 (2005).
37 The exceptions are when: (1) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in petitioner's main and reply briefs, are not disputed by respondent; (10) the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [Merck Sharp and Dohme (Philippines) v. Robles, 620 Phil. 505, 512 (2009)].
38 Rules of Court, Rule 13, Sec. 3; Padre v. Badillo, 655 Phil. 52, 63 (2011); Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. NLRC, 366 Phil. 41, 48 (1999).
39 Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m); Eureka Personnel and Management Services, Inc., v. Valencia, 610 Phil. 444, 453-455 (2009); Sevilla v. Cardenas, 529 Phil. 419, 433-434 (2006);
40 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 44; Eureka Personnel and Management Services, Inc. v. Valencia, supra.
41 CA rollo, p. 80.
42Id. at 75-78.
43Id. at 81.
44Id.
45Eureka Personnel and Management Services, Inc. v. Valencia, supra note 39.
46 Respondents' Position Paper, CA rollo, pp. 131-135.
47 Complainant's Position Paper, id. at 119.
48Id. at 117.
49New City Builders Inc. v. NLRC, 409 Phil. 207, 211 (2005).
50Eastern Overseas Employment Center, Inc. v. Bea, 512 Phil. 749, 754 (2005).
51Peckson v. Robinsons Supermarket Corporation, 700 SCRA 668, 685 (2013).
52R & E Transport Inc. v. Latag, 467 Phil. 355, 360 (2004).
53Concrete Solutions, Inc./Primary Structures v. Cabusas, G.R. No. 177812, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 44, 54.
54Vicente v. Court of Appeals, 557 Phil. 777, 785 (2007).
55Ha Yuan Restaurant v. NLRC, 516 Phil. 124, 128 (2006).
56Id.
57Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin v. Keihin Philippines Corporation, 641 Phil. 300, 310 (2010).
58 CA rollo, pp. 131-135; 146-147.
59Id. at 148.
60Id. at 116-120, 140.
61San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 574 Phil. 556, 570 (2008).
62Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc., G.R. No. 163431, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 56, 69.
63Fulache, et al. v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp., 624 Phil. 562, 583 (2010).
64Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin v. Keihin Philippines Corporation, supra note 57.
65Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa, 232 Phil. 201, 206 (1987).
66Id.
67National Service Corporation v. Leogardo, Jr., et al., 215 Phil. 450, 457 (1984); St. Luke's Hospital, Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 201 Phil. 706, 724 (1982).
68National Service Corporation v. Leogardo, supra.
69 CA rollo, p. 144.
70Id. at 148.
71Id. at 150-151.
72 2005 REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE NLRC, Rule V, Sec. 7; see also 2011 NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule V, Sec. 11.
73 CA rollo, p. 155.
74ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Nazareno, 534 Phil. 306, 326-327 (2006) .
75Rollo, p. 117.
76 232 Phil. 488, 495 (1987).
77Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, supra.
78 G.R. No. 75907, March 23, 1992, 207 SCRA 415.
79Family Planning Organization of the Philippines v. NLRC, supra, at 421.
80Alcosero v. NLRC, 351 Phil. 368, 373 (1998).
81Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 330 Phil. 979, 985 (1996).
82 Vigilla v. Philippine College Of Criminology Inc., G.R. No. 200094, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 247, 270-271.
83 See note 22.cralawred